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ABSTRACT 
The Islamic law prohibits charging and paying of interest but allows 
earning profits on the basis of participation in the market. This legal injunction 
has motivated the establishment and successful operation of a number of 
Islamic financial institutions. The emergence and rise of these institutions is 
an important academic and practical development of our time. The theory of 
Islamic finance evolved on the basis of profit and loss sharing (PLS) principle 
underlying participatory Islamic financial contracts. However, the practice of 
Islamic finance does not conform to the theory and overwhelmingly relies on 
the mark-up principle which underlies deferred trade. The PLS is in striking 
contrast to the interest mechanism, but the mark-up is not. 
The present research inquires the causes underlying the negligence of 
the mark-up mechanism at the time when the theory was developing. Looking 
at the preferences of users and suppliers of funds, the causes of the 
overwhelming use of mark-up in the practices of Islamic finance are also 
analyzed. Pakistan has remained at the forefront of financial Islamization. The 
research also draws on this practical experience with a view to explore how 
the market rewards risk. The study also analyzes the prospects of financial 
Islamization in a real world scenario in which most Muslim countries rely 
substantially on foreign financial resources. 
Thq central conclusion of the study is that the mark-up and PLS 
mechanisms have their own merits and weaknesses. The merit of the mark- 
up is that it facilitates the acquisition of assets. The merit of the PLS is that it 
links financiers' interests with the outcome of projects. The study 
concentrates on the analysis of the inherent characteristics of the PLS and 
mark-up as parent principles of Islamic finance rather than the institutional 
environment in which these are practiced. It implies that given the market 
environment, the strength of Islamic finance lies in the integration of the 
prime merits of mark-up and PLS and in developing a comprehensive set of 
Islamic financial instruments. 
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1ABACKGROUND 
The Islamic law prohibits charging and paying of interestl but allows 
earning profits on the basis of participation in the market. This legal injunction 
has motivated the establishment and successful operation of a number of 
Islamic financial institutions. These institutions include Islamic banks, and 
non-banking Islamic financial intermediaries, namely, Islamic insurance 
companies, Islamic investment funds, mudharabah and ijara (leasing) 
companieS2. In addition, a secondary market for Islamic financial instruments 
and an inter-bank Islamic money market are also emerging. 
The evolution of a complete interest-free Islamic financial system is 
thus, not far from reality. At the present, the international financial community 
seams ready to consider any viable alternative financing arrangement. Given 
this readiness, the emergence of the Islamic financial system can be 
considered as a significant development. The real strength of the Islamic 
alternative however, shall rest on its own inherent characteristics as well as 
lAbolition of riba- is the fundamental issue in the contemporary discussions on Islamic 
financing. In the contemporary context the term riba includes interest (riba of debts) and 
trading in the forward currency markets (riba of sales). However, in the common usage, riba is 
a synonym of interest. Throughout this research therefore, we use the terms riba and interest 
interchangeably. 
2There are different estimates of the size of funds managed by the Islamic financial 
institutions at the present. The most systematic source of information about Islamic banks is 
the International Association of Islamic Banks (IAIB). IAlB (1994) reports that there are 166 
registered members, about 100 of these provide information. The reporting institutions have a 
combined strength of US dollars 2.5 billion paid-up capital; these institutions are managing US 
dollars 42 billion in deposits and 54 billion in assets. Another estimate by the FT puts the 
deposits between US dollars 50-80 billion (FT: 28-11-1995). The WSJ (9-4-1996) estimates 
the size of funds managed by the Islamic financial institutions at US dollars 30 billion. It can 
therefore, safely be estimated that at the present the Islamic financial institutions are 
managing at least US dollars 35-40 billion, which is expected to increase in the future. See, 
also Ahmad (1996). 
the clarity and ease with which it can be distinguished from the conventional 
interest-based financial system. 
The Islamic financial system has started evolving only during the early 
seventies. However, Muslim thinking in this regard has a long history. For 
example, opposition of the shariah scholars to institutionalized (bank) interest 
is traced back to 1903. This year, in Egypt, the payment of interest on Post 
Office Savings Funds was declared unlawful by Shaikh Mohammed AbdU3. 
In fact, an Islamic critique of interest-based banking had started earlier. 
A branch of the Barclays Bank was established in Cairo during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Through this branch, the bank financed 
construction of the Suez Canal. Ever since the establishment of this first 
interest-based bank in the Muslim world, Shaikh Abdu had initiated a critique 
of its operationS4. 
Similarly, the seminal work of Siddiqi (1976) on contemporary Muslim 
economic thinking tracks the critique of the institution of interest by a Muslim 
economist to 1946 when an important book was published on Islam and the 
theory of interest5. 
Interests in Islamic banking and finance are not only limited to the 
Muslim countries. Since the early eighties, European as well as American 
academic circles have taken keen interest in the subject. So far, a large 
number of Ph. D., thesis have been written on the subject in many Western 
universities. Prominent Western scholars and institutions are actively 
contributing books and articles in the area6. Western financial institutions are 
increasingly offering Islamic investment opportunities to their clientS7. 
3 See, Homoud (1974). 
, 41 came to know about this fact while discussing the historical data reported in ibid with the 
author and followed it with other Egyptian scholars as well. 
5Anwar 1qbal Qurishi, Islam and the Theory of Interest, Lahore: Shaikh Mohammad Ashraf, 
1946. 
6See, in particular Wilson (1990), Presley (1988). 
7See Ahmad (1996). 
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1.2 THE ISSUE 
Research studies to find an Islamic alternative to interest-based 
banking were initiated by the late forties and intensified during the fifties, 
sixties, and early seventieS8. Muslim economists in particular took the task 
very thoughtfullf As a result, largely between 1955 and 1974-75, the theory 
of Islamic banking developed. In 1955 the first formal model of an Islamic 
bank was presented'O. During 1974-75, two Islamic banks, namely, the Dubai 
Islamic Bank, UAE, and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Jeddah, 
respectively, initiated their operations for the first timell, 12. 
As a matter of consensus among majority of writers on the subject 
during the 1955-75 period, an Islamic bank must primarily be based on the 
principle of p rofit/risk-s ha ring. Profit sharing is the common basis of the two 
popular Islamic financial contracts: mudharabah and musharakah (MM). 
Therefore, the banking model emerging from the MM contracts is often 
termed as profit and loss sharing - PLS banking (for convenience, in the 
present research, until otherwise specifically mentioned, we also use the 
acronym - PLS, interchangeably, for the MM contracts on one hand and for 
risk-sharing on the other). 
8See, Siddiqi (ibid). 
917or the review of these efforts, see Siddiqi (1 983b) and Kahf and Khan (1992). 
1OMohammad Uzair, An Outline of an Interest-less Banking, Karachi: Raihan Publications 1955 
11Two unique experiences are worth mentioning here. First, during the 1963-67 period, an attempt 
towards establishing an Islamic financial institution was made in Mit-Ghamr, rural area of Egypt. This 
operationally unsuccessful, but conceptually a precursor Islamic banking experience was an attempt to 
combine the concepts of German savings banks, rural banking and the Islamic participatory modes of 
financing (for details see, e. g., Khan 1983). Second, during 1962-69, the Pilgrims' Management and 
Fund Board (Tabung Hajji - TH) evolved in Malaysia. The TH is not only a viable Islamic financial 
institution, but is also a dynamic concept. As a concept, the TH suggests that the performance of HaB 
and Umrah involves substantial cost (I estimated that, about two hundred thousand people performed 
Hah and Umrah from one country during 1994. For the year, the cost of Hajj per an individual was about 
US dollars 1400, hence the total expenditure on HaB and Umrah incurred by the citizens of the country 
during 1994 was US dollars 280 million). Every Muslim aspires to perform Hajj and Umrah. 
Performance of these religious duties are therefore an important motive for saving. Since, Hajj and 
Umrah are spiritual acts, people would refrain to keep their savings made for this purpose in interest- 
based banks. Thus, institutions like the TH are needed in the Muslim countries to mobilize these 
savings. These savings can then be invested in accordance with Islamic principles. Working on this 
philosophy, the TH is the only Islamic financial institution which has won the prestigious IDB Prize for 
Islamic Banking (for more details, see, IRTI 1987). 
12 Some writers also consider the Nasser Social Bank Egypt established in 1972 as an Islamic bank. 
This is a public sector institution which largely functions as a non-profit organization. 
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Nevertheless, since the actual emergence of the Islamic financial 
institutions in the market during the early seventies, the proportion of the PLS 
in their total operations has remained negligible. Scholars, who had 
envisioned a significant role for the PLS are naturally discontented with this 
situation13. Through the IDB operations, the mark-up first appeared in Islamic 
banking in 1976. Ever since its first appearance, the mark-up is the most 
predominant form of financing among the emerging Islamic financial 
institutions. Although permissible in the contemporary Islamic lawl4,15, in terms 
of non-risk sharing characteristics, the mark-up principle doesn't differ much 
from the conventional interest-based banking system. Instead of interest- 
based money lending, under the mark-up principle, the creation of finance 
takes the form of deferred trading. 
Hence, compared to the mark-up, in terms of risk-sharing, the PLS 
presents a striking contrast to the traditional interest-based banking. It may 
also be noted that most Muslim countries are plagued by chronic public 
budget deficit and skyrocketing public debts. Credit markets and financial 
systems are inefficient, domestic and foreign risk capital are shy in most of 
these countries. In this environment in particular, an overwhelming majority of 
Islamic economists consider that compared to the mark-up, the PLS can offer 
an efficient and stable alternative to the existing interest-based financial 
13 This discontentment is being shown in various forum. Islamic economists are more 
pronounced in this regard. Shariah scholars who have legitimized the mark-up are also 
showing their growing displeasure at the disproportionate reliance of the Islamic financial 
institutions on the mark-up. During discussions in the 1415H IRTI Ramadhan Fiqh Lectures, 
some shadah scholars even suggested that the Islamic banks' reliance on the mark-up is far 
more than the reliance of the conventional banks on interest. Islamic economists and shariah 
scholars agree that this is unhealthy trend for the future of Islamic banking (see, also, IRTI- 
OICFA, 1993). 
141t needs to be noted that the Report on the Elimination of Riba from the Economy (of 
Pakistan) had recommended very limited and exceptional use of mark-up, otherwise, it was 
warned that it will open a back door to interest (see, the report in Ahmad, et. al eds., 1983). 
The, Shariah Court Pakistan Judgment on Riba 1991, is an important source of the 
contemporary Islamic law. Despite, wide scale consensus among Islamic jurists on the 
permissibility of the mark-up principle, the judgment condemns the mark-up as practiced in 
Pakistan. 
151t must be noted that a minority of Islamic scholars also maintains the view that a whole-sale 
acceptance of the mark-up will open a back door to interest. 
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markets in these countries. Consequently, among the Islamic economists the 
preference for the PLS is much stronger compared to the mark-up. 
The PLS and mark-up are in fact two parent principles of Islamic 
financing16. Ironically, the theory of Islamic finance entirely relies on the PLS, 
while the practice is dominated by the mark-up! Thus, a dichotomy between 
the theory and practice of Islamic financing can be observed. An analysis of 
the causes and effects of this dichotomy is important for understanding the 
basis of Islamic financing, the future of Islamic financial institutions and the 
contribution which these institutions may make to individual Muslim 
economies as well as to the global economic scene. 
The research works and ideological rhetoric related to the theory and 
practice of Islamic financing can be classified into a number of groups. First, a 
large amount of the existing literature reflects on the hesitation of Islamic 
financial institutions to offer PLS funds due to many institutional reasons. 
Second, a small but influential literature also tries to show that the users of 
funds are not much interested in the PLS either. The existing literature 
however, does not compare the characteristics of the mark-up and the PLS, 
in simultaneously meeting the preferences of users of funds and banks. Third, 
ideologically, in a closed economy context, the PLS is strongly favored. 
Paradoxical as it is, in an open economy context, the same sentiments 
disfavor foreign control of national resources which the PLS will seemingly 
bring with it. It is noticeable that most Muslim countries cannot meaningfully 
Islamize their domestic financial systems without at the same time dealing 
16Service-fee is in fact a third Islamic mechanism which underlies loan financing. The OIC 
Fiqh Academy (Resolution No. 1 Session No. 3, held in Amman Jordan during October 11-16, 
1986) allows charging service-fee on loans which should be exactly equal to the cost of 
administering the loan (Service-fee = loan amount X implementation period X annual rate). 
Annual rate is an average of the past five years actual administrative expense on such loans 
which should not however exceed 2.5 %. In case, service-fee is estimated and charged and is 
found more than the actual expense on ex post basis, the excess amount is refunded. In case 
of default, the principal loan amount or service fee does not change. However, the most 
prominent contemporary Islamic jurist Shaikh Mustafa al Zarqa has reportedly called for an 
imposition of a financial penalty by the lender if the borrower is found to be actually solvent but 
defaults in payment. See, Hussain Kamel Fahmi (forthcoming) 'Problems of Compensating 
Islamic Banks for Delay of Payment of Financial Debts and Solutions", Jeddah: IRTI. 
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with the rest of the world using Islamic modes of finance. Compared to the 
previous two aspects of the theory and practice, this important paradoxical 
phenomena is least talked about, letting alone any serious research. Finally, 
but importantly, if the PLS has to establish an edge over the mark-up, in 
practice, it must reward risk. In the literature, this matter has so far not been 
investigated empirically. 
Related to the dichotomy of the theory and practice of Islamic 
financing, many specific questions can also be posed. Why didn't, the Muslim 
economists incorporate the mark-up in their initial theoretical models of 
Islamic banking? Why didn't, the Islamic banks adopt the PLS which is 
strikingly different from interest-based system and simultaneously, is 
considered to be more efficient and stable than the interest-based banking? 
Will the domination of the PLS by the mark-up continue or will the Islamic 
banks develop and keep balanced proportion between the mark-up and PLS? 
How can the PLS take care for the preferences of user of funds (firms) for 
different types of finance? What are the requirements for those firms which 
opt for Islamic financing to fair well in the globalizing markets as compared to 
their competitors? What are the prospects of mark-up vis-ti-vis PLS in 
mobilizing external resources so urgently needed by the Muslim countries? 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The literature on Islamic financing is vast. The question that why 
should mark-up and not PLS and vice-versa be adopted, has also been 
discussed either by the proponents of the PLS or the mark-up17- However, to 
gauge the causes of the dichotomy in theory and practice of Islamic financing, 
a comparative and objective analysis of the inherent characteristics of the 
two, vis-6-vis the perspective of user of funds and the banks has never been 
17See for example, Homoud (1974) and Ismail (1989) in support of mark-up, Council of 
Islamic Ideology (1981), Siddiqi (1988) and Khan (1992) in support of the PLS. 
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undertaken. Such an analysis is essential for understanding the causes of the 
phenomenon, its evaluation and suggesting appropriate strategies for the 
formulation of policies. 
In the present research, we aim to seek answers to most of the 
questions raised above. Compared to the nature and importance of the issue, 
neither the list of questions can be considered complete, nor an exhaustive 
treatment of all the questions raised is possible. Therefore, to limit the scope 
of the study, and to make it manageable in the given resource-time frame, 
specific objectives of the research need to be identified. These are to: 
1. Trace the causes of the double edged phenomenon: the missed 
mark-up in the initial models of Islamic banking and the subdued 
PLS and overwhelming mark-up in the operations of Islamic 
financial institutions, 
2. Discuss the evolution of the mark-up vis-6-vis the PLS in a short 
and longer-term perspective and the implication of this for the future 
shape of Islamic financing, 
3. Study the preferences of suppliers (banks) and users (firms) for 
PLS and mark-up funds with a view to understand the phenomenon 
I 
of subdued nature of PLS in the operations of Islamic banks, 
4. Study the financial market performance of the PLS in a mixed 
environment where interest-based instruments also exist, 
5. Examine the inherent characteristics of the PLS in retrospect 
focusing on firm level considerations, 
6. Examine the mark-up and PLS mechanisms in retrospect focusing 
on an open economy scenario, in particular, formally present the 
seemingly paradoxical phenomena related to the prospects of using 
the PLS in external resource mobilization and 
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7. Suggest possible reform in the PLS for enhancing risk sharing in 
Islamic financing. 
1.4 RATIONALE 
Islamic financing is an important area of contemporary academic and 
policy interest. Opposing views in the area are analyzed in the light of 
empirical evidence. The implication of answers to questions cited above and 
similar others for the future shape of Islamic financing is immense. As these 
questions directly deal with the issue of preferences of users and suppliers of 
funds with a view to resolve their conflicts and enhance risk capital, we also 
expect that the study has a general relevance. The study is of general 
theoretical importance as well as of particular practical significance for policy 
makers who intend to conform their exis ting financial systems to Islamic rules. 
1.5 METHODOLOGY 
Two important considerations have determined our approach in this 
research. One of these is general in nature and is related to the state of the 
existing theory and practices of Islamic financing. The other consideration is 
related to the specific aspects of the study. 
General Considerations 
A number of general considerations effect the environment in which 
this research has to be conducted. First, recently the expansion of Islamic 
financing practices has out-paced the theoretical developments in the area. 
Due to this phenomenon it is natural to confront difficulties in choosing a 
suitable theoretical framework for evaluating various aspects of the practices. 
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Second, the existing theoretical works mostly relate to Islamic banking. 
Compared to financing, banking has a narrower connotation. The extension of 
the theoretical framework of Islamic banking to cover the broader area of 
Islamic financing is again subject to certain limitations. 
Finally, the present age is the age of international interdependence 
and globalization of financial markets. Economies and firms can neither be 
expected to remain competitive nor can Islamize effectively by adopting 
financial policies in isolation from the rest of the world economy. Firms which 
opt for Islamic financing cannot remain competitive and acquire value by 
ignoring the availability of finance to their conventional competitors. This 
requires understanding the challenges and opportunities for opting for Islamic 
financing in a market where the competitors have access to a wide range of 
flexible financial alternatives. 
Specific Considerations 
The above and related considerations were not pertinent even five 
years ago. We understand that these need to be integrated in attempts to 
study the theoretical and practical realities of the Islamic financial system. 
These broader considerations are therefore, incorporated in the approach of 
the present study. 
As for specific considerations are concerned, four separate but inter- 
related aspect§ of the present study are clearly identifiable. The study of each 
of these aspects requires a suitable methodology. 
A. We are trying to understand the dichotomy between the PLS- 
based theory and mark-up based practices of Islamic financing. A 
comparative study of the evolution and economics of PLS and mark-up is 
therefore inevitable. This requires an analytical and critical review of the 
relevant literature in order to gauge why the mark-up was not incorporated in 
the PLS theory of Islamic banking. At the same time it is also necessary to 
critically follow the evolution of the theory of mark-up. In this regard, it is 
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necessary to note that we are dealing with both the PLS and mark-up as two 
parent mechanisms rather than as modes of financing. 
B. We want to know why the mark-up is overwhelming in the 
operations of Islamic banks. In this regard ours is not the first attempt. 
However, we approach the subject differently. 
In the outset it should be mentioned that compared to the PLS, mark- 
up is certainly more consistent with the traditions and conventions of 
conventional commercial banking. The orientation of the bank staff, the 
language, terminology, technology and culture of banking, the premises of 
competition, similarity of bank products, services, laws and regulations, all put 
the mark-up at comparatively advantageous situation compared to the PLS. 
Unless, these parameters are changed in favor of the PLS, mark-up will 
dominate the operations of the Islamic banks. 
As these conditions are related to the banking environment, efforts are 
required by the Islamic banks to change the conditions for an extended use of 
the PLS. Thus, the existing research by the Islamic economists on the subject 
assigns relatively, a greater responsibility to the Islamic banks. This approach 
implicitly implies that the banks are in a position to dictate forms of financial 
(PLS) contracts to their clients. Consequently, the preferences of the users of 
funds for the PLS and mark-up are not discussed in detail simultaneously. 
There i§ no doubt that as suppliers of funds, the banks must be playing 
important role in influencing the choice of their clients for particular forms of 
funds. Nevertheless, it is also true that in a competitive environment the 
banks cannot always dictate funding conditions against the preferences and 
desires of their clients. Therefore, along with the supply side considerations, 
the perspective of the users of funds must also be studied in order to improve 
our objective understanding of the observed phenomenon. Given the 
considerations of the banks and their clients, the task, then is to critically 
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compare the inherent characteristics of the PLS and mark-up contracts, in 
simultaneously meeting these considerations. 
The lack of emphasis on the demand side considerations by the 
Islamic economists is not without reasons. In the PLS modes of Islamic 
banking developed by Siddiqi (1967,1983 and 1983b, subsequently used by 
other researchers as a synonym for Islamic financing), the Islamic economy 
was visualized to be a debt free economy. Elimination of interest-based debt 
was taken to leave the companies (user of funds) with only one option - 100% 
PLS. Moreover, during the last three decades the famous Miller-Modigliani 
(MM) proposition (that under perfect competition, considerations for the cost 
of finance is irrelevant in choosing between debt or equity) almost dominated 
the field of finance. Given the indifference of the firms between debt and 
equity as implied by the proposition from the cost side, and their clear 
preference for equity for Islamic reason s, the non-existence of the PLS in the 
flow of funds can justifiably be seen as a reflection on the banks' attitude. 
Nevertheless, the innovation of mark-up as an Islamic form of debt 
financing has however, restored the users' choice for debt18 and equity. In 
addition, the M-M proposition has been weakened substantially due to its very 
restrictive assumptions which have been proved unrealistic both theoretically 
as well as empirically. It implies that users' preferences cannot be ignored 
while explaining the reasons for the overwhelming use of the mark-up as a 
form of debt finance. 
Moreover, the existing works do not consider the most important 
source of financing the growth of a firm i. e., its retained profits. The reason for 
this is also understandable - the PLS particularly, pure mudharabah does not 
allow retention and re-investment of profits in the enterprise. 
In addition to the supply side factors, in the present research, we also 
discuss the preferences of firms for the mark-up as well as profit retention. 
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These considerations allow a comparison of the inherent characteristics of the 
PLS and mark-up vis-A-vis the preferences of the banks and users of funds. 
This approach is expected to help the development of such PLS contracts 
which can simultaneously be consistent with the preferences of both users 
and suppliers of funds. In our understanding, this is a crucial requirement for 
the promotion of the PLS principle in some form. 
C. We intend to study the actual performance of the pure PLS. It 
may be noted that theoretically, the case for the PLS has been strongly 
presented. But, there is no empirical evidence of its actual performance. In 
this regard two scenarios can be presented. In the first scenario we need to 
show that in practice, the Islamic banking is dominated by the mark-up. This 
is easily done by extracting information from the Islamic banking practices. 
The second scenario is related to the practical performance of the 
pure PLS in a mixed environment. As the Islamic banks do not do PLS, this 
cannot be done based on their experience. Fortunately, we have a practical 
experience of the Modaraba Companies of Pakistan with the pure PLS, in the 
form of the mudharabah certificates. The analysis of the practices and 
performance of these companies provides a useful case study and covers the 
third aspect of the present study. 
No specific Islamic theoretical framework is available to analyze the 
performance of the Islamic companies. Therefore, we have the flexibility to 
select a suitable one from the conventional methodologies. After a thoughtful 
comparison between the competing methodologies we select the capital 
assets pricing model (CAPM). Some Islamic economic considerations for 
selecting this model, the simple model used and the nature of data on which 
the model is applied has been explained in the relevant chapter. It is sufficient 
to mention here that the central concern of the CAPM is valuation of assets 
181t need to be noted that the matter of debt financing by issuance of bonds and other debt instruments 
is not yet settled. 
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under conditions of risk. For this reason, as compared to its counter-parts, the 
CAPM is directly relevant for the evaluation of the pure form of the PLS. 
D. The fourth distinct aspect of the present research is the fact that 
we deal with a number of issues which are not discussed in the existing 
literature on the subject. In Islamic economics, the researcher is required to 
work within a premises which must be consistent with the shariah. During the 
research whenever, there was a need, we referred back to the shari'ah 
sources. Some of the prominent contemporary scholars in the area were also 
accessible. These scholars were frequently consulted, both in writing as well 
as verbally. After consultation, we have synthesized each relevant issue in 
the light of the shari'ah opinion as well as our own framework. In case no 
shari'ah solution was found, we either dropped the issue or approached it 
from a different angle. This approach was highly rewarding as we found that 
most problems of the contemporary financial markets can be meaningfully 
discussed without violating the general shari'ah framework. Therefore, this 
work has the merit to explore the flexibility of discussing a number of issues of 
contemporary financial markets within the framework of Islamic economic 
principles. 
E. It must also be clarified that this research is not a case study of 
Pakistan. Rather, it relates to the evolution of the central theme of Islamic 
financing. The case of Pakistan has been introduced only to derive some 
lessons from 
* 
the practice of Islamic financing. The Pakistani case is 
representative for a number of reasons. First, the nation has made conscious 
efforts to introduce an Islamic financial system. Second, it is an open and 
liberalizing economy. Third, for economic reasons, recently it has targeted at 
reducing the interest cost of debt for the economy. Finally, above all, data is 
available for meaningful analysis. 
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1.6 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
The work has been organized thematically. Chapters two and three, 
respectively, deal with the theory of PLS and mark-up, both in terms of 
evolution and economics. Chapters four and five deal with the analysis of the 
practice of PLS. Chapter four specifically deals with our interpretations of the 
reasons for the lack of use of the PLS by the Islamic banks. In chapter five we 
formally evaluate the market performance of the pure PLS. The theme of 
chapters six and seven is a retrospective look at the PLS as well as its 
prospects. In chapter six we put forward firm-level (micro-economic) 
considerations. In chapter seven we discuss the relative significance of mark- 
up and the PLS in an open economy context. Chapter eight provides an 
analytical recapitulation of the central idea emerging from the discussion of 
the previous chapters. Conclusions of different chapters are put together in 
chapter nine in summary form. 
14 
CHAPTER 2 
ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THEORY: 
EVOLUTION AND ECONOMICS OF PROFIT SHARING 
Chapter 2 
ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THEORY: 
EVOLUTION AND ECONOMICS OF PROFIT SHARING 
"... Mark-up system, as in vogue, is held to be repugnant to the injunctions of 
Islam and the word 'mark-up' be deleted from the provisions of sections 79 
and 80 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 ... the best modes of Islamic (financial) system as alternate to the present system, are Mudharabah 
and Musharakah... " Emphasis added. 
Federal Shadah Court of Pakistan, Judgment on Interest (Riba) See, IRTI: 
1995, p. 177. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one we set the background and basic issue to be discussed 
in the present research. We explained that PLS and mark-up are the two 
parent principles of Islamic financing b ut the theory relies on the PLS and the 
practice on the mark-up. 
The objective of the present chapter is to explore the emergence of 
PLS as a theoretical model of Islamic banking, discuss the reasons for the 
non-existence of mark-up in the theoretical model of Islamic financing, 
analyze the economics of PLS financing and discuss the challenges 
confronted by the PLS in its practical application. The description of the 
various Islamic financial contracts, the meaning of riba (interest) etc., are well 
documented in the existing literature (See, e. g., Siddiqi 1985, Chapra 1986, 
Abod et. al., 1992, Homoud 1986, FSC 1995 and CII 1981 etc. ). Therefore, in 
this or subsequent chapters we do not aim to formally describe any of these 
concepts. 
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2.2 EVOLUTION OF THE PROFIT SHARING MODELl 
Economic rationalization of the prohibition of interest and evolution of 
an efficient interest-free alternative have dominated contemporary Islamic 
economic thinking. During the last two decades some Muslim countries have 
also put financial Islamization in the agenda of their respective economic 
policies. With a view to highlight the evolution and significance of the PLS, in 
this section we examine major academic and policy oriented works. 
2.1.1 The Economic Interpretation of the difference Between Interest 
(riba) and Trade (bai) 
The basic guideline for Islamic financing is contained in the verse: 
Those who devour usury (interest) will not stand except as stands one who 
the evil one by his touch has driven to madness. That is because they say, 
"Trade is like usury (interest)", but God has permitted trade and forbidden 
usury (interest)" (The Holly Qur'an, 11: 275, Translation by Yousuf Ali). The first 
step in designing an alternative to interest is to compare it with trading and 
highlight the differences. 
The conceptual differentiation between interest and trading is 
undertaken in the framework of economics on one hand and Islamic law on 
the other. For the purpose of comparing PLS with mark-up, we hypothesize 
that the PLS is the result of an economic comparison of interest and trading 
and the mark-up is the outcome of a legal comparison. We discuss mark-up 
in its turn in. chapter three. Here we elaborate on the premises of the 
economic comparison of interest and trading and its consequences for the 
development of PLS. 
The economic critique of the institution of interest offered by the 
Muslim scholars is based on their challenge to the rationality of interest as 
fixed rate of return on financial capital. In this regard, Qurishi (1946) and 
lThis section has been adapted from Kahf and Khan (1992). 
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Maududi (1961, this work was partly published as early as 1950) have led the 
debate by acting as precursors. 
In differentiating trade from interest, referring to al Qaffal (circa 417H), 
Qurishi says: "One, who sells clothes worth Rs. 10 for Rs. 20 does so 
believing that the clothes are equivalent to that sum. When mutual agreement 
has been arrived at, the exchanges value become equal, with the result that 
the parties to the transactions all benefit. But if a person were to acquire Rs. 
20 for Rs. 10, the additional Rs. 10 does not represent any real benefit. It will 
not be then admissible for him to say that he obtained the additional sum in 
exchange for time, in as much as "time" is neither a commodity of exchange 
nor any such thing which could be pointed out as an exchangeable wealth". 
(1946, p. 50). 
From the above comparison between interest and trading, we can 
easily infer that in the interest-based transactions, time becomes the object of 
sale and interest plays the role of price. As quoted from the Holly Qur'an, 
certain people are so irrational that they confuse this with trading. 
In our discussion of the mark-up we will see that some causes of price 
differential, e. g. between Rs. 10 and Rs. 20 have far reaching consequences 
for the Islamic financial system. But Qurishi does not discuss this subject. We 
understand that if the causes and consequences of the price differential were 
elaborated upon, the mark-up would have entered the initial models of the 
PILS. 
Maududi looks into the difference between trade and interest in context 
of equitable distribution and efficient management of risk. In interest-based 
transactions, risk is transferred to the borrower so that all interest-bearing 
assets become risk free. From the Islamic economic stand point, this is 
socially inequitable and economically inefficient. Whereas, trade conforms to 
the natural phenomenon of uncertainty; it is not only equitable but efficient 
too. This is the main difference between the two concepts, which according to 
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Maududi provides the economic rationale for the prohibition of interest and 
permission of trading. 
In the framework of an economic rationale for its prohibition, interest is 
a contractual increment received by a lender from a borrower over and above 
the principal20. This implies that interest essentially, though not exclusively, 
applies to money lending2l; money lending being the predominant source of 
debt/liability creation. Therefore, the presence of an advance contract on the 
financial return to capital is considered the distinctive and unique 
characteristic of interest as compared to trading. Maududi strongly challenges 
the rationale of charging interest and says: "Which rational principle, which 
logic, which cannon of justice and which sound economic principle can justify 
that those who spend their time, energy, capacity and resources, and whose 
efforts and skills make a business thrive, are not guaranteed a profit at any 
fixed rate, whereas those who merely lend out their funds are fully secured 
against all risk of loss and are guaranteed a profit at a fixed rate? " (Maududi 
1987, p. 214). 
It can be seen that the premises provided by the two works referred to 
above share one common ground. Both compare the characteristics of 
interest and trading rather than the literal and customary connotation of the 
two concepts as these prevailed at the time of the prohibition of interest. This 
approach has two important implications. 
First, as far as the difference between saleltrade and interest-based 
transactions is concerned, the first category of transactions is subject to the 
natural conditions of uncertainty and risk in relation to time and the second is 
not. Capital involved in trade may grow or decline through time, whereas, in 
interest-based transactions, capital automatically increases over time. 
20We will notice in chapter three that this is the case in framework of the legal rationale of the 
prohibition too. 
21Riba, may also be practiced in all quantifiable commodities which are characterized by 
similarity in exchange such as quality-standardized been, cotton, grain, etc. 
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Mudharabah was mainly used for trade financing22 as compared to interest 
for money lending, the underlying principle of mudharabah namely, profit- 
sharing emerges as the only alternative to interest. 
Second, in the interpretation of verse 11: 281, although Maududi 
indirectly refers to credit sale, he does not formally discuss the sources of 
"deferred obligations (debts), '23 appearing in the same verse, except for loans 
(qard). Thus the difference between debt created by money lending and debt 
created by deferred trading was not discussed. Hence the financing potential 
of deferred trading as compared to interest was not analyzed. 
2.2.2 The Altemative to Interest 
Following Maududi and Qurishi, charging any guaranteed return on 
financing was considered illogical, irrational and unjust by both Uzair (955) 
and Siddiqi (1967 and subsequent works) who actually have developed the 
PLS model of Islamic banking. In comparison with fixed and certain nature of 
interest-based transactions, the Islamic alternative should naturally be based 
on a principle whereby the rate of return on financial capital should vary in 
accordance with the variations in the return of the whole enterprise24 (See, 
e. g., Maududi and Qurishi op. cit., Uzair 1954, Siddiqi 1983a, 1983b, Chapra 
1985 and others). Since interest is prohibited for being a fixed rate of return 
on capital, it is only logical for the Islamic alternative to base on a variable 
rate of return or PLS, In our categorization, the PLS covers both mudharabah 
and musharakah. It is however, useful to identify some minor differences 
between the two. For a brief time we call mudharabah as pure profit sharing 
(PPS). 
22The most important example being the pre-revelation mudharabah between Mohammad 
and Lady Khadija. 
231n chapter two we discuss that the use of deferred trading as financial mechanism by the 
Islamic financial institutions is derived from this concept. 
24AIthough new form of Riba-based lending apply in contemporary economics, e. g., variable 
rate of interest, variation in the rate of return is not the only Islamic characteristic of the PLS. 
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Under the PPS, profits are shared between the owner of capital and 
the entrepreneur on pro rata basis, whereas, under normal circumstances 
losses are written on capital. The first indication of the PPS in the economics 
literature was provided by Qurishi op. cit in his notion of partnership. But his 
concept is unclear, as he suggests capital will be provided by one party and 
work by another and profits or losses will be shared by the two parties. The 
ambiguity lies in the fact that as far as provision of capital and division of work 
are concerned, his partnership follows the mudharabah principle, while 
regarding liabilities, it is closer to the musharakah. Moreover, Qurishi does not 
formally discuss the problem of financial intermediation. 
Uzair (1955) emphasized and focused the PPS by quoting the 
following from Quduri (circa 428H): "mudharabah is a contract based on the 
combination of capital from one of the two parties and it means participation 
in profit. This is feasible with capital fro m one of the two parties and work from 
the other party. There is no mudharabah except with this condition. If, 
however, the whole of profit would go to the owner of capital, it (the 
mudharabah) becomes simple investment; and if it is agreed that the worker 
enjoys the whole of it (the profit), the contract is a qard". (Uzair 1978 p 117). 
Emphasis added. 
The above quotation introduces mudharabah in contemporary 
economic literature for the first time and draws lines between the principles of 
direct investment, loan (qard) and mudharabah25. Uzair also presented a 
sketch of an Islamic financial intermediation system based on the PPS which 
he called the "two-fold mudharabah". The first "fold" refers to bank-depositors 
relationship and the second bank-users of funds relationship. 
Other Islamic characteristics of the PLS include non guaranteed principal and a money income 
and sharing form of contract instead of lending form. 
25 In direct investment the capital owner simply takes all decisions or employs a manager. If direct 
investment takes the form of musharakah decision making becomes collective. Capital owners claim all 
profits and bear all losses. In qard the lender doesn't share the profit and claims back his principal 
without any return. While in mudharabah, the owner of funds shares the profits with the working partner 
but he alone bears all risks of loss. 
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An elaborate theoretical foundation of the PLS and detailed framework 
of financial intermediation based on it along with a formal model of financing 
were however, presented by Siddiqi (1967,1983). Siddiqi in fact formalized 
and extended the works of Qurishi, Maududi and in particular, that of Uzair. 
This formal and extended work also contains two distinctive contributing 
elements of its own. 
Firstly, the axiom of two-fold mudharabah becomes the fundamental 
principle of an economy-wise credit system. It entitles an entrepreneur who 
has obtained financial resources on the basis of a profit sharing contract to 
lend part or whole of these funds to another party on the basis of another 
profit sharing contract. The question whether a mudharabah profit can be 
attributed solely to the specific function of generating a second mudharabah, 
i. e. whether a financial intermediation system based on the two-fold 
mudharabah is permissible has been raised by Siddiqi himself. He relies on 
the works of Qurishi, Maududi and Uzair in support of the idea: "it is not clear 
if the practice of two-tier-mudharabah reflected in these juristic discussions 
had evolved into pure financial intermediation, where one who obtained profit 
- sharing funds conducts the sole business of supplying these funds to other 
(working) parties on the basis of profit-sharing. What is important for us in this 
chapter is, however, the fact that the permissibility of doing so was made the 
basis of a new model of banking by a large number of Muslim economists and 
jurists writing between 1945 and 1975" (reference to Siddiqi 1981, Siddiqi 
1988, p. 35). 
Secondly, Siddiqi formalized the principle of mixing up personal money 
of the mudharib (financial institution) with the mudharabah funds. Moreover, 
in his formal model, Siddiqi envisions to establish the Islamic bank with 
musharakah capital and suggests to mobilize deposits and manage them on 
the basis of mudharabah. Thus, the mudharabah and musharakah are 
formally brought together for the first time giving rise to a complete PLS 
model of Islamic banking. 
I 
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In the case of musharakah, profits are distributed on pro rata basis and 
liability of loss becomes proportionate to capital contribution. The principle 
was first mentioned by Qurishi but formally discussed by Ahmad (1947). 
According to Ahmad, Islamic financing may take one of two forms: Shares 
may be floated by ordinary joint stock companies in accordance with' the 
musharakah principle, or banking institutions may mobilize resources on the 
basis of the mudharabah principle. 
Among other Muslim economists, Chapra (1985) assigns an important 
role to the musharakah principle. He however, does not present any model of 
a typical financial intermediation system as Siddiqi or Uzair did. Moreover, his 
emphasis is on institutional arrangements which characterize the Islamic 
financing institutions more as investment institutions rather than typical 
financial intermediaries. Ahmad (ibid. ) and several other scholars are in line 
with this approach. The natural outcome of such arrangements is expected to 
provide a much more fertile ground for musharakah. On the other hand due to 
its nature, the two-tier-mudharabah was found suitable as a basis of the 
intermediation system. 
Chapra's above mentioned contribution makes a potent point regarding 
the evolution of Islamic business organizations. Although the Islamic 
economy will hav6ýsole proprietors, mudharabah and musharakah enterprises 
and joint stock corporations, Chapra suggests that we shall also expect to 
have hybrid fo. rms of business organizations. Taking some digression from 
our study of the PLS theory, it is easy to see that the suggestions of Siddiqi, 
Chapra and others regarding the development of Islamic financial institutions 
have come true practically. 
Most operational Islamic business organizations are neither pure 
mudharabas nor pure musharakas. For instance, share-holders own the 
Islamic banks on the principle of musharakah, yet, depositors own it on the 
principle of mudharabah; promoters of the Pakistani Modaraba companies 
own these companies on the basis of musharakah and mudharabah 
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certificate holders own the companies on the basis of mudharabah, the 
Islamic Development Bank is a mudharib in the Unit Investment Fund and 
Islamic Banks' Portfolio, yet, the bank has its capital contribution in both 
schemes. The existence of mixed forms of enterprises has become a rule not 
an exception for the emerging Islamic economy. This phenomenon has an 
important implication for the theory of Islamic finance. It implies that provided 
the prohibition of riba, gharar, etc., are complied with, no new form of an 
enterprise need to rigidly follow the specific rules of any traditional Islamic 
contractual arrangements. 
Thus, the PLS theory has evolved distinct from the pure mudharabah 
on a number of counts: a) The classical mudharabah is based on a one to 
one relationship between the owner of capital and the entrepreneur, whereas 
in the PLS, numerous capital owners (depositors : investors) face one 
entrepreneur, financial institution, b) In the classical mudharabah mixing of 
personal capital of the mudharib with the mudharabah capital is an exception, 
while in the PLS, this became the fundamental rule as the Islamic financial 
institution will use its own share capital together with the investors' money, c) 
Using mudharabah money for making another mudharabah contract is an 
exception in the classical form, but, in the PLS, this also became a 
predominant rule and d) In the PLS, investors freely enter and exit the 
investment pool of financial institution, whereas, in the traditional mudharabah 
this is not possible.. 
The departure from the traditional contracts to the PLS has an 
immense implication for the Islamic financial system as evidenced empirically 
by the establishment, resource mobilization and allocation practices of Islamic 
banks, Islamic investment funds and mudharabah and ijara companies. 
It can be seen that the PLS does not allow room for debt financing in 
the Islamic economy. Rather the Islamic economy becomes as a synonym for 
an all PLS and a debt free economy (see e. g., Khan 1983a, Khan 1983b and 
Nadiri 1984). Consequently, all debts in the economy would be caused by 
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benevolent lending which is made on humanitarian and social grounds. This 
characterizes such debts as "non-economic", although the debt itself may 
play an important financial role, particularly, in alleviating the need of 
consumers for creditl. 
1.2.3 Support for Profit Sharing in Retrospect 
It is hard to suggest any conclusive reason for why the otherwise 
exhaustive work of Maududi overlooked the potential of deferred trading in 
comparison with interest as a financing mechanism. In retrospect, however, it 
may be suggested that he might have gauged the flaw of proposing deferred 
trading as a core mechanism of Islamic financing. 
For two decades, the debate on financial Islamization has remained 
lively in Pakistan. First, an important document in this regard was prepared by 
the Council of Islamic Ideology Pakistan, CII (1981) on the elimination of 
interest from the economy. This report is an exhaustive document jointly 
prepared by economists, bankers and shariah scholars to eliminate interest 
from a contemporary economy. In preparing this report the Council had the 
1 Before the advent of Islamic banking practices, most of the scholarly writings on the subject 
seem to agree with the fundamental role of the PLS. The only exception may be that of al 
Sadr, who prefers the principles of ju'ala and ijara as bases of financial intermediation. 
According to al Sadr, banking services could be rendered on the basis of the ju'ala principle - 
contract between the client and the bank for specific service against specific fees. Earlier 
durishi had also suggested a similar arrangement whereby a central finance house, in 
addition to administering zakah, may offer banking services on the basis of service charge 
e. g., like the provision of health, education and other social services. The idea also got support 
from Muslihuddin whose understanding of mudharabah made him apprehensive about its 
capability as a financing principle. al Sadr also downplayed the role of the PLS in managing 
the bank's assets and gave preference to the principle of ijara (see, Siddiqi 1976). 
In the framework of the literature so far reviewed consumers credit can only be financed by 
qard i. e., benevolent loan (see, particularly Siddiqi 1983 pp 155-61). In an Islamic society 
consumers' cooperatives are expected to enhance the provision of this service. In this regard, 
an important observation is the complimentarity of the operations of the two institutions of 
Islamic banks and qard funds or cooperatives (see, Ahmad 1947). These institutions promote 
each other. Therefore, their simultaneous existence becomes important. The cooperatives can 
keep their cash balances with the Islamic banks and can earn profits. The banks always 
maintain a certain part of current accounts in cash form. This can be used as a base for the 
generation of qard. 
Irshad (1963) suggested that the Islamic bank shall promote sale on credit for consumption 
purposes. This will increase demand and the resultant increase in sale could be an incentive 
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advantage of benefiting from sources of shari'ah, views of Islamic economists 
and experience of Islamic banks which had already been operating for some 
time when the report was prepared. Although, in preparing the report the 
Council aims at providing a blue-print for transforming the banking system in 
Pakistan yet its general validity is widely acknowledged. 
The report provides a comprehensive package of interest-free 
financing. The authors of the report had several considerations in addition to 
the primary objective of elimination of interest. These included bank safety, 
inter-sector resource allocation, suitability of the proposed modes for different 
users, etc. The report classified the Islamic instruments of financing into PLS, 
sale and services based modes. 
The central recommendation of the report was to rely utmost on the 
PLS and the least on the mark-up as the later can open a back door for 
interest. Commenting even on this recommendation, Siddiqi writes, I would 
prefer, baP mua: Ual (deferred trading) is removed from the list of permissible 
methods altogether .... in order to save interest-free banking from being 
sabotaged from within" (Ahmad et. al., 1983 p. 227). 
The weaknesses of the deferred trading mechanism are a source of 
strength for the PLS theory. Pakistan started introducing Islamic modes of 
financing in 1981. After a decade long experience, in 1992, the Federal 
Shatiat Court made a judgment on the elimination of interest from the 
economy. Thfj court has re-produced substantial material as an evidence 
supporting the judgment. One out of several interesting quotations from a 
leading shariah consultant for Islamic financial institutions, namely Justice 
Taqi Usmani is re-produced here. "... An important condition of "Bay'rnua: Ual 
(deferred trading)" is that the price of the goods for sale and the period of 
repayment should precisely be determined at the time of the contract. In the 
C ase of default on the part of the buyer any legal action may be taken against 
for earning profit. It should be noted that this point is dealt with latter in detail particularly by Homoud 
but with an entirely new perspective. 
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him but there is no justification for enhancing the price on account of prolonging 
the period of repayment which comes in purview of interest. The scheme not 
only ignores this , but also, in some cases, clearly violates this rule. For 
example, it is laid down that mark-up rate on import bills for the first 20 days 
would be 0.78 percent and, if not settled during the period, the rate will be 
enhanced by 0.58 percent for a further period of fourteen days. If it is still 
unpaid, the rate will further be enhanced by 0.62 percent. And if not yet paid 
(within this total of forty eight days), the rate of enhancement would be a 
further 0.79 percent for every fifteen days. The above condition is nothing else 
than the procedure of charging interest. The only difference is that this is now 
termed as mark-up. " (FSC, 1995, p. 172). As predicted by Siddiqi, in case of 
Pakistan, mark-up merely opened a back door for interest. 
Thus, the court reached the conclusion that "... Mark-up system, as in 
vogue, is held to be repugnant to the injunctions of Islam and the word 'mark- 
up' be deleted from the provisions of sections 79 and 80 of Negotiable 
Instruments Act, 1881 ... the best modes of Islamic (financial) system as 
alternate to the present system, are Mudharabah and Musharakah... " 
(ibid. p. 177, emphasis added). 
2.3 ECONOMCIS OF PROFIT SHARING 
As the PLS mechanism is proposed to replace the interest mechanism 
(one of the fundamental institutions of the market economy), theoretically, the 
PLS is a significant proposal. For this reason, it attracted several Ph. D., 
dissertations and rigorous model building from a number of researchers. 
These models can be classified thematically such as, contractual models, 
portfolio models, macro-economic models, models of investment theory and 
macro-monetary models etc. We refer to these works during the course of our 
research, but is not possible to review all these contributions thoroughly. 
However, in the following we discuss selected monetary models of the PLS in 
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somewhat detail as these models are central to all the other models and refer 
to other model in relevant places of different chapters. 
2.3.1 Monetary Models Of Profit Sharing 
The PLS replaces the profit sharing (p/s) ratio which is a real variable 
for the interest rate which is a monetary variable. In this manner, the p/s ratio 
renders the functions of a crucial monetary variable. For this reason, we 
consider the PLS is an important monetary model. In the present section, we 
review and discuss the evolution of the basic monetary model of the PLS and 
the development of its various variants. 
A. The Fundamental Model of Financial Intermediation 
The basic PLS model and its fundamental variables were first formally 
defined and their inter-relationship discussed by Siddiqi (1983). The model 
also provides a framework analyzing the effects of monetary policy changes 
and its transmission mechanism. Most other models of the PLS are 
refinements and extensions of this basic model. Therefore, a more detailed 
review of Siddiqi's model of PLS financing is in order. 
Definition and Determination of Basic Variables 
In our understanding, the most important contribution of the model in 
question is the definition of a number of fundamental variables. For this 
reason, we start the discussion of this model by the definition of the basic 
variables of the model. 
The Rate of Profit 
For defining profits, the concept of capital growth underlying the 
mudharabah contract is followed. In the traditional mudharabah, capital 
growth (profit) is known as the difference between the monetary values of all 
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tangible inputs (including hired labor and liability financed assets27) of a 
specific economic activity and the monetary value of all tangible outputs of the 
activity. The opportunity cost of the entrepreneur's services is reflected in his 
positive share in profits if any. In case of loss, the loss of the entrepreneur is 
fully reflected in the opportunity cost of his services. For the owner of funds, a 
profit is capital appreciation, and a loss capital depreciation. 
Siddiqi emphasizes that the concept of profit underlying mudharabah is 
an accounting concept; it includes the reward for capital, some kinds of rent 
as defined by the economists (rent also covers hired labor) besides the 
reward of enterprise and does not include interest. Profit is thus seen as a 
result of the divergence of monetary values of all tangible inputs and tangible 
outputs. The conventional dichotomy between pure profits and interest as 
productivity of entrepreneur-ship and financial capital, respectively is rejected. 
It is interesting to note that the case of determination of profits is not 
taken up. The model, assumes the existence of a positive capital growth 
(profits) and takes the task of its sharing between different parties. Therefore, 
this initial monetary model as well as its subsequent extensions do not 
incorporate the possibility of loss. Indeed, the probability of occurrence of loss 
is accepted. In the models under discussion, the possibility of a positive 
capital growth is taken as a simplifying assumption. In particular, Siddiqi 
justifies this on the basis of the fact that the banks as core managers of funds 
will almost ensure this. 
The existence of a positive rate of profit is not crucial for the model 
either. Instead, the acceptance of a pro rata p/s ratio by parties is crucial. The 
p/s ratio is based on the expectation of entrepreneurs about future profits (p). 
So entrepreneurial expectations provides the most crucial framework for the 
model. This expectation is shared by primary financiers (savers who deposit 
in banks) and secondary financiers (banks as intermediaries). 
27These two elements are not included in the initial model and have been added by us. The 
concepts are discussed in more detail in chapter three. 
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Bankers' Ratio of Profit Sharing 
Banks are secondary financiers. Their resources (liabilities, but not 
fixed in the present models) include, their own share capital, PLS deposits 
and part of demand deposits. These are managed by investing in a variety of 
ways, chief among them being supply of mudharabah funds to businessSb in 
Fig. 2(a) panel (B). The banks are entitled to an agreed percentage share in 
the profits accruing to these funds in the business enterprise in which they are 
invested. This percentage is called the Banker's Ratio of Profit-Sharing, 
(BRP). The liability of loss in this case is also limited. Banks are involved in a 
double burgain. Given p, banks burgain with entrepreneurs on behalf of their 
depositors as well as share-holders. Claim by banks for higher BRP will 
discourage and lower BRP will encourage investment demand by 
entrepreneurs De in Fig. 2(a) panel (B). Conversely, entrepreneurs can get 
more funding by offering higher BRP. Other things given, the supply of 
mudharabah funds can be treated as a direct function of BRP. Given p, the 
equilibrium level of BRP is determined by the supply of and demand for 
mudharabah funds. 
Depositor's Ratio of Profit Sharing 
As Siddiqi's model of PLS is based on the concept of "two-tier- 
mudharabah", in the model, the depositor is a primary financier and the bank 
a secondary financier. In the model, a deposit is a mudharabah contract 
between the depositor as supplier of depositsSd in Fig. 2(a)'in panel (C), and 
the bank as a -manager. Thus deposits of the bank comprise of hundreds of 
thousands of mudharabah contacts. The liability of depositors to bank losses 
is limited to the extent of their deposits. If expected rate of profits accruing to 
banks from entrepreneurs, are given as p, the percentage of bank profits 
given to the depositors is described as the depositor's ratio of profit-sharing 
(DRP). The DRP is the ratio in which depositors share the profits accruing 
to deposits as they are employed profitably by the banks. In the model it is 
determined after the determination of BRP. Given p and BRP, the supply of 
mudharabah deposits is treated as a direct function of DRP; the 
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higher this ratio the more the depositors stand to gain and the more the 
supply of PLS deposits. Depositors know that given BRIP, their claim for DRIP 
is a constraint on the bank's demand for their funds Db in Fig. 2(a) panel (C), - 
claim for higher DRIP will weaken and lower DRP will support the demand for 
their deposits by banks. The equilibrium level of DRIP is thus determined by 
the supply of and demand for mudharabah deposits, given p and BRP. 
Determination of Equilibrium Profit Sharing Ratio 
We develop a modified and integrated version of Siddiqi's monetary 
model of the PLS in Fig. 2(a). The basic purpose of this variant of the model 
is the determination of the equilibrium p/s ratio for the economy. Given banks' 
perception of entrepreneurial profits and their own intermediation cost, in 
panel (A) the banks negotiate (on behalf of depositors) a cost sharing formula 
with entrepreneurs. If oo" is the total intermediation cost, ol, 62, and o"3 
replicated as pl, P2 and P3 are three of the many cost sharing possibilities. The 
ol possibility shows that all costs will be shifted to the depositors. Conversely, 
the o"3 possibility shows that all costs are shifted away from depositors to 
entrepreneurs. Banks as prudent institutions know that to clear the market for 
funds the intermediation cost has to be shared equally by the depositors and 
users of funds. This is given by the 62 cost sharing possibility line. In this 
case, the oo' amount of intermediation cost will be shared by depositors and 
0109 
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amount by the entrepreneurs. Whatever the intermediation cost may be, 
to clear the market for funds, it must be shared in equal proportion by 
depositors and entrepreneurs. As a result, the BRP is set at point a in panel B 
given the demand curve by entrepreneurs for PLS funds D. and Sb Supply 
curve of banks of the same funds. Banks do not retain any funds, there are 
no excess reserve requirements either; therefore, deposits and advances of 
funds must match. The equilibrium DRP is determined in panel (C) at point b 
given the demand of banks for deposits Db and the supply of deposits Sd, 
With these equilibrium levels of DRP and BRP, in panel D, the optimal level of 
p/s ratio for the economy is set at point p*. 
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Fig. 2(a): Determination of Profit Sharing Ratio under PLS 
The monetary models of PLS formally discuss the relative stability of 
the macro-monetary system under the new regime. Siddiqi's model provides a 
formal and necessary input in this regard. However, following Siddiqi, several 
other researchers have developed models to show the relative stability of the 
PLS-based monetary system. To start with, the stability of the system can be 
gauged by introducing changes in the most fundamental variable of the model 
- the expected profits, p. The determination of DRP and BRP, and demand 
and supply of funds at both level is based on the assumption that there is a 
given expected rate of profits, p the information about which is equally 
available to the entrepreneurs, bank and depositors. What will happen if the 
expected profit, p changes? Or, if the availability of information changes. The 
monetary models do not formally consider the significance of unequal access 
to information; the consequences of this will be discussed under the 
contracting models. The effects of a change in expected profits are discussed 
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here. 
An increase in expected profits will expand the entrepreneurs' 
investment demand. This will raise the expectations of banks and depositors 
about profits proportionately. The primary supply of funds (deposits) will 
expand, banks will also welcome this. Thus, according to the demand and 
supply conditions of PLS funds discussed above, an increase in expectations 
about profits will cause expansion at all levels. Since all parties have equal 
information about expected profits, given BRP and DRP, the expansion will 
be proportionate at all levels. A decrease in expected profits and given BRP 
and DRP, there will be proportionate contraction at all levels. Siddiqi 
considers various possibilities of equilibrium with expansion and contraction 
caused by an increase and decrease in p, respectively. Moreover, different 
possibilities of changes in the BRP are also discussed. As far relative 
changes in DRP and BRP are concerned, the conclusion is that "Supply of 
savings into the banks' investment accounts is likely to be sluggish in its 
response to changes in p, as compared to the response of the bankers' 
demand for deposits to changes in p, because the latter are better informed 
and keeper to take advantage of the expected changes. Should this be true, 
changes in p will cause DRP to change in the direction in which p changes. 
A rise in p will cause DRP to rise and a fall in p will cause DRP to fall. This 
will not affect our conclusion relating to BRP, which will also change in the 
direction in which p changes. " 
As p* is a ratio of DRP and BRP, and as BRP is determined first, as a 
contractual phenomenon settled between the owner and user of funds, it is 
the most important monetary variable in the PLS regime. There are some 
objections on the use of this contractual phenomenon by the central monetary 
authorities as an instrumental variable. But, in the monetary models of PLS, 
the BRP can be used as a core instrument of monetary policy. By 
manipulating the BRP, credit and resource allocation can be effectively 
regulated in the economy. 
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B. A Model Of Monetary Transmission 
Mirakhor and Zaidi (1992) extend the monetary model of the PLS, to 
an open Islamic economy. Since this extension is based on Tobin (1969) and 
Tobin and Brainard (1968), some preliminary remarks on the relevant aspects 
of these works for the PLS-based economy would be useful. The famous 
Tobin's "q" (the ratio of the market value of firms to the replacement cost of 
their physical capital) theory explains the phenomenon that changes in 
monetary policy effects the economy through changes in the valuation of 
equities. The relevance of the "q" theory for the Islamic economy is found to 
be in the fact that the "q" ratio like the p/s ratio is the principal link between 
the'financial and real sectors of the economy. 
A monetary policy which causes a relatively higher increase in the 
market value of firms in relation to an increase in the replacement cost of 
equipment, makes new equipment and plants cheaper. This will motivate new 
equity issues by companies for buying new plants and equipment. The effect 
of such a monetary policy would be expansionary. On the other hand, if 
monetary policy reduces the "q" ratio by increasing replacement cost or by 
decreasing market value of equity, companies will have no incentive for 
expansion and the effect of monetary policy will be contractionary. 
A decrease in money supply will lead to lesser purchase of equity by 
the -public causing a -decrease in "q". In addition, interest rates will increase as 
a result of a decrease in money supply and the public will substitute equity 
holdings with bonds, again leading to a decrease in the value of equity and 
investment expenditures. Households, firms and financial institutions will 
adjust their portfolios of different assets accordingly (the assets in these 
portfolios are assumed to be substitutes in gross terms). The changes in 
monetary policy will thus effect aggregate expenditure and real income in the 
economy through an effect on the value of equity. 
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In the original PLS model of Siddiqi the central monetary authority will 
regulate the p/s ratio. Thus in PLS-based economy, compared to the interest- 
based regime, authorities will loose control of monetary policy as the p/s ratio 
is 'a looser instrumental variable compared to interest. Mirakhor and Zaidi 
contend that, according to the general equilibrium approach to monetary 
theory, the good news is that "a principal way in which monetary policy affects 
aggregate demand is by changing the valuation of physical assets relative to 
their replacement costs, and that monetary policy can accomplish such 
changes even in the presence of uncontrolled financial intermediaries. (ibid p. 
401). 
Some of the main equations but all notations and assumptions of the 
model are reproduced here. There are three assumptions. First, there are four 
assets: bank equity, bank loans, physical capital, and currency. In the model, 
the set of excess demand equations for these assets determines the rates on 
the assets, given the values of the various exogenous variables; demand for 
assets being a fu nction of their respective rate of return. Since assets are 
gross substitute for each other, change in the rate of return of one asset will 
bring along change in the composition of the portfolio but only partially. This 
implies that the partial derivative of the asset demand function with respect to 
its own rate is positive, while with respect to an alternative rate, it is negative 
or zero. Second, the demand function of household and firms for bank 
deposits is related to the fact that the four assets are available as gross 
substitute. Finally, as far the foreign sector is concerned it holds only two of 
the four assets: PLS deposits in local banks and equity. The characteristics of 
important macroeconomics variables-are the same as in Siddiqi's model. For 
example, shocks on the asset side of banks will be automatically transmitted 
to the liability side. In other word, banks will not be required to liability 
management as deposits are not guaranteed. 
After appropriate mathematical manipulations for excess demand 
equations, equation (1), with matrix A with elements aij, as a matrix of partial 
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derivatives of the excess demand functions with respect to the endogenous 
rates of return, and B defined analogously with respect to the exogenous 
variables, is derived28 
AdY + BdX =0 orAdY =- BdX (1) 
with 
dG 
dc 
drh dH 
dY dr dX dK 
Ldrk., drf 
_de 
dY = -A-lBdX (2) 
A fundamental assumption of the model is that all assets in each 
portfolio are gross substitutes for each other. Given these specifications of the 
model, the objective is to determine the effect of monetary policy change. As 
central bank holding of equity in commercial banks is the only control 
variable, for a desired expansionary monetary policy, the central bank will buy 
and for a contractionary monetary policy will sell commercial bank equities. 
From equation (2) the entries for changes in government holdings dG, of bank 
equities on the endogenous rates of return are: 
drhIdG (111AI) [(-a22 a33) + (623 a32)] (3) 
dr1dG (111AI) [-(a23 a3l) + (621 a33)] (4) 
drkIdG 111AI) ff-a2l a32) + (622 a3l)] (5) 
All the three endogenous rates of return decrease as a result of 
increase in G. An increase in G increases the supply of funds available to the 
commercial banks. Given the demand for these funds the rates of return on 
the finance offered must decline. As capital becomes cheaper, the demand 
28For derivation of the equation see the original paper. 
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for investment expenditure will increase. The economy will accumulate 
physical capital. 
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A Portfolio Model Of Islamic Banking 
To show that the probability of bankruptcy of an Islamic bank can be 
reduced by increasing PLS - based assets in their overall portfolio, Mirakhor 
(1987) develops a portfolio model of Islamic banking under condition of 
uncertainty. The model is based on a number of assumptions: a) The 
probability of a bank to confront bankruptcy depends on its ability or otherwise 
to absorb shocks of losses, b) As a safeguard against bankruptcy, monetary 
authorities fix a certain minimum capital asset ratio (k), this constrains the 
bank's total leverage, c) There are only two assets, mark-up (H) and PLS 
(M), and d) Bankruptcy is related to the performance the total portfolio of the 
bank of H and M, rather than either one of the two assets. 
For the bank's total leverage, given assumptions b) and c), the model 
specifies that, 
f, +f,, = I or fH= I- fM 
kk ................................. (1) 
fH and fm are respectively, fraction of mark-up and PLS assets 
absorbing the bank's funds. 
The return on the bank's overall portfolio is, 
7r=fH7rH+fM7CM 
........................................ 
7CH and 7rm are respectively, net return per unit of mark-up and PLS 
assets . 
The variance of the return on the bank's overall portfolio is therefore, 
527r=PH52H+f2M82M +2fhfm5HM 
......................................... (3) 
82 
R, 
82 
H9 
82 
m and 
8Hm are respectively, variance of overall portfolio 
return, variance of return on mark-up assets, variance of return on PLS 
assets and covariance between return on mark-up and PLS assets. 
The probability that a bank will face bankruptcy (defined as a situation 
where total losses of a bank exceed its total capital i. e., 71 <- 1) is, 
0& 
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Pr(7r: 5-1)< 
(, T 1)2 ....................................... 
(For reaching at this equation through the process of Chebyshev's 
inequality, see the original model). 
7C = fH 7CH + fM 71 M ......................................... 
Where 7r, 7rH and 7r m are respectively, expected mean overall 
return, expected mean return on mark-up assets and expected mean return 
on PLS assets. 
Substitution of Equations (3) and (5) in Equation (4) gives, 
f2 HC2 H +f 
2A, 
o. 
2M 
+2fHfwaHm Pr (7C <-1<2................................. (6) 
VHý7H + fM; -TM + 11 
Equation (6) provides the most crucial relationships of the model, 
namely, a) relationship between exp ected returns and mark-up and PLS 
funding of the bank, b) the variability and co-variability of those returns, c) the 
breakdown of assets between mark-up and PLS, d) the capital position of the 
bank and e) the probability of the bank to go bankrupt given these 
relationships. 
The total variance of return on the bank's overall portfolio cannot be 
minimized by merely focusing on either mark-up or PLS funding. Instead, it 
can be minimized by simultaneously focusing at both. Thus to minimize the 
variance of return on the overall portfolio we need, 
, ýOr ir -f 82 'ý 0 7T 2H H+2fM5HM ' ..................................................... (7) 
and 
ýo. 
9= 2f m 
82M + 2fH8HM =0...................... . ................... (8) d fA4 
The optimal mark-up and PLS assets for the bank's overall portfolio 
are found from the last two equations, 
a2 M-OHM fH "2-................... . ................................ k(o. 2 H+ 72M- 2aH, &, ) 
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7 HAI H f 
11 = _( ..................... ............. ................. k er 
2 
HM+ 0.2 A, _ L7 
2 
H) 
The overall portfolio of mark-up and PLS assets which minimizes 5'7r is 
given by 
a2- +k)-aHAI(FA4+k) f*Hý MOTH 
............. [a2 or 
2m(; r k H(FM + k)+ 4 1, + k) - 
2aHm (FH + FAI + 2k)] 
Equation (11) sets two important functional relationships: a) The 
optimum level of mark-up assets in the bank's overall portfolio is an 
increasing function of the mean return on mark-up assets and variance of 
return on PLS assets and a decreasing function of variance of return on mark- 
up assets and mean return on PLS assets; the opposite is true for the 
remaining part of the portfolio, i. e., for the PLS assets, b) The optimal level of 
mark-up in the overall portfolio is an increasing function of the covariance of 
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return between mark-up and PLS assets, only if: ( 7CH+k) 81m >( 7[M+k) H- 
Thus, the implication is derived that if expected returns from PLS and 
mark-up are different, the fraction of PLS and mark-up in the overall portfolio 
will effect the portfolio's return. If the expected returns on the PLS are higher 
than that on mark-up, restriction on the use of PLS will increase the 
probability of bankruptcy. Such would be sub-optimal policy for the bank and 
for the macro - economy. 
We have three main observations on the model. In chapter three we 
briefly discuss. the fact that the model ignores some basic issues, namely, a) 
diversification leads to an increase in the cost of capital and macroeconomics 
inefficiency and b) mark-up is a fixed asset not fixed liability for the Islamic 
banks, hence it may not cause bankruptcy in the form caused by interest 
based fixed liabilities do. In chapter five we discuss the fact that the mark-up 
is in fact a fixed return asset of an Islamic investment portfolio which the 
model in question ignores. 
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D. Monetary Model Of Price Stability Under PLS 
Under Islamic financing in general and the PLS in particular, creation of 
money without the creation of a corresponding real output or service is limited 
compared to the interest-based system. Due to this fact, it is argued that in the 
PLS-based system the level of inflation would be lower compared to the 
interest-based system. Latif (1985) presents a formal model aiming at 
comparing monetary causes of inflation under a PLS as compared to an 
interest-based regime. We find this model more as a critique of the interest- 
based monetary system rather than offering a model of stability of the PLS as 
such. Nevertheless, it is useful to discuss the main model in brief. The model is 
a representative of three monetary scenarios under which credit is created in 
the interest-based system, namely, no time deposits and only demand deposits 
(yd), there are no excess reserve requirements except the required reserve ratio 
and currency notes are not used for tra nsactions, (only demand deposits and 
cheques are used for this purpose). 
Credit Creation With no Excess Reserve 
Given all the three assumptions, if one monetary unit, D, enters the 
bank network its yý% will be kept in reserve and 1-y, % will be extended as 
credit. The volume of money created is as follows: 
AD, =1 
AD2*: "l-1 (Yd)=1 
AD3= k-k. yd= yd(l-yd) =k2 
AD4 k3 
ADn kn-I 
changes in the total deposits are calculated as 
P? AD =Z ADj = (1 +k+k 2 +kl+... ) 0<k<1 
W 
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AD =I=I=I I-K '-(]-Yd) Yd 
Money multiplier (demand deposit) can be shown as md= 
I. For 
OV d 
example, if 100 monetary units enter the network (in the form of a new deposit) 
and if Yd=20% the volume of money in circulation is AD= 
100 
= 
100 
= 500. 1-(]-. 2) .2 
Under the scenario of no excess reserve, - no currency and no time 
deposits, the newly created 400 units of money is bank profit and yd plays a 
crucial role in this regard. The newly created money has no corresponding 
output in the real sector of the economy, thus inflation would be explosive. 
Credit Creation Under Existence of Excess Reserve 
The introduction of excess reserve ER, slows down the credit creation 
power of banks. If excess reserve ratio is ye then ye = ER/D, where D. is total 
demand deposits. Given the money multiplier ind = 
I- 
, if AD, = 100 and +'Ve Yd 
yd = 20% and ye = 20%, then changes in the volume of money in circulation, 
would be 100/(. 20 +. 20) = 250, changes in the volume of loans AL = 150 
Credit Creation When Currency is Used in Transactions 
The introduction of currency further slows down the process of credit 
creation and inflation. A credit by bank will lead to the creation of current 
account as well as currency C in the hands of people depending their 
C 
propensity to use currency ot. Then a-. In this case, (x% of AD, = 1 will not D 
be deposited in the bank. Therefore, 
AD2 ý (1-7d) (1 -00"*- 
AD3' ý, 
-Yd) -(X) -Yd) 
"= 2ý2 (1 -CCd) (1 _CC) = %3 AD4 = 
(%2-%2'Yd) (1-(I) 
" 
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ADn Xn-l 
and total change in the demand deposit in circulation would be 
AD ADi 
AD = 
I I 
'-('-Yd)(1-a) = a+yd-ayd = Illd 
If preliminary demand deposit is 100, and yd=20%, a= 25%, the volume 
of bank drafts (cheques) which is a collection of demand deposits will be: 
AD= AD, 
I 
=- 
loo 
= 
loo 
= 250 
a+ Yd - (a Yd) . 25+. 20 -( 20)( 25) .4 
If the total volume of money in circulation is equal to the volume of the 
bank-notes in circulation, plus total demand deposit (M=C+D), where M stands 
for total volume of money in circulation also, changes in those volumes would 
be: 
AM=AC+AD and 
AC 
=: >AC=cc(AD) AD 
a+yd-ayd 
(if one unit Linters in the beginning as preliminary deposit) As a result: 
AM=AD+aAD=AD(l+a) 
AM=- 
(I+a) 
is the multiplier of the supply of money m. and a+-Yd-ard 
111d =I is multiplier for Deposit money (demand deposit). a+yd- ayd 
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Credit Creation under the Existence of Currency, Cheques and Excess 
Reserve. 
In this case, where all assumptions have been removed, there are 
constraints on the multipliers such as 
M= 
(]+a) 
a+rd+r, -a(yd 
+ r. ) 
I 
rIld = 
a+rd+r, -a(rd + r. ) 
Latif does not present a case of price stability under the PLS due to an 
excess reserve requirement or higher level of currency use. He rather argues 
that even if there is no excess reserve requirement and even if the use of 
currency is lower, due to fundamental nature of the Islamic economy, inflation 
will be lesser in the Islamic economy. The most distinctive characteristic of the 
PLS-based system as shown in the basic model of PLS economy is that new 
credit cannot be created without creating a corresponding creation of new 
output of goods or services. 
E. Monetary Model Of Demand for Investment 
Introduction of the PLS is likely to effect the demand for investment. 
In this respect, a number of scenarios are put forward by different researchers 
and different models are formulated. One interesting model is presented by 
Khan (1996). Before presenting his formulation, Khan first discusses two 
other propositions: 
First, Khan refers to Haque and Mirakhor (1986), who contend that 
the marginal productivity of capital will be lower in a PLS economy, therefore, 
investment will be high in such an economy. According to Khan this 
proposition ignores the supply side. 
Second, Khan refers to (Nadiri 1987) who assumes that in the PLS 
system the entrepreneur has nothing to loose in financial terms. Thus, the 
demand for funds will be infinitely elastic. Khan contends that the abolition of 
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interest does not mean the abolition of rate of return on capital, therefore, 
funds cannot be freely available in the PLS system. 
Khan's alternative presentation can best be understood in the 
framework of the offer curves. In Fig. 2(b) we have presented a simplified and 
modified version of Khan's model. The model implies that the financier offers 
its funds and the entrepreneur offers a p/s ratio after deciding on the ratio of 
profits it must apportion for itself. The offer of funds by the financier OF is thus 
partly a positive function of the p/s ratio offered but partly an inverse function 
of the risk of "putting all eggs in one basket". For a small amount of funds, the 
direct relationship works strongly but as more funds are supplied, the inverse 
relationship becomes stronger. Thus the financier has to limit the supply of its 
funds to a single entrepreneur. 
On the other hand, OE shows the offer of p/s ratio by - the 
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur has to keep a certain level of profits for itself. 
Knowing that OF has limitations, the entrepreneur will offer its p/s ratio. As 
more funds are employed, the law of marginal productivity will apply and the 
p/s ratio is bound to decrease limiting the demand for capital. 
Funds 
f 
0 
P/S' P/S 
Fig 2(b): Demand for Investment Under PLS 
p/s ratio 
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At an equilibrium, O-f amount of funds will be offered at O-p/s share 
in profits. If the p/s ratio offered is reduced, lesser funds would be available. It 
is obvious that there are limitations on both the demand as well as supply of 
funds. Thus, the main conclusion of Khan, that in an Islamic economy neither 
capital would be available free nor it is unlimited. 
2.3.2 Some Practical Problems And Prospects 
The theory of the PLS presented briefly above envisions some 
practical problems of implementation. Some important of these problems are 
briefly discussed here, whereas, in subsequent chapters we discuss these 
problems more formally and critically. 
2.3.2.1 Contractual Models of the PLS and Incentive Considerations 
We observed in section 2.3 that the basic model of the PLS is based 
on availability of full information to the two (all) parties. This is justified on the 
basis that the MM contracts are trust contracts in which both parties do not 
hide information from each other. But contractual models of the PLS, e. g., 
Khan (1983b) challenge that in practice, the PLS contract inherently involves 
information asymmetry. 
According to conventional wisdom, the ideal situation to perform a 
task, is to do it oneself. But, as it is said in the rationalization of the 
mudharabah contract, that all fund owners may not also have the ability and 
time to manage them. Similarly, people having the abilities and time to 
manage financial resources may not own these resources. 
This necessitates a joint venture arrangement among the owner of 
financial resources (financier) on one hand and human resources 
(entrepreneur) on the other. The financier and entrepreneur share accrued 
profits according to agreed ratios. Profits represent the common interest of 
the two parties. Theoretically, therefore, their incentives under this 
arrangement are harmonious. However, in practice, when one party extends 
funds for an enterprise, he would expect the entrepreneur to utilize the funds 
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the way he would have utilized them (had he the requisite abilities and timel). 
Whether or not, the owner of funds will realize his expectation, virtually, 
depends on his relationship with the entrepreneur. The following two 
situations are most representative of this relationship. 
Scale of Operations 
Several fund owners viz., depositors and equity holders may contribute 
their funds to a single entrepreneur such as an Islamic bank or a corporation. 
The very nature of the organizational structure of an Islamic bank or a 
corporation is expected to ensure the realization of the fund owners' 
expectations. 
First, the operations of an Islamic bank or a corporation are normally 
large. This enables them to diversify their portfolios between high yielding 
risky assets with no covariance of returns on one hand, and less riskier 
assets, on the other. For this comparative advantage, effort levels of the 
Islamic banks may be higher compared to those of the individual fund owner 
and 
Second, due to its larger size, and joint ownership, the Islamic bank or 
a corporation, may be more cost effective in terms of accounting, auditing and 
performance monitoring29. Thus, the supplier of funds, will obviously weigh, 
the effort levels of the Islamic bank higher, compared to his own or that of an 
individual entrepreneur. 
291-lowever, some points of apprehension must also be mentioned. Firstly, the depositors may 
confront a hazardous situation in safeguarding their interests. This situation may arise due to 
the illusion of deposit insurance and that bigger institutions are financially safer (see e. g., IMF 
1991). Islamic scholars have also discussed the interests of depositors under profit and loss 
sharing modes of deposit mobilization (for a review of this literature, see Kahf and Khan 
(1992). All these apprehensions are due to the risk of bankruptcy, rather than due to incentive 
problems. Also see Khan (1986) for comparison of stability of the financial systems under 
Islamic and conventional deposit mobilization. Secondly, it is argued, that elimination of risk- 
free financial assets will have an adverse incentive effects on supply of funds. For this, and 
counter arguments see, Nadeem and Mirakhor (1987). 
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Observability of Performance 
If the scale of operations of the enterprise are limited and does not 
entail performance monitoring, or joint management, the fund owner cannot 
realize his expectations without the cooperative behavior of his entrepreneur. 
The problem with this typical organizational setting is that the entrepreneur 
controls all the information related to the operational results of the enterprise. 
He could report the enterprise as inefficient and keep for himself a larger 
proportion of the project's outcome30.31 
Thus, from the perspective of the fund owner, efficiency of the 
enterprise can only be reflected from the report of the entrepreneur rather 
than its actual operation. Consequently, realization of the principal's 
expectations largely depends on the implicit or explicit incentive mechanisms 
underlying the contracts. 
The problem basically arises due to information asymmetry. In the 
Islamic literature, the issue of information asymmetry has been discussed in 
context of exchange. It is concluded, that Islamic jurists recognize the 
problem of information asymmetry and positive transaction costs32. In 
transactions involving two or more parties, it is natural that some parties may 
have more information compared to others about certain aspects of the 
transaction. In an ideal Islamic situation such a comparative advantage 
should not be exploited to harm the other party. 
Islam aims at elimination of the root causes of dishonesty, mistrust and 
cheating by both moral suasion and regulation of the individual's work 
environment and motivation. In addition to moral suasion, the fuqaha have 
recognized the importance of a fool-proof and infallible system which 
minimizes the room and incentives for dishonesty and maximizes and 
32See Zarqa (1991). 
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strengthens the cooperative attitude among parties33. Until performance of 
an agent can be observed free of cost, pure sharing may be a suitable 
arrangement for pooling financial and human resources. An number of 
examples can be cited where performance can be monitored without incurring 
any significant cost. 
First, the possibility of performance signaling contributes to the 
reduction of moral hazard. For instance, Caravan trading automatically 
signals the performance of its participants. When traders travel and trade in 
the same markets and merchandise of the same nature, the performance of 
one trader can signal the performance of the other. This fact may not be of 
any significance when traders are honest, but its significance for the pure 
sharing arrangement is immense under lesser favorable moral conditions. 
Therefore, it can be expected that even if moral conditions are worst, 
mudharabah can be effectively applied if signaling is possible in general. 
Second, even if signaling may not be possible, performance 
observance may not be costly as markets produce unbiased information in 
certain cases. For instance, the prices of precious metals, major stocks and 
currencies are objectively revealed by the market. Under these conditions too, 
the principle of pure sharing could be generally applicable. 
Third, in certain other cases, the two parties could have equal and 
definite pre-contractual information regarding the expected outcome of their 
joint enterprise. These will depend on the degree of certainty with regard to 
factors effecting the outcome of the enterprise. For example, assuming 
particular climatic conditions, the output of a particular crop on a farm can be 
estimated. The climate can then be observed without incurring any cost. Such 
cases could also facilitate the application of the pure sharing arrangement. 
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2.3.2.2 Limitations Imposed by Real World Situation 
The PLS theory suggests that the deposits, and equities of the Islamic 
banks, Islamic financial instruments, and shares traded in stock exchanges 
offer channels of financial transactions within and across countries. Moreover, 
short-term trading particularly, in precious metals and management of foreign 
exchange risks etc., also offer chances for the use of the pure sharing 
arrangements of finance. Liquidity, security and high return are the major 
factors effecting such financial transactions. The socio-economic conditions, 
prevailing in most of the developing countries, work as dis-incentives. In 
addition, there are a number of institutional restrictions on a wider scale 
utilization of the PLS for promoting financial transactions among Muslim 
countries and among them and the rest of the world. 
Non-existence of R&D Intensive Services 
The main stream PLS is an equity financing regime. In addition to PLS 
funds, Research and Development (R&D) intensive services such as a project 
appraisal study and equipment are important in establishing investment 
enterprises. In terms of their technological activities, enterprises are classified 
into five basic categories - enterprises aggressively pursuing R&D activities 
in order to achieve technical and market leadership; defensive innovator 
enterprises, which may be R&D intensive but avoid heavy risks of being the 
first to innovate and seek the benefits of learning from and often capitalizing 
on mistakes made by early innovators; imitative follower, enterprises, which 
are equipped with a technological capacity sufficient to conduct product 
engineering and design work, normally seeking licenses from successful 
innovators; dependent follower enterprises, which accept an essentially 
satellite or subordinate role, often as a sub-contractor for innovators and 
imitative followers; and a traditional firm which survives on traditional skills. 
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In this classification, firms in Muslim countries can best be placed in 
the range from the third to the last. With a common sense judgment it can 
safely be concluded that, major concentration of the enterprises in Muslim 
countries is expected to be in the traditional category. These conditions 
restrict the preparation of project feasibility studies to be financed by the PLS. 
In such circumstances, the inflow of foreign capital is inevitable for 
undertaking new investments in the Muslim countries. A capital inflow will take 
the form of a package - having particularly a technology component. In most 
cases multinational corporations introduce their technology as well. Given the 
present state of Muslim countries, capital transactions among them cannot be 
ex pected to guarantee automatic transfer of technology. The capital surplus 
economies are net technology importers. Consequently, other Muslim 
countries or external sources of technology are required, Most of the Muslim 
countries in the reasonably developed category with the degree of industrial 
specialization above average may, however, be expected to provide 
technological inputs. In the majority of cases, however, the inclusion of a 
multinational corporation as supplier of technology may be inevitable in an 
Intra-MC context of financial transactions. 
State of Entrepreneur-ship 
Risk taking is basically an entrepreneurial function. The importance of 
the role of entrepreneur in capital formation has long been recognized. The 
function of an. entrepreneur is central to the basic PLS model as discussed 
above as profits are crucial in the model. Depending on the organizations, 
economic systems and economic conditions in question, the general 
entrepreneurial functions are performed by people of different professional 
categories - termed as entrepreneurs, managers, and bureaucrats. It is 
interesting to note therefore, that depending on circumstances, the 
entrepreneurial functions can be performed by these different organizational 
agents. The function of an entrepreneur and to some extent also of the 
managers depends on many factors viz. availability of capital, infrastructural 
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facilities, market environment, supply of professional experts, marketing 
specialists etc. 
The supply of all such activities differs from country to country. In the 
least developed Muslim countries, therefore, we cannot expect better supply 
of entrepreneurs and managers to pursue PLS activities convincingly 
acceptable to financiers. This shortage could only be filled by the supply of 
"bureaucratic" industrial organizations. As the economies will develop, 
institutions are created, trained industrial manpower could be transformed into 
an organizational form, where managers can take over. Further 
improvements in the overall infrastructural base could facilitate the 
entrepreneurial type of organizational activities. 
It may therefore, be generalized that a new comer economy to 
industrialization (majority of Muslim countries) mostly rely on bureaucratic 
organizations for capital formation. In other words, in the initial stages the 
public sector has to play a dominant role in the overall process of the 
industrial organization. Such activities depending on their orientation and 
government strategies will develop infrastructural facilities. The intermediate 
economy with such an infrastructural base can be organized by the managers 
of different corporations. Only an advanced economy can efficiently be 
organized by the typical entrepreneurs. 
The above discussion leads us to conclude that the supply of the 
entrepreneurial* services depend on the structure of the economy in question. 
In such economies where the degree of industrial specialization is 
considerably high, one may expect managers to forth-come and organize 
investment projects. In some cases even the entrepreneurs may also be 
available. However, in general, a proper institutional support to supply either 
entrepreneurs, managers or efficient bureaucrats is highly needed in the 
Muslim countries. 
In this regard the PLS has the potential promotive role as it spreads 
the risks of projects between the financier and the entrepreneur. A financial 
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system committed to promote the entrepreneurial class can effectively use 
the PLS. We critically discuss the lack of an initiative among Islamic financial 
institutions in the area of promotion. 
Long-term Nature of Investment 
Almost all investments involving new projects are long-term by their 
nature. Compared to short-term investments e. g., in trading, longer-term 
investments are exposed to unforeseen risk factors. This increases the 
uncertainty of these investments, adding a risk premium to them and thus 
ensuring a higher rate of return. In capital scare countries, the return to capital 
on such investments are considerably higher compared to the return on the 
same investments in the developed countries. But unfortunately economic 
laws do not work under the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions 
of many developing countries. Political instability, non-commercial risks, 
sovereign dominance, non-existence of infrastructural facilities, transfer risks 
etc., are some of the factors which aggravate the climate for long-term 
investment in these countries. Given the above conditions, unless appropriate 
institutional arrangements are made, both in terms of redefining contracts as 
well as structural reforms, appropriate atmosphere for the PLS cannot be 
ensured. 
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Chapter 3 
ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THEORY: 
EVOLUTION AND ECONOMICS OF MARK-UP 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter one we set the background and basic issue to be discussed 
in the present research. We explained that PLS and mark-up are the two 
parent principles of Islamic financing. The theory relies on the PLS and the 
practice on the mark-up. In chapter two we discussed the evolution and 
economics of the PLS. 
Like interest, mark-up is a fixed return mechanism and unlike interest, it 
is permitted in Islamic law. The basic principle of two sided transactions - 
demand-supply, sale-purchase, offer-acceptance, etc., is central to mark-up as 
to any other financial transaction. Price deferred sale (PIDS) and object 
deferred (ODS) of goods and services, provide the basis for several 
commerce-based arrangements of Islamic financing. Islamic financial 
institutions manage their assets mainly by a variant of the PIDS, namely, bai'al 
murabahah fil amir bil shira (mark-up sale to the orderer). The use of the mark- 
up mechanism underlying the ODS arrangement can also enhance availability 
of resources, but the Islamic financial institutions do not utilize it for this 
purpose. 
This chapter aims at tracing the origins of deferred-trade, in particular its 
underlying pricing mechanism - the mark-up as an Islamic alternative to the 
interest mechanism. Deferred trade in goods and services generates various 
types of financial contracts. The mark-up mechanism also underlies all these 
contracts whenever these are used as modes of finance. We will also discuss 
these arrangements in brief and offer an economic comparison of these with 
interest. In addition, the chapter aims to put forward the proposal that for 
resource mobilization, the potential of the PDS arrangement need to be 
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exploited by the Islamic financial institutions. Formal discussion of this 
proposal is however deferred to latter chapters. 
3.2 FOUNDATIONS OF TRADE-BASED ISLAMIC FINANCING1 
The Islamic law makes an apt distinction between bai' (sale, including 
the PIDS and ODS) and riba (interest). Sale is permitted and encouraged and 
interest is prohibited and condemned2. This guideline is fundamental to the 
Islamic financial system. In addition, the Islamic regulations for managing the 
direct result of riba and bai', namely, dayin (debt)3, has a crucial bearing on 
financial contracts. 
It should be noted that it is the creation of debt, for which both interest 
and commerce-based credit are needed. At the time of revelation of the 
Qur'an, the debt creation through bai'and riba were a common practice in the 
commercial region of the Arabian peninsula. The Qur'an regulates these 
transactions (see, e. g., verse, Ik 275)4. On the basis of the interpretation of 
these verses by three prominent ancient commentators of the Qur'an - Ibn al 
Arabi, al Qurtubi, and al Jassas, it can be concluded that as sale can be spot 
or deferred, the term bai' used in this specific verse must specifically be 
referring to credit sale (PIDS and ODS), as it is being used in contrast to 
another source of credit - riba. Ibn al Arabi and al Qurtubi, specifically mention 
that in this verse, the term baicovers a// pennissible defeffed sales5. 
1 This subsection is based on the author's contribution to Kahf and Khan (1992). 
2 This refers to the Ouranic verse, 11-275, See, next footnote. Riba is considered to cover all 
forms of interest. See, OIC Fiqh Academy Resolutions. Appendix-1, of Chapra (1985) provides 
an English rendering of all Ouranic verses and important sayings of Prophet Mohammed and 
his learned companions about riba. A detailed analysis of sale and riba can be found in Homoud 
(1986). 
31t rnust be noted that debt also results from qard (interest free loans). 
4 That is because they say: Trade (bai) is only like interest (riba), but God has permitted trade 
and forbidden interest.. All translations are taken from Arabic are by Ali (undated). 
517or more details, see Ismail (1989). 
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Permissible deferred sales are usually of four forms, namely, salam sale 
(price is paid at the time of contract but object of sale, whether goods or 
services, becomes due as an in-kind debt), muaWal sale (object of sale is 
delivered at the contract time but price becomes due as debt), istisna' sale 
(price is paid at the time of contract or deferred for a future datel and object of 
sale to be manufactured and delivered later), ijara (sale of use rights of assets 
where assets are delivered to the user, who in turn pays periodic rentals in 
advance or on deferred basis). During the early Seventies, another form of 
credit sale - the deferred form of murabahah (mark-up based financing) was re- 
discovered from the traditional fiqh (Islamic legal) literature. 
The above deferred sales create debts (dayin). The term dayin appears 
in verse (11: 282) of the Holly Qur'an2. The three commentators agree that 
dayin, in this verse includes the result of deferred sales which have been 
mentioned in the verse discussed before3. The debt created by interest-based 
transactions being prohibited is certainly out of place and not in consideration. 
In context of differentiating riba from bai', it needs to be noted that fiba applies 
to the transaction of debts whether they result from lending or deferred trade. 
According to the three commentators, fiba is an increment taken over and 
above the principal of a debt (whether caused by lending or deferred trade) 
against granting time for repayment4. 
1 Some difference exists in different laws as far the payment of price (the principal of salam) is 
concerned. The economics of these differences are discussed in more detail in subsequent 
chapters of this research. 
20 Ye who believe! When ye deal with each other in transactions involving dayin (debt) in a 
fixed period of time put them in writing... 
3 For more critical views, see, Ismail (1989). 
4 However, we should also note that another cause of future obligations is direct borrowing 
(qard) which dominates the contemporary financial system. Borrowing existed among Arabs 
and Jews at the time of the Prophet (pbuh) as showed by the commentaries of Ibn al Arabi, al 
Jassas, al Razi and others. 
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3.2.1 Relationship Between Sale and Financel 
Consumption and commerce in few commodities (such as alcoholic 
beverages and pork) and services (such as prostitution and gambling) and 
deferred trading in quasi services (such as money and debtS)2 are absolutely 
prohibited by the Islamic law. Except for these few prohibitions, in general, 
Islam encourages the free operation of the demand and supply forces. 
In all market economies the availability of finance plays an important 
role in enhancing demand and supply. In conventional economies although 
credit sale also serves the purpose of finance, yet, the role of interest-based 
markets is crucial in the provision of finance. In the Islamic economy, since 
interest-based finance could not exist, the financial constraint on demand and 
supply is removed by creating a liability3 through deferred sale. 
However, in the Islamic economy, the existence of deferred sale 
depends on the simultaneous fulfillment of three essential conditions: i) The 
object of deferred sale can only be goods or services; the Islamic law does not 
recognize money and debt as the object of deferred sale, ii) price can either be 
money or goods and services and iii) at a time, either the delivery of the object 
of sale is delayed or the payment of its price; to generate finance, one should 
essentially be delayed, but as regulated by law, simultaneously, both cannot be 
delayed. As a result of the deferred sale, a creditor-debtor relationship is 
established between the suppliers and users of capital, goods and servicesl. 
Credit sale (purchase) can be utilized to finance both the demand as well as 
supply sides of the market. 
1 This section is taken from the author's earlier work, see, Khan (1991). 
2 These sales are prohibited by Prophet Mohammad. For, translation of original text, see, 
Chapra (1986), appendix-1. For more detailed analysis see, Homoud ibid. 
3 The concept of dayin (future obligations) is given in the Quranic verse 11-282 translated by 
Yousuf Ali as: 0 Ye who believe! When ye deal with each other in transactions involving dayin 
(debt) in a fixed period of time put them in writing.... 
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Financing the Demand Side 
In case, there is a financial constraint on demand - the buyers are in 
deficit, credit will be created by the market in question through postponement 
of the payment of price for the future, while giving delivery of the object of sale 
at the time of the contract. This is known as bai' al muaýal (price deferred 
sale). Like the spot price, the deferred price, too, is determined by the mutual 
understanding of the two parties. Thus, the deferred price of an object could be 
equal to or higher/lower than the spot pricel. 
To explain this phenomenon, we may turn to the basics of the individual 
demand and, supply schedules. Let us assume that all available means can 
support an individual demand shown as DID in Fig. 3 (a). Let us also assume 
that the actual needs of this individual are reflected by the D*D* schedule. In 
the conventional sense, the individual in this case will come to this market with 
interest-based borrowed money. Thus the dichotomy between the DID and 
D*D* schedules is not relevant in the conventional markets due to availability of 
interest-based finance. 
Since interest-based borrowing is not available, our problem is 
therefore, to seek alternative means of credit. Without credit, the demand 
schedule would remain as DID. Given this demand schedule, it is in the interest 
of the suppliers to offer credit sale (finance) corresponding to s*s* supply 
schedule, so that the demand schedule D*D* would become effective. The 
quantity qq* sold corresponds to the amount of finance created, and oq* is the 
total sales. The price will rise to op* reflecting the mark-up. Similar would be 
the case with services. 
1 Since, the availability of finance will increase the effective demand for the goods and services 
in question, it can generally be expected that the deferred price will be higher than the spot price 
(under the financially constrained demand). Nevertheless, due to several reasons, e. g., the 
promise in Islam for a non-material reward for offering the extension of time in the payment of 
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Fig. 3 (a) Credit Creation by the Markets of Goods and Services 
Financing the Supply Side 
Often, production is constrained by the non-availability of finance and 
simultaneously, households and firms may be in surplus. If the non-existence 
of the stock is due to a financial constraint on supply, buyers (households and 
firms) will offer advance payment to secure the acquisition of supply in the 
future. Thus, the supplier's future income is transformed into his present 
income and he benefits from the finance. In such a case, the financier is the 
ultimate buyer of the product. The user of finance is the supplier of the 
goods/services and the debt will be in-kindl. 
Thus, if. the seller is in deficit, finance will be provided by delaying the 
delivery of the object of sale for a future date while getting payment of price at 
the time of the contract. This is known as bai'al salam, (delayed delivery sale). 
liab I ilities, the expectation of profits from the expansion of sale, etc., the deferred price of an 
object could also be less than its spot price. 
I The monetary value of this debt could either be equal to the prevailing market price or could be 
different. 
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3.2.2 Composition of Sale-Based Finance 
Based on the general rule of delaying the payment of price (mua: Ual 
sale)' or delaying the delivery of the object of sale (salam sale), deferred 
transactions, may give rise to several combinations of sales which create 
deferred obligations as summarized in Exhibit 3 (a). Each of istisna, and ju'ala 
can provide two different variants of financing, whereas ijara can provide three 
different variants with respect to the payment of price. 
In cases of istisna' and ju'ala, payment may accompany order, or 
payment may be deferred even after the accomplishment of the order,. In Uara, 
rent may be paid in advance of using the services of the asset, or at some 
specified intervals or may be accumulated for payment at a later date2. The 
obvious advantage of the last variant in each of the three cases is that 
payments can be made from the revenues of the project in question. 
3.2.3 Evolution Of Mark-Up3 
The Islamic banks evolved in two phases. The first and practically 
unsuccessful but historically, a significant experience started in Egypt in 1963. 
During this phase of Islamic banking, the concept of the mark-up remained 
undiscovered. The second and present successful phase of Islamic banking 
started in 1974 with the establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank, United Arab 
Emirates, and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Jeddah, in 1975. 
With the establishment of these and several other specialized banks, the 
practice of Islamic financing principles were initiated. To start their operations, 
it was natural for these banks to face tough challenges in innovating financial 
instruments. Data of early operations undertaken under the Islamic financing 
principles are available in case of the IDB. Sale-based financing, i. e., 
1 In cases of istisna'and ju'ala where payments are delayed, initially no finance is created. But 
as soon as orders are accomplished and payments are deferred, finance is created and the 
buyer benefits from it. 
2 By their nature, services are a continuous flow, but rent cannot be paid except at specified 
times. Therefore, unlike istisna'and ju'ala, three cases of ijara create finance. 
3 This sub-section is based on the author's contribution to Kahf and Khan (1992). 
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murabahah is shown for the first time in IDB operations in the year 1397H 
(1976). The Quantitative value of this operation was US $ 50.52 million, 
substantially high compared to other modes of operations then undertaken by 
the bank. Since its first known use in 1975, by the IDB, the mark-up has 
achieved an overwhelming position as a mode of asset management by the 
Islamic banks. In this research we have also discussed potential of the mark-up 
mode for resource mobilization by the Islamic banks. In the present section we 
discuss the evolution of the mark-up and related issues. 
Definition of Murabahah 
Although deferred trade and its various variants were known to provide 
credit, the mark-up as such was not known in the traditional literature. Rather it 
evolved only during the early seventies. The use of the mark-up by the Islamic 
banks has received its highest academic support from Homoud (1975). In his 
analysis of the murabahah, Homoud quotes Ibn Qudamah who, according to 
Homoud defines murabahah as: "selling for the cost price plus a specified 
profit, provided that both the seller and the buyer know the cost price. The 
seller says, 'my capital, or the cost price, is a hundred, and / sell it to you for a 
profit of ten. ' This is permitted and there is no doubt about its legitimacy. No 
scholar is reported to have regarded it with legal 'dislike' (karahah). (Homoud, 
1987, p. 7). 
Deferment of Price 
It is noticeable that the above definition is representative of a situation 
where the seller owns some assets and declares his purchase price as well as 
his selling price which contains a declared rate of profit. So far, this 
arrangement is related to spot sale and does not generate finance. 
Nevertheless, it is agreed that the declared price can be deferred and it can 
contain an additional profit margin for consideration of the deferment. The 
prominent Hanbali scholar Ibn Qudama has reportedly said that, "It is 
permissible if the seller of a commodity says that he sells it by such (excess) 
amount if the payment is after a certain time" (FSC: IRTI, 1995 p 173). With 
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this deferment of price (with higher profit margin), the sale arrangement creates 
finance. 
Putting An Order 
To suite the financing requirements of user of funds and those of 
financiers, the arrangement must contain a possibility for the user of funds to 
place orders whenever needed. To incorporate a purchase order in the above 
mentioned deferred murabahah transaction, Homoud turns to Imam Shafi'i 
who says, "if a man shows, certain goods to another and says, 'buy this for me 
and I will give you so much profit, and the second man buys it, then the 
transaction is permitted. However, the one who has made the promise has the 
right of withdrawal. If he buys, it makes no difference whether he pays 
immediately or at a later date. So, the first sale is valid but there is no 
commitment as to the other, they are at liberty (ibid). 
This example of Imam Shafi'i has led Homoud to evolve the financing 
mode called bai'al murabahah li al 'amir bil shira which replaces interest with 
mark-up in financial advances. As can be seen, the mark-up principle of 
finance results from incorporating deferred payment in murabahah. In the 
mark-up, the financier benefits from the difference between the immediate and 
deferred prices of the goods. 
Making the Order Binding 
The last part of the above quotation from Imam Shafi'i makes the 
orderer non-committal to the purchase. The fine-tuning of mark-up to suite to 
operational needs of modern financial transaction has effected the 
incorporation of further conditions to the contract. Unless, a secure demand 
does not exist, the purchase of assets by the financier could be a risky 
enterprise. Thus, when the order was incorporated in the original murabahah, 
the. question whether the orderer should finally be bound to purchase or not, 
came up for heated discussion among scholars. As the business of Islamic 
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banks goes, predominantly, the orderer is bound to purchase the asset 
provided it meets the full specifications mentioned in the order'. 
The Buyer Can Act As An Agent 
Meeting the full specifications of the orderer exposes the financier to 
certain level of unwanted risks. At the time of taking ownership of the acquired 
assets, the orderer may go on interpreting its specifications. This will delay the 
acquisition of the asset by the orderer, prolong the active ownership of the 
asset by the bank, increase the bank's storage costs and other liabilities, thus, 
exposing the bank to risks which it must avoid. To avoid such risks, the bank 
appoints the finance user to act as an agent on its behalf. The client than 
selects the asset of its choice, purchases it on behalf of the bank for the bank. 
As a second step the ownership is transferred to the client. In most cases 
thus, the asset does not remain in the ownership of the financier for any 
meaningful period2. Thus, in most cases, for creating the initial debt, mark-up 
based financing is as risk-free as interest-based financing. 
3.2.4 The Limits Of Mark-Up Based Finance Creation 
The sale of goods and services on deferred basis creates debt to be 
repaid in a specific time period. However, if the debt is not paid during the 
specified time, the owner of the debts cannot claim any increment in his 
principal amount of debt. If he claims an increment, it implies that he is 
involving in a ýale transaction in which the object of sale is debt and its price is 
interest known at the time of the revelation of the Holy Qur'an as riba. 
The features of bai' and riba in terms of the limitations in creating 
finance are compared in Fig. 3 (b). On the vertical axis of panel (A) we keep 
ODS and PIDS price p, and of panel (B) deferred price p, as well as interest i; in 
1A prominent shariah consultant to many Islamic banks favors to make the purchase binding 
on the orderer, see Adu Guddah (1992) 
2Supply of electricity on the mark-up basis is an important example of a situation where 
physical control of the asset by the financier is not possible. 
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in the horizontal axis of panel (A) we keep the amount of deferred trade Q, and 
in panel (B) time t. 
In Panel (A), if the total deferred trade is indicated by the O'q distance, 
subject to the DID demand for ODS, the total deferred price (finance) would be 
Op. Each point on the O'S line will indicate a level of debt created by a given 
amount of trade. Given Oq amount of a good or service to be traded, 00' spot 
trade, O'q deferred trade must be available, for the market to clear. This will 
create Op amount of debt (finance). Given the amount of the good or service 
which cannot clear without credit sale, the amount of total debt created \Mll be 
determined by the slope of the O'S line. This slope in turn depends on the 
mark-up; if the mark-up islow, given the O'q, deferred trade, debt would be 
less than Op and vice-versa. 
PDS Price I 
pII 
pi 
p 
(A) (B) 
Fig. 3 (b): Limitations Of Credit Creation by Deferred Sale 
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The Op amount of debt created by deferred sale is put on the vertical 
axis of panel (B). This debt is independent of the time and cannot be 
rescheduled on the basis of buying time for a material consideration. Suppose, 
time'to'indicates the time of the repayment of this debt as contractually agreed 
by the two parties. If the debtor fails to pay at this time, the financier cannot 
claim any reward for a further delay in payments. If such a reward is claimed, 
'e -given by the distance ab, corresponding to time tj, a'b' corresponding to 
timet2and so on, the ab, a'b' and so on, is what is known as the prohibited riba 
(interest), in this particular case. Referring back to points p' and p" in panel (A), 
it is easy to conclude that these prices are fictitious and do not correspond to 
any demand and mutual agreementl. These prices therefore, do not 
correspond to any real counter values. Acceptance of such a fictitious price is 
in fact tantamount to abrogating the basic market mechanism. 
From the above discussion, the following differences can be derived 
between conventional concept of debt financing and the Islamic concept of 
financing through deferred sale. First, in the Islamic economy, debt creation 
depends on trading in real goods and services. Debt creation is basically a 
phenomenon of the goods and services market, whereas, in the conventional 
economy it is essentially a monetary phenomenon. Second, though the 
creation of debt serves a financial purpose, yet it cannot be treated similar to 
debt financing in which debt default is penalized by an automatic increase in 
intereSt2. 
We can compare panels (A) and (B) quickly. Let us assume that in panel 
(A) a'client orders an Islamic bank to buy for it an equipment q on the 
horizontal line, the market price of which is 1000 US dollars to be repaid in 4 
In the Holly Qur'an trade is characterized to be through mutual agreement. 
2-' In context of financial intermediation it may also be noted that, in contrast to interest based 
lending, the final return to the seller is not fixed in these transactions. In fact the final return 
could be lower than the deferred price because of the element of risk carried by the seller while 
the object of sale is in his possession. See, Khan (1991) and Kahf and Khan (1989). 
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years. The bank agrees and buys the asset for the client at 10% mark-up. The 
following fundamental formula will be used to calculate the future value of the $ 
1000. This formula is the most representative of the simple annuities created 
by mark-up financing. The future value in this specific case is: FV=PV(J+mark- 
Up)n. FV=$1000(1+0.10)"=$1000(1.10)" =1610.51 denoted by p on the vertical 
line. The client will then pay $402.63 yearly for 4 years. The time line of this 
annuity can be shown as bellow. 
0 $402.63 $402.63 $402.63 $402.63 
Year, Year2 Year3 Year,, 
Fig. 3 (c) : Time line of cash-flow sequence of a mark-up based annuity 
This time line is reflected by the line Pt4 in the lower part of panel (B) 
showing the fact that as yearly re-payments are made, the amount of 
outstanding debt declines proportionately. It is noteworthy that the amount of 
outstanding debt does not increase in the zero interest Islamic scenario due to 
time factor. The upper part of panel (B) is representative of the interest case 
where the amount of outstanding debt increases due to time factor. This is the 
most and in t he final analysis perhaps the only difference between the interest 
and. mark-up based debt financing. 
Throughout this research we treat mark-up as a mechanism rather than 
a mode of finance. As a mechanism it underlies all other deferred sale 
contracts, namely, installment sale, leasing (finance lease or hire-purchase) 
and istisna. In each of these deferred sale contracts, once the deferred price is 
settled on the basis of the mark-up, the resultant debt becomes an annuity and 
subject to the same amortization procedure. We partially re-produce in Table 3 
an amortization schedule of such annuities used in the Pakistani banks when 
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Islamization was in its peak level. As it can be observed, this amortization 
procedure is the same in any conventional bank. 
Table 3 (a) Amortization of Mark-up Based Debts: 
Present Value Of I Received Per Period 
PERIOD 0.91667 
(11) 
1.00000 
(12) 
1.08333 
(13) 
1.16667 
(14) 
1.25000 
(15) 
1 0.99092 0.99010 0.98928 0.98847 0.98765 
2 1.97283 1.97040 1.96796 1.96554 1.96312 
3 2.94583 2.94099 2.93616 2.93134 2.92653 
4 3.90999 3,90197 3.89397 ' ). 88600 3.87806 
5 4.86539 4.85343 4.84152 4.82966 4.81784 
6 5.81212 5.79548 5.77892 5.76243 5.74601 
7 6.75024 6.72820 6.70627 6.68445 6.66273 
8 7.67984 7.65168 7.623368 7.59583 7.56813 
9 8.60100 8.56602 8.53126 8.49670 8.46235 
10 9.51379 9.47131 9.4291 I 9.338718 9.34553 
11 10.41829 10.36763 _ 10.31734 10.26740 10.21781 
12 11.3 ) 1458 11.25508 11.19605 11.13746 11.07932 
13 12.20272 12.13375 12.06534 11.99749 11.93019 
14 10.08279 13.00371 12.92532 12.84760 12.77056 
15 0 3.95488 133.86506 13.77608 13.68791 13.66055 
16 14.81904 14.7175 14.61772- 14.51853 14.42030 
17 15.67535 15.56226 15.45035 15.333957 15.22992 
18 16.52388 16.39828 16.27404 16.15114 16.02956 
19 17.336470 17.22602 17.08891 16.95335 16.81931 
20 18.19789 18.04536 17.89505 17.74631 17.59932 
21 19.02351 18.85699 18.69255 18.53 )0 13 18.36970 
22 19.84163 19.66039 19.48150 19.30490 19.1305 
23 20.65231 20.45583 20.26200 20.07074 19.88205 
24 21.45564 21.24340 21.034 1 3) 20.82775 20.62424 
25 22.25167 22.02317 21.79798 21.57603 21.35728 
I Source: Taken from Islamic Banking Procedural Instructions, United Bank Ltd., 
Pakistan, Karachi: August 14,1984 
The mark-up rate is the rate of internal rate of return (IRR) in Islamic 
banks', investments in their financial operations. So determination of the mark- 
up, of . an . operation 
is in fact finding its IRR. By definition the IRR is that 
discount rate which equalizes the present and future values of a project's cash 
flows i. e., puts its NPV to zero. 
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3.2.6 Time Value Of MoneYl 
From what has been discussed above, it is clear that only for 
consideration of deferment, a deferred price can be higher than a spot price. 
Moreover, debt as such created is amortized in the same form as it is done in 
the conventional sense. These points are related to time value of money in 
Islami 
,c 
economics. The subject has recently been discussed by a number of 
writers. 3he. point is that since, a higher deferred price of an object of sale, 
compared to its spot price is legitimate, it implies a recognition of the time value 
of mOney-in Islam. This value may be determined ex-ante. However, arguing 
that fixed rent, or fixed price in deferred sale doesn't mean fixed return on 
capital because of uncertainty and risk incorporated in these transactions 
(Khan 1992) rejects the above proposition and suggests that time value of 
mon , ey can only be ex-poSt2. 
Therefore, the value of time is related to its being needed for the 
completion.,, of a real transaction, not by itself. Under riba-based transactions, 
postponement of liability justifies a return to capital. Whereas in real 
transactions, return to capital is linked to owning real goods whicli are subject 
to uncertainty by virtue of their nature. Time is one of several factors that effect 
profit and loss because it is required to complete real transactions. 
The mark-up is justified on the basis of a generally accepted axiom that 
time miy be valued provided it is incorporated in a sale transaction. As such, 
financier's claim for return derives its riqhi legitimacy from the fact that the 
financier'owns the subject of sale, for at least some period of time. Such an 
ownership'implies carrying risk and uncertainty. Thus a return is justified on the 
ground of ownership and responsibility of its risk. -Ii 
Adapted from Kahf and Khan (1992). 
2However, Khan discussed this point in the context of discounting and he pre-assumed that 
money is always invested in accordance with Shariah i. e. lending at a variable rate of interest is 
excluded. 
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, -, 'The mark-up creates a fixed, pre-determined and secure indebtedness. 
This has made it attractive for the Islamic banks as an alternative to the interest 
based transactions. It should however, be noted that in contrast to interest 
based lending, the final return to the financier is not fixed in the mark-up based 
financing. In fact the final return to the financier is lower than the mark-up price 
because of the element of risk carried by the financier while the merchandise 
are in his possession. By the same token the mark-up saves the user of funds 
the risks which he would have otherwise borne, had he owned the goods for 
the same period of time. Thus the final cost of the finance for the finance user 
may be less than the mark-up price (see, Khan 1992). 
This is particularly so due to inflation, in some Muslim countries, at 
ti m es, inflation is as high as 130%. Inflation hits hard the value of the principal 
of loans as well as debts both under PDS and ODS. In case of debts whether 
created due to PDS or loans, the future value of the amount of debt is eroded 
away by inflation. In case of ODS, the price is normally paid in advance of six 
1 '' ,,,, -" months. During the six months' period, in many countries, prices increase 
substantially. Thus at the time of delivery, the objects become more valuable 
compared to the time when the contract was actually signed. The financier can 
use this as, a hedge to neutralize the impact of inflation on its debt assets. For 
instance, if it has sold assets of $ 100's worth on the PIDS basis for six months, 
it can fully hedge against inflation by buying $ 100's worth on the ODS basis 
for six months and vice versa. If for example, 10% of the value of PIDS assets 
is, wiped, out by inflation, its ODS assets can become valuable by the same 
percentage. But common users of funds cannot always hedge against inflation 
effectively., 
The effect of inflation on the future value of assets involving deferred 
transactions has recently attracted substantial attention from the Islamic 
scholars. Whereas, a group of Muslim economists calls for indexation of 
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debts', compensation rateS2 etc., a large majority of shari'ah scholars as well 
as Muslim economists does not accept these either on Islamic or economic 
grounds. In general, once a debt is created by PIDS or ODS, the amount of 
debt is considered as qard (benevolent loan) and a rate of return cannot be 
imposed on such debt. However, in Sudan, to overcome the effect of inflation 
on 
I 
ODS contracts, financiers and clients agree on a condition (band al ihsan) in 
the contract which is meant to relieve the effects of inflation at the time of final 
sefflement3. 
3.2.6 Issues In Mark-Up Based Resource Mobilization 
The mark-up mechanism has so far been utilized by the Islamic financial 
institutions for asset management. The use of the mark-up principle in resource 
mobilization is not common. Initially, the Islamic banks had an excess liquidity 
problem-, Therefore, the need for mobilizing additional resources was not an 
urging matter. But, financial as well as non-financial enterprises always require 
additional funds for expanding their operations. 
The mark-up is irrelevant for deposit mobilization, because, the Islamic 
law does not recognize money as an object of sale. Individuals, households 
and firms need money not for its own sake, but for the fact that money enables 
its holder to have a command on goods and services. In this way money plays 
a crucial role in the market economy. To play this role efficiently, money has to 
be neutral between goods and services and not compete with them as an 
object of sale. If money changes its neutral role and starts to play the role of an 
See, Kahf (1995). 
2Shirazi and Kamalzadeh (1995) argue that , "We can compute a compensation rate which 
while taking into account bank services, maintains the purchasing power of money for a period 
of time. Such rate can be defined as: R, =Rp-B,. Rp is the rate of inflation and B, the rate of bank 
sýrvices offered. For example, if inflation rate is 0.10 (RP = 0.10) and bank services rate offered 
is 0.04 (B, =0.04), the compensation rate, (RJ would be 0.06. By relating Bs to the inflation rate, 
we can adjust the fluctuations in the compensation rate. In fact with rising inflation rate, the 
offered rate of bank services will also increase" p 117. 
3See, Babikir (1996). 
72 
object of sale like goods and services, markets will loose their efficiency and 
consequently the society will suffer. 
Deferred trading in money for money, is thus prohibited in Islam. 
Interest-based deposit mobilization, in fact implies that the depositor sells his 
current amount of money on deferred basis to receive a higher amount in the 
future - with 10% annual rate of interest, a dollar deposit is sold now, for 1.10 
dollars a year from nowl This constitutes riba. For this reason (for the 
prohibition of sale of money for money), the mark-up is entirely irrelevant for 
deposit mobilization. 
However, deposit mobilization is not the only source of resource 
mobilization. As mark-up based financiers, Islamic banks acquire ownership of 
assets and then lease or sell these on installment basis to their clients. In all 
cases, the Islamic banks pay up-front to the sellers of these assets in lump 
sum, but they receive from their clients on installments. This must causes a 
mismatch in the two sides of the balance sheet as well as imposes a cash flow 
constraint on operations of the banks. 
The liabilities of Islamic banks comprise only of permanent equity 
(share-holders' capital) and temporary equity (deposits)'. In this way Islamic 
banks are 100% equity-based. Similar is the case with non-banking Islamic 
financial 'institutions. As a matter of fact, the conceptual foundations for 
re , source mobilization through deferred purchase are yet to be developed. 
Even if Islamic financial institutions can adopt a policy of 20% mark-up 
based leverage, by avoiding up-front and lump-sum payments and resorting to 
,ý__L ý', 
installment purchase, they can mobilize substantial resources. The case of 
Islamic banks is different compared to conventional banks. Islamic banks are 
II "i " 
involved in deferred trading. The assets financed by them make their clients 
.1 For the classification of Islamic financial instruments in terms of the IMF's System of National 
Accounts, see, pages 4-84,4-86 of IMF (forthcoming). 
73 
more - solvent compared the clients of conventional banks where the use of 
funds is oftbn not possible to monitor. Hence, Islamic banks asset side is 
comparatively more stable. Moreover, Islamic banks do not have any fixed 
obligations on the liability side of their balance sheet at the present. Thus, they 
have a better potential to take the burden of a suitable amount of leverage. 
3.3 THE PLACE OF L. I. B. O. R 
I 
I- --, Islamic banks having international transactions, use the London Inter- 
Bank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) as a bench-mark for the calculation of mark-up. 
For 'a, typical operation, e. g., the mark-up would be: LIBOR minus two 
perc ' 
entage points plus mark-up plus actual service charge. In most cases, the 
rebate on LIBOR will cancel out the amount of service charge so that the 
actual cost of financing would turn out to be LIBOR plus agreed mark-up rate. 
The use of LIBOR as a bench mark for calculating the mark-up is not 
0 bjected by the shail'ah scholars. However, some Muslim economist have put 
up a challenge to this practice and attempt at evolving newer methods which 
can be more consistent with the ethos of Islamic financing. 
We need to take some digression to discuss important related issues. 
Zarqa (1983) suggests that discounting future cash flows to arrive at present 
values of competing projects' outlays is equally important for investment 
decision making in an Islamic economy. However, it is not an imperative that 
discounting should be based on the rate of interest. Even in the conventional 
economies, the time preference of different individuals could be positive, 
negative or neutral. Therefore, with regard to time preference, even in the 
conventional sense, nothing can be conclusively said a-priori. Khan (1992d) re- 
affirms the non-existence of time value of money in an Islamic economy but in 
general he refutes the importance of discounting in conditions where rates of 
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return of projects are different. For him, discounting would be needed only if 
the rates 6f return of competing projects happened to be equal. 
Both Zarqa and Khan suggest that the discount factor of an all equity 
firm should be the rate of return of its risk class. For public projects such rates 
should be adjusted to achieve social optimality. The theoretical essence of 
Zarqa's'message on both counts is upheld by a number of other Islamic 
economists. 
However, the situation on the practical ground is different. The decision 
of the Islamic banks to finance given sets of operations is an investment 
decision. Broadly speaking, Islamic banks arrange finance on the basis of the 
price mechanism (as in renting and installment sale) and profit sharing as in 
p articipatory arrangements. The pricing mechanism is overwhelming and also 
guides the Islamic financial institutions to imagine the implicit cost of capital in 
the meager amount of funds they extend under participation. This is reflected 
in the relative sharing ratios for the bank and the client determined in any 
specific contract. 
In determining the deferred price of goods and services, the Islamic 
banks have to consider, spot prices, transaction and insurance costs for the 
bank as a trader and a rate of return comparable to alternative investment 
opportunities in similar risk class. 
The present legitimacy of taking Islamic investment decisions on the 
basis of the market bench-mark is likely to continue irrespective of the feelings 
of Muslim economists! This shall not mean that the academic works to de-link 
Islamic' investment decisions from the market bench-mark should not continue. 
The central issue of such works would be to suggest a project evaluation 
criteria which can be used by managers of firms for making long-term capital 
expendit ure decisions in the absence of an ax-ante implicit time value of 
- _ý"-''T money. 
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If LIBOR or interest has to be avoided in the process of investment 
decision making, its natural contender, would be some form of profit'index. One 
recent unpublished research at the Islamic Research and Training Institute, for 
example, is daringly captioned as, "Profit-index: As a Substitute to LIBOR in 
Islamic Banks' Mark-up based Operations". The weakness of such an index 
lies in the fact that too high or too low an index compared to the bench-mark of 
LIBOR is bound to adjust to it in a few years time. Moreover, conceptually, the 
case for the index has not yet been presented convincingly. 
Nevertheless, in their attack on the conventional-NPV wisdom in 
finance, 'the Islamic economists are not alone. Recently, there has been a 
rigorous criticism of the NPV method by Dixit and Pindyckl. This contribution is 
being termed as most influential for decades to come in the area of investment 
and, finance. Two points of the central. theme of this work are relevant in our 
present context. First, the authors challenge the rationale of the significance 
assigned to interest rates in the theory of corporate finance, in particular in the 
NPV-Ied investment decision process. The authors contend that "Econometric 
tests of. the orthodox theory generally find that interest rates are only a weak or 
insignificant determinant of investment demand"l. Secondly, the authors treat 
investmentý opportunities valuable options, not non-waiting take-it or leave-it 
opportunities as treated by the NPV method. Since investment decisions are 
irreversible, waiting for additional information to arrive to utilize the option is in 
fact valuable contrary to the NPV "take-it or leave-it" approach. 
The point is that it is not only Islamic scholars who question the 
foundations of the conventional theory of finance but there are also influential 
conventional economists who find objective reasons for doing so. Having said 
that we must not neglect the need for a rigorous approach to long term 
investment decision making. Empirical research on the use of capital budgeting 
criteria' by"I 89 companies shows that almost all companies use more than one 
1 See', Dixit, A. K. and Pindyck, (1994). 
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criteria with different degree of reliance on different methods. As for the 
popularity of the individual methods are concerned, these were found to be: 
pay-back method 74%, internal rate of return method 65%, return on 
investment method 59% and net present value method 57%1. It is therefore, in 
the interest of Islamic banks and their clients to cross check the feasibility of 
projects by applying different methods. 
3.4 A BROADER CASE FOR SALE-BASED 
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
The exact nature of a variant of the sale-oriented financing is based on 
whether. demand or supply needs to be financed and on the nature of the 
object of sale involved in the transaction. One of the crucial determinants of 
demand financing through deferred sale is the condition that demand should 
strictly be related to a specific object of sale, which must already exist. In other 
words, the notion of demand financing through deferred sale could be realized, 
only, if a specific object and its demand simultaneously exist. 
3.4.1 Some Issues in A Cross-country Scenario 
In., the context of financial transactions between countries, demand 
financing implies import financing. For the capital importing countries, demand 
i. e., import financing takes precedence over export financing. Moreover, 
production of exportable commodities depends on an initial minimum requisite 
amount of imports. Imports could be financed in different ways. 
Im oýt Substitution by Deferred Sale p 
Import substitution is often seen as an effective substitute of import 
financing. Import substituting projects could be established on the basis of 
price deferred istisna'. Accordingly, foreign investors will install industrial or 
11bid p 13. 
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infrastructural projects in the host country according to specifications and the 
mark-up price will be settled with a deferred payment arrangement. This 
method contains an obvious incentive for the host party. It ensures the transfer 
of ownership of an industrial facility, which was otherwise, impossible. But 
simultaneously, it may also have adverse incentives. For instance, ensuring 
quality of plants imported as such, often involves high risks, particularly, when 
the importer is a developing country. 
For the supplier, sales expansion of R&D intensive resources ensures 
an increase in revenues. Moreover, it may also avoid any ownership related 
problems with the host country. This ascertains a future market share for more 
products. However, a financial institution is not expected to have any R&D 
intensive comparative advantages. As such, it does not trade in such 
resources. Thus, the incentive of increasing sales revenues, or, securing share 
in future product markets, is irrelevant for a financial institution. Consequently, 
it is 'not surprising to observe that Islamic financial institutions lack incentive in 
supplying industrial projects on the basis of deferred sale. 
Import Substitution by Renting 
An import substituting plant may be established and rented out to the 
host parties. In this case, ownership is retained by the financier. Consequently, 
substantial amount of resources will remain engaged in a single project and 
that too, in a single country. This will increase the financier's exposure to risks. 
Perpetuation of foreign ownership, is not welcome by the host parties, either. 
The interests of the lessee in the life of the leased project may also be weak, 
causing an increase in the maintenance cost. 
See, Shall, L. D. et., al., (1978). 
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Equipment Financing 
Equipment financing through leasing and installment sale, offers another 
form of import financing. It can be expected, that by supporting investment 
activities directly, such financing will improve the recipient country's capabilities 
to meet future debt services obligations. However, a number of risks 
associated with equipment financing through leasing and installment sale 
cannot be singled out. The financier has to carry additional costs of selective 
procurement, obsolescence of the equipment and its maintenance. 
These factors may create conflicts among suppliers of equipment, 
financiers and recipients. As for the obsolescence of the equipment is 
concerned, it will often force the financial institution to liquidate the equipment. 
But, only equipment in successful ventures can be liquidated easily. In the 
longer-run, this will imply, that profitable projects will be liquidated and capital 
will remain stuck with unprofitable projects. This will also aggravate the risk 
exposure for the financier. However, by increasing the interests of the buyer in 
the equipment, installment sale may substantially decrease the maintenance 
costs compared to pure leasing. Keeping these considerations in view, from 
the point of view of the financier an installment sale may be superior compared 
to pure leasing. However, from the point of view of the user of finance this may 
not be the' 'case. Therefore, most Islamic international leases are finance 
leaseS'. " 
General Purpose Import Financing 
Consumers' goods can be imported through the mark-up principle of 
financing. This principle improves the short-run financial transactions of the 
fina , ncier, as well as reduces his risk exposure, compared to all the previous 
cases. But the investment content of such financing may be insignificant. 
1, This 1, s despite the fact that such the OIC Fiqh Academy has strong reservations against such 
leases. '" 
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Consequently, in the longer-run, it could not improve the recipient's debt 
servicing capabilities. 
Salam Sale and Export Financing 
If competitive supply exists, certain firms and households as well as 
Islamic financial institutions may always prefer to acquire ownership by making 
advance payments. In this case, the supplier of goods and services will benefit 
from the finance (advance payments). Some agricultural commodities are in 
fact "pur6hase'd by the Islamic banks. An example is the advance purchase of 
Pakistani rice by some Islamic banks on the basis of salam. But the application 
of this principle to the manufacturing sector in the Muslim countries is highly 
limited as manufacturing exports from these countries are either non-existent 
or less competitive. 
3.4.2 Brief Comparison With Traditional Transactions 
Mark-up based financial, investment and leasing transactions are similar 
to interest-based finance due to the fact that these also create debt. Due to 
debt creation, finance does not cause any undesirable control of projects by 
the foreign financiers-cum-investors. 
However, at the same time, sale-based financial arrangements are 
similar to direct investment in that, they transfer physical assets, R&D intensive 
services and technology to the host countries. Sale-based finance, like grants 
(unlike debt finance) ensures the transfer of resources at the initial period of 
the, contract. Logically, the so-called "urgencies" which divert debt finance to 
consumption, and more often to capital flight, could not influence resource 
allocation under sale-based finance. 
Moreover, completion of the sale contract of the equipment, 
consumption goods and R&D intensive services, also completes the transfer 
processlof ownership. This could be expected to work as an added incentive 
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for the efficient operation of projects'. The bias of sale-based finance towards 
investment is also expected to positively contribute to the overall performance 
of an economy. As a result, the issue 'of debt-default, which serves as an 
adverse incentive under debt-finance, could not matter much in this case. 
Management of debts created through debt finance and sale-based 
finance, gives rise to a number of considerations. Under sale-based financial 
arrangements, a greater part of foreign liabilities constitute projects, equipment 
or other physical assets. If need may arise, ownership of these projects can be 
sold to amortize the debt. Such is not the case under pure debt. However, if 
sale-based finance is used for consumption purposes, debt management 
II-ý 
problems, under the alternative arrangements, may be similar. Probably, the 
problem may be more severe under the sale-based arrangement as debts 
cannot be rescheduled at higher rates. ' 
`, 'ý t" 3.4.3 Adverse Incentives 
While the mark-up modes of finance, namely installment sale, short-term 
murabahah, and leasing has dominated the IDB operations (which are a form 
of resource flows among the Muslim countries), in the longer-run some 
problems caused by negative incentive factors can be foreseen. The following 
can be mentioned as an example. 
Lack of Mutuality of Interest 
If investment oriented financing is adopted (viz., installment 
sale/purchase of equipment, sale of plants, projects, R&D intensive services 
and technology), a serious incentive problem may arise from the supply side. It 
is true that the repayment of installments will depend, at least indirectly, on the 
contribution of the supplied plants to production. Also, that in providing the 
Payment of installments, is not necessarily a function of the operation of the projects. Yet, for 
an incentive advantage such an arrangement could be superior. 
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plants and projects, suppliers stake their reputation and future market share. 
These factors may work as checks on the quality of the plants. Nevertheless, 
the sale arrangement transfers the ownership of the projects. In this manner, 
suppliers do not directly share the risk of the project's outcome. They only 
claim a fixed liability. Therefore, they may save on the quality of the resources 
supplied. This situation may aggravate, if the suppliers are different from the 
financiers and the recipients are developing countries; who are initially unable 
to gauge the exact nature of technological components of the transaction. 
Structure of Existing Imports 
Trade promotion among the Muslim countries is widely cherished. Given 
the level of the industrial sector and manufacturing exports of these countries, 
it is natural, that trade among them will be biased in favor of primary 
commodities and consumption goods and against investment. Investment 
content of import from the developing countries is often lower compared to the 
investment content of imports from the developed countries. A trade-off 
between trade promotion between these countries and investment, need to be 
established. Thus, the objective of trade promotion among the Muslim 
countries should be consistent with the objective of financing investment rather 
than consumption. 
Implications for Elimination of Interest 
For its longer-run viability, the Islamic financial system need to develop 
its own production processes. Mark-up-based trade financing of commodities 
produced under the interest-based financial system, in the final analysis, 
supports and stimulates the interest-based system. This runs counter to the 
objective of elimination of interest, thus unambiguously, detrimental to the 
establishment of an Islamic financial system. It is, therefore, imperative that the 
Islamic financial transactions should primarily target the development of 
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production facilities which may support the purpose of financial Islamization 
and abolishing interest. 
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Chapter 4 
ISLAMIC FINANCE IN PRACTICE: 
RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROFIT - LOSS - SHARING 
AND MARK-UP IN ISLAMIC BANKING 
-14.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the preceding chapters, the PLS and mark-up are the 
two parent principles of Islamic financingl. Most research undertaken by the 
Islamic economists emphasize the benefits of the PLS compared to the mark- 
UP-2. In the initial stages of their operations, some Islamic banks were also 
enthusiastic about the PLS arrangements. However, the present chapter aims 
to show that very soon, the mark-up became the basis of an overwhelming 
proportion of the Islamic banks' operations. Islamic banks seem to be satisfied 
with, their present use of the mark-up compared to the PLS. But a general 
, 
consensus exists among Islamic scholars that the present use of the mark-up 
by, the 
. 
11slarnic banks is disproportionate. It is desirable to reduce the reliance 
on the, mark-up and increase the use of other Islamic modes particularly, the 
PLS., This requires an understanding of the factors which are responsible for 
the observed phenomenon of the subdued PLS. 
The present chapter also aims at putting forward some explanations for 
the overwhelming use of the mark-up and subdued nature of the PLS in the 
operations of the Islamic banks. The objective is to seek ways and means to 
enha n"ce the flow of PLS funds from the Islamic banks. 
1The participatory modes of Islamic financing include muzara, musaqa' diminishing musharakah (DM), 
durable asset participation (DAP), musharakah and mudharabah. However, the first two modes are 
specific to agriculture. DM and DAP being only recent innovations are not known in the market. Whereas, 
musharakah'and mudharabah are not only famous but also relevant to the financial structures. In the 
present study, therefore, PLS is treated as a synonym for only the mudharabah and musharakah modes 
of Islamic financing. Rent is a price of the usufructs rights. As such, in an exchange relationship, it 
necessarily functions as a price. Thus organically, rent and mark-up are not much different. Both create 
fixed liabilities. In both cases the financier does not participate in the risk of the enterprise. Narrowing 
down the small differences facilitates a sharp comparison between the extreme cases of the participatory 
PLS and debt creating deferred sale principles of Islamic financing. 
2see e. g., Siddiqi (1988), Khan (1992), Mirakhor (1987) and Ziauddin (1985). 
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I, Section Two overviews the diverse nature of the Islamic modes of 
financing, the concentration of Islamic banks' operations in the mark-up and 
, the consequences of the dichotomy in the the6ry and practice. Section Three 
Aeals with the preferences of firms for forms of finance and its implications for 
the PLS and mark-up. Section Four looks at the suitability of PLS and mark-up 
for acquisition of assets. Considerations for issuance of bonds and taxes are 
discussed, respectively, in Sections Five and Six. The supply side 
considerations such as the moral hazard proposition, collateral, adverse 
selection and a number of other considerations are covered in Section Seven. 
Some institutional aspects are discussed in Section Nine. 
4.2 DICHOTOMY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ISLAMIC 
BANKING: AN OVERVIEW OF CONSEQUENCES 
Contractual relationships and trusts between parties are the two 
fundamental building blocks of an Islamic economic system. The Almighty God, 
while characterizing the believers says: The believers must (eventually) win 
through [verse i]... Those who faithfully observe their trusts and their covenants 
[verse, viii] Sura al Mominoon (translation by Yousuf Ali). The Holly Quran 
provides basic guidelines for establishing just and efficient contractual 
relations'and their preservation (see, e. g., verse 282 of Surah al Baqarah). The 
Prophet (peace be upon him) was a perfect trustworthy (Amin) person in his 
transactions with followers and foes alike. ' 
4.2 1 Diversity of Islamic Modes of Financing 
As discussed, the fiqh has provided detailed schemes for preparing just 
and efficient contracts and their administration. Contracts of exchange (uqud al 
mua'wadat) and contracts of partnership (uqud al sharikat) are the two parent 
Islamic contracts for administering the economic, financial and commercial 
transactions in a Muslim society. The former contracts are based on (deferred) 
price. -, Whereas, the latter contracts are based on sharing the outcome of a 
transaction or enterprise. Moreover, leasing and ju'ala can be characterized as 
uqud al manafi' (contracts based on the utilization of benefits of assets). By 
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combining the basic principles, several modes of financing can be innovated to 
meet -the requirements of an Islamic economy under various economic 
-conditions 
(see e. g., Hassan 1992). Some of these arrangements as 
summarized in the following chart ensure the diversity of the Islamic modes of 
finance. 
Islamic Principles 
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Table 4 (a) Concentration Of Islamic Banks'Assets 
PILS Mark-up 
Banks in Islamic Republic of Pakistanl 13 87 
Banks in Islamic Republic of Iranl 37 52 
Islamic Development Bank2 04 81 
Faisal Islamic Bank, Egypt3 03 52 
Islamic Bank for Investment and 
Development, Egypt3 02 75 
al Barakah Turk Finance House, Turkey4 05 94 
, Jordan Islamic Bank, Jordan4 05 65 
Bangladesh Islamic Bank5 NA 65 
Sudanese Islamic Bank5 NA 54 
Tadamon Islamic Bank5 NA 61 
Qatar Islamic Bank5 NA 98 
Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad6 NA 94 
NOTES 
NA implies not available. 
1. IMF (1985); for Pakistan and Iran data relates to 1984 and 1985 respectively and covers the 
entire commercial banking sector. 
2. Annual Reports of IDB; average of all operations till end of 1991. 
3. Elias (1990); data for FIBE averages for 1980-88, for IBID averages for 1981-88. Most of the 
remaining IBID assets for the period were absorbed in foreign exchange markets and FIBE 
funds in the Central Bank of Egypt. 
4. Gul (1991); data for BTFH represent annual averages for 1986-89, for JIB only one year i. e., 
1988. 
5. Ahmad (1987), data for all banks is for 1984. 
6. Bank Nagara Malaysia, Annual Report (1991) 
,,, - 4.2.2 Concentration of Islamic Banks'short-term Assets 
As far the use of PLS and mark-up are concerned, Table 4 (a) provides 
information for some Islamic banks. Mark-up is predominant in general. The 
little use of PLS reported for some banks also concentrates on short-term trade 
financing. 
4.2.3 Overview of Consequences 
. The phenomenon of concentration of the Islamic banks' assets in the 
mark-up mode which is short-term in nature and does not require risk sharing 
has certain consequences seen in different perspectives differently. 
88 
4.2.3.1 Islamic Economic Preferences 
Different attitudes regarding the preference for PLS and mark-up modes 
of Islamic financing can be cited. First, the Council of Islamic Ideology (1981), 
Siddiqi (1988), Khan (1992) and other researchers recognize PLS as most 
distinct from interest-based financing. This comparison is based on the fixed 
nature of mark-up and interest as a rate of return and consequently similarity in 
risk concentrating qualities of finance. Following this pattern, many studies 
(see e g. Khan, 1983a, Khan 1983b, Nadir 1987) treat PLS as a synonym for 
Islamic financing. 
Second, Homoud (1974) views that mark-up is the most important 
Islamic substitute to interest. For its sharing nature, he sees the PLS as 
irrelevant for many financing needs where no outcome could accrue to share. 
Moreover, in his understanding, the traditional PLS modes of finance imply one 
to one correspondence between suppliers and users of funds which falls short 
to meet the modern needs of financial inter mediation. In line with Homoud, 
Ismail (1989) also takes a serious critical note of the first attitude. In his 
understanding the most important Islamic alternative to interest-based debt 
creation (financing) is deferred trading-based dayin (debt) creation. He argues 
that mark-up is a price. It is not a rate of return on financing. As a price it has to 
be fixed. Further, according to him, it is incorrect to say that interest is 
eliminated for its fixed nature. He cites the variable rates of interest which are 
more common. than fixed rates of interest. Moreover, in his view the Islamic 
banks' reliance on the mark-up mode is approved by the shariah consultants of 
these banks. 
Third, Chapra (1985), and while surveying the principles of financing in 
Islamic economics, Kahf and Khan (1992) adopt a middle course by 
integrating the above two views. The essence of this approach is to accept the 
sharia'h p ermissibility of both PLS and mark-up and then to concentrate on the 
suitability of one or the other to a particular economic environment. Although 
therriark-up is more prone to violate the shariah requirements compared to the 
1 
89 
PLS, - the last approach is widely considered useful in view of the need for 
designing financial policies in the Muslim countries. 
4.2.3.2 Stability of the Banking System 
The consequences of the use of mark-up and PLS are also compared 
by researchers in terms of their implications for the stability of the banking 
system. Several studies have discussed the stability of the Islamic PLS 
banking system and have compared it with the traditional system. Khan (1986) 
compares the implications of the balance sheet characteristics of Islamic PLS 
banks with the traditional banks. No fixed liabilities are involved in the Islamic 
PLS -banks' balance sheets. Thus deposits are considered as shares. 
Therefore, any shock on the assets' side (suppose losses reported by 
enterprises using PLS funds) would automatically be absorbed and adjusted on 
the liability side (losses will be absorbed by PLS deposit holders). By its nature, 
the PLS banking system is thus stable. In the absence of this automatic 
stabilization mechanism in conventional banking, when a crisis arises on the 
assets' side, banks turn to liability management. This makes the banking 
system highly unstablel. 
I I- 
Mirakhor (1987) develops the above argument further to compare the 
effects of PLS and mark-up on bankruptcy of the banking system. It is 
suggested that to avoid bankruptcy, Islamic banks should also use PLS modes 
of ýfinancing. This argument is valid in general. But in context of the present 
practices of Islamic banks, some more considerations need to be added. First, 
in - any-manner there is no fixed liability in the Islamic banks' balance sheet. 
Deposits of Islamic banks are in fact PLS deposits and are not treated as fixed 
liabilities2. Second, the type of credit risk and the resultant, bankruptcy 
confronted by the conventional banks is not relevant for Islamic banks. Mark-up 
is a very short-term operation. Therefore, it does not involve any significant 
I Khan 'provides several examples that some what similar to the Islamic banking system is proposed in 
the United State for reforming the US banking system. 
20n the liability side of Islamic banks the PILS is fully being utilized. 
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credit risk. Moreover, mark-up inevitably results in the transfer of ownership of 
assets to the borrower. Therefore, the borrower in Islamic banking is in general 
more solvent compared to his counter part in the traditional banking system. 
Due to these facts bankruptcy in Islamic banking is less likely to happen as a 
result of concentration of their assets on the mark-up, compared to 
conventional banks due to interest-based financing. 
,,, 4.2.3.3 Diversification and Macro-economic Competitiveness 
Diversification eliminates the risk of individual assets. Thus, it is argued 
that, even if individual PLS operations may be risky, by diversification this risk 
can always be eliminated. Islamic banks are thus advised to use more PLS by 
way of diversification. From the point of view of an individual investor or 
financial institution, the benefits of diversification are obvious. 
,-', Economy wide diversification may however, lead to an increase in the 
cost 'of capital, consequently to an over-all economic inefficiency. This 
argument is based on the fact that with diversification only high return assets 
with ýnegative covariance of returns will attract the attention of portfolio 
managers. Risk aversion which causes the acceptance of lower return 
investments will be eliminated. There would be a continuos search for higher 
return bearing investments. Highest return investments would be undertaken, 
implying that low return projects would be given up. There would be a constant 
diversion of investment to high return projects pushing up the cost of capital in 
the macro ecoriomy. When the cost of capital increases, the competitiveness of 
the economy compared to other economies decreases thus creating a general 
inefficiency. Therefore, it is not always justifiable to urge the Islamic banks to 
diversify in order to enhance the flow of their PLS funds. 
4.2.3.4 Efficiency of Bank and Stock Oriented Firms 
. The cost of capital raised from the stock markets includes risk 
adjustments for agency costs, pressure by speculators, transaction costs, the 
cost of 'short-run disputes (takeovers, mergers) etc. These costs can be 
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avoided by direct equity linkages between financiers and firms. Thus the total 
cost of finance raised from stock markets is supposed to be higher compared 
to the finance provided by direct equity stakes. 
Direct equity stakes by banks in industrial projects enforces more 
effective monitoring control on the managers of industrial projects. This type of 
control is simply not possible for individual owners of common stock. Moreover, 
it also puts the stakes of the banks in focus and increases their monitoring 
concerns and leads to overall efficiency. Therefore, a longer-term interest of 
the Islamic banks in projects could improve the performance of the projects 
and contribute to macro-economic efficiency. 
4.2.3.5 Development of New Interest-Free Enterprises 
For its longer-run viability, the Islamic financial system needs to develop 
its own production processes. This requires undertaking such new investment 
enterprises (by an appropriate mix of the mark-up and PLS modes of Islamic 
i- 
financing) which do not contain any capital involving interest. This argument 
was taken up more forcefully during the seminar on Problems of Islamic Banks, 
organized jointly by the Islamic Research and Training Institute and the Fiqh 
Academy 
-, 
of the Organization of Islamic Conference, held in Jeddah during 
April 1993. In conclusion of the seminar it was recommended that Islamic 
banks should consider to reduce their reliance on the mark-up mode and 
search ways and means to participate in productive activities by using the PLS 
principle. 
ý It is with the last two objectives that the Islamic banks may be urged to 
enhance their PLS operations for the benefit of the society as well as for their 
own longer-term benefits. 
4.3 PREFERENCES OF FIRMS FOR FORMS OF FINANCE 
Individuals' attitude towards risk has crucial implications for their 
preferences for different forms of funds. Individuals differ in their feelings 
92 
towards risk and return. This, in turn, determines their preferences for the 
choice of alternative sources and uses of funds. Since, there would be as many 
preferences as individuals, a generalization regarding peoples' approach about 
risk is impossible. In this section, it is assumed that individuals' liking for risk 
changes over time depending on their exposure to risk and experience with 
entrepreneur-ship. In other words, in the initial stages of their entrepreneurial 
functions, individuals will, in general, avoid risk. But as experience is 
accumulated, entrepreneurs, would gradually develop risk bearing qualities. 
4 
4.3.1 Attitude towards Risk as Viewed by Islamic Economists 
Except for the prohibition of gambling, separation of risk of an asset 
from, its ownership (as in interest-based transactions), and gross uncertainties 
related to contractual relations (as in gharar), no hard and fast rules are 
mentioned by Islamic economists regarding the Islamic temperament towards 
risk. This implies that Islam recognizes the natural attitude of people towards 
risk, namely, some people may have natural inclination for avoiding risk, some 
may be risk neutral and others may have an affection for risky activities. 
-4.3.2 The Basis of Preference for the PLS 
It may be noted that in Islamic economics, the owner of an asset is 
required to be responsible for all risks underlying the asset. Resorting to risk- 
sharing is however, accepted as a necessity. For instance, people need 
mudharabah, becaus e the owners of funds lack time and entrepreneurial skills; 
and those possessing time and entrepreneurial skills lack financial resources. 
These limitations of the two parties are overcome by the risk-sharing 
arrangement through mudharabah. 
For growth, all economies depend on the fulfillment of certain minimum 
entrepreneurial functions. In one way or another, these functions are related to 
risk''taking. The risk taking functions of entrepreneurs in turn, promote 
investments, induce innovations and technological progress and ultimately 
economic efficiency Nevertheless, the entrepreneurial class is weaker in the 
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developing countries. Only an insufficient number of people are capable to take 
entrepreneurial risks. Inculcation of the entrepreneurial qualities in the 
population should therefore, be an integral part of an Islamic economic policyl. 
In this regard, the PLS can be greatly instrumental, because: i) the PLS 
spreads the risk of projects between the entrepreneur and the financier, thus 
encourages entrepreneurial activities, ii) it does not require collateral; hence 
ensures access to funds only on the basis of financial merit of projects and iii) it 
ties-up the interests of the financier with the project and ensures technical 
support and efficiency. 
The mark-up concentrates all risks on the entrepreneur and lacks these 
fundamental risk spreading characteristics of the PLS. Thus, it is obvious that 
the infant firms should have stronger preferences for the PLS arrangements 
compared to the mark-up. 
4.3.3 The Role of Islamic Banks 
As the infant entrepreneurs lack risk taking qualities, the mere existence 
of the preferable PLS option is insufficient. The Islamic banks need to come 
forward to share the risk of projects through the PLS arrangements and enable 
such individuals to undertake new projects. Once a project is undertaken and 
operated' on the basis of the PLS, the entrepreneur would get acquaintance 
with the entrepreneurial functions. After certain aspects of the project's 
01p. eration becoming clearer to the entrepreneur, his confidence would improve. 
His risk profile will undergo favorable changes and he is expected to be in a 
p- osition'to assume greater entrepreneurial risks. 
4.3.4 The Nature of the PLS Contracts 
, Some observations about the nature of the PLS contracts and the 
utilization of the entrepreneurs' improved risk profile are useful. The traditional 
lKhan (1992C) argues that if appropriate policies are adopted, the PLS system has the in-built incentive 
mechanism to overcome the fear of starvation as a result of any investment decision and its subsequent 
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forms of the PLS (both mudharabah and musharakah) are perpetual and 
permanent contracts (see, e. g., Hassan, 1992). Once formulated and agreed, 
these contracts could not be terminated before the conclusion of the enterprise. 
This implies that even though the risk profile of the entrepreneur may have 
improved, this improvement will not be effectively utilized for the whole period 
of the PLS contract. Because, risk and ownership shares are defined in the 
contract once for all, and the entrepreneur is not left with any opportunity to re- 
invest his savings in the project. 
4.3.5 Utilization of the Improved Risk-Profile 
It is in the interest of the financial and economic system that the 
'improvement 
in the risk profile of the entrepreneur should be positively utilized. 
In other words, the entrepreneur should gradually take more and more share of 
the project's risks, i. e., the project's ownership. After the entrepreneur stands 
on its own feet, the bank can be relieved from the risk-sharing arrangement 
with this growing firm. Thus, the bank can undertake risk-sharing 
arrangements with other infant firms more effectively. Using the PLS, banks 
would thus play effective role in the promotion of entrepreneurs in the society. 
4.3.6 The Need for Redeeming PLS Contracts 
On the basis of the above arguments, it can be suggested that 
diminishing PLS contracts (diminishing musharakah) would be an improvement 
on the non-red. eeming, perpetual and pure PLS contracts. Accordingly, a bank 
will undertake a musharakah contract with an infant entrepreneur. The contract 
will ensure that the project will be wholly transferred to the entrepreneur within 
a specified time period, e. g., 5 years. Payments for the purchase of the bank's 
ownership will be made from the profit share of the entrepreneur. Thus as the 
I entrepreneur will mature, he would be able to take the ownership risk. The 
more the entrepreneur acquires the risk taking qualification, the better it would 
be, for the efficiency of the contract, the shorter would be the time for the 
failure, an extreme case of risk-aversion. 
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transfer of ownership, the more would be the bank capable of undertaking 
diminishing PLS contracts with other infant enterprisesl. 
With some digression, the above point can be further clarified. Several 
instances can be provided, where gradual termination of financier's ownership 
in the PLS contract is in the interest of both parties. Hence, it can improve the 
efficiency of the contract itself. For instance, 
i) the above logic also applies to social role of the Islamic banks e. g., in 
poverty alleviation. It is well-known that poverty can be alleviated effectively by 
enabling the poor to participate in the market by making them owners of real 
assets. Keeping in view the extent of poverty in the Muslim Umah, under the 
perpetual PLS contracts, this again requires the banks to engage in infinite 
number of projects. By terminating PLS contracts, banks can generate more 
projects as ownership of projects will continuously roll-over to the 
entrepreneurs. 
1ý I ii) similarly, terminating PLS contracts can reduce the foreign control of 
local projects, enhance the understanding between host societies and foreign 
investors, minimize no-commercial risks and promote foreign investment 
through the diminishing PLS. 
iii) in a number of activities, if the financiers' ownership is not terminable, 
despite a need for funds, demand for PLS cannot be generated. Examples are, 
development of owner-operated agricultural farms, or mobilization of finance for 
the construction of houses. 
For these considerations, and from policy perspective, it may be useful 
to consider that while in general entrepreneurs are expected to be risk-neutral, 
certain "group of new investors are extremely risk-averse. The last and most 
dominant group of new investors, should prefer PLS as it spreads risk. The 
banks could therefore, play crucial role in the promotion of investment by 
I For a detailed profile of the diminishg PLS contract, see Khan and Boulem (1993). 
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offering PLS funds. On the other hand, when these investors become familiar 
with risk, they build -up confidence. This opportunity can be better utilized if 
banks are relieved from maturing projects and use their resources for 
generating newer infant projects. 
In the framework of the above analysis, the demand for the PLS funds is 
to be generated by the investment promotion policies of the Islamic banks. It is 
the expressed view of a number of senior Islamic bankers that Islamic banks 
rarely deal with infant firms - firms who have high preferences for the risk 
spreading characteristics of the PLS. Rather, the Islamic banks prefer to deal 
with, established companies. Some observations about the preferences of 
growing firms for sources of funds are presented in the next section. 
4.3.7 Preferences of Growing Finns for Self - Financing 
For growth, a firm meets its capital needs from three main sources, i) 
internal funds, ii) external funds - debt and iii) external funds - equity. Until 
recently, the first source of funds was considered to be of lesser significance. 
About the relative significance of debt and equity as external sources of funds, 
in the existing literature we find two opposing opinions. Some scholars argue 
that interest-based debt has no significant role in the capital structure of firms. 
Others argue that debt has dominant role. However, the mainstream economic 
thinking is that as too much debt will make the bankruptcy cost significant and 
too much equity will raise tax liabilities as well as put a downward pressure on 
the price of equity (value of the firm), there is the possibility of an optimum debt 
equity ratio. Most Islamic scholars however, hold the view that the role of 
interest-based debt in the economy is usually over exaggerated (see, e. g., 
Ahmad 1985, Siddiqi 1983, and Zarqa 1986). However, until recently little 
empirical evidence was available to verify the validity of these arguments. 
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4.3.8 Some Empirical Evidence 
When two prominent economists found that, in 1983, for growth, most 
US firms relied on their internal funds, they felt astonishedl. Their finding has 
however, become an established fact now. A comprehensive evidence on this 
is provided in a recent'study of the International Finance Corporation (see IFC 
1992). Some useful insights are available in this study about the actual 
significance of alternative sources of funds of growing firms. 
From the data for US, European and Japanese firms, presented in 
appendix charts 4(a) and 4 (b), we derive the following conclusions: 
i) in all cases, firms mostly relied on internal funds, 
ii) in all cases, in general, reliance on debt is substantially lower than 
what was usually believed. This debt Is however, generated by asset based 
mortgages, and bond issues and to a lesser extent owned by banks, 
iii) in all cases, stocks constituted insignificant part of total funds of firms, 
and 
iv) Thus, these firms retained generally a very significant proportion of 
their profits. In some cases, for example in the UK, it appears that firms even 
bought their own stocks - over 100% of profits were retained for the period 
reported. I 
In the developing countries, the structure of companies' capital is 
strikingly different from the developed countries. Appendix chart 4(c) provides 
information about firms' capital structure in four Muslim countries. Retention is . 
a major, source of funds only in the Pakistani companies but still lesser 
compared 'to the developed countries. Jordanian and Turkish companies 
greatly rely on stock market for funds. The Malaysian companies also do not 
rely much on bank funds. Similar discrepancies are found among other 
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developing countries. Owning to various factors, discrepancies are found 
among the developing countries and among the developing and developed 
countries in this regard. 
However, this information is helpful to conclude that: 
i) in the developed countries overwhelmingly, and in the developing 
countries to a certain extent (Pakistan and Malaysia in a sample of four 
countries), growing firms rely on internal sources of funds, 
ii) it may be noted that these figures reflect only retention and do not 
contain information about depreciation allowance, which is another significant 
internal source of funds. Adding the two sources of internal funds, the reliance 
of firms in both developing and developed countries on external sources will be 
much lower and 
iii) This also supports the argument that the role of interest-based debt 
in the economy is over exaggerated. 
It is very difficult to provide an exact explanation for the overwhelming 
reliance of these firms on internal sources. However, some observations in this 
regard may be useful. 
i) the observed reality is a historical phenomenon, at least in the case of 
the US' firms, for which such data is available. Therefore, it cannot be 
considered as a recent concern of firms due to some new structural changes, 
ii) Retention is the most efficient form of capital. Compared to debt and 
equity, ý, it is free of transaction costs. Thus it increases the value of the 
company. - When companies have to save, it may be rational for them to acquire 
more assets of their own companies rather than selling their own assets and 
acquiring 'outside assets, 
1See Samuelson, Paul A. and Nordhaus, Willaim D. (1985), Economics Twelfth Edition, New York, 
McGraw -Hill Book Company, p 411. 
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iii) Moreover, resorting to outside capital also increases the cost of 
takeovers, mergers, bankruptcies, taxes etc., as well as decreases the 
companies privacy, 
iv) Furthermore, the prices of stocks increase overtime due to capital 
gains. In such cases, it is in the interest of the enterprises not to sell their 
stocks and resort to alternative means of financing if available. 
4.3.9 Implications for Form of Funds 
The case of these established and growing firms is therefore different 
compared to the infant firms. These growing firms have become familiar with 
risk, they need to absorb their savings in their growth by acquiring assets. 
Those firms which struggle for their birth not only need capital but also need 
risk'spreading characteristics of funds. Thus the two cases are strikingly 
different. Such growing firms which need to acquire assets will not be attracted 
by the PLS. As these firms are building assets from their own funds, they will 
prefer mark-up. Moreover, the PLS does not allow retention of profits and their 
investment in the growth of the firm. 
However, a word of warning is in order. The information presented 
above is related to only incorporated firms. It cannot be considered a 
representative of the thousands of non-incorporated firms particularly in the 
developing countries. A considerable number of such growing firms may need 
risk spreading characteristics of the PLS and external funds simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, retention, and re-investment of profits in the growth of the 
firm can be considered as a sign of sound policy. It is consistent with the 
motiv ation for acquiring ownership thus has an in-built incentive mechanism for 
efficiency. Therefore, enlarging the retention of firms may be considered one of 
the ultimate policy objectives of a PLS contract. 
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4.4 ASSET ACQUISITION 
The users of Islamic bank's funds may have two objectives for the 
acquisition of assets, namely, end-use purposes and re-sale purposes. In the 
former case, only mark-up is relevant whereas, in the latter case both mark-up 
and PLS are relevant. Some observations on this comparison are in order. 
To explain the relevance of mark-up and PLS under this case, we may 
again refer to the basic demand and supply schedules of Fig. 3 (a) reproduced 
in Fig. 4 (a). Let us assume that all available means can support an individual 
demand shown as DID in the Fig. 4 (a). Let us also assume that the actual 
needs of this individual are reflected by the D*D* schedule. In the conventional 
sense, the individual in this case will come to the market with interest-based 
borrowed money. Thus the dichotomy between the DID and D*D* schedules is 
not relevant in the conventional markets due to availability of interest-based 
finance. 
Since interest-based borrowing is not available, our problem is therefore, 
to seek alternative means of credit. Without credit, the demand schedule would 
remain, as DID. Price rather than profit is relevant to this phenomenon of the 
market., Therefore, the PLS cannot be incorporated in this fundamental case of 
the demand curve. Since mark-up is a price, it can more conveniently fit into 
the mechanism. As mark-up is a price inherent in the same (commodity) 
market, it may not carry transaction costs compared to interest being a price in 
the money market. 
Given the DID demand schedule, it is in the interest of the suppliers to 
offer credit, sale corresponding to S*s* supply schedule so that the demand 
schedule D*D* would become effective - the quantity qq* would reflect credit 
sale and oq*. total sales. The price will rise to op* reflecting the mark-up. 
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ý, Fig. 4 (a): The Case of Irrelevance of PLS Mechanism 
This fundamental pricing mechanism as compared to the profit sharing 
mechanism is relevant to all such activities where the purpose of acquisition of 
merchandise is not re-sale, such as supplying an equipment to a project, or 
purchase of a car by a household. 
We do not have any empirical support to claim that this is the nature of 
demand for most bank funds. However, from the data of lDB operations as 
reported in various documents of the bank, it is easy to observe that a 
I substantial demand for funds is effected for end-use purposes. 
_,,,, 
Most government procurement demand is also effected for end-use 
rather, than re-sale purposes. However, oil and a few other exceptions can be 
cited in which governments buy and sell to their public. But these sales are 
often subsidized and do not involve profit to any significant extent. In such 
cases the basic concept of profit and loss-sharing is again not relevant. If the 
public sector is large, we can expect this type of demand also to be large 
proportionately. This again limits the horizon of the application of the PLS 
arrangements. 
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--4.5 ISSUANCE OF BONDS 
Bonds are an important source of mobilizing external funds for a firm. 
Different financial contracts must have different implications for the mobilization 
of funds by issuing bonds. These characteristics cannot be ignored while 
comparing the preferences of firms for financial contracts. In this subsection, 
we briefly compare the implications of PLS vis-a-vis mark-up for the issuance 
ofbonds. 
4.5.1 Issuance of Bonds under the PLS and Mark-up 
Under certain restrictive conditions, the Fiqh allows the issuance of 
Muqarada bonds for the mobilization of funds (see IFA 1989). An important 
condition is that, the bonds can only be issued against real assets owned by 
the issuing authority. In the PLS contracts, most funds are not owned by the 
firmý Thus a firm will only opt for the PLS, if it is willing to forego its rights of 
issuing bonds. It is understandable that in a particular given condition a firm 
may not need to issue bonds. But it is hard to imagine a firm which can willingly 
accept a permanent restriction on its financial policy. 
On the other hand, mark-up ensures the transfer of ownership of assets 
to the firm. Thus, the mark-up is consistent with the Fiqh pre-requisite for the 
issuance of Muqarada bonds. Since, firms must be sensitive to the provisions 
of a financial contract for raising additional funds, in this regard, the PLS is at 
an obvious disadvantage. 
., 4.5.2 
The Problems of Implementing a Bond Contract 
Fjqh provisions may be discovered for the issuance of bonds under the 
PLS contracts. As a result, the PLS contract may allow issuance of bonds. 
Even'then, due to lack of retention of profits in the PLS compared to the mark- 
up, the'PLS will always be at a disadvantage. To consider this point, let us 
assume that the firm can equally resort to the issuance of bonds under the PLS 
and mark-up. As soon as a bond is issued, the ownership of the firm is divided 
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between the bondholders and managers of the firm. The welfare of the 
bondholders and managers of the firm may diverge over time. 
For the shariah validity of the bond contract, it is crucial that the welfare 
of'. the managers of the firm and the Muqarada bondholders must move 
together overtime. It may be argued that due to a direct relationship between 
the bondholders' expected returns and the market value of the firm, the welfare 
of the two groups will always move together. But for a number of reasons such 
a relationship cannot be taken for granted. The danger of divergence in the 
welfare of the manager of the firm and the Muqarada bondholders may exist 
unless proper protective clauses are incorporated in the bond contract. 
ý 4.5.3 Some Common Causes of Conflicts 
The most important cause of a conflict between the welfare of the firm's 
manager and its bondholders is the difference between before and after bond 
issuance policies of the firm. For instance, at the time of the issuance of bonds, 
the, company was observed by the bondholders to practice a particular wage, 
dividend, and other expenses' policies. But after raising funds through bond 
I, -- issuance, the company may change these policies - increase wages, 
dividends, operating expenses such a beautification of offices etc. As a result, 
the welfare of the firm managers will increase. But, as these factors will 
decrease the value of the firm, welfare of the bondholders will decrease. 
Moreover, at the time of issuing the bonds, the observed risk exposure 
Of the company was attractive for the bondholders. But as soon as the bond 
funds 
'are, 
collected, the company may review its investment policy and change 
its risk exposure. The new risk exposure of the company may not be consistent 
with the risk profile of the initial bondholders. Managers' welfare will improve at 
the cost of the bondholders. In addition, at the time of the initial bond issuance, 
the company's observed value was attractive for the bondholders. But after 
sometime, the company issues new bonds, the value of each bond issued 
previously will decrease. The welfare of the initial buyers will decrease. 
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4.5.4 The Cost of Resolving the Conflict 
In conclusion, many factors may contribute to a conflict between the 
interest 
,s 
of bondholders and managers of a firm - often managers tending to 
maximize their welfare at the cost of the bondholders. As a result, a net wealth 
transfer will take place by-passing the contract. To avoid such a situation, 
certain restrictive clauses need to incorporated in the bond contract. The 
following costs may thus emerge. For instance, the bond contract may have a 
clause to restrict the company's investment policy to certain areas and 
direction. In terms of management interference, this may be considered as a 
high cost . Also, restricting the company's investment decision will restrict its 
investment opportunities, causing a welfare loss for both parties. 
Moreover, in the bond contract restrictions can be put on the sale, lease, 
transfer etc., of the assets of the company after the issuance of the bonds. 
There may be several factors which will cause a welfare loss to the company 
and to both parties. For instance, the assets of the company may be more 
valuable to another company than the company in question during the passage 
of time. Therefore, the transfer of assets may have been profitable and hence 
improved welfare; its absence a welfare loss. In addition, the bond contract 
may require maintenance of the company's assets which will certainly improve 
the value of the company thus improve global welfare. Further more, structural 
changes such as merging firms, or splitting them between different owners may 
be restricted in the bond contract. This again may adversely effect the dynamic 
nature of the firm. 
4.5.5 Profit Retention: Minimizing the Costs of a Bond Contract 
In addition to the above, other restrictive clauses may be included in the 
bond contract. But in each case the company will incur additional costs, is 
there any way to minimize the costly restrictions of the bond contract at the 
same time ensuring the welfare of the two parties to move together? Longer- 
run value of the firm is a crucial variable in this regard. The welfare of both the 
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managers and bondholders of the firm depends on whether the value of the 
firm increases or decreases overtime. An effective indicator to gauge the long- 
run value of the firm is to see how much profits are retained and re-invested in 
the firm. Retained profits are cost free form of funds, because these do not 
involve additional contract and transaction costs. Retained profits also reflect 
the management confidence on the state of the enterprise, which in turn 
reveals internal information about the company. Retained profits strengthen the 
equity base of the company. Thus the higher retained profits the more would 
be the longer-run expected value of the company, and the more consistent 
would be the welfare of the bondholders and managers of the firm. 
,,, Retention of profits is normally seen as a management decision. 
However, the choice of a financial contract can force on the management a 
particular dividend policy. For example, under the mark-up and diminishing 
PLS, the management is forced to retain profits. Whereas, under the PLS even 
if the management desires to retain profits, due to the nature of the PLS 
contract, retention is not possible. Thus, in the choice for a financial contract, 
'mark-up and diminishing PLS will dominate the PLS contracts. 
4.6 THE TAX CONTROVERSY 
The implication of taxes for the company's choice between forms of 
external finance (i. e., debt and equity) is a debatable issue. The traditional view 
is that, as the cost of debt is tax exempted, but the cost of equity i. e., dividends 
are subject to taxes, equity increases tax liabilities and increases the cost of 
cIaI pital. Hence, the tax system enhances the demand for debt and suppresses 
the demand for equity. 
'This is a controversial argument, because, tax liabilities are related to 
dividends, not equity itself and dividends are not the sole reward for equity. 
Consider capital gains. A company has the option to pay dividends or retain its 
profits and'enjoy capital gains. Reinvested profits proportionately minimize or 
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even eliminate debt and tax liabilities, thus increase the value of the company 
resulting to an increase in capital gains. So, equity can be raised without 
increasing tax liabilities, even if taxation system is discouraging dividend 
payments'l. But it is certain that if dividends and capital gains are both taxed, 
the tax liabilities of raising equity would be serious and taxes would be 
unambiguously biased against equity. 
The last point is particularly relevant in the developing countries. Many 
individual studies as well as Islamization reports indicate that the taxation 
system in the developing countries is biased against the application of the PLS 
system. The essence of these arguments is that: As the cost of debt is tax 
exempted, by opting for debt, companies can minimize the interference of tax 
officers. On the other hand, as corporate incomes are tax deductible, payment 
of dividends implies declaration of taxable income. As in the developing 
countries tax evasion is common, the preference for the PLS is naturally less. 
Thus Khan (1991) argues that the prevailing corporate income tax 
SI ystern need to be replaced by a net-worth taxation system. With this 
arrangement, he ultimately expects that dividends would be tax exempted. 
Hence, in his view even tax evading companies will not hesitate to demand for 
the PLS funds. 
. 
However, this argument misses a crucial point: That if a net-worth tax is 
introduced, to evade the tax, companies will have the incentive to suppress 
their net-worth by paying high dividends. The corporate income tax system is 
biased against dividends. The incentive implication of this is to retain profits 
which is favorable for the growth of the company. But, if the proposal of a net 
lHowever, the possibility of raising equity without dividend payments may be viewed questionable. 
Dividends signal a company's credibility. If investors see companies paying high dividends, they will buy 
more shares of such companies. The value of the company will increase. In the absence of such a 
dividend, investors cannot be attracted and the company's value will decrease. So, dividends are 
considered important to issue equity. Nevertheless, this argument is also challenged on the basis of 
empirical evidence. An initial increase in the value of the company due to an increase in dividends is 
acceptable. But in fact such an increase is very short and un sustainable in nature. These arguments are 
controversial. Retention is likely to increase the companys value and its capital gains. Should investors 
prefer this to dividends is however, a controversial phenomenon. 
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worth taxation system is adopted, it will shorten the life of companies as they 
will try to suppress their net worth in order to evade taxes. 
4.7 PREFERENCES OF BANKS FOR FORMS OF FUND FLOWS 
Banks are the suppliers of funds. As discussed in Section One, most 
Islamic economists assign an important responsibility to the Islamic banks for 
the overwhelming use of the mark-up. The present Section aims to discuss 
considerations which are expected to effect the decisions of the Islamic banks 
in determining the form of funds supplied to their clients. 
4.7.1 Moral Hazard: The Case of Ongoing Entetprises 
, ý" At present, the moral hazard hypotheses is the dominant explanation of 
the problems which are being faced and could be faced in the practical 
I, 
application of the PLS. In context of the application of PLS modes of Islamic 
financing, it was first proposed by Khan (1983b)l. He concluded that due to the 
existence of an economic incentive for a dishonest attitude, the application of 
the PLS banking principles would require additional costs of monitoring the 
activities of user of funds. Thus, he concluded that without efficiency loss, the 
introduction of the PLS modes of financing is not possible2. Tag Eldin (1991), 
while commenting on this proposition and expressing his concern with the 
overwhelming 
* 
concentration of Islamic banks' assets in the mark-up mode, 
observed that "it is essentially the moral hazard problem which explains the 
general unwillingness of the management of Islamic banks to supply individual 
investment clients with funds on profit sharing basis"1. Most Islamic scholars 
interested in the promotion of the application of the PLS are also pre-occupied 
with this problem (see, e. g., Siddiqi 1988,1993, al Gari 1993 etc. ). 
IThe most important and useful policy implication of Khan's work is its appeal for designing incentive 
mechanisms for the application of the PLS. This suggestion provides a crucial premises for the 
implementation of the PLS principles in some forms. 
? Khan (1983) also treats mudharabah as a synanym of Islamic financing. 
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ý': 4.7.1.1 Brief Overview of the Agency Theory 
The moral hazard hypotheses uses the framework of agency theory 
developed by Jensen and Meckling (J-M) (1976). The J-M theory explains 
several aspects of the principal (financier, sleeping partner, employer) - agent 
(manager, working partner, employee) relationships. More generally, in all 
activities where work is not directly and independently undertaken, a principal- 
agent relationship exists -a relationship in which the principal delegates to the 
agent some authority to make decisions on his behalf. Where ever there is a 
principal-agent relationship, there is an agency cost. However, this cost will 
differ in different activities, environments and organizations. The agency cost 
includes monitoring costs, probable failure of the monitoring and the resultant 
divergent utility maximization by the agent, the cost of auditing, guarantees etc. 
If ý the principal-agent relationship is inevitable, these costs must be met to 
induce the agent to act to maximize the welfare of the principal. The theory 
therefore, suggests that, on efficiency grounds, a direct and independent 
activity where ever feasible, is preferable to an activity involving a principal- 
agent relationship. 
This simple but strong conclusion of the theory rests on the fact that 
y 
11 
from the principal's point of view, the agent-manager is a divergent utility 
maximizer. The principal's utility depends only on the value of the firm. But the 
manager's utility depends on the value of the firm on one hand and his non- 
pecuniary benefits derived from the firm on the other. The value of the firm is 
shared by the principal, but the non-pecuniary benefits are exclusively 
derivable by the manager. Hence, the manager will maximize his utility by 
deriving maximum non-pecuniary benefits. But the value of the firm is inversely 
related to the non-pecuniary benefits - one dollar non-pecuniary benefit derived 
will lead to a reduction in the value of the firm by one dollar. As the manager 
maximizes his utility (by deriving maximum non-pecuniary benefits), the 
determinant of the utility of the principal (value of the firm) declines. The 
lTage Eldin (1991) pp 62 
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principal's problem is to check this tendency by monitoring. Thus, the 
conclusion: the PLS will be associated by monitoring costs and banks acting as 
owners of funds will not offer PLS funds. 
4.7.1.2 Critical Evaluation of the Proposition 
In our understanding the moral hazard hypothesis offers a misleading 
explanation for the subdued nature of PLS. Because, in the framework of the 
same theory it can be argued that efficient PLS contracts may not always 
require any monitoring. 
Table 4(b), provides a simplified hypothetical example of the 
fundamental logic underlying the theory. It shows that given non-pecuniary 
benefits derived by the manager, the cost of this borne by him declines along 
with his ownership, so that at 100% external ownership all non-pecuniary 
be nefits become free of cost. Where at 100% internal ownership, all cost of the 
non-pecuniary benefits are borne by the manager himself. 
Table 4 (b) Efficiency Implications of Ownership Structure 
Contracts 
A 
Manager's 
ownership 
as % of 
total 
ownership 
- 
Out-side 
ownership 
as % of 
total 
ownership 
Dollar value per 
unit of non- 
pecuniary 
benefits derived 
by the manager 
Dollar 
value of 
the firm 
per share 
Cost per unit 
of non- 
pecuniary 
benefits for 
the manager 
Cost per unit 
of non- 
pecuniary 
benefits for 
the out-side 
owner 
A 100 0 0 2 0 
B 100 0 . 10 1.90 . 10 - 
C 90 10 . 10 1.90 . 09 . 01 
D' 80 20 . 10 1.90 . 08 . 02 
Eý, 70 30 . 10 1.90 . 07 . 03 
IF 60 40 . 10 1.90 . 06 . 04 
N -0 100 10 1.90 0 10 
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Assuming that the manager himself keeps 100% ownership and does 
not derive any non-pecuniary benefits, and at the maximum efficient 
operational level of the firm, the value of 1 share is 2 dollars. If the manager 
decides'to derive 0.10 dollar non-pecuniary benefits, he has to forego same 
amount in the value of the firm - the value of one share of the firm would be 
1.90 dollars. He can maximize his utility by issuing equities - enjoy the same 
amount of non-pecuniary benefits, but forego lesser and lesser costs as a 
reduction in the value of the firm. If he sells 100% ownership, the entire cost of 
, the non-pecuniary benefits derived by him will be borne by the outsiders. As we 
can see, this is only one side of the coin, which the moral hazard hypothesis 
utilizes. 
The other side of the coin is however, more positive in its implications. 
We'may consider an upward movement from the bottom of Table 4 (b), starting 
with, 100% external ownership, and increasing the ownership stake of the 
manager. It can be seen that internal ownership enhances efficiency. As his 
stake in the firm increases, the manger has to pay more and more costs for the 
same level of non-pecuniary benefits. Thus PLS contracts which can enhance 
internal ownership can also enhance efficiency without causing additional 
monitoring costs. The original J-M model itself explains this conclusion as 
evident from the simplified version of the model presented bellow. 
Wealth of the firm depends on the firm's market value as well as the 
growth _of 
its. investment. The manager of the firm is indifferent about 
maximizing its wealth and non-pecuniary benefits. If his investment is at the 
level. 
1z 
w. ith all internal sources, w1 and f, are the corresponding wealth and 
non-pecuniary benefits. If the firm has growth plans with all internal funds (no 
agency cost), its expansion will take the zc path with optimum investment at c, 
(i. e., the normal optimum investment under diminishing returns), wealth level 
w3 and non-pecuniary benefits f2. But if it decides to issue equity to finance 
growth, ý , 'it will be put on the zdh expansion path with the corresponding 
optimum investment at d (tangency point of his indifference between w and f 
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with his fractional ownership of the firm), wealth W2 and non-pecuniary benefits 
f3. 
Using equity, can an expansion path higher than zdh be ensured? There 
are'tw, o possibilities. One of these is explained in detail in the original J-M 
model. Accordingly, monitoring will push the expansion path up. But since it 
involves cost, the expansion path of investment with monitoring will remain 
between zc and zdh. This framework is utilized by Khan (1983b) to suggest 
that elimination of interest and its replacement with equity financing would put 
the economy at a lower growth path. 
Wealth 
w3 
w2 
wi- 
0 f- 
Non-pecuniary benefits 
Fig., 4(b) Efficiency of a Declining PLS 
- However, it may be argued that efficient PLS contracts can be designed 
without monitoring and therefore take the zc expansion path. The difference 
between the zc and zdh* expansion paths is effected by the logic underlying 
I 
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I a- i 
Table ý4 (b). If the firm is risk neutral, and it is seeking external funds for 
, expansion, it would prefer an arrangement for financing which could ultimately 
lead to greater internal ownership (100% at the extreme). Hence, it may be 
suggested that the zc investment expansion path is possible with equity 
participation but with a declining characteristic. 
Specifically, suppose a diminishing PLS contract is arranged. According 
, 
to the contract, overtime, the entrepreneur will buy the ownership shares of the 
, financier out of the profits generated 
by the project. The ownership incentive 
will force the entrepreneur not only to work efficiently, but also to report profits 
ýhonestly. Thus there would be no needs for monitoring costs and the zc 
investment expansion path could be attainable. It may therefore, be concluded 
that if the concentration of mark-up in the operations of Islamic banks was only 
due 
'to 
moral hazard problems, this problem would have been solved by 
designing contracts which enhance the incentive of the manager. This would 
have been done by offering them ownership of the projects. As a result, 
diminishing musharakah would have been significant among Islamic banks. 
: 4.7.2 Moral Hazard: Case of Non-ongoing Enterptises 
Other important arguments for the overwhelming use of mark-up by the 
Islamic banks are liquidity, cash flow and considerations for matching assets 
with liabilities. Commercial banks' liabilities are predominantly short-term in 
nature, therefore, the assets should also be short-term in nature. The trading 
activity involveý short-term investments. For that matter the PLS in the trading 
activity may equally be liquid as the mark-up. It is also consistent with the term- 
structure of deposits. The PLS is traditionally a trade financing device. 
Ironically, why then the mark-up also dominates trade financing operations of 
the Islamic banks? 
Some observations related to this issue were discussed in Section 3.3 
under the demand side considerations. As those considerations dealt with the 
nature of the PLS contract, they are equally valid in context of the supply of 
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credit. However, the phenomenon of domination of trade financing by the mark- 
up needs further explanations from the supply side. 
The trading operation generally comes to an end in a short period of 
time. If this activity is financed by external sources, with the conclusion of the 
activity, the contractual relationship between the financier and user of funds 
would also conclude. Therefore, the issue of moral hazard may seem to be a 
major determinant factor for the lack of PLS-based trade financing activities. 
Nevertheless, keeping in view the special nature of trade financing, (as well as 
other such ownership structures), a number of considerations help us again to 
understand the actual significance of the moral hazard phenomenon. 
First, in consideration for a reward for efficiency, it is possible to agree 
on different profit or crop sharing ratios. For instance, the two parties may 
agree tfiat if the manager of funds makes a certain level of profit, he will enjoy 
a more favorable profit sharing ratio (e. g., if the realized profits are 15%, the 
profit sharing ratio would be 50: 50, and if realized profits are 20% the profit 
sharing ratio would be 60: 40 in favor of the manager of funds). Second, the 
possibility, ý of performance signaling contributes to the reduction of moral 
hazard. For instance, Caravan trading automatically signals the performance of 
its participants. When traders travel and trade in the same markets and 
merchandise, of the same nature, the performance of one trader can signal the 
performance of the other. This fact may not be of any significance when traders 
are honest, but its significance for the pure sharing arrangement is immense 
under lesser favorable moral conditions. Therefore, it can be expected that 
even if moral conditions are worst, mudharabah can be effectively applied as 
signaling is possible in general. Third, even if signaling may not be possible, 
performance observance may not be costly as markets produce unbiased 
information in certain cases. For instance, the prices of precious metals, major 
stocks'and 'currencies are objectively revealed by the market. Under these 
conditions too, the PLS principle could be generally applicable. Fourth, in 
certain" other cases, the two parties could have equal and definite pre- 
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contractual information regarding the expected outcome of their joint 
enterprise. These will depend on the degree of certainty with regard to factors 
effecting the outcome of the enterprise. For example, assuming particular 
climatic conditions, the output of a particular crop on a farm can be estimated. 
The climate can then be observed without incurring any cost. Such cases could 
also facilitate the application of PLS. 
ý, , On the basis of the above considerations we may not be able to refute 
the, moral hazard factor in the non-existence of PLS in trade financing. But 
these 
, 
arguments are certainly helpful to suggest that moral hazard may not be 
the only factor responsible for the phenomenon. 
, 
4.7.3 Acquisition of Assets for Re-sale 
,, If a, significant portion of the trading transactions are effected for re-sale 
in'addition to the end-use purposes discussed before, these activities could 
have generated substantial demand for the PLS funds. Why then PLS is not 
being used? 
A closer scrutiny of the trading transaction would reveal that a large part 
of finance for the trading enterprise is provided by the multinational producers 
in various, I forms (such as advance deliveries, credit lines etc. )1. For capturing 
markets, expansion of sale, and maximization of revenues on their research 
and. development intensive investments, the goods sold must be competitive. 
As the objective of credit is to facilitate sale, it must be very cheap. 
, 'Islllamic 
banks as suppliers are not only competing with other suppliers 
on this premises but are also competing with the traditional banks. In these 
circumstances if the Islamic banks opted for the PLS in trade financing, will not 
the cost of their funds be higher? Will they ask for more profit share in order to 
adjust t'he. 
'risk? 
Will they loose their markets to other channels of trade? At 
least, theoretically, the Islamic banks are not pure financiers. In mark-up 
ISome useful information, in this regard is provided in an OECD Publication, Japan's General Trading 
Companies, Paris. OECD, 1985. ) 
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finan cing too, the banks are supposed to be responsible for the risk of the 
commodities while in their ownership. Nevertheless, this risk is minimized 
under mark-up by practically securing the credit sale through irreversible orders 
by clients for assets (credit) -a weakness of the mark-up compared to the PLS 
judged in the criterion of risk-sharing. 
Although, the demand for funds to finance acquisition of assets for end- 
use purposes cannot be financed by the PLS, a large part of import trade 
financing which is effected for re-sale purposes is a good candidate for the 
ý I, '' .1 PLS. However, the probability of commodities not being sold will remain to 
continue, as an excuse for the banks to refrain from contracting the PLS, 
particularly when mark-up is available as an Islamic substitute. The PLS can be 
bro'ught at par with the mark-up in this regard, by institutional arrangements, 
such as a commodity clearing house (CCH) to be jointly implemented by the 
I PLS financiers. The CCH will work towards ensuring market for PLS-financed 
assets whenever, the anticipated demand happened to be weak. 
Research works in the direction of similar institutional arrangements 
should be conducted. Nevertheless, in financing trade transactions, more work 
on protecting the mark-up from possible abuses is equally important. For, the 
distinct risk sharing attributes of the PLS are relatively more significant in 
,, ongoing 
concerns where enterprises grow similar to biological organisms. Thus 
we must distinguish between a single trade transaction and an ongoing trading 
enterprise such as the Pakistani mudharabah companies, the Trading 
Co, rp9ration of Pakistan, an Islamic bank as user of funds or an industrial 
enterprise. In an Islamic framework, all such institutions needing funds can 
resort, only to the profit sharing as PLS deposits of Islamic banks and 
mudharabah certificates of the Pakistani companies. In all ongoing enterprises, 
the re-payment of the mudharabah funds is however, a major problem. In the 
existing conceptual framework, all funds of a mudharabah contract retire 
_ 
together leading to lump sum payments after adjusting for losses. For the cash 
transactions of a fund user or a fund supplier enterprise, gradual re-payment of 
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funds is of vital significance. Some form of gradually redeeming PLS (after 
accounting for losses) will meet this vital requirement in the same form as the 
mark-up does due to its installment payment. It is ironical that this important 
consideration has been neglected in the otherwise well advanced literature on 
the PLS1. 
4.7.4 Collateral Conditions and Adverse Selection 
Collateral requirements play important functions in the supply and 
allocation of credit in the interest-based credit markets. Collateral may be 
internal -a firm offering its own assets as a pledge to secure credit or can be 
external -a firm mobilizing such a pledge from third sources. In both cases, the 
quality of assets pledged will determine the quality of the collateral. Thus, in the 
bank-firm contractual relationship, collateral plays an important role. The 
relationship can be seen from two perspectives - the firm's perspective and the 
bank's perspective. Since, through the collateral, the firm aims to secure credit 
and through collateral the bank aims to asses the firm's risk position, the 
perspectives of the two parties are inter-related. 
4.7.4.1 Firm's Perspective 
From the perspective of the firm, a collateral offer gives a lender a claim 
on its'oWn assets without of course rendering bank's own credit claims. Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) used this framework to suggest that only safer firms - firms 
which'are certain about their expected payoff would offer high collateral and 
firms which are bad would not risk the pledge of their assets. As the title of 
Stiglitj - Weiss paper suggests, in situations where information about the risk- 
return profile of firms is kept private and not shared publicly with the banks, 
collateral conditions may be manipulated by the banks to screen-out bad 
projects and dishonest firms. 
1A more detailed and formal analysis of this point is undertaken in a forthcoming IRTI research.. It is very 
encouraging that some prominent shariah scholars have confirmed the permissibility of the proposals 
raised in relation to the re-payment of PILS funds in the paper. 
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If collateral have to play such an important role, credit markets will not 
clear without their existence and effective operation. We may cite two such 
situations: Collateral are required only for securing debt finance. If the bank 
have to participate in the risks of firms, they by-pass collateral requirements. 
Mhat would be the source to extract the internal private information of the firm 
with respect to its risks? In the absence of any such cost-free mechanism the 
banks are opened to the danger of selecting bad projects - adverse selection. 
Adverse selection may however, also happen in the debt market. If borrowers 
, understood that 
it is a common norm for banks to believe the proposition that 
high collateral offerings are made only by good firms, bad firms will also start to 
offer high collateral pledges. If all borrowers have to pledge high collateral, the 
screening effect would match each other out with the effect that banks may 
select bad projects'l. 
4.7.4.2 The Banks'Perspective 
Thus there is no reason for the banks to formulate credit policies on the 
basis of theoretical propositions built around the privately held information of 
firms about their risk and return situation. Alternatively, the banks rely on 
observed facts about the risk-return situation of a borrower. If a borrower is 
found to be riskier more than average, its collateral pledge has to be more than 
, average and vice-versa. This option dominates commercial banks credit 
, policies. 
Berger and Udelle (1990) report on three empirical studies including 
-their own work. on the relationship of risk and collateral pledges. The studies 
test three hypothesis: one each representing the risk of the borrower, the 
lender and the credit. They report that they and the previous two works used 
different methodologies and different data, but surprisingly the results of the 
three studies all indicate that contrary to the Stiglitz-Weiss proposition, to 
secure credit, riskier firms offered higher collateral pledges. 
For a formal model of the crucial role of capital market failure due to adverse selection see de Meza 
David and Webb, Devid (1990), "Risk, Adverse Selection and Market Failure", The Economic Joumal, 
March 1990,206-214. 
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-- These studies suggest that collateral pledges have important but 
confusing signals for the credit market clearance. There are good reasons to 
believe that genuine borrowers will offer good pledges but the likelihood of 
exploiting this situation by dishonest borrowers is also high. Thus banks would 
prefer to secure genuine collateral pledges rather than having non. The 
empirical studies largely depend on ex-post information about collateral 
requirements of various firms, it is therefore natural that all these reflect banks' 
lending behavior - if riskier firms have to secure credit, they have to offer higher 
collateral pledges. 
4.7.4.3 Attitude of Islamic Scholars to the Role of Collateral 
A reference to the works of Islamic scholars on certain aspects of the 
Islamic financial system, refers also to the basic references used in these 
works. In relation to deferred trading transactions, where debt (finance) is 
created and debt default is possible, the concept of a material pledge is given 
in the Holy Qura'n: If you are in journey, and cannot find a scribe, a pledge with 
possession (may serve the purpose).... S. 11.283. This verse clearly permits 
the pledge of an asset to secure a credit purchase (finance) for the sake of 
ease and justice to both parties . Operations of Islamic banks which come 
under the umbrella of deferred sale contracts, may also come under the 
umbrella of this concept. In fact, in all such domestic transactions an internal 
pledge is provided by the respective borrowing firms and in transactions 
involving international payments, an external pledge in the form of third party 
(government) guarantee is provided. 
However, as for the theoretical argument in favor of PLS banking is 
concerned, the concept of a pledge or any type of guarantee was not viewed 
possible'until recently. As the PLS arrangement, like equity financing implies 
risk-sharing, it also by-passes the collateral requirement. Chapra (1985) and 
several other scholars considered that this would improve the efficiency of 
credit, markets., The existence of collateral requirements makes the banks 
indifferent to the efficiency of firms. Many inefficient firms may secure credit by 
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virtue of collateral. Conversely many efficient firms would not find finance due 
to not being able to pledge collateral. Once the collateral requirement is 
removed, banks are bound to screen projects on the basis of their feasibility. 
Kahf (1989,1992) upholds a more concerned position with respect to 
the need for a third party guarantee in an Islamic financial system. However, in 
g eneral, the major concern of Kahf falls in the framework of the deferred sale 
arrangements. Some of these can best be characterized as quasi equities 
rather than pure PLS arrangements. The OIC Fiqh Academy, in its Resolution 
on the muqarada bonds justifies a third party guarantee of the principal of a 
sharing financing. Siddiqi (1988,1993) suggests to take such proposals more 
seriously. The essence of Siddiqi's view is that the principal capital of a PLS 
fund ' may be considered to be guaranteed against properly defined 
uncertainties which may be identified with unfavorable moral behavior or 
contract failure due to avoidable factors. The proposal may result in attaching 
more importance to guarantees, e. g., similar to those provided by the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). This would certainly be a 
support for the PLS. 
Nevertheless, it may be argued that the cost of managing such an 
additional institution will ultimately reflect in the cost of capital. As a counter 
argument one may suggest that a part of the capital of such an institution may 
come from free contributions. In the zakah system indebted people are defined 
as al gharimin.. As a suggestion, it may be considered to channel the zakah 
expenditure under this head to the new institution. Another source of such a 
fund may be the penalties collected from defaulters of contracts. The institution 
may also raise funds by selling services such as insurance or undertaking 
profitable enterprises. 
On the more critical side however, a number of observations may be 
made'. ' Even under ex-post circumstances, the definition and identification of 
uncertainties which can be clearly associated with lack of care and blemish 
moral attitudes are difficult. This by itself may cause disputes. Moreover, under 
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the proposed arrangement, the PLS model of banking will loose some of its 
distinct characteristics. The non-guaranteed nature of deposits ensures an in- 
built mechanism of stability. Some sort of guarantee will have an adverse 
impact on this characteristic. The PLS - based proposal is a striking alternative 
of the fixed return banking mechanism. Some sort of guarantee will also 
mitigate this characteristic. As collateral does not provide any protection to the 
banks'against adverse selection, any other guarantee mechanism will share 
the same weaknesses. In addition, such an arrangement may increase the 
influence of the government or the institution on the credit policies of the banks. 
This: may cause an inefficiency. 
However, the banks can minimize the problem of adverse selection by 
investing in their own research and development facilities related to project 
appraisal, implementation and follow-up. This will no doubt increase the cost of 
capital initially. But in the longer-run, it will enhance efficiency and expansion of 
the banks' investment activities. In the absence of these capabilities, the 
phobia of selecting bad projects will always restrict the use of the PLS. 
4.8 INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
A number of institutional factors also put the PLS at a weaker position 
compared to the mark-up. Some of these factors are discussed here. 
4.8.1 Size and Management of Public Sector 
The size and management of the public sector is another important 
problem confronted by the financial inter-mediation mechanism in the 
developing countries. The problems posed by this phenomenon for the 
application of PLS are numerous. To mobilize funds, developing country 
governments often issue various bonds and certificates at a very high rate of 
return., For example, in Pakistan, most government securities are issued at a 
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guaranteed and tax free rate of return of over 14% per annum. As a result, we 
can expect that: 
First, public savings of longer-term maturity are kept in these securities. 
This implies that only short-term savings will be kept in bank deposits. 
.Ii 
Therefore, the balance-sheet structure of these institutions will be dominated 
by short-term liabilities. With short-term liability structure, it is not prudent for 
the' banks to involve in longer-term investments. Even if they manage to 
undertake such longer-term investments, their risk adjusted rate of return could 
not match the risk and tax free rate of return on the government securities. On 
the other hand, if lending to the government was not so (unnaturally) attractive, 
longer-term savings of the public would have been kept in the banks. Thus the 
banks would have been in a better position to undertake longer-term 
investments. In the absence of high and guaranteed rate of return, the public 
wo. uld have an option of higher rate of return only after taking the required risk. 
Consequently, the PLS could have found fertile soil for its nourishment. 
Second, as discussed in Section 3, the mark-up can be used to finance 
government procurements. The PLS is again at a disadvantage. Naturally 
therefore, the institutional implications of the above and similar other 
conside rations related to the size and management of the public sector is 
biased against the PLS. The size of the public sector has remained a 
controversial issue. However, reforms in the management of the public sector 
is lesser, controversial. It may be observed that alternative ways to manage 
public -sector on the basis of profit 'sharing may be considered which would 
naturally enhance the efficiency of the public sector and welfare of the society. 
4.8.2 Behavioral Considerations 
PLS contracts establish a longer-term contractual relationship between 
the - two parties. This characteristic of the PLS puts it at disadvantage 
compared to the mark-up which does not establish any such relationship 
between the parties. A number of examples may clarify this point. 
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First, a conflict between the values of the contracting parties may cause 
problems later in the implementation and follow-up of the projects. Thus banks 
while providing funds to their clients have to consider these factors in addition 
to the feasibility of the projects in question. In other words, a technically good 
project may be presented by a party, where a conflict of cultural and behavioral 
values may be present. In such cases, despite the feasibility of the project, it 
may not be considered suitable for a PLS financing. 
Second, the urge for privacy is a recognized natural phenomenon. 
Privacy may be needed for keeping the actual operations of the enterprise 
confidential, for protecting the bases of comparative advantages of the 
enterprise or for avoiding certain government regulations etc. Unless 
contracting parties are willing to share such privacy, PLS contracts would be 
difficult to implement. 
- Therefore, unless, a consistent behavioral relationship exists, PLS 
contracts would be a source of inconvenience for the financiers and user of 
funds. The existence of unfavorable institutional factors such as completion of 
various legal formalities in day to day operations of the enterprise, etc., are 
expected to further aggravate this situation against the PLS. 
4.8.3 Other Considerations 
There are numerous other institutional considerations which are biased 
against a large. scale application of the PLS contracts. These include: similarity 
of the mark-up with the established commercial banking traditions and 
conventions, the orientation and familiarity of the banking personnel with these 
traditions, the convenience of the mark-up for the banks, the general notion of 
risk-return trade-off in the banking arena, the government and central banking 
regulations, the non-availability of complete financial inter mediation framework 
consistent with the PLS, the competition for banking services, the limited 
sources of income of the Islamic banks, short-term nature of deposits, the 
effect of inflation and so on. There is a long list of these factors which can be 
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put in the general framework of the "culture" of commercial banking. The mark- 
up is more familiar to this culture. 
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APPENDIX 
Chart 4 (a): Sources of Funds of US Corporations (1900-1979) 
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Chart 4 (c): Sources of Company Funds in Some Muslim Countries (1980-88) 
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CHAPTER 5 
ISLAMIC FINANCE IN PRACTICE: 
MARKET PERFORMANCE OF PROFIT-LOSS-SHARING WITH SPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE PAKISTANI MODARABA COMPANIES 
Chapter 5 
ISLAMIC FINANCE IN PRACTICE: 
MARKET PERFORMANCE OF PROFIT-LOSS-SHARING WITH 
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PAKISTANI MODARABA COMPANIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
,-- , _-: -, 
In chapter four we presented and analyzed alternative explanations for 
the'subdued nature of PLS and overwhelming use of mark-up by the Islamic 
banks. Non-banking financial institutions are also playing increasingly 
important role in the efficient functioning of modern capital markets. The 
evolution and development of Islamic banks as depository institutions has also 
encouraged the development of non-banking Islamic financial institutions 
including investment funds and insurance companies managed by various 
Islamic banks. In addition, since 1984, there has been an evolution and 
significant increase in the activities of Modaraba, companies (MCos) in Pakistan 
treated, as non-banking Islamic financial institutions by the State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP). 
These companies constitute an important segment of the Islamic 
financial system. Useful lessons can be drawn from their experiences and 
challenges. Since the companies are participants of an emerging dynamic 
stock market, namely, the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), for attracting 
investments, these companies face tough competition from other market 
participants. The competitors range from leasing companies (I-Cos) which are 
new entrants to the market too, to the relatively experienced and mature 
market participants, such as, chemical and pharmaceutical firms which are 
listed in the K SE for many years. Although, the I-Cos., do not claim to offer an 
agenda of Islamic financing, these companies however, have emerged in the 
scene to compete with the MCos., in the renting and trading business, in 
addition to competing for mobilization of resources as all other firms do. 
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As direct participants of financial markets, the MCos., are thus, 
confronted with more serious challenges compared to the Islamic banks. First, 
the Islamic banks offer a contrasting alternative to interest-based banks - the 
lines between Islamic and conventional banking are thinly defined. The MCos., 
do not have this comparative advantage. Since investments in stocks, in 
general, are permitted from the religious perspective, the MCos., do not offer to 
their investors, much different investment opportunities compared to common 
stocks. Second, unlike deposit mobilization by the Islamic banks, the resource 
mobilization requirements of the MCos., compel them to participate in the 
capital markets. Third, while contributing to economic development by resource 
mobilization and allocation, these institutions, compared to Islamic banks are 
directly and more actively involved in the development of Islamic financial 
instruments and capital markets. Fourth, the MCos., are providing finance to 
industry more directly and have been able to establish longer-run relationship 
between finance and industry, in comparison to Islamic banks. Nevertheless, 
the activities and functions of the MCos., and Islamic banks are inter-related 
and supplement each other in spreading the application of Islamic principles of 
financing. Whereas, in the existing research on Islamic banking and finance, 
much aftention has been accorded to Islamic banks, investment funds and 
Islamic insurance companies, MCos., are relatively ignored. 
The objective of the present chapter is to study the evolution, practices 
and performance of the MCos., as operating under Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan's Modaraba law. Since this exercise can be better undertaken in 
comparison with similar other institutions, the study also deals with the 
practices of other non-banking financial institutions, particularly, the LCos., and 
investment banks. 
Section Two deals with the institutional framework, evolution, 
development and profile of the MCos. Section Three, provides an overall 
assessment of the KSE, which provides the market environment for the MCos. 
This Section also reports the recent position of the MCos., as a separate sector 
in the KSE. Section Four provides comparisons between sectors and individual 
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companies with respect to their acquisition of value overtime. Section Five is 
an attempt to identify the challenges of the Modaraba as a sector as opposed 
to other market participants. Section Six deals with the relevance of Islamic 
warrants as financial instruments for the MCos. 
5.2 INSTITUTIONAL SETUP, EVOLUTION AND PROFILE 
Mudharabah is an important Islamic financial contract. During the past 
three decades interests in the contract have renewed. The deposit side of the 
Islamic banks is largely based on this concept. This experience of the Islamic 
banks has been instrumental in expanding the scope of mudharabah. ' The 
experience of the MCos., is yet another important example of the application of 
mudharabah in the contemporary complex market economies. This experience 
can be expected to encourage the development of sophisticated Islamic 
financial instruments. The present section and remaining part of the chapter 
deal with the challenges and opportunities of this expectation. 
5.2.1 The Law And Regulation Of Modaraba Companies 
The Law 
The establishment and operations of the MCos., are governed by the 
Modaraba Companies and Modaraba Floatation and Control Ordinance 19802, 
and rules, regulations and guidelines issued as follow-up (referred to in the 
I See, Kahf and Khan (1992) on how the deposit side of Islamic banks has actually expanded the concept. 
2 This law was introduced on June 26,1980. Evolution of an alternative system to interest has remained under 
consideration of policy makers in Pakistan for a long time. The 1973 constitution calls for a complete elim , 
ination of 
riba from the economy. However, paradoxically, pronounced efforts in this regard were made only during 1977-85, 
the period, when the constitution remained suspended. The extreme attitude of presenting Islam and the constitution 
as competing goals has unfortunately cost the country her political and constitutional stability and socio-economic 
welfare. Even Pakistan's experience with conversion of its banking and financial system during the 1977-85 period 
into an Islamic one may well be seen skeptically. As for the operations of commercial banks, national development 
financing institutions, and public sector resource mobilization is concerned, such a skepticism is not unfounded (one 
may refer to IPS 1994, for a general evaluation of this exercise). However, there are also some examples of positive 
institutional changes for the operation of an interest-free Islamic financing system. Scholars and policy makers agree 
that the approach to be pursued to replace riba with some Islamic alternatives, has to be gradualist and two pronged. 
First, an attempt is needed to familiarize the public with the broader Islamic alternatives. Secondly, a legal 
framework needs to be ensured to smoothen the process of the supply of the Islamic alternatives to forth come. With 
respect to both these policy objectives some successes have been achieved in Pakistan. 
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chapter as Modaraba law). Salient features of the Modaraba law are given 
below. 
1. Modaraba is defined in the Ordinance as, "a business in which a 
person participates with his money and another with his efforts 
or skill or both his efforts and skill and shall include Unit Trusts 
and Mutual Funds by whatever name called". 
2. Under the Modaraba law, two different legal entities are 
established. A) Modaraba Companies (MCos). MCos., can be 
formed by any company which is registered under Companies 
Ordinance 1984 or a private company or public corporate body 
(established under any law in force and owned or controlled 
whether directly or through a company or corporation, by the 
Federal or a Provincial Government) by fulfilling other conditions 
/ 
under the law. MCos., are registered under the Companies 
Ordinance 1984 as private or public limited companies for multi- 
purpose or specific-purpose operations.. Private MCos., are not 
registered with the stock exchange and B) Modarabas are 
perpetual or temporary Funds floated by the MCos., under the 
Modaraba Companies and Modaraba Floatation and Control 
Ordinance 1980. Unlike each MCo., each Modaraba must be 
registered with a stock exchange. 
3. All Modarabas are registered with the Registrar of Modarabas by 
fqlfilling certain shariah and operational requirements. 
4. The Modaraba funds are mobilized by issuing Modaraba 
certificates (MCs). The MCs., are non-voting shares of common 
stock in the Modaraba. 
5. The minimum capital requirement for a multi-propose Modaraba 
is Rs. 7.5 million, and for a single-purpose Modaraba it is Rs. 5 
million. 
6. In both cases, the MCo., has to contribute the initial 10% of the 
subscribed capital. 
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7. The MCo., as a manager (mudharib), W11 charge not more than 
10% of total annual profits as its remuneration, besides the 
returns on its capital contribution to the Modaraba. 
8. The MCo., can issue rights, stock dividends and distribute cash 
dividends. 
9. The MCo., cannot involve in any activity prohibited by the 
shari'ah. 
10. Moreover, 75% of the Modaraba's operations must be kept in 
the main line of its business. 
-The 
Registrar and Registration of Modarabas 
-- As a follow-up on the Modaraba Companies and Modaraba Floatation 
and Control Ordinance 1980, institutional arrangements were made for the 
establishment of enterprises, floatation of Modarabas, religious supervision of 
the companies' activities, regulation of issuance of certificates, tax coverage 
and incentives, accounting procedures, arbitration of disputes etc. The above 
law makes it incumbent for the Federal Government to appoint through 
separate notification, an office called the Registrar of Modarabas. The 
Registrar of Modarabas is appointed by the Corporate Law Authority (CLA), 
Government of Pakistan (an official body responsible for implementation of the 
corporate and allied laws) to regulate and administer the establishment and 
operation of these enterprise as limited liability companies. ' 
For establishing a MCo., a party applies to the CLA for registration. For 
granting registration, the CLA evaluates the application in the framework of the 
above-mentioned law. When a MCo., registered with the CLA, it submits 
another application for initiating operations - floatation of Modarabas. This 
application is accompanied by a Prospectus related to the nature and conduct 
of business, Modaraba certificate indentures etc. To ensure the shari"ah 
conformity of the operations, the entire documents are evaluated by a 
1 Since 1990, the Corporate Law Authority has started publishing annual reports on the companies. So far, two 
reports have been released (1990-91 and 1991-92). Some information in this chapter has been dra%%n from these 
reports. -- 
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standing Religious Supervisory Board (RSB)'. After clearance from this board, 
the company applies to the Controller of Capital Issues and Stock Exchange 
for floatation of the Modarabas. Once operational, periodic inspections are 
u ndertaken by the RSB, and chartered cost and management accountants 
appointed by the CLA. 
No company can become operational without a registration with the 
Registrar of Modarabas. An applicant for registration as a MCo., must itself be 
a registered company under various concerned laws of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan. The company, must have at least 5-7 million Rs. paid-up capital for 
the purpose of the Modaraba business. Before granting registration, the 
Registrar has also to make sure about the integrity of the promoters of the 
Modaraba, the nature of business to be undertaken in relation to the shariah, 
and compliance with other relevant laws. All the required details have to be 
presented in the Prospectus of the applicant. Following are the salient features 
of the guidelines of Registrar Modarabas. 
1. Sponsors must have a certified net worth (and declared to the tax 
officials), not less than the amount subscribed by them 
personally. 
2. The sponsors must have clean record with tax departments, 
banks and other regulatory organizations. 
3. The proposed Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a MCo., must be 
of clean background. Once appointed, a CEO cannot be removed 
6 without the consent of the Registrar Modarabas. 
4. No more than 50% of sponsoring Directors can be from the same 
family. 
5. Experienced sponsors are preferred for the allotment of 
registration. 
6. A sponsorship shall not be transferred at least for two years. 
7. All companies will appoint Chartered Accountants. 
I The Board consists of three members, one of them nominated as chairman must be a person to be qualified as a 
Judge of the Supreme Court of the country. The two other members should be prominent religious scholars. 
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8. Registration for subsequent Modaraba floatation can only be 
granted upon receiving reports of previous operations. If reports 
of three years are not available, registration will not be granted. 
9. No business activities will be repugnant to the sharfah. This will 
be verified by the RSB. 
1O. The MCo., will agree to the regular administrative, financial and 
re igious inspections and audits of the Registrar Modarabas and 
11. Once the Prospectus is approved by the Registrar Modarabas, 
only then the registered MCo., shall approach the Controller of 
Capital Issues and the stock exchange for floatation of the 
Modaraba certificates. 
Tax Rates 
Initially, those Modarabas, which were distributing 90% of their profits as 
dividends were exempted from corporate income tax. At the present, for initial 
three years all companies are tax exempt. For the subsequent two years each 
company is subject to 12.5% tax on corporate income. Thereafter, each 
company is subject to 25% corporate income tax like all other companies. 
Since June 1995, the government has also imposed a 15% tax on stock 
dividends. 
State Bank Regulations 
The SBP has no specific regulations for the MCos. These companies 
are treated by the SBP as non-banking financial institutions. The instructions of 
the SBP for floatation of Modarabas by such institutions are given in the 
Prudential Regulations for Non-banking Financial Institutions. Following are the 
salient features of these regulations which also affect the MCos. 
1. Each Modaraba will establish with the SBP a reserve fund 
equivalent to its own paid up capital. This reserve fund will be 
established by annual contribution of at least 20% of the after tax 
profits of each Modaraba floated. Once the reserve fund equals 
the paid-up capital, the annual contribution will be decreased to 
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5% of after tax profits. Stock dividend is considered as an 
appropriation for this purpose. 
2. At least 15% of the liabilities of the Modaraba must be invested in 
the National Investment Trust Certificates (NIT Units) or in 
securities of public corporations. 
3. At least 70% of the Modaraba's assets to be kept in its principal 
line of business. 
4. For initial two years, the debt/equity proportion of the Modaraba 
will be 1: 7, thereafter, it can be 1: 10 and may be further changed 
with the consent of the concerned regulatory authorities. 
5. A Modaraba will not be entitled for any financial assistance if its 
debt/equity ratio remains below 60: 40 on long-term basis. This 
level of debt/equity ratio must be maintained by all energy sector 
Modarabas. 
6. Current assets/current liabilities ratio will have to be maintained at 
1: 1 of the Modaraba's equity. 
7. A single business group cannot be financed by more than 20% of 
the Modaraba's equity, and 
8. The instructions also regulate the Modarabas' business practices 
with its Directors and principal share holders. 
During 1991-92, Pakistan experienced large scale financial scandal 
involving cooperative banks and finance companies. These institutions were 
classified by the SBP as non-banking financial institutions. It is widely believed 
that the negative image of these cases of failures has been large as far the 
confidence of investors in the Modaraba sector is concerned. After this scam, 
the SBP, CLA and Registrar of Modarabas have also increased their regulatory 
supervision. These regulations are often alleged to be too restrictive by the 
Modarabas. 
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5.2.2 Profile Of Companies' 
The Modaraba legislation was complete by 1984. The first MCo., was 
authorized in 1984 and the Modaraba was floated in 1985. Charts 5 (a-d), 
provide the yearly increase in the number of MCos., and their paid-up capital. 
From charts - 5(a) and (b), it can be seen that the real increase in the number 
of listed companies came during 1990-93, highest number, 15 companies 
listed during 1991. By the end of June 1994, there were 52 Modarabas listed in 
the stock markets of the country, with a total paid-up capital of about Rs. 8 
billions. 
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I All charts included in this section are based on table-5(e).. 
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Chart 5(b). Cumulative Yearly Listing of Modaraba Companies 
60, N 
0 
50 
0 
f 
40, 
c 
0 
M 30, 
p 
a 
n 20 
i 
e 
s 10, 
00 
1985 1987 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
year of Listing 
136 
Chart 5 (c) 
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Chart 5(d) 
Similarly, from charts 5(c) and (d), it can be seen that by 1989, the total 
paid-up capital of about Rs. 1.2 billion was listed in the Modaraba sector. 
Another Rs. 1.2 billion was added during 1990, a record level of Rs. 1.8 billion 
was added during 1991. By the end of June 1994, the total cumulative paid-up 
capital listed in the Modaraba sector reached to about Rs. 8 billion, which was 
9.4% of total paid-up capital listed in the KSE. For the 1985-95 period, the 
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average annual growth rate of the listed capital in the Modaraba sector has 
remained about 50%. 
Ownership Structure 
The companies are registered as limited liabilities. Most Modarabas are 
floated by sponsors in the group of 4-8 persons. This is one of the important 
differences of the MCos., from the traditional concept of a mudharabah 
enterprise in which the mudharib is a single person. However, considering the 
mudharib as a legal entity, this difference ceases to exist. The 5-6 group of 
sponsors is most common. 
Table 5(a): Alodaraba Certificate Holders by Category in % by end of June 1992 
Individuals Inves- Insura- Joint Financial Modaraba others 
tment nce stock institutions companies 
companies compa- companie 
nies S 
Average oT9 61-22 4.96 3.52 10.35 11.52 8.21 . 22 
companies for 1990 
Average of same 9 53.91 7.15 4.09 9.74 16.15 8.80 . 16 
companies for 1991 1 1 1 1 
Average of 8 new 55.15 4.09 2.23 4.67 18.54 4.32 10.99 
comoanies for 1991 
1 1 
Source: Derived from CLA (1992) 
The companies raise funds from the market by issuing the tradable 
MCs. Table-5(a), provides information about the holders of the certificates of 
some companies. An important conclusion to be derived from this table is that 
the companies have been able to reach the individual investors, as a large part 
of the certificates are held by individuals. The second largest group of the 
certificate holders are the financial institutions. 
Size 
The legislation allows Modarabas to be as small as worth Rs. 5 million; a 
Modaraba can be floated with a Rs. 5 million paid-up capital. However, MCos., 
are. - not necessarily small companies compared to the size of an average 
company in the KSE. Frequency distribution of the Modarabas in terms of the 
size of their paid-up capital is provided in chart 5(e). Out of the 52 companies, 
35 companies have a total paid-up capital of less than 150 million Rs. In fact, 
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25 companies are listed with a paid-up capital less than 100 million Rs. (about 
3 million US dollars). Ten companies have paid-up capital less than 50 million 
Rs. (about 1.5 million US dollars). Two companies are listed with capital as 
small as 25 million Rs. Only 16 companies have pald-up capital above the KSE 
average. The largest two companies have a paid-up capital of Rs. 400 million 
each. 
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Sources of Funds 
Information on the debt-equity position of 20 MCos., is available for 
1993 and 1994 and is given in table-5(e). Out of these, 12 companies are 
100% equity-based. Only one company has over 50% debt in its capital (this 
company happens to be the oldest one), but it reduced its debt/equity ratio 
from 1.17: 1 in 1993 to 1.13: 1 in 1994. The remaining MCos., have very little 
debt in their capital structure. 
The sources of debt in the capital are installment purchase, lease 
contract deposits, customer security deposits and long-term lease finance. The 
sources of equity include musharakah funds of the sponsors and Modaraba 
I 
_3 
9 
funds of the certificate holders, capital reserve, general reserve and un- 
appropriated profits. ' 
Source of Income 
Table 5(b): Source of Current Income 
Sources 1990 Average for 
9 companies 
1991 Average 
for the same 9 
companies 
1991 Average 
for 8 new 
companies 
1991 
Average 
for 17 
companies 
SOURCES Leasing 75.92 80.65 . 79 70.09 OF Investment . 57 . 25 . 79 . 31 
CURRENT Trade Credit 18.72 14.04 51.31 18.97 
INCOME % PLS A/C . 34 . 33 . 88 . 40 2.42 1.60 27.6 5.05 
Others 2.03 3.13 18.63 3.18 
Source: Derived from CLA (1992). 
Some information about the sources of current income for some 
companies is given in table-5(b). Rentals are the dominant source of the 
operating income of the companies. This implies that most funds are engaged 
in 'equipment and assets. Trade finance in the form of mark-up is also 
significant source of the operating income of the companies. 
Dividends 
According to the Modaraba law, dividends can be paid either in cash, or 
in the form of stocks. Table-5(e), contains information about the number of 
companies which paid cash and stock dividends during 1993. This information 
is*summarized in charts 5(ý and (g), respectively, for stock and cash dividends. 
As can be seen from these charts, 33 companies paid stock dividends at an 
average rate of 14%, the highest being 40% and the lowest 4%, 27 companies 
paid more than 10% stock bonus and 8 companies paid 20% stock bonus. 
I See CLA(1992). 
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Chart 5(f) 
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As compared to 33 companies which paid stock dividends, only 15 
companies paid cash dividends, the average dividend being 13%, the highest 
32% and lowest 3%. Discrepancies in tax benefits are important reasons for 
such an over reliance on stock dividends. Since, fiscal year 1995, a 15% tax 
has been imposed on stock dividends, this is expected to change the 
composition of total dividends paid. The over-reliance on stock dividends may 
also be due to shortage of cash. With the evolution of financial instruments 
compatible with the shari'ah, and resultant improvement in the liquidity position 
of the companies, it can be expected that in the future the reliance on stock 
dividends will be reduced. 
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Chart 5(g) 
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Ten companies paid both stock dividends as well as cash dividends. 
The highest cash dividend (32.5%) paying company also paid 10% bonus 
shares, paying highest total dividends. The highest stock dividend paying 
company did not pay cash dividend. 
Rate of Return on Equity (ROE) 
Information about ROE is available for 20 companies for 1993 and 1994 
(see, table-5(c). The average ROE for the 20 companies in 1993 was 17.44% 
which reduced to 13.6% during 1994. Compared to 2 companies ROE below 
10% during 1993, in 1994, the ROE Of 8 companies fell below 10%. In 1993, 
the ROE of 12 companies was above 15%, in 1994,6 companies registered an 
ROE above 15%. Compared to these, the average ROE for most of the 20 
mutual funds of the Investment Corporation of Pakistan, for 1992 was over 
25%. 
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Table 5(c): Frequencv Distribution of 20.11odaraba 
Companies and ICP Mutual Funds in Terms of ROE 
% ROE Modaraba Companies 
in 1993 
Modaraba Companies 
in 1994 
20 Mutual Funds in 
1992 randomly 
selected out of 28 
less than 10 2 8 nil 
1 ýO- 15 6 5 nil 
15-20 6 3 4 
20-25 4 11 3 
greater than 25 2 L2 13 
Source: Derived from: a) Table 5 (e) and b) KSE, Company Analysis 
Earning Per Share (EPS) 
The EPS, calculated as total net income of the company divided by the 
number of its shares of common stock outstanding, gives a measurement of 
how investors are benefiting in terms of their earning per each share held by 
them. If a company has 10 million outstanding shares and earns Rs. 20 million 
net profit, its EPS is Rs. 2. Table-5(d) shows that during 1992, per share, 
investors in the ICP Mutual Funds earned in average over Rs. 40, while 
investors in the 20 Modarabas earned an average EPS of Rs. 1. 93, which 
jumped to Rs. 6.38, in 1994. This jump is due to an unusual, Rs. 93 EPS, 
realized by one company, but the number of MCos., whose EPS declined 
increased in 1994. 
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'rabic 5(d): Frcqucncý Distribution of 20 Modaraba 
Companies and ICP Mutual Funds in Terms ofFPS Rs. 
Frequency of Earning 
Per Share Rs. 
Modaraba IvIodaraba Companies in 
Companies in 1993 1994 
20 Mutual Funds in 1992 
randomly selected out of 
28 
less than 1 33 nil 
1 to 1.50 29 nil 
1.50 to 2 71 2 
2 to 2.50 61 13 
greater than 2.5 1 26 1 15 
Source: Derived from: 'I able 5(e) and KSE. Company Analysis 
The EPS is a crucial indicator of changes in the stock-holders' wealth 
over time. Given other considerations, higher EPS is better compared to a 
lower one, but a number of factors must be watched over a period of time to 
have a meaningful comparison between the EPS of various companies. Many 
factors, including time value of money for 'investors, relative risk- retu rn-trad e- 
off, leverage and the changes in stock prices, capital gains effect the 
meaningfulness of EPS overtime. EPS also changes the distribution of wealth 
between old and new stock-holders as the proportionate growth in the net 
profits may be lesser compared to the proportionate new issues which could 
finance the growth opportunities. 
Chart 5(i) 
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MVR, market capitalization/paid-up capital, is another crucial indicator of 
the performance of a listed company. MVR depends on the volume of trade in 
a particular stock. Given capitalization/paid-up capital data of table-5(e), MVR 
for 20 Mos., during April 1995, is calculated and is given in chart 5(k). It can 
be seen that the mean MVR for the MCos., is even lesser than one point. This 
information may be compared with the mean value of MVR for the KSE, which 
was 5 points on June 30,1994. The MVR for the Modarabas has declined 
further during the rest of 1995. 
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Table 5(e) - Profile of Modaraba Companies 
Name of MCo. Year of 
Listing 
Paid up 
capital 
Rs. (M) 
Capitalization 
Rs. (M) 
April 1995 
% Stock 
bonus 
in 1993 
D/E 
Ratio 
1993 
D/E 
Ratio 
1994 
Al-Ata Lease 1992 50.00 10,50 
Al-Azecm Lease 1992 110.00 '00 
Al-Noor-I 1992 1 210.00 152.00 5,00 1 . 00 '00 Allied Bank 1 1993 350,00 245,00 1,60 . 00 '00 Asset Lease 1993 39,69 
BRR Capital 1 1985 202,82 294,00 1.17 1,13 
BRR 11 1990 150,00 109,00 
. 00 '00 Confidence 1 1991 55,00 10,00 
Constellation 1 1991 64.63 17,50 
Crescent 1 1991 158,03 158,00 7,50 '15 '18 Custodian 1 1994 30,00 
DGM 1 1992_ 50,00 
DR Asset 1993 39,69 
Elite Capital 1992 113,40 5,00 
Equity Int 1993 150,00 96,00 
. 00 '00 Equity M1 1992 262,20 197,00 '00 '00 F. B Modaraba 1989 45,70 
'00 Fidality M1 1992 208.80 193,00 20,00 . 00 1 '00 Financial Link 1994 100,00 
Guardian Lease 1994 100,00 
General Lease 1 1993 56,25 12,50- 
Grindlays M 1987 346,50 820,00 10,05- . 67 49 Habib Bank 1 1991 397,07 258,00 15,00 1 . 00 '00 Habib M1 1985 252,00 242,00 20,00 . 12 '09 Hajvcry M1 1991 205,32 123,00 18,00 . 00 '00 Ibrahim M1 1993 116,00 104,00 16,00 . 00 '00 Imroz M1 1994 30,00 
Industrial CM 1991 86,25 
Inter Fund M1 1991 67,85 20,00 
LTV Capital 190 400,00 548,00 47 18 
" A] Mal 1987 182,57 173,00 28,00 27 20 
" Al Týjara 1991 66,00 10,00 
Mehran M1 1990 83,16 20,00 
National M1 1989 52,99 
Pak M1 1991 110,00 10,00 
Premier M1 1991 27,50 
Professional M1 1991 77,67 15,30 
Providence M1 1991 63,13 18,00 
Prudential M1 1990 293,31 12,00 
Prudential M 11 1990 193,05 10,00 
Prudential M 111 1991 222,60 5,00 
Punjab M1 1993 270,00 284,00 35,00 '00 '00 Sanaullah M1 1990 116,88 
Schon M 1992 234,05 
- 
103,00 17,00 '00 '00 Tawakal M1 1990 258,75 20,00 
Tri Star M1 1990 96.80 10,00 
Tri Star M 11 1993 110,00 
Trust M 1992 273,00 369,00 40,00 67 02 
UDL M 1991 249,38 212,00 11,00 '11 '15 Unicap M 1991 136,40 89,00 10,00 '00 '00 Unity M 1993 300,00 
Sum 864L 
___L_, 
39 4769,00 459,90 3,63 2,44 
Mean 154.20 238,45 13,94 18 12 
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Table 5(c) (Continued.. ) 
Name of MCo Year 
of 
Listin 
9 
% Cash 
Dividend 
1993 
% 
ROE 
1993 
% 
ROE 
1994 
EPS 
Rs. 
1993 
EPS 
Rs. 
1994 
PAT 
1993 
Rs. (M) 
PAT 
1994 Rs. 
(M) 
Al-Noor-I 1992 15,00 20,70 8.80 2,22 92 44.40 19.40 
Allied Bank 1 1993 1 14.30 9,50 1,67 1,04 1 50.10 36,50 
Asset Lease 1993 1 
BR. R Capital 1 1985 17,50 22,00 11,20 26 1,46 51,90 29,60 
BRR. 11 1990 15,00 18,50 1,61 2,04 2,05 30,60 30,80 
Confidence 1 1991 32,50 
Crescent 1 1991 15,00 21,10 21,70 2,27 2,78 27,20 35,90 
DGM 1 1992 12,50 
Equity Int 1993 8,30 
N 
. 96 1,47 14,40 21,40 
Equity M1 1992 15,00 13,60 13,30 1,59 1,75 36,20 40,00 
F. B Modaraha 1989 '00 
Fidality M1 1992 16,70 18,20 1 2,00 2,66 23,30 1 31,00 
Grindlays M 1987 17,00 19,10 7,90 3,00 1,22 94,60 42,20 
Habib Bank 1 1991 13,40 8,50 1,55 93,00 53,60 36,90 
Habib M1 1985 17,30 8,20 1,06 46 22,20 11,50 
Hajvcry M1 1991 15,50 9,60 1,86 1,26 32,40 21,90 
Ibrahim M1 1993 14,00 12,20 1,63 2,77 16,30 32.20 
Inter Fund M1 1991 10,00 . I I 
LTV Capital 1989 10,40 44,00 44 3,33 17,70 133,20 
M Al Mal 1987 24.00 10,90 2,61 1.23 34,50 17,60 
Punjab M1 1993 29,90 12,90 3,50 1,48 70.00 40,00 
Sanaullah hI 1 1990 12,00 
Schon M 1992 13.80 4,20 1.67 53 33,40 10,70 
Tri Star M1 1990 15,00 
Tri Star N1 11 1993 10,00 
Trust M 1992 28.60 16,80 5,21 2,82 78,10 55.00 
UDL M 1991 9,50 27,80 1,09 3,98 18,50 75,10 
Unicap M 18,10 10,90 2,00 1,35 24,80 16,80 
Mean 13,10 17,44 13,59 1,93 6,38 38,71 36.89 
N 15 20 19 20 20 20 20 
Notes: () implies complete information missing. 
Abbreviations: Ml, First Modaraba; Mll, Second Modaraba; Mll, Third Modaraba; D/E, 
Debt/Equity; ROE, Return on Equity; EPS, Earnings Per Share; PAT, Profits after Tax. 
Sources: 
Compiled from: a) Various Issues of Pakistan And Gulf Economist, Karachi. b) Annual 
Report of Corporate Law Authority, Islamabad. c) Bulletin State Bank of Pakistan, 
Karachi, various issues, and d) Karachi Stock Exchange, Report on Companies. 
I, - 
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5.3 THE MARKET ENVIRONMENT 
For most companies the choice to list themselves in stock exchanges 
comes after some operational experience. Except for mutual funds, initiation of 
business activities with listing in a stock market is a rare phenomenon. Despite 
operational differences between MCos., and mutual funds regarding initiating 
business by listing in a stock market, the case of Modarabas is similar to 
mutual funds. It is extremely difficult for the MCos., to mobilize funds without 
being listed. Consequently, it is unique with MCos., to initiate business by 
listing in a stock market, rather than to initiate operations and list latter. The 
market environment for the MCos., is briefly provided in this section with an 
overview of the KSE along with the overall status of MCos., in the market 
during 1994. 
5.3.1. Stock Markets In Pakistan 
The operational pattern of MCos., indicates that the stock market is 
crucial for their existence. Pakistan has three stock exchanges: A matured one 
in Karachi, and two novices, one each in Lahore and Islamabad. Most 
Modarabas are listed in all the three markets, but KSE is the hub of their 
business. The historical development of the KSE is summarized in chart-5(l) 
depicting the number of companies, chart-5(m) reflecting the paid-up capital 
and market capitalization and finally chart-5(n) showing the pattern of MVR'. 
Established in 1950, the KSE is now a matured market. In 1950,15 
companies were listed in the KSE, with a total paid-up capital of Rs. 117 
million. By April 1995, about 700 companies were listed in the market with a 
total paid-up capital of about Rs. 87 billion. It can safely be expected that the 
number of listed companies will increase to over 780 during the next five years. 
The forecast for this trend is given in chart-5(l). 
I The charts in this sub-section are based on KSE Brochures. 
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It is interesting to note that during the 1970-80 period, the market 
remained almost stagnant at around 300 companies (actual figures, 300 in 
1970,314 in 1980). During this period, the total paid-up capital of the listed 
companies increased to Rs. 7.5 billion from Rs. 4.4 billion in 1970. However, 
the market remained stagnant, as the capitalization declined to lower levels, 
even compared to the paid-up capital. 
Business activities of the market accelerated after 1980 (see, charts 5(l) 
and (m). By 1986, the number of listed companies increased to 360, involving 
a paid-up capital of Rs. 14.4 billion. Actual acceleration of the market is 
obvious from the five-fold increase in the market capitalization to Rs. 30.3 
billion in 1986 from Rs. 6.4 billion in 1980. Since then, the KSE continuously 
gained strength. While growth in the number of listed companies and paid-up 
capital has steadily increased ever since, during 1990-91, there was an 
upsurge in the trading activity and market capitalization increasing from Rs. 62 
billion in 1990 to Rs. 190 billion in 1991. Since then, the increase in market 
capitalization has again been steady, whereas, relatively, the paid-up capital 
has increased at a faster pace. 
On the basis of the past 45 years operations and expansion of the KSE, 
some forecasts can also be made about the future status of the KSE (see, 
chart 5(l). By the year 2000, about 780 companies will be listed in the KSE. 
The*total paid-up capital of these companies is estimated to reach Rs. 170 
billion. As the R' is significantly high, (. 988), this estimate could be considered 
as a good approximation. On the other hand, the, market capitalization is 
estimated to reach over 800 billion Rs. Again, given the . 96 value for the R2 this 
can be considered another reasonable estimate. 
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The MVR considerably improved in 1960 over 1950, but substantially 
declined during the seventies (see, chart-5(n). During the 1986-90 period, the 
MVR remained around 2 points. The up-surge in the market activity pulled the 
ratio to 5 points in 1991, again declining to around 3 points during 1992-93. 
There has been an improvement in the market activity during 1994. But, due to 
policy differences between the government and the business community, the 
market activity declined to record lows during the early half of 1995 pushing the 
MVR ratio to below 3 points. 
jý However, the market activity is expected to take momentum. Based on 
the 45 years activity of the KSE, our projected mean MVR for the future five 
years is around 5 points. This scenario is based on expectations that an 
understanding between the business community and the government will be 
reached, political stability, particularly in Karachi will be achieved, privatization 
and macro-economic improvement expected from foreign investment-based 
energy sector led growth will be realized by time of budget for fiscal year 1996. 
For, the period 1997-2000, we expect the MVR to remain over 6 points on an 
a verage which will prove instrumental in covering the losses during 1995-96. 
1, 
5.3.2 Basis Of Competition 
.. Under the law, MCos., can operate as mutual funds. However, in 
practice, almost all MCos., are operating in the leasing and installment trade 
business. Thus 
', 
as far asset management is concerned, MCos., are practically 
competing with the I-Cos. Moreover, commercial banks have also entered the 
leasing business. Banks are also involved in the installment trade as an Islamic 
mode of finance. There is, however, a difference between the installment trade 
6u's'iness of banks and Modarabas: banks only finance trade, and Modarabas 
involve in trade directly. 
Like Modarabas, leasing is a new and fast growing sector in Pakistan. 
Most Modarabas are in fact LCos., but for their preference for Shadah, have 
registered as MCos. Except for this choice of the legal framework, and 
requirement that the paid-up capital of a leasing company must be at least Rs. 
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100 million, as compared to Rs. 5-7 million for Modarabas, LCos., and 
Modarabas are treated similarly by the SBP, Controller of Capital Issues and 
Stock Market as non-banking financial institutions. Reform in corporate income 
tax laws has recently permitted the deduction of asset depreciation only from 
rentals for the purposes of taxation. This is seen as an incentive for the leasing 
sector. 
By the end of 1994,23 I-Cos., were listed in the KSE. The information 
about these companies is provided in table-5(f) and summarized in charts 15, 
16 and 17 respectively, for profit after tax, EPS and net investment in leasing'. 
The cumulative net investment of these companies in leasing activities in 1994 
increased to Rs. 9.4 billion from Rs. 8.9 billion in 1993. The cumulative after tax 
profits of the sector stood at Rs. 440.6 and 439.34 million, respectively, in 1993 
and 1994. The mean EPS improved from Rs. 1.7 in 1993 to Rs. 2.2 in 1994. 
Compared to MCos., for the I-Cos., the stock market is not an inevitable 
institution. Indeed, many LCos., get listed after acquiring a certain level of 
operational experience. This is not possible for the Modarabas. LCos., can and 
do borrow money on the basis of interest. Several LCos., have long-term credit 
lines with banks and even international financiers. This is not the case with 
Modarabas, which have opted not to deal in interest. Modarabas do receive 
short-term mark-up funds from banks. But most leasing operations involve 
long-term investment, therefore, MCos., involved in leasing activities cannot 
benefit much from such credit compared to the I-Cos. 
I-Cos., to a larger extent and MCos., to some extent depend on banks 
for acquiring credit. On the other hand, banks compete with these companies 
in the leasing business. Compared to the I-Cos., and MCos., banks have, thus, 
a better access to cheaper finance. Therefore, even in their own area of 
specialization, I-Cos., and MCos., are at a disadvantage compared to banks. 
'All charts of this sub-section are derived from table-5(f). 
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Chart 5(q-a) 
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Table 5(f): Profile of Leasing Companies 
Name of I-Co. Year of 
Listin--c, 
NIL 1993 
Rs. (M) 
NIL 1994 
Rs. (M) 
PAT 1993 
Rs. (M) 
PAT 1994 
Rs. (M) 
EPS RS. 
1993 
EPS Rs. 
1994 
Asian Icasin2 1990 408.2 428.6 20.70 13.44 2.9 1.56 
Askari leasing 1993 203.3 539.3 6.50 23.60 .7 2.36 
Atlas BOT lease 1989 740.0 973.0 18.20 24.20 3.3 4.00 
Capital Asset 1993 1 39.5 53.0 2.90 3.00 .61 . 60 
Crescent leasing 1992 88.8 121.2 2.50 3.80 .5 . 50 
Dadabhoy leasing 1992 23.2 2.60 .4 
English leasing 1992 144.1 153.3 18.70 9.80 2.3 1.23 
First Icasin! z 1992 286.3 367.6 29.90 16.50 2.3 1.27 
Ghcmni leasing 1992 191.3 188.7 11.40 7.60 2.3 1.51 
Inter Asia 1993 81.6 83.1 8.30 10.00 .8 1.00 
International 
Multi 
1991 104.2 105.0 5.60 3.40 1.1 . 69 
Lease Pak Ltd. 1983 1 33.0 82.3 . 00 6.10 .0 1.02 National Asset 1991 141.5 126.2 5.60 4.70 .6 1.01 N. D. L. C 1985 2356.0 1668.0 124.60 70.90 3.0 1.37 
N. Motor Lease 1994 77.7 67.4 4.90 2.60 .0 . 49 
Orix 1986 1371.0 1932.0 40.60 53.10 6.2 7.33 
Pak- Ind. & Com. 1988 332.4 371.9 16.20 20.00 3.2 5.08 
Pak- Ind. Leasing 1989 1 1347.0 1053.0 55.90 42.10 5.3 3.47 
Standard 
Chartered 
1991 710.0 779.0 42.90 58.80 4.3 4.90 
Trust leasin-2 1992 212.0 292.6 22.60 60.00 2.3 6.01 
Union leasing 1994 21.0 5.70 . 57 
Sum 8891.1 9406.0 440.60 439.34 
Mean 444.6 41-0-3 22.03 21.97 2.1 2.30 
Minimum 23.2 21.0 . 00 2.60 .0 . 49 
Maximum 2356.0 1932.0 124.60 70.90 6.2 7.33 
N 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Abbreviations: NIL, net investment in leasing; PAT, profits after tax; EPS, earnings per share 
Source: Derived from Pakistan and GuIfEconomist, Karachi, various issues. 
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5.3.3 Overall Market-Status Of Modarabas 
The companies listed in the KSE are classified into 28 sectors (see, 
table- 5(g). Modarabas, I-Cos., and financial institutions are considered as 
separate sectors. The information provided in table-5(g-a) is sorted for 
companies on the basis of their numbers. Although on June 31,1994, about 53 
MCos., were listed in the KSE, for 49 companies complete information was 
available. 
It can be seen that in terms of numbers, the Modaraba sector largest as 
it is second in rank on descending order, financial institutions rank sixth, LCos., 
rank thirteenth and mutual funds rank eighth. In terms of total size of the paid- 
up capital, the 7.4 billion rupees of the MCos., keep these companies in the 
fourth position. Whereas, financial institutions with a total paid-up capital of 9 
billion rupees rank second and LCos., are in the twelfth position with 2 billion 
rupees capital. 
The total paid-up capital of the Modarabas constitute 9.35% of the total 
KSE paid-up capital. Whereas, financial institutions contribute 11.34% of the 
total KSE capital. The contribution of the leasing sector is a mere 2.56%. But 
looking at the market capitalization, the significance of different sectors is 
changes to different positions. With a total about Rs. 10 billion market 
capitalization, Modarabas move to the thirteenth position in the ranking, 
contributing only 2.57% to the overall KSE capitalization. Whereas, banks 
move to the third position with Rs. 47 billion capitalization and 12% contribution 
to KSE capitalization. In terms of capitalization leasing gained value about five 
times of their paid-up capital, at almost the same amount of Rs. 10 billion 
capitalization as MCos., and 2.5% contribution to KSE capitalization. 
Useful comparisons can be made on the basis of some average figures. 
The, size of an average company suggests that MCos., are rather more capital 
intensive compared to an average company on the KSE list. The size of an 
average MCos'paid-up capital is Rs. 152 million, whereas, the market average 
for the same is Rs. 146 million. 
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The size of the paid-up capital of an average financial institution (Rs. 
282 million) is much larger compared to the IVICos. Compared to this, the size 
of an average LCo's paid-up capital is much smaller at Rs. 93 million. The 
average size of a LCo., is much smaller compared to the market average. In 
this comparison, Modarabas are, thus, closer to the market average. 
In terms of the average market capitalization both leasing and financial 
institutions out-perform Modarabas. The average market capitalization of a 
MCo., is Rs. 203 million compared to Rs. 1.5 billion for financial institutions and 
Rs. 452 million for LCos. In terms of the market - capitalization for an average 
company in the KSE (Rs. 650 million rupees) both Modarabas and leasing are 
weaker. Leasing, is nevertheless, much stronger compared to Modarabas 
whose average market capitalization is less than even 1/3 of the market 
average. 
In terms of the amount of shares in circulation, Modarabas come in the 
second position with a total amount of 779 million shares in circulation, 
compared to 298 million sector average for the KSE, 774 million for financial 
institutions and 170 million for I-Cos. Lesser shares are in circulation in the 
leasing sector compared to the average of the KSE, Modarabas and financial 
institutions. But looking at the average size of shares per company in the 
Modaraba sector, it can be noticed that average size is closer to the KSE 
average (16 million for Modarabas and 15 million for KSE sector average). 
These comparisons provide some indications about the overall market 
performance of the various sectors. Table -5(g-b) lists the various sectors in 
descending order on the basis of MVR. Sorting the sectors in terms of this 
crucial variable drops Modarabas to the bottom 25th position in a ranking 
among 27 sectors. Moreover, the MVR for Modarabas (1.34), is much below 
the market average (5) for the 27 sectors. Compared to this, financial 
institutions and leasing maintained a sound MVR (5.2,4-9). Their ranking is 
respectively 10th and 11th compared to 25th for the MCos. The ratio for 
financial institutions is 0.3 points above the KSE market average of 4.98 and 
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the leasing sector faired as good as the market average. Obviously, these facts 
have to be reflected in the price earning and earnings per share. Again 
Modarabas are pushed to the bottom of the ranking compared to financial 
institutions and I-Cos. 
I Thus, our over-all assessment suggests that the Modaraba is a sizable 
sector in terms of number of companies and total capital listed. But in terms of 
performance comparisons, for the year 1994, the Modaraba sector is seen to 
be much weaker compared to the leasing sector and other financial institutions. 
The over-all market valuation suggests that to survive in the market, the 
Modaraba sector has to perform much better in the years ahead. 
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Table 5(g-a): Alodarabas, Leasing Companies and Banks: Over-all Status in the Karachi 
Stock Exchange (as on June 31,1994, otherwise indicated) 
Sectors No. 
of 
Cos. 
Paid up 
Capital 
Rs. ( M) 
Average 
Size of Co. 
Rs. (M) 
Capitaliza- 
tion of 
Sector Rs. 
(M) 
Average 
Co. 
Capitaliza- 
tion Rs. (M) 
%of 
Sector 
Capital in 
KSE 
% of Sector 
Capitalizatio 
n in KSE 
Textile Spinning 150 10572,95 70,49 22462,68 149,75 13.29 5.80 
MCOS. 49 1 7438,86 151,81 9962,10 203931 9,35 2,57 
Textile Composite 42 4994,05 118,91 13829,46 329927 6,28 3,57 
Sugar & Allied 37 4007,53 108,31 8455,70 228,53 5,04 2.18 
Chemical & 
Pharmac 
36 5817,06 161,59 76018,90 2111,64 7,31 19,61 
Banks etc. 32 9018,47 281,83 47044,12 1470,13 11,34 12,14 
Insurance 31 910,03 29,36 9731,34 313,91 1,14 2,51 
Mutual Alodarabas 28 1368,32 48,87 5241,67 187,20 1,72 1,35 
Textile Weaving 26 2331,78 89,68 1930,16 74,24 2,93 50 
Miscellaneous 25 1103,92 44,16 2715,72 108,63 1,39 71 
Auto & Allied 23 2584,17 112,36 10806,14 469,83 3,25 2,79 
Food & Allied 22 1511,83 68,72 19131,62 869,62 1,90 4,94 
LCos. 22 2037,83 92,63 9936,00 451,64 2,56 2,56 
Synthetic & Rayon 22 4068,37 184,93 29769,89 1353,18 5,11 7,68 
Vanaspati & Allied 19 394,44 20,76 576,70 30,35 50 '15 
Engineering 17 967,40 56,91 3375.56 198,56 1,22 87 
Fuel & Energy 17 8179,53 481,15 54042,98 3179,00 10,28 13,94 
Cable &, Electrical 16 700,87 43,80 6371,56 398,22 88 1,64 
Cement 16 3663,62 228,98 33411,94 2088,25 4,61 1 8,62 
Paper & Board 15 1 890,78 59,39 6892,98 459,53 1,12 1,78 
GWs &, Ceramic 10 639,79 63,98 1548,93 154,89 80 40 
Jute 9 427,58 47,51 446,55 49,62 54 12 
Woolen 9 218,47 24,27 773,08 85,90 28 20 
Leather & tannery 7 305,98 43,71 2164,67 309,24 39 56 
Tobacco 7 519,69 74,24 3743,29 534,76 65 97 
Construction 4 116,42 29,11 73,43 18,36 '15 1 
02 
Transport 4 4773,03 1193.26 7117,96 1779,49 6,00 1,84 
Sorted by No. of 
Cos. 
All figures rounded 
Sum 79562,77 3930,68 387575,12 17607,04 100,02 100,02 
Mean 2946,77 145,58 14354,63 652,11 3,71 3,70 
Minimum 116,42 20,76 73,43 18,36 '15 
02 
Maximum 10572,95 1193,26 76018,90 3179,00 13,29 19,61 
N 27 1 27 1 27 27 27 27 
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Table 5(g-b): Modarabas, Leasing Companies and Banks: Over-all Status in the Karachi 
Stock Exchange (as on June 31,1994, othenvise indicated) 
Sectors PE 1993 PE 1994 No. of Co. 
shares 
Average 
No. of 
shares 
Valuatio 
n 
Ratio 
EPS 
1993 
EIIS 1994 
Chemical & 
Pharmac 
24,550 22,620 599,160 16,643 13.060 5,540 6,010 
Food & Allied 22,410 1 18,850 93,430 4,247 12,660 8,440 1 10,030 
Insurance 15,500 14,530 110,960 3,579 11,000 5,800 6,020 
Cement 14,870 21,040 427,020 26,689 9,120 6,240 4,410 
Cable & Electrical 14,810 16,190 72.830 4,552 9,100 7,090 6,460 
Paper & Board 3,860 3,090 98,980 6,599 7,720 2.590 3,230 
Synthetic & Rayon 16,320 15,280 706,350 32,107 7,320 3,210 3,440 
Tobacco 14,520 14,520 52.570 7,510 7,210 4,580 4,950 
Leather & tannery 14,850 17,000 36.600 5,229 7,090 3,950 3,450 
Fuel & Energy 22,050 23,830 714,240 42,014 6,600 3,920 3,630 
Banks etc., 24,380 19,120 773,850 24,183 5,220 2,440 3,110 
LCos. 13,370 9,960 169,640 7,711 4,870 2,510 3,310 
Auto & Allied 30,690 21,710 277,750 12,076 4,180 1,200 1,700 
Mutual Modarabas 8,250 7.160 140,580 59021 3,830 4,020 1 4,640 
Woolen 48,310 14,080 21,850 2,428 3,550 670 2,300 
Engineering 103,710 6,101 3,490 -3,830 -2,460 
Textile Composite 19,150 500.860 11,925 2,770 '150 1.480 
Miscellaneous 10,180 1 $4,580 2,183 2,460 2,610 200 
Glass & Ceramics 10,770 15,220 83,370 8,337 2,420 1,650 1,170 
Textile Spinning 1089,000 7,260 2,120 -1,630 -. 320 
Sugar & Allied 15,000 17,600 320,290 8,656 2,060 19570 1,340 
Transport 11,000 19,130 475,120 - 118,780 1,470 1,320 760 
Vanaspati & Allied 39,440 2,076 1,460 -10,060 '010 
MCOS. 5,830 4.920 778.840 15,895 1,340 19580 1,880 
Jute 51,040 5,671 1,040 -2.000 - 9000 
Textile Weaving 234.430 9,017 830 1 -1,310 -, 260 
Sorted by Valuation Ratio; Capital ization/Pai d-up capital 
All figures rounded. (. ) implies missing value of variable due to non-availability. Case eliminated. 
Sum 341,520 352,330 8041,630 400,272 134.620 52,030 69,600 
Mean 17,076 16,778 297,838 14,825 4,986 19927 2,578 
Minimum 3,860 3,090 15,140 2,076 630 -10,060 -2,460 
Maximum 48,310 37,330 1089,000 118,780 13,060 8,440 10,030 
N 20 21 27 27 27 27 27 
Source: Compiled and calculated from various issues of Pakistan and The Gulf Economist, 
Karachi 
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5.4. DO MODARABA CERTIFICATES REWARD RISK? 
Profit and loss sharing (PLS) principle of Islamic financing is considered 
unambiguously distinct from the interest-based system and therefore, widely 
cherished in the Islamic economic literature'. For the PLS system to work 
efficiently, it must reward risk with matching rates of return. The actual 
performance of the PLS in this regard has so far been discussed only 
theoretically without any empirical evidence. Modaraba certificates (MCs) 
represent a pure form of the PLS. In this Section, we formally analyze the 
actual market performance of MCs. In this and subsequent sections of the 
paper, we discuss how the Mos., using the MCs., as a solitary Islamic 
financial. instrument are incapable of successfully competing in a market 
environment where diverse forms of financial instruments are available to the 
competitors. 
5.4.1 On CapltalAssets . cl g In An Islamic Economy 
In uncertain markets, the claim for a fixed and certain rate of return on 
pure financial capital is unanimously considered by the Islamic scholars as a 
central cause of several economic inefficiencies and inequities. The theory of 
Islamic finance, as a corollary, rests on the natural phenomenon of the 
existence of risk, and as a result, on an uncertain rate of return on pure 
finance. Though Islamic scholars assign great social responsibilities to Islamic 
financial institutions, the rate of return is, however, the most crucial 
consideration of undertaking any financial activity. If the profit-sharing 
arrangement of Islamic financing has to function successfully, it must pass the 
actual test of performing in the market. 
Investors, in both conventional and an Islamic framework, look for an 
accumulation of value for their wealth. In a world of uncertain markets, the 
accumulation of value by different companies is therefore crucial for their 
The PLS is mostly comprised of mudharabah and musharakah modes of sl 
a call to implement the PLS, see, e. g., C11 (11981) and FSC (1995). 
1 amic financing. For 
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survival, as investors overtime, have to choose between them on the basis of 
this criterion. 
On The Existence of Fixed Return Assets 
Some Islamic economic discussions treat the deferred price underlying 
bai'murabaha fil amir bil shira (mark-up) similar to interest due to its non-risk- 
sharing characteristics. Therefore, the existence of mark-up is considered as a 
characteristic of the transition process from the interest-based financial system 
to' an Islamic one. Its role is thus ruled out from a truly PLS-based Islamic 
financial system. These analysis therefore, rule out the presence of a fixed 
return asset in an Islamic portfolio. Moreover, some researchers introduce 
zakah as a 2.5% financial penalty on holding cash as well as on the cash to be 
distributed as dividends'. 
The practical merits of these academic ideas are yet to be seen. 
However, for a number of reasons, the existence of a risk-free asset cannot 
and should not be ruled out from an Islamic economy. First, interest has been 
prohibited as a fixed return on pure finance. Indeed, the scholars of r1qh 
recognize that deferred price may contain a fixed return as a reward for the 
deferment of payment2. As this fixed return is a phenomenon of the goods and 
services market, in economic terms, this cannot be treated as a return on pure 
finance'. Islamic banks use this return with the consent of r1qh scholars. 
Sec ond, risk aversion helps keeping the cost of capital low. Elimination or 
bypassing risk 6version by refusing the existence of a risk-free asset cannot be 
rationalized. Moreover, no Islamic scholar has argued that risk aversion is not 
acceptable in Islam. The only important injunction to be derived from the 
prohibition of interest is that if risk exists, it should be shared by mutual 
agreement between all parties to a contract. Third, the above mentioned 
academic ideas which decline the existence of a risk-free asset do not provide 
I See, Ibrahim (1991), Mirakhor (1987) and Ashkar (1993). 
2 Ibn Oudama is reported to have written that, wit is permissible if the seller of a commodity says 
that he sells it by such amount if the payment is on the spot and by such (excess) amount if the 
payment is after a certain time". See, FSC (11995, p1l 73). 
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an alternative mechanism through which the cost of capital can be compared 
for different projects and for the same project with different life span. Fourth, 
the introduction of zakah as a 2.5% financial penalty will not make any 
difference as it would be a universal rate. Moreover, zakah contribution and for 
that matter, contribution of interest-free loans both fall in the non-economic 
domain. The incorporation of these in considerations similar to the one in 
question lack approval from shariah scholars. Lastly, but most importantly, the 
market strength of the MC as a financial instrument would depend on the 
demand for it. This demand cannot be restricted to only those investors who 
believe in the non-existence of a fixed return investment. The imposition of this 
additional consideration will simply weaken the demand for the asset and will 
lead to a depreciation in its value overtime. For these reasons, we consider 
that the portfolio of an Islamic investor may contain a risk-free asset. 
Therefore, in addition to risky investment opportunities, the legitimacy of 
the mark-up in the shari'ah provides the investors the opportunity to seek risk- 
free, but "qualified" fixed return investments. The coexistence of mark-up as a 
risk-free investment opportunity along side the risk bearing opportunities is 
known to improve the welfare of investors over a situation where only one of 
these opportunities may be available. Given these opportunities, and 
depending on their risk profile, investors must expect from risk-bearing 
investment opportunities, a reward over and above the risk-free mark-up rate, 
as a risk premium. The higher is the total risk over and above the risk-free rate, 
the higher must be the premium, its reward. 
On Partitioning of Total Risk 
The current literature on Islamic financing does not formally discuss the 
fact that risk cannot be diversified completely. In this literature, risk refers, in 
general,. to uncertainty or total risk of a project or economic activity involving 
time. This is not without reason. In the context of investment projects which are 
new or which relate to non-listed enterprises, risk can only refer to the 
" Indeed, -'most critics argue that the mark-up based asset management strategies of Islamic 
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uncertainty of the future outcome of such projects, which is the total risk of the 
project. 
However, the situation of companies listed in the stock exchanges is 
different. In these cases, not only total risk of new opportunities in investing in 
the stocks can be calculated precisely, but also this risk can be partitioned into 
firm specific and market related, respectively, diversifiable and non-diversifiable 
risk. In competitive markets, the diversifiable risk should not exist and it is the 
non-diversifiable risk which needs to be rewarded'. 
,.. This theoretical framework of evaluation and pricing of capital assets 
under conditions of risk is thus, equally applicable to the evaluation of profit 
sharing arrangements as long as these are listed in the capital markets. Since 
the MCos., are listed, and MCs., are traded, these can be evaluated using the 
fra mework. 
5.4.2 Reward For Risk 
In the framework of the premises referred to above, i. e., under 
conditions of risk, investors view the outcome of investments in terms of some 
probability distribution. The investment decisions are made in terms of a) the 
expected value of the probability of outcome of an investment and b) its 
standard deviation. The utility function of a typical investor is thus written as: 
f (Eý, 
Ew is expected future wealth; aw is predicted standard deviation of actual 
future wealth from the expected, E,. Since expected future wealth depends on 
expected future return R on present investment, and the standard deviation of 
the R, aR, investor's utility function directly depends on the expected R. 
U=g(ERICT R) 
banks make the mark-up prone to becoming a fixed return on pure finance. See, ibid. 
This extremely useful premises of partitioning total risk is laid down by Sharpe (1964) and 
Treynor (1965) in their models of pricing capital assets under conditions of risk. 
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dU/dER : ý' 0; Higher expected return is preferred to lower expected 
return, and 
dU/dCrR <0; Lower risk is preferred to higher risk. 
These rational assumptions imply up-ward sloping indifference curves 
relating to ER, andGR. Each ER, aR combination reflects a unique investment 
opportunity. Investment opportunities lying on higher indifference curves 
improve welfare of the investor over lower indifference curves (in Figure - A, 
the tangency of these indifference curves, not shown, will correspond to points 
A, B and C, respectively, for lower, middle and higher curves). 
All investment possibilities other than the risk-free opportunity will 
involve certain level of risk. An efficient investment plan, like point C in Figure - 
5 (a), will be chosen by the investor by ensuring: a) No alternative with the 
same ER, but with lower aR is possible, b) No alternative with the sameCrRand 
higher ER, is possible and c) No alternative with a higher ER, and a loweraR is 
possible. 
:ý, All investors have also the possibility of borrowing and/or investing at a 
risk-free rate and share equal amount of information of the market. Under 
these conditions, combination of efficient investments (E) will fall along a 
straight line, similar to OC' and 013' in Figure A. Ej = Rf + bui ; Rf,, Risk-free 
rate, b, is risk premium, which will always be positive as investors prefer lesser 
risk over more. 
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CIR 
ER 
Figure 5(a): ERandCTRRelationship under Presence of Rf 
Given that an investor can receive credit or invest at a risk-free rate (Rf) 
and have the choice to invest in risky stocks -with expected outcome subject to 
(Ei, ai), then by allocating his funds between the Rf and risky investment, the 
investor can attain the best point which gives highest value for (Ei - RD/a, i. e., 
the investor will maximize the reward for risk. 
- While comparing individual stocks (or portfolios), for a level of risk, 
efficient stocks should give higher return. Conversely, for a level of return, 
efficient stocks. should be lesser risky. In Figure A, stock C is the most efficient 
at the risk class of 10% variability of return, given the risk-free (R) mark-up rate 
which we assume as 7% for Pakistan for the period of the study. 
I 
We calculate reward (average monthly return on MCs and stocks minus 
the 7% annual risk-free mark-up rate adjusted on monthly basis)lvariability of 
average return ratio to find how the MCs and stocks of the companies in our 
sample have rewarded the risk over and above the 7% rate. The existence of 
ý, 1 11 
stocks close to or lower than the risk-free rate (e. g., points A, a and so on, 
compared to B and C will indicate non-economic (may be ideological) 
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-3% 
0 7% 9% 11% 14% 
mark-up 
Rf 
determinants of investment decisions, suggesting need for improvements in 
performance. Obviously, if the market rewards risk the prospect for risk-sharing 
(mudharabah and musharakah) would be high. We use two indices, the Sharpe 
Index and the Treynor Index as a measure of the reward for variability of 
return. 
The Sharpe Index is calculated as: Expected rate of return on an 
asset minus the risk-free mark-up rate divided by variability of the rate of 
return on the asset (measured by the standard deviation of average monthly 
expected return). Hence, 
Sl= 
RF-RF 
v 
The. Treynor index, replaces variability of return by the beta, non- 
diversifiable risk of the asset. Therefore, the 
Rr -RF TI 
Beta 
Data 
Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) is the main stock market (see, previous 
sections). Systematic information about the KSE is provided by at least two 
sources. Since 1961, the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) publishes systematic 
information. about certain aspects of the companies listed in the market. Since 
1991, KSE has also started to provide information about selected companies. 
This useful, information is unpublished and distributed among the members of 
the KSE only. This section relies mostly on the SBP sources, except for the 
use of the KSE sources in a few places. Using the SBP data, in this section, 
we calculate the Sharpe and Treynor Indices, for MCos., I-Cos., and banks. 
The SBP. in. dex of share prices, (SBPI) is treated as the market index. The 
composition of sectors which make the SBPI is given in table-5(h). 
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Table-5(h). 
Sectoral Composition of the SBPI of Share Prices 
Number 
of Sectors 
Name of Sectors Number of 
Companies 
1. Textiles 24 
2. Chemical and 
pharmaceuticals 
8 
3. Engineering 4 
4. Auto and Allied 7 
5. Cables and Electrical 5 
6. Sugar and Allied 8 
7. Paper and Board 5 
8. Cement 5 
9. Energy and Fuel 6 
10. Transport and 
Communication 
5 
11. Banks 5 
12. Modarabas 8 
13. Issuance 4 
14. Leasing 5 
Expected Return, Variability of Return and Betas 
The performance of individual stocks is measured by studying the return 
on the 'stock in question in relation with the market rate of return (return on 
SBPI). -,, The prices of most stocks move together in a systematic fashion. 
Pakistan's main market - the Karachi Stock Exchange has been suffering 
serious instability due to socio-political strife. This and similar other causes of 
instability are in general common to all stocks. In normal circumstances, on the 
average,, 25-30%' of total instability in prices of individual stocks are counted 
for the instability of the market due to similar socio-political, technological and 
market conditigns. However, some stocks follow the market more than others - 
having more than average systematic risks and vice-versa. The firms having 
more. than average risk characteristics are in general leveraged, firms whose 
assets depreciate fast, firms having cyclical sales and firms engaged in the 
basic industries. A large part of instability (in general, 70-75%, in average) in 
the'rate 'of return on stocks of individual firms is, however, due to individual 
characteristics of the firms and are unsystematic. In competitive markets, this 
risk is eliminated and not rewarded. So, it is the degree of the systematic risk of 
a stock which counts. 
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The Model 
I, % To analyze the performance of individual stocks in relation to the 
mar 
, 
ket, ". following the seminal works of Treynor and Sharpe, the simplified 
variant of capital asset pricing model under conditions of risk as given below is 
utilized'. This simple model is extremely useful in calculating a stock's 
systematic and unsystematic risk, i. e., its relationship and performance vis-6- 
vis the market and for assessing how a stock rewards per unit of risk. The 
general form of the model to estimate the regression line is 
a, + b, r, t + e, 
r,, return on the stock of an individual company in period t, the 
dependent variable of the model, is calculated as: 
r, t (pt., - pt + d) / pt 
pt'beginning of period market price of individual stock 
p,.,, end of period t price of same stock 
d, cash dividend in period t for individual stock 
r,, t is return from market in period t- independent variable of the model, II 
calculated as, 
"(SBPlt., - SBPI) / SBPlt 
: ', ý 
SBPI,., Rupee amount of the SBP Index of 100 companies at the end of 
period t and SBPIt rupee amount of the SBPI index at the beginning of period t. 
Monthly rit, for 18 companies (8 MCos., 5 I-Cos., and 5 banks) and rmt 
calculated for 27 months (November 1,1991 - January 1,1994) as such are 
See, Evans and Archer (1968). 
2A thorough discussion of the model can be read from any standard text book on corporate 
finance and investments. For a text book comparison of this model with other models one can 
refer'to 'Kelly, ' Frank K. (1989), Investment Analysis and Portfolio Management, London: 
Hourcourt Brace Jovanovich. 
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given in table 5(l). The period of 27 months has been selected as it is generally 
accepted that for such purposes a period of 25 - 30 months is an ideal period. 
The regression intercept ai estimates the rate of return on individual 
stock r, when return on the SBPl is stationary i. e., the r,,,, =O. The slope statistic 
b, gives the predicted response of r, to changes in r, - the beta index of the 
non-diversifiable systematic risk of the individual stock. This component of risk 
is crucial, because the remaining part of risk, which is specific to the stock in 
question can be eliminated by diversification. e, is the random error around the 
regression line which occurs in period t. For a specific stock then, the 
regression model becomes: 
ri = a, + b. rm 
We apply this model to the data of table 5(i) to run regression for the 
rate of return of the 18 companies as dependent variable and rate of return on 
the market index as an independent variable. The resultant betas (separation 
of systematic and unsystematic risk of companies), standard deviation, Sharpe 
and Treynor indices are given in tables 5(i) and 50). 
Sector Comparisons 
The results of inter-sector comparisons in terms of risk-reward as given 
by the Sharpe Index are provided in table-5(i). These results suggest that the 
Modaraba sector does not at all reward risk. The risk adjusted return for the 
Modaraba sector is 15% below the fixed return on markup-based investments. 
In fact, Modaraba is the only sector which is characterized with this 
phenomenon. Compared to this, investment banks and LCos., perform much 
better. The cement sector gives maximum reward for risk followed by the 
chemicals and pharmaceutical companies. 
Company Comparisons 
The Sharpe Index and Treynor Index calculated for the 18 companies 
are given in table-50). These suggest that the return adjusted for total risk as 
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well as adjusted for systematic risk offered by 3 MCos., falls below the markup 
rate. One leasing and one investment bank fall to the lowest position in this 
regard. The risk adjusted return offered by the other 5 MCos., is slightly above 
the markup-based return amongst which 2 offer above average risk adjusted 
return, in this classification. 
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Both in terms of the Sharpe and Treynor indices, the reward for risk 
offered by 35.5% of MCos., 20% of I-Cos., and 20% of investment banks is 
below the 7% annual bench mark of fixed rate of return. On the average, 
MCos., do not at all, and I-Cos., and investment banks do reward total risk. But 
MCos., do offer 2 units of reward per unit of systematic risk. This is half of the 
reward offered by I-Cos., and investment banks. These findings highlight the 
fact that MCos., compared to both I-Cos., and investment banks have inherent 
problems both in relation to the market and within the industry. 
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Betas 
The average beta for the 18 companies is 0.60, i. e., the unavoidable 
systematic risk of these companies is 60%, leaving 40% of the unsystematic 
risk which can be diversified away. These 18 companies cannot be 
representative of the market which consists about 700 companies. 
Nevertheless, this is indicative of the fact that the KSE is almost three times 
more riskier compared to some developed market economies, as the average 
beta for-a developed market is considered to be 0.25 which leaves the 
diversifiable risk to 75%. The higher risk of our example of the KSE is 
consistent with the existence of higher rate of return in the developing 
countries compared to the developed countries and offers better investment 
opportunities. It should be noted that betas for the same company changes 
overtim6. ' Thus it is often more useful to depict the stability of betas over. time. 
But due to limited availability of data, it was not possible for us in the present 
study to check for this characteristic. 
Unsystematic and systematic risk, partitioned, company-wise for our 
sample is given in table-5(k). Non-risk-rewarding companies constitute a larger 
part of the average systematic risk of our sample of 18 companies. According 
to experience based conventional wisdom, riskier companies should offer 
higher return, but in this sample they, do not. Risk-rewarding companies have 
relatively lower systematic risk. This sounds paradoxical, but is consistent with 
our finding that some companies are simply riskier than others irrespective of 
what they can offer in return. 
Inter Sector Linkages 
It is also interesting to see that with what sectors of the economy the 
MCos., and I-Cos., are integrated? Given the nature of this research and the 
daýa used for it, we can only translate the inter-sector linkages in terms of the 
movement of share prices. The correlation coefficients of stock prices for 
different sectors for the period October 1991 - January 1994 is provided in 
table 5(m). It can be seen that MCos., are inversely correlated with most other 
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sectors except for textiles and banks. The correlation coefficients between 
MCos., banks and textiles are. positive and strong indicating an integration and 
strong linkages between these sectors. 'But 
comparatively, banks and Mos., 
have weaker, MCos., -textiles, and Banks - textiles have stronger correlation. 
The correlation of leasing with these sectors are weak, but with most other 
sectors it is strong. It is also very interesting that only MCos., and transport 
have weak correlation with the market. 
There are reasonable explanations for the strong positive correlation 
between MCos., and textiles. First, a good number of MCos., is floated by 
companies which have strong stake in the textile sector. Second, textiles and 
MCos., are both on the down swing in the market. Since MCos., have negative 
correlation with most sectors, it seems during the weak days of MCos., most 
investments have been diverted from MCos., to cement and chemicals. Similar 
is the case with textiles. 
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5.5. CHALLENGES OF MODARABA COMPANIES 
The preceding discussion highlights that in a short period of time MCos., 
have expa. nded fast and acquired substantial market significance. This can be 
attributed among other things to wide scale ideological preference accorded to 
this sector by the investors. MCos., however, do not perform well compared to 
other sectors particularly, leasing and investment banks which are registered 
as non-banking financial institutions and treated to a large extent similarly by 
the SBP- In the present section, some of the peculiar problems of Mos., are 
briefly discussed. 
5.5.1 Salient Features Of Modaraba Companies 
The challenges confronted by the MCos., can be better understood in 
the light of their peculiarities. The following salient features of MCos., may be 
recapitulated. 
1 Mos., have found the stock market inevitable for their existence. 
There has been no example of Modaraba company, big or small, 
- which may 
have started operations without being listed. It is unique 
characteristic of Mos., to open to stock market competition without 
1, ý any prior experience of business. 
2., MCos., are almost 100% equity financed. Due to non-availabilitY of 
appropriate financial instruments, these are incapacitate of 
mobilizing Funds other than the MCs and initial contribution o the 
paid-up capital by the sponsors. 
3. Due to the second feature, MCos., have to overwhelming rely on 
distributing stock bonuses for saving cash. 
4., Again, due to the second feature, for mobilizing Funds, MCos., 
overwhelmingly rely on rights issues. 
5. M, any Mos., are registered as leasing MCos., which have to have at 
least 100 million Rs. paid up capital. As leasing institutions, 70% of 
their Funds must be kept in leasing operations. Due to constraints 
on cash flows capital replacement is restricted. Depreciation of 
assets overtime, leads to the depreciation in the prices of MCs. 
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6. Leasing MCos., are also competing with I-Cos., and leasing 
operations of commercial banks. Unlike MCos., the latter group of 
organizations have an access to local as well as international long- 
term credit lines. 
7. MCos., have to distribute all profits as dividends. These cannot 
. retain profits. 
Due to cash flow problems, distribution has mostly 
been in form of stocks dividends. 
8. MCos., have to build a cash reserve with the State Bank of Pakistan 
equivalent to their paid-up capital. This reserve is built by a 20% 
contribution out of annual profits till the reserve is fully built. 
Thereafter, they have to contribute 5% of annual profits for the 
preservation of this Funds. According to new regulations, they can 
issue bonus shares only against this reserve. This regulations is 
considered to constrain the cash flow as well as dividend distribution 
by MCos. 
9. Investors are understood to. consider MCos., as a form of non- 
conventional business. The collapse of finance companies, and 
cooperatives which were somehow not similar to conventional 
financial institutions, has created a confidence problem for MCos., 
too. 
10. Initially, MCos., were tax exempt provided they paid 90% of profits in 
dividends; 10% is paid to the management company as mudharib's 
share prescribed in the law. This tax benefit prompted many 
established companies to float MCos. The more novice MCos., are in 
fact competing with these matured institutions. 
1 1. At the present, MCos., are paying taxes on earnings in the following 
form:. First 3 years no taxes, following 2 years 12.5% and after 5 
years of listing 25%. In addition, for leasing business, capital 
depreciation is adjusted in rentals for tax exemption. 
12. Total 15% of liabilities must be invested in the shares of National 
Investment Trust (NIT Units). 
13. Current assets/current liabilities ratio must be maintained at 1: 1. 
14. Equity/leveraged ratio must not exceed the 1: 7 for first 2 years, and 
1: 10 ratio thereafter. 
15. MCos., are over-regulated by the SBP, CLA, Registrar of MCos., 
RSB, Monopoly Control Authority, Controller of Corporate Issues, 
Stock Market authorities and Tax officials. 
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16. A consensus is emerging that MCos., have over-spread. 
, 17. MC-holders 
have no voting rights; thus common stocks-holders have 
a preference over the MCs. 
16. -MC-holders do not enjoy the preferential treatment which holders of 
preference share do as a reward for not voting. 
19. Modaraba firms are intensive in physical capital. MCs are issued 
against these physical assets. The value of the MCs basically 
depends on the value of these assets. The assets depreciate 
overtime. Asset replacement by means of profit retention or 
borrowing is not common. Naturally, therefore, the price of MCs 
must depreciate in proportion to depreciation of the assets. 
20 MCos., have no R&D investments. These investments, e. g., in the 
chemical and pharmaceutical firms enable them to acquire value and 
capital gains overtime. 
21. MCos., do not produce commodities. Improvement is product 
designs and other innovations add value to the firm and improve 
capital gains, e. g., in the electronic and engineering sector. 
22. MCos., have not been able to spread their activities, e. g., like the 
banking sector. Banking services are wide spread and banks are 
able to continuously improve their services by the use of modern 
technology which adds to the value of the industry and capital gains 
for investors. 
23. Most MCos-, indigenous have abruptly exposed to stiff competition in 
an widely open economy. Compared to this, most other companies 
of the KSE were protected and subsidized in their infancy. 
24. -The above is a short list of the unique characteristics of MCos. 
These pose challenges to the future development of these Islamic 
enterprises. Thorough investigation of these and similar other 
considerations such as negligence of growth financing could be 
highly useful to understand the observed phenomenon regarding 
MCos., and to guide policies to alleviate some of their problems. 
. 5.5.2 Salient Policies Of Modaraba Companies 
, -The above 
is a short list of the unique characteristics of MCos. These 
pose, challenges to the future development of these Islamic enterprises. 
Thorough investigation of these and similar other considerations such as 
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neg ligence of growth financing could be highly useful to understand the 
observed phenomenon regarding MCos., and to guide policies to alleviate 
some of their problems. For many limitations, such a comprehensive treatment 
of the subject is not feasible in the present paper. In the following we will 
concentrate, in more detail, only on : a) excessive reliance on rights issues, b) 
excessive reliance on stock dividends and c) consequences of constraining the 
dividend and financing policy of MCos. 
,, ý Scope of Rights Issues 
When 
,a 
firm needs more Funds it resorts to various options - various 
forms of debts, various forms of equities and various forms of "dequities" 
(quasi-equities). For additional Funds, Mos., are relying only on equities. 
The three, . prominent forms of raising additional equity are: a) selling new 
stocks, to the public (public offering) through firm commitment underwriters, b) 
issuing rights to holders of existing stocks with insurance to purchase the non- 
subscribed stocks by standby underwriters and c) uninsured rights issues to 
holders of existing stock on pro rata basis'. 
As opposed to public offering (PO), rights offering (RO) is an offering of 
additional stocks to existing stock holders in proportion to their holding. Thus 
rights issue allows the selling of additional stocks while maintaining the 
ownership, proportion of the firm intact. In addition, it is beneficial for firms 
whose stocks are kept in blocks by few interest groups and the firms are not 
much4, known to the general investors. ROs-, are also considered to be 
concessiorial sale of stock thus some form of bonus. Moreover, ROs., are 
considered'to, be much less costlier compared to POs. As the prices of the 
stock will generally fall after new issues, in POs., the new owners benefit at the 
expenseý of the old owners. In ROs., this is completely avoided. 
'it jS'reported that over the 1933-55 period, 50% of new issues worth $1 million and more were 
raised by RO ' 
s. By 1963-81, this'reduced to 5% i. e., 95% of new issues came through firm 
commitment arrangements. In Canada, 50%, in Europe close to that level but actually declining 
in amount, is the share of ROs. This is despite the fact that ROs are much cheaper and 
convenient compared to POs. See, Smith (1978). 
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In general, POs., are very common compared to ROs., particularly in the 
US. Companies in Europe and Canada are known to use ROs., too. In 
Pakistan, POs., are common in general. However, MCos., entirely rely on 
ROs-, formobilizing additional equity. 
The RO., by MCos., works in the following general form. Assuming the 
price , (market value) of an MC., of a particular 
Modaraba is Rs. 30 on 
31.5.1995. An investor holds 12 MCs., on that date. The Modaraba needs to 
mobilize more equity. The management decides that for each 6 MCs., held by 
investors one right will be offered. Each right can be converted into one MC., 
at a price of Rs. 27 instead of Rs. 30 provided the option of conversion is utilized 
by the owner of the existing MCs., by 22-6-1995. 
Existing MC-holders are owners of the right to purchase the new MCs., 
at Rs. 27, -during the specified period subject to the number of MCs., already 
held by them. If they do not want to subscribe to new MCs., they can sell 
these rightS'to other investors. In this particular example, each right apparently 
offers a bonus of Rs. 3. By selling this right for any positive amount the owner 
will benefit. Thus most MC., owners who are in need of cash will sell their 
rights. But they have to act fast; the subscription period is usually short, the 
offer can lapse. 
Some indeed lapse. Since ROs., involve cost for the firm, the firm likes 
all ROS., must be utilized. To ensure this, the subscription price is kept low, 
over-subscriptidn privilege is given to MC-holders and sometimes standby 
underwriting (a formal commitment with an underwriter to buy the un- 
subscribed MCs) is ensured. 
When new capital is required, Mos., have the only choice between 
pos., and ROs. It is generally known that share prices decline after each P0. 
Thus, although, t, he company benefits from POs., in case of price decline as a 
result of a PO., the senior stock-holders shall loose. Their net wealth is 
transferred to the new share-holders. This problem is avoided by ROs., as new 
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stocks will be bought by senior stock-holders and wealth transfer does not take 
place, - , 
It should however, be noted that if ROs., are used by senior stock- 
holders,! the wealth transfer will not take place. Many ROs., are indeed not 
used by senior stock-holders. Some are used as by over-subscription rights by 
other investors and underwriters. As ROs., are meant to issue new stocks, 
stock prices are bound to decline after these are issued. Thus, theoretically, 
the, problem of wealth transfer cannot be avoided by ROs., either. This is to 
indicate that in the interest of senior owners, both POs., and ROs., need to be 
issued carefully. An constant increase in ROs., associated with a constant 
de , creasý in the prices of MCs., indicates that things have gone wrong in 
conformity with the theory and against the interests of senior owners of MCs. 
' : The above cannot be acceptable from the shariah point of view. ROs., 
are however, useful in maintaining the proportional ownership structure of the 
company. This can be seen as consistent with the pure mudharabah principle 
V 
of not dilutind'the ownership structure with old and new owners.. 
Limitations of Stock Dividends 
Mos., predominantly depend on 
minority of them distribute cash dividends 
distributing stock dividends. A 
Only a few distribute both. The 
over reliance on stock dividends is often related to the cash flow problems of 
the companies.. By distributing stocks, the companies save cash for some 
otherýurgent uses. Stock dividends are distributed in proportion to the already 
held MC.,, shares by investors. 
In general, investors prefer cash dividends over stock dividends. This 
I 
is because, in fact, stock dividends, merely "divide the pie into smaller slices". 
if a ý0% stock dividends is issued, an investor holding 4 shares will get an 
additional one. The increase in the number of shares will put a down ward 
pressure, on share prices. Given total earning the same, an increase in the 
number of shares will simply lead to a proportionate decrease in earning per 
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share., - Investors will be well-off, only if an increase in stock dividend is 
associated with an increase in the total earnings of the company, EPS and 
cash dividends. 
Stock dividends, are thus good for companies whose share prices are 
increasing rapidly and which desire to check this increase to keep an optimal 
price level. This objective is, however, more directly achieved by stock splits; 
an over-priced stock, for example, is divided into two, so that an optimal price 
structure can be maintained. 
,, - As the prices of MCs., are already much weaker compared to the share 
prices in general, stock dividends can only put further downward pressure on 
the MC prices. This coupled with ROs., which are also expected to suppress 
MC., prices, provide enough explanation for the MCs., to constantly loose 
value. 
To assist the prices of the MCs., MCos., in fact need to adopt MC., re- 
purchase plans rather than stock dividends and ROs. This option is however 
difficult, because most MCos., are already short of cash. Another possible 
option, is to resort to reverse split. MCs., are grossly under-priced. To bring 
these prices closer to certain optimal level, MCs., can be withdrawn, and 
instead of 3 MCs., for example, one MC., can be issued. If the price of one 
MC., is Rs. 10, instead of 3 MCs., being kept, one MC., of Rs. 30 can be kept 
b. y an investor. This proposal at this stage should be treated a mere idea. This 
crucial area indeed requires a separate study. 
Consequences of Constrained Policies 
MCos., are unique in the sense that these companies can neither device 
their financial policy independently nor their dividend policy. Their financing 
policy is- constrained by non-availability of diversified financial instruments for 
resource mobilization. They are virtually dependent on one instrument: the 
MC. Reliance on one type of financial instrument could have been fair, 
provlid. ed it was the same for all market participant. All the non-Modaraba 
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sector has the choice to utilize the over 30 instruments available. Obviously, 
therefore, this constrain is reflected through the market on the depreciating 
prices of the MCs. 
Similar is the case with the dividend policy. Compared to other 
companies, IVICos., are not free in deciding between how much to retain and 
how much to pay in dividends. In fact, the concept of retention of profits in the 
Modaraba business has not yet been thoroughly discussed. 
Working together, these two factors impose a severe constrain on the 
policy of growth financing by the MCos., as compared to other companies. As 
a mater of fact, it seems that MCos., have no growth financing policies. For 
ongoing firms growth financing is an important source of continuity, dynamism 
and acquisition of value. 
5.6 VALUE OF MODARABA CERTIFICATES AND 
ROLE OF ISLAMIC WARRANTS 
As we saw in the preceding analysis, in terms of its size, the modaraba 
is a significant sector of the Karachi Stock Exchange, yet, it has not been able 
to reward the risk taken by investors by investing in the modaraba certificates. 
Most recently, the pressure of the market on the sector has further increased 
and the market value of modaraba certificates has depreciated. 
'The theoretical explanation for this phenomenon is very simple. Other 
things remaining the same, an increase in supply is bound to put a downward 
pressure on the prices of an asset. Since, for resource mobilization, the 
modara 
i 
ba companies have entirely relied on the modaraba certificates, the 
supply, of these certificates has increased, consequently the value of the 
certificates has decreased. To avoid complicating the simple matter we rely on 
this fundamental explanation and propose ways to support the value of 
modaraba certificates as dominant assets of the companies. 
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Uncertainty and the Value of Managerial Options 
The independence of the manager of a mudharabah enterprise to make 
decisions relating to the operations of the enterprise are discussed in detail in 
the'relevant literature. The literature recognizes the fact that in order to make 
t he enterprise profitable, the manager must be given suitable flexibility in 
decision making. Rigid conditions such as "trade only in one specific 
commodity 9V etc., are not approved by a large group of shariah scholars. 
However, we noticed that the modaraba companies are over-regulated. 
Moreover, in context of lack of application of profit sharing in contemporary 
Islamic financial practices, some researchers suggest to impose rigid 
conditions on the manager of funds. They justify this in order to safeguard the 
interests of owners of funds. The modaraba companies have little flexibility 
even in areas of crucial policy making such as financing and dividend policies. 
Rigid conditions on managerial decision making of a modaraba 
company cannot be justified in the framework of the recent developments in 
the theory of managerial options. This development is consistent with the 
traditional theory of managerial options under the mudharabah in the sense 
that. the manager by assumption is a trustworthy person and always works in 
the best interest of the owners of the enterprise. Thus he must be able to make 
independent decisions to ensure profitability of the enterprise. 
Uncertainty of Project's Outcome 
FIG. 5(b) Uncertainty of Projects' Outlays and Value of Managerial Options 
The theory suggests that as uncertainty about a project's outcome 
increases, managerial options become more valuable and as certainty 
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Value of Managerial Options 
increases, managerial options become lesser valuable'. This relationship 
between the value of managerial options and uncertainty of the project's 
outcome is shown in Fig. 5(b). The point is simple. If it was certain that trading, 
e. 'g., in one commodity is profitable, restricting the manager's decisions to trade 
in that-commodity does not cause a loss to the enterprise. As trading in a 
single commodity is not sure to make the enterprise profitable, allowing 
additional decision powers to the manager will improve the probability of 
profitability of the enterprise, thus, these managerial options become valuable. 
The theory of managerial options considers that opportunities for the 
firm to acquire value must be treated as options - rights but not obligations. The 
manager has the right but not obliged to take these opportunities. It is 
interesting to note that investment decisions which may apparently be irrational 
in the framework of the traditional theory may in fact turn out to be rational 
decisions when viewed in the framework of the theory of managerial options. 
As an extreme case, postponing a positive net present value (NPV) 
investment opportunity by itself may in some cases be valuable. In some other 
cases, speeding with a go ahead decision can be valuable even if the project's 
NPV may be negative. Unless, the manager of a modaraba company is fully 
trusted and given complete freedom to make timely decisions, value 
maximization by the company will be constrained. 
This premises can be used to highlight the simple problem of the 
modaraba companies. Assets Of a typical company comprise of: a) assets in 
place and b) new investment opportunities. New investment opportunities are 
options not obligations, therefore, can or cannot be taken at the discretion of 
the' manager. If new investment opportunities are financed by new equity 
issuesi'the price (value) of assets in place will decline. Therefore, unless the 
expected profits are very high, a trustworthy manager will not take new 
investment opportunities with new equity issues. As the value of assets in 
place increases more and more investment opportunities will be given up if 
For a full treatment of the managerial options theory, see, Dixit and Pindyck (1994) 
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these were to be financed by only equities. This relationship is defined in Fig. 
5(c). 
Positive NPV Investment opportu 
NPV2 
NPVI 
NPVo 
Take /opportunities ies 
..... . Do n 
........... 
........ : Do not take opportunities 
3 V1, 
V2 Value of assets in place 
FIG. 5(c): Value of Assets in Place and Limitations of Equity Financing 
If the value of old modaraba certificates is as high as V2, the new 
investment opportunity must be as high as NPV2, to issue new modaraba 
certificates and undertake the project. Thus given the value of existing 
modaraba certificates as V2 all investment opportunities bellow NPV2wilI be 
given up unless the company has financial resources such as leasing, 
installment purchase, retained earnings etc. Thus, to keep the value of equity 
high there must be sources of growth financing other than permanent equity'. 
In case of modaraba companies, this principle was ignored as can be seen by 
the reliance on modaraba certificates, amount of stock dividends paid and right 
issues. 
The I. F. C. Inifiative in Mudharabah Financing 
The modaraba companies have recently increased their effort to seek 
sources of funds,, particularly, temporary funds in addition to the modaraba 
certificates. As a result, three types of additional instruments have been 
approved by the Religious Board and are being used by some companies. 
ý 'I '' These instruments are: a) musharakah certificates, b) redeemable musharakah 
certificates and c) convertible income notes. It is expected that all these 
instruments will predominantly be offered to institutional investors. 
See, Myers, and Majluf, (1984) for detailed analysis. 
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7he musharakah certificates are issued for a minimum period of three 
months, held to maturity and are tradable. Certificate holders will share in the 
90% profits of the respective companies and will share in losses in proportion 
of their contribution to total capital of the companies. Redeemable certificates 
are 
'convertible 
to modaraba certificates and are also tradable. A redemption 
reserve fund is generated equivalent to 5% of outstanding redeemable 
certificates. In case of both certificates 18% rate of return is secured through 
hy'p6thecation of assets, pledge of share of listed companies and personal 
pledges of clients of modaraba companies. 
While both these instruments are welcome addition, the introduction of 
the income notes (IN) of the IFC' is a much more significant development in 
many'ýespects. First, the IFC has not only recognized the viability of the 
modaraba companies but has also entered the business. This initiative is 
expected to enhance the understanding of the business in the international 
financial markets. Second, the initial capital commitment by the lFC has been 
around US dollars 80 million which is a substantial amount. Third, the IFCs 
involvement is also expected to be instrumental in financial innovation by the 
modaraba companies. 
,. The IN is a redeemable financial instrument; can be redeemed in six 
equal installments but with a seven years grace period. The IFC can opt any 
time for up to 20 % value of the IN for modaraba certificates. The IN will share 
in cash'd'ividends of the company but will not share in operational losses. It will 
however share losses proportionate to its capital in case of liquidation. The 
share of the IFC in cash dividends declared by the company will be as follows: 
if cash dividend is up to 15%, the IFC will claim 60 % of this. If cash dividend is 
up to 30 %, the IFC will claim 60% of it up till 15%, and 40% of the remaining. if 
cash dividend is above 30%, the IFC will share 60% up to 15% and thereafter 
20%. In this way, the IFC is not sharing anything in the 10% management fee, 
but only sharing dividends with the modaraba certificate holders. 
See, Siddiqi (1995) and Mangi (1995) for notes on these new instruments. 
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Need for Islamic Warrants 
In the framework of our theoretical explanation of the depreciation of the 
value'of modaraba certificates, we can expect that the initiatives by the 
companies may alleviate some of the downward pressure. This expectation is 
consistent with the above simple but most powerful explanation for the need of 
a value maximizing company for different forms of funds. If a company has 
readily available funds by retention or it can raise non-risky debt it can take 
more investment opportunities without putting a down ward pressure on the 
value of its assets in place. Such an expansion will in fact enhance the value of 
its existing assets. 
If the company has no retained earnings for re-investment, such as the 
modaraba companies which are by law bound to distribute all profits, the same 
theory suggests that the company must issue convertible warrants. Warrants 
are quasi debt instruments and contain an option (but not an obligation) for the 
owner to convert the debt into common or preference stock of the company at 
a, specific time and specified price. These new instruments have become 
popular - among new firms, which cannot raise debt easily and among 
depressed firms which cannot issue straight equities. Thus, warrants are called 
for. - 
In warrants, investors have secured debt instruments with prospects of 
earning more by converting them into equity if firms become profitable. 
Warrants are basically interest-based. Moreover, the option is normally 
traded in the market. Indeed, these two features need to be removed to make 
warrants acceptable from the perspective of Islamic financing. In addition, 
warrants involve conversion of debt for equity. This also has to be justified in 
the framework of Islamic economics. 
Raising Resources Through Murabahah 
Modaraba companies are relying on shareholder's equity and modaraba 
certificates and the new found instruments. In addition, these companies have 
the potential to expand their activities and improve their return on equity by 
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opting for installment purchase to finance their trading and leasing operations. 
Such financing may be readily available with the Islamic banks which are 
looking for investment opportunities. 
.,, Even if these institutions can adopt a policy of 20% mark-up based 
leverage,, by avoiding up-front and lump-sum payments and resorting to 
installment purchase, they can mobilize substantial resources. The case of 
Islamic institutions is different compared to conventional banks. Islamic 
institutions are involved in deferred trading. The assets financed by them make 
their'clients more solvent compared the clients of conventional banks where 
the use of funds is often not possible to monitor. Hence, the assets' side of the 
Islamic institutions is comparatively more stable. Moreover, Islamic institutions 
do . not have any fixed obligations on the liability side of their balance sheet at 
the present. Thus, they have a better potential to take the burden of a suitable 
amo-u'nt of leverage. 
Suppose this leverage is US dollars 20 million. The company will 
approach investors to purchase the assets on its behalf on the basis of mark- 
up. Th'e'investors can be attracted only on the basis of a guaranteed return, 
which is suppose, 8% mark-up. Thus the total mark-up would be 1.6 million US 
dollars and the total funds to be repaid in installments by the company would 
be 21.6 million US dollars. 
Suppose, the dollars 20 million is mobilized by issuing 50, 000 
murabah'ah debt certificates (MDCs). The value of each MDC would be US 
dollars 432 (principal = 20,000,000 - 50,000 = 400 plus mark-up = 1,600,000 
+50,00 
,0 
32). A MDC is created in the same manner as a mark-up debt is 
created by an Islamic bank. The only difference is that instead of one financier, 
in the present case there would be several financiers. In this manner the MDC 
financing would be similar to a syndicated murabahah. 
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Liquidity of the MDCs and Role of Warrants 
The MDC is only a certificate of debt. The principle of hawala al dyin 
allows*the transfer of debt from one person to another person only on its face 
value. Thus there is no market for the MDCs. Due to the liquidity problems it 
will be difficult to issue MDCs. 
, 
How to make the MDCs more liquid? To achieve this goal, MDC holders 
may be given the option (not obligation) to convert their MDCs into common 
stock of the firm in some future date at a specified price'. Suppose, it is offered 
tha tt' he MDC holders can either claim their guaranteed debt of 432 dollars in 
the future, or if they desire, they can convert the MDCs into the stock of the 
firm at the rate of dollars 20 per share during a period of 3 years. Assuming 
poor prospects for the firm, (stock prices not rising over the dollars 20 offer 
rate'), ' investors will only claim their secured debt. 
But, in general the prospects must be good for the firm and the stock 
price 
- 
s,, may be expected to surpass the dollars 20 rate. Thus the option to 
convert the MIDC into equity becomes valuable. In case the option is a valuable 
asset, -, MDCs will be transferred on the principle of hawalah al dayin. Persons 
having liquidity will invest in taking responsibility of the MDC obligations so that 
they, can benefit from the value of the option. In this way the market for the 
MDCs would be created strictly following the rule of hawalah al dayin. 
Given that the debt is not created through interest mechanism, and that 
options are not traded, we propose that there should be a wide range of 
flexibility for the use of these MDC warrants. For instance, some MDCs may be 
1" ' 
converted into stocks, some others may be converted into the redeemable 
equity of the firm. In this manner, the preferences of different investors can be 
looked after. 
'This proposal resembles combination of sale and lending which is avoided. We will define this 
problem later. 
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Conversion of Debt into Equity' 
The MDC warrants lead to the conversion of debt into equities. The 
rationale of this arrangement within the framework of Islamic economics can be 
looked at from three alternative scenarios: 
First Scenario: Debt as Principal of mudharabah 
First, the arrangement becomes similar to the use of debt as a principal 
capital r of mudharabah or musharakah contracts. This subject has thoroughly 
been discussed in the Fiqh literature. In general, all scholars do not accept 
such abse of debt. But it is reported that according to the Hanafis it is possible 
to say that "collect such and such debt and do mudharabah or musharakah 
with it"'. Moreover, reportedly some Hanbalis went further by saying that an 
indebted person can collect a debt from himself and does with it mudharabah. 
'I , Second Scenario: Debt as Price in Sale 
, 
Second, it can be looked at as a sale of debt for equity. It is known that 
debt cannot be sold for debt, but debt can be treated as a price in a sale 
transaction'. The companies can approach the owners of the debt, offering 
their existing shares (not new issues) in a sale for the outstanding debt. This 
would be equivalent to using the debt as a price in the specific trade which is 
not objected by shariah scholars. 
Third Scenario: Replacing MDCs with Real Asset Certificates 
Finally, an installment sale is indeed a finance lease in the conventional 
sense. In Islamic economics, finance leases are not encouraged 4. If finance 
'For this subsection, I am grateful to Dr. Monzer Kahf, and Dr. Leyachi Feddad for providing me 
with useful insights during discussions. 
2See, Government of Kuwait, mausu'al fiqh al Islamiyah 
'For a consensus opinion in this regard, see ibid Vol. 21, p 126 paragraph 58. 
4 The olC Fiqh Academy dealing with hire purchase agreements concluded by discouraging 
such arrangements and by urging to deal in installment sale with appropriate guarantees 
instead. See, IFA: 1989 p 88. 
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leases can be encouraged', MDCs would be replaced by real asset certificates 
(RACs). Holders of RACs would be entitled to fixed rental incomes as 
compared to the fixed murabahah profits of MDC owners. The purpose of 
mobilizing fixed income resources will thus equally be achieved by replacing 
RACs for MDCs. 
Suppose the same company which mobilizes murabahah funds and 
issues MDCs, mobilizes funds to establish the ownership-partnership (shatikah 
al milk) by issuing RACs. The value of one RAC would be again 432 dollars 
and a total of 50,000 RACs will be issued to mobilize the 21.6 million dollars for 
the purchase of the asset. 
Since RACs are title to ownership of rentable real assets, RAC owners 
together constitute sharika al milk. If warrants are attached with rent sharing 
RAcs, the question than becomes one of providing an option to transform 
sharika al milk into sharika al aqd (contractual partnership) in a future date. The 
transformation of sharika al milk into sharika a/ aqd may also be fully 
acceptable from an Islamic economic point of view. 
Thus the modaraba companies can explore with the Religious Board the 
feasibility of issuing warrants either on the basis of MDCs or RACs. These 
warrants can be instrumental in relieving the pressure on the modaraba 
certificates. As the theory fully explains the issue at hand, the suggestion 
based on the theory need to be taken seriously. 
'Many Islamic banks do undertake finance leases. Ijara bonds discussed in Kahf (1995) are 
based on the premises of finance leases used by the Islamic banks. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PROFIT-LOSS SHARING IN RETROSPECT: 
FIRM LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS 
Chapter 6 
PROFIT SHARING IN RETROSPECT: 
FIRM LEVEL CONSIDERATIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter four we analyzed some alternative explanations for the non- 
existence of PLS in. the Islamic bank's operations. In chapter five we took up 
the case of the market performance of the pure PLS and found that the market 
for the PLS does not at all reward risk. Among many reasons we explained that 
the PLS companies in our sample relied only on a solitary financial instrument, 
namely, mudharabah certificates compared to the several instruments available 
in the conventional markets. As a result the PLS was not able to perform well in 
the market in terms of acquisition of value for investors and rewarding risk. 
In the present and the following chapters we look at the PLS in 
retrospect. In the present chapter we critically look at the PLS from the micro 
(firm level) perspective. We saw that the PLS is dominated by the mark-up as 
far as the operations of Islamic banks are concerned. It did not perform well in 
the financial markets where it was applied in its pure form. Nevertheless, 
participation in the capital of enterprises offers a crucial investment opportunity 
for investors who abstain from interest; the enterprises, in turn, mobilize 
resources. Ideally, capital participation entails providing finance in the form of 
fI undsl by acquiring ownership. Examples of participation in the risk of an 
enterprise are the ownership of capital shares in musharakah; the ownership of 
capital and entrepreneurial qualities in mudharabah and the resultant 
responsibilities for the uncertainty of outcome respectively, in the two cases. 
I Due to the striking contrast of the PLS principle with interest, the articles 
of agreements establishing some Islamic banks have given priority to the use 
'Durable asset participation is another form of risk sharing through allocation of rentable assets 
instead of funds. 
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of -, PLS in their operationS2. However, in their present practices, the 
participation of Islamic banks in the capital of enterprises is negligible. Islamic 
scholars have been urging3 the Islamic banks to enhance the flow of 
participatory capital in their supply of funds. However, the Fiqh Academy of the 
organization of Islamic Conference, in a number of meetings, has asked the 
Islamic banks to refrain from participating in the capital of such companies 
which have interest-based assets/liabilities in their balance sheets4. 
The above considerations imply that the Islamic banks shobld enhance 
their capital participation in enterprises, but, should at the same time, avoid 
investing in leveraged firms. Apparently, the conclusion is paradoxical: Does it 
mean that for all practical purposes, the Fiqh Academy ruling prohibits the 
Islamic investors from investing in existing enterprises? 
Prohibition of capital participation in enterprises has important economic 
implications. Many investors must withdraw their existing funds from leveraged 
enterprises. Consequently, the basket of investment opportunities will reduce 
having'adverse implications for savings and growth. Thus, efforts must be 
made'at academic as well as policy levels to enhance capital participation in 
enterprises within the framework of the premises provided by the shariah 
ruling. The ongoing efforts in this regard can broadly be classified into two 
groups. 
I The first group of efforts is related to the exploration of possibilities 
where existing interest-based debts of specific firms could be replaced by 
2T'he authors of the report on Islamization of the financial system in Pakistan also treat profit 
sharing as the foremost alternative for the interest-based financial system. See Council of 
Islamic Ideology Pakistan (1981). 
3See particularly, Siddiqi (1987,1993) Ahmad (1985) and Khan (1992). 
41n its 7th Session held in Jeddah, 7-12/11/1412H (May 9-14,1992), the learned Fiqh Academy 
formally considered the legal status of Islamic banks' owning shares of such companies' 
whose capital structure includes interest-based funds and the resolution was made that: ...... it is 
originally unlawful to participate in companies dealing sometimes in unlawful things, like interest 
etc.; despite the fact that their activities are basically lawful". This resolution was reiterated in 
the recommendations of the seminar on Problems of Islamic Banks, jointly organized by the 
Academy and IRTI, held in Jeddah during 22-10-1413H (14-4-1993). 
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Islamically acceptable alternatives5. Once the capital structure is cleaned from 
interest, investors can participate in the capital of such enterprises. The crucial 
pa rameters for the success of these efforts are: i) Willingness of the 
management of enterprises to replace their existing interest-based debts with 
Islamically acceptable forms of funds, ii) Availability of the Islamic alternatives 
to achieve the objective and iii) Once the capital is replaced appropriately, its 
I 
maintenance overtime. 
If a typical firm is willing to replace its existing interest-based debts, what 
are the-possible Islamic alternatives? 
6 The problem is simply one of availability 
of cash, so that the firm can pay its debts. In this regard, the ongoing efforts 
refer to some possible arrangements. The cash-fund may be provided by an 
Islamic financier by purchasing part of the assets of the indebted enterprise 
and, either selling these back on installments, leasing them back7 or assuming 
the role of a partner in the enterprise. In addition, flow of the company's 
retained savings may be diverted towards the payment of the debts. This can 
be ensured if an Islamic financier provides funds to meet those needs which 
the company would have otherwise met by its retained profits. The cash flow of 
the enterprise may be enhanced by raising its equity capita18. 
above mentioned efforts of cleansing the capital structure of 
companies from interest, are nevertheless, limited in nature as these depend 
on the willingness 'of the companies (management commitment cannot be 
ensured for ever). While these efforts are underway, some basic questions 
must also be addressed to: Why, in the rirst instance, interest enters in the 
capital structure of enterprises? How to avoid the entrance of interest in the 
51n this regard, the IDB has initiated a Pilot Project of replacing interest-based capital with 
lslamic alternatives in some of the companies where the IDB has an equity stake. 
6 it should be noted that all debts of an enterprise may not be interest bearing as some of these 
may be due to qard (interest-free loans) and some may be the result of a deferred purchase 
arrangement such as mark-up and others may be due to accrued rents. 
7AIthough this method is suggested in IDB (1994), shariah objections are raised against such 
arrangements. 
BSee IDB (1994). 
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capital of enterprises in their infancy? How to let the enterprises grow without 
using interest? For, if there is any analogy between raising up a human being 
and an enterprise, the enterprise like the human being must be put into the 
right direction from its infancy. Thus, a rather fundamental consideration is the 
development of comprehensive participatory Islamic financial instruments 
which can meet the requirements of enterprises at their infancy and through 
out their growth. 
The central point of the present chapter rests on the proposition that 
because of its redeeming feature, debt (whether it is the result of mark-up or 
interest-based credits) is preferred particularly, by sole proprietorship 
enterprises. Due to this preference, debt enters the capital structure of sole 
proprietorship enterprises at their infancy. As the enterprises grow, they 
contract one debt after another. Hence, although each debt contract redeems, 
certain level of debt permanently remains in the capital structure of enterprises. 
This implies that enterprises which prefer debt for its redeeming nature, should 
equally prefer redeemable profit and loss sharing arrangements of financing. 
Given the above background, the present chapter aims at putting 
forward some considerations for enhancing capital participation in enterprises 
within the framework of the OIC Fiqh Academy Resolution. The specific 
obje'ctivei of the chapter are to discuss the: 
Limitations imposed on the wider use of profit sharing principle of 
Islamic financing by the non-redeemable nature of the notion of PLS 
prevalent in the existing Islamic banking literature, 
'2. Need for, and feasibility of redeemable PLS for use in ongoing 
enterprises, such as sole-proprietorships, 
3. Implications of redeemability of PLS for profit retention, self-financing 
and growth of interest-free enterprises and 
4. Possibility of subordinating the sale-based financing to the PLS and 
its usefulness in enhancing the cash flow of Islarnizing enterprises. 
206 
Section Two of the chapter briefly discusses differences between modes 
of fina 
' 
ncing, forms of enterprises and a comprehensive financing mechanism. 
Section Three, argues that an enterprise has the right to prefer any type of 
Islarnically defined ownership structure. Maintaining this ownership structure, it 
must also be given the right by the society for a comprehensive profit and loss 
sharing financing instrument. In Section Four, it is argued that a redeemable 
financial instrument has the capability of providing a comprehensive profit and 
loss sharing financing mechanism, which can simultaneously be neutral to the 
longer-run ownership structure of the enterprise. Section Five, tries to invoke 
support for the scheme of re-payment of mudharabah funds discussed in 
section four. Section Six argues that a redeemable financial instrument is also 
expected to promote self-financing, thus ensure growth as well as restrict the 
enterprises exposure to interest to a minimum level. Section Seven puts 
forward some considerations to subordinate sale based finance to the PLS and 
enhance cash flow of Islarnizing enterprises. 
6.2 COMPREHENSIVE FINANCING MECHANISM9 AND ITS 
NEED IN AN ISLAMIC ECONOMY 
In the present section, it is argued that in order to effectively replace 
interest, 'the Islamic economy needs a comprehensive financing mechanism. In 
the absence of such a mechanism, even if the capital structure of an enterprise 
is cleansed from interest, overtime, the maintenance of such an interest-free 
capital structure may not be possible. On the other hand, if a comprehensive 
1-slamic financing mechanism can be devised, not only interest can be 
prevented"' from entering in the capital of enterprises but also existing 
eI nterprises may be able to replace their interest-based debts at a larger scale. 
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6.2.1 Modes of Financing and Comprehensive Financing Mechanism 
In the outset, a comprehensive financing mechanism may be defined as 
a financing facility which provides monetary financial accommodation to 
enterprises but remains neutral with respect to their longer-run ownership 
structure. In order to understand the relevance of such a mechanism for the 
Islamic economy, there is a need to thinly define and differentiate between a 
mode of finance and a comprehensive financing mechanism. 
Profit sharing and deferred sale are the two parent principles of Islamic 
financing. Installment sale (in fact, installment purchase, which uses the mark- 
up mechanism) and leasing (in fact hiring, which uses the renting mechanism) 
I- and , mudharabah, etc., are examples of modes of finance derived from the 
parent principles. In addition, one may also finance, for instance, the 
construction of a house on one plot from funds generated by the sale of 
another plot (if one possesses an additional one! ). Similarly, one may finance 
one part of ones enterprise, by accepting new partners after selling its part as 
stocks. Selling a plot or part of a company, is simple sale (mostly spot, as such 
sellers in general, need lump sum), yet, both sales function as modes of 
finance. 
Although, hiring, installment purchase, and spot sale of owned assets 
and mudharabah etc., serve the purpose of financing but, neither of these can 
function as a comprehensive financing mechanism. Exhibit 6(a), highlights this 
comparison between the implications of a mode of finance and a 
comprehensive financing mechanism for an enterprise. Hiring and installment 
purchase are not comprehensive, because, these are specific to the 
equipment/assets in question. For some reasons, if the company needs cash, 
installment purchase or hiring does not directly meet such requirements. But on 
the other hand, if cash is available to the enterprise, it can always purchase the 
required equipment. Mudharabah and musharakah arrangements directly meet 
9 The word "pure finance", is more suitable instaad of "comprehensive financing mechanism". 
Nevertheless, due to an objection of a colleague, on the use of the previous word, throughout 
this chapter the latter phrase is used. 
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the c, ompany's cash requirements. But both of these essentially lead to a 
change in the ownership structure of the enterprise. Thus, enterprises which 
need cash, but, for the time-being, not wanting or being able to change their 
ownership structure would find hard to compromise. 
The summary of Exhibit 6(a), is re-produced as Exhibit 6(b). The choice 
of most enterprises for a financing mechanism is expected to be effected by 
three basic inter-related considerations: i) acquisition of, or access to 
equipment by the enterprise, ii) direct adjustment of the enterprise's cash 
flowslO and iii) separation of the financing decisions from decisions related to 
the ownership structure or non-interference of the financing mechanism in the 
ownership structure of the enterprise. 
lolnstallment purchase and leasing can however indirectly be instrumental for the cash flow 
adjqstment as funds which could otherwise have been used for the purchase of assets can be 
released. 
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From the brief comparison of Exhibit 6(b), it can be seen that 
installment purchase and hiring, simultaneously meet only two namely, 
acquisition or access to assets and non-interference in the ownership 
s tructure, out of the three requirements of the firm. These two modes however, 
do not meet the requirement of the enterprise for direct cash flow adjustment. 
The mudharabah and musharakah mechanism, on the other hand meets both 
the requirements for asset acquisition and direct cash flow adjustment, but 
aggravates the non-interference requirement. A comprehensive financing 
mechanism is one which meets all the three requirements simultaneously. An 
II 
interest-free comprehensive financing mechanism is thus needed by an Islamic 
economy. 
Exhibit 6(b) Matching Financing Mechanisms with Important 
Considerations of Enterprises 
Financing Acquisition of or Direct Non interference 
Mechanism Accessto adjustment of financing 
equipments of cash flows in the ownership 
structure 
Installment yes no yes 
purchase/hiring 
Mudharabah yes yes no 
Musharakah 
Comprehensive yes yes yes 
financing I I II 
From what is discussed above briefly, the following characteristics of a 
an Islamic comprehensive financing mechanism can be derived: i) It is a 
mechanism which by itself is derived from a financing or enterprising principle, 
ii) it is always available in the form of cash, iii) It does not interfere in the 
organizational structure of the enterprise, iv) It remains in the ownership of the 
provider, v) It is in general capable to replace all other forms of finance in a an 
01 ngoing enterprise and vi) In the longer-run perspective, it does not cause a 
change in the ownership structure of the enterprise. 
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6.2.2 Forms of Enterprises and a Comprehensive Financing Mechanism 
Most Islamic modes of financing have the dual connotation of mode of 
financing and form of enterprising. In fact, in their original form, the 
characteristics of mudharabah, musharakah, muzara, musaqa'and istisna'in 
the- sense of enterprises or companies are more dominant than their 
characteristics as modes of financing. Indeed, a mudharabah or musharakah 
enterprise is established to overcome the difficulties related to both manpower 
and financell, 
12. As a comprehensive financing mechanism must be in the 
form of cash, among the Islamic forms of enterprises, only the first four 
arrangements remain relevant for comparison. The limitations of these 
business forms in rendering financing functions at a wider scale can be 
identified with their requirement to establish new enterprises, each time, when 
more funds are needed. 
In most forms of the above mentioned enterprises the required 
manpower (management) as well as assets (financing) are equally important. 
In fact, the enterprise is the result of an integration and combination of human 
and financial resources. Thus, after the integration of funds and human 
resources, one cycle of the function of finance, namely establishing the 
enterprise is completed, but, another crucial cycle of the need for finance 
emerges. The difference between these two cycles is crucial: In the first 
instance, establishment of the enterprise (in the present case, the ongoing 
enterprise) is eminent, where in the second case it is not. 
This is the case with all modern forms of enterprises too. First, whether, 
sole proprietorship, partnership, or a joint stock company, all enterprises, need 
11 To i llustrate this point, we may refer to the pre-revelation mudharabah enterprise between 
Lady Khadijah and Prophet Mohammed. As the story is narrated, Khadijah was a pious rich 
lady. She needed a pious and honest manger for her funds. Mohammed was approached to 
manage these funds through a mudharabah enterprise. The point is that the mudharabah was 
initiated as an enterprise for managing surplus funds rather than for financing a deficit. But this 
enterprise, financed the utilization of the entrepreneurial talents of Mohammad. It naturally 
implies that mudharabah inevitably leads to the establishment of an enterprise. 
1.2Actually people need resources not money as such. The provision of resources with deferred 
payment arrangements serves the purpose of finance. But, here we are talking about financing 
in the general sense, where money only is relevant. 
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funds and human resources for their establishment. Second, with their 
establishment, the need for financing does not however, discontinue. For 
instance, its own profits, and bank borrowings may be a main source of 
financing the sole proprietorship, the partnership company may in addition sell 
its own debt instruments, and the joint stock company, will in addition sell its 
parts as common stock, or resort to quasi-debt such as preferred stocks. In 
any case, we cannot think of one form of an enterprise, e. g., partnership to 
serve as a mode of financing for another form, e. g., a sole proprietorship and 
vice-versa. 
In context of the modern enterprise as an ongoing concern, the same 
logic is applicable to the Islamic forms of business organizations. For instance, 
when a musharakah or mudharabah company is established, the matter of its 
financing continues. In the most common form of the traditional mudharabah - 
a single transaction enterprise, the differentiation between the two cycles of 
financing is not required. But, if a mudharabah or musharakah enterprise of 
longer-term duration is visualized as an ongoing concern, e. g., in the form of 
partnership, joint stock companies, the Unit Investment Fund of IDB or 
Pakistani Mudharabah Companies, etc., the difference between the two cycles 
becomes evident. Overtime, the mudharabah or musharakah company will 
itself need financing. Moreover, as a sole proprietorship and a mudharabah 
are two different forms of enterprises, we should not expect any one of these 
enterprises to serve as a financing mechanism for the other enterprise. 
The last is an important point and needs further elaboration. For 
illustrative purposes, a mudharabah enterprise or a sole proprietorship as an 
ongoing concern can be considered. Suppose, after one year of operation, the 
enterprise needs more funds for expansion. Can the mudharabah or 
rnusharakah be used to raise the additional funds? The answer is yes, 
provided either or both of the following two restrictive conditions are met. 
First, an enterprise requiring more funds could identify an independent 
transaction within the enterprise, which can be financed (can constitute a 
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subordinate enterprise) by a new mudharabah. For example, if the enterprise 
is a grocery store, it can identify edible oil to be financed by the new 
mudharabah -a subordinate mudharabah enterprise will be established. The 
operational results of trading in this item will be calculated to meet the 
mudharabah conditions. In some businesses such an arrangement is possible. 
But the' practical difficulty with a larger scale use of this method is that the 
profitability of an enterprise, in general, can be calculated only after 
aggregating the profits and losses of the operations of different sections of the 
enterprise. Many items in the grocery store for example, may not actually be 
generating substantial profits but these items may be essential to attract clients 
for'the store. Moreover, consider advertising costs; on what items the store 
should' charge these? Therefore, for practical reasons it is extremely 
inconvenient to identify specific items, each time when new funds are needed. 
We believe that this is one of the difficulties due to which the much cherished 
profit sharing principle is not widely used by the Islamic banks. 
I 
Second, if funds are needed for expansion and business sections 
cannot be identified for new mudharabas or musharakas the enterprise has to 
admit new mudharibsImushariks (partners) e. g., by issuing profit sharing 
financial instruments. Besides the cost of such arrangements, this option is 
suitable only for those enterprises which are willing to change their ownership 
structure. As discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter, in the 
Islamic economy we shall expect to have numerous enterprises needing funds 
but' for 'many -reasons not willing to change their longer-run ownership 
structure., How to meet the financing needs of such enterprises? The limitation 
for mudharabah and musharakah to meet the need of these enterprises shall 
persist, as these are basically business forms. Again, we believe that the 
practical non-existence of profit sharing in Islamic banking is also related to 
this difficulty. 
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6.3 THE ROLE OF A COMPREHENSIVE FINANCING MECHANISM 
IN THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF ENTERPRISES 
In the previous section a comprehensive financing mechanism was 
defined as an arrangement which meets the cash requirements of enterprises 
but remains neutral to their longer-run ownership structure. The conceptual 
difference between this and a mode of financing and the limitations of using a 
form of enterprise as a financing mechanism were also discussed. In the 
present section, the preference of different enterprises for such a 
comprehensive financing mechanism is briefly discussed in the context of 
strengthening the fina n ce-ente rp rise relationship in the capital and 
entrepreneur scarce Muslim countries. 
6.3.1 Initiating Infant Enterprises 
In the Muslim countries, in general, the entrepreneurial class is nascent. 
As technological progress and growth of all economies depend on 
entrepreneurial risk-taking, recent research on Islamic economics has rightly 
raised'the issue of promotion of such qualities through small enterprises13. 
Sole, proprietorships require the entrepreneur to borne all risks of the 
enterprise. The bankruptcy risks confronted by infant entrepreneurs, in fact, 
may -' not allow entrepreneurs to initiate enterprises'14. Since capital 
participation by a financier will spread the risks of the enterprise, it can thus 
encourage the -entrepreneurial functions. 
We argued in chapter four that when the enterprise starts functioning, 
the entrepreneur gets acquaintance with its operation, his risk profile improves, 
and he is expected to manage more and more risks over time. The proper 
development of this improving risk profile is in the interest of the financial and 
I 3An 'inte rested reader may refer to Siddiqi (1983) and Chapra (1986) for how by removing the 
collateral requirement, the PLS can encourage small enterprises on mere efficiency grounds, to 
Khan (1992b) how profit sharing is conducive to human resources development. 
1141slam . ' ic economists also argue that the social security system provided by zakah will provide 
a shield against such risks. 
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economic system. In this regard, the most effective mechanism would be to 
assign' more and more ownership responsibilities of the enterprise to the 
entrepreneur. The logical implication of this mechanism is a gradual withdrawal 
of thefinancier from the project by redeeming his funds. This will also relieve 
the', financier to support other infant projects. This reasoning, nevertheless, 
implies a reverse-order capital structure relationship. As a convention, when an 
enterprise grows it sells stocks. In the present case, as the enterprise grows, it 
is -expected to become a sole proprietorship. Nevertheless, in context of 
Muslim countries, for instance, Bangladesh, Indonesia or Pakistan, such a 
promotional policy can be considered logical and rational. 
6.3.2 Capital Structure of Sole Proprietorships 
'As single person owned enterprises, normally, sole proprietorships are 
established either by borrowed resources or out of the savings of the owner. In 
either case, the entire liabilities of the enterprise, rest on the owner-operator. 
So'me'of these enterprises actually die in their infancy, some close after 
attaining maturity while many others develop into corporations of different 
sizes., The significance of such enterprises can be seen from several facts 
related ýto them. For instance, these enterprises are effective source of 
productive engagement of manpower, particularly, in the capital-scare 
developing countries. Being owner-operated, these may even be efficient. 
Major innovations are undertaken by theml 5 
The existence of sole proprietorships at a large scale, in itself is an 
evidence of the fact that for certain justifications of their own, the owners of 
these enterprises prefer their typical ownership structure. As sole 
proprietorships do not like to associate others with their enterprise, they cannot 
utilize musharakah or mudharabah finance. Even if these opt to mobilize funds 
by issuing stocks to the public, they cannot do so until their operations reach a 
15ACcording to the Small Business Administration Department of the US Government, 98% of 
all business in the US is considered as small, these provide about 60% of total US business 
employment, 1 o0% of new jobs in US industry, these enterprises innovated more than half of all 
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certain minimum size. In addition, the relative cost of issuing stocks is much 
higher for smaller enterprises compared to bigger firms, effecting their relative 
competitiveness16. The availability of appropriate form of finance (finance 
which is consistent with their ownership structure) is an important known factor 
for the growth of these small enterprises into joint stock companies. 
The capital structure of these enterprises may contain debt as a natural 
result of shortage of internal resources to finance either the establishment of 
the enterprise or its expansion. But, since these are solely owned by a single 
pers 
' 
on, 
' 
by definition, the capital structure of such firms shall never contain 
external funds such as mudharabah, musharakah, or common stock. In other 
words, due to their typical ownership structure, these enterprises could not 
benefit from the traditional Islamic participatory modes of financing or from 
equity, finance. This should be seen as a universal rather than a localized 
17 
phenomenon Hence, in the absence of an Islarnically acceptable 
comprehensive financing mechanism, these enterprises could face serious 
financial constraints compared to enterprises which can use interest-based 
finance. Since comprehensive Islamic finance in not available in the Muslim 
world, enterprises which use interest-based funds are in a relatively 
advantageous position compared to those which avoid interest. Once grown as 
corporations on the basis of interest, it is natural for these corporations to 
become indifferent to the Islamic injunctions against interest as e. g., re- 
activated by the Fiqh Academy resolution mentioned above. 
US product and service innovations since the early forties. For more details see Brigham, 
(1992). 
16The flotation cost is estimated as 4% for offerings worth more than US $50 million and 21 % 
for offering up to $1million. Given the same rate of dividend payout the cost of equity for the 
smaller firm is 19% compared 15.6% for the larger firms. In addition the market rate of return on 
stocks of smaller firms is also reported to be high - the market also charges more. See ibid. 
17A]thodgh'in the framework of the present chapter it is irrelevant to ask sole proprietorships to 
opt for Mudharabah or musharakah, some recent empirical studies confirm this proposition. See 
al Habar'and Presley, (1996) for the preferences of these enterprises for mode of financing in a 
capital surplus country. Also see Ahmad (1990) for the lack of preference of firms in a capital 
deficit country. 
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It may not be just to ask the enterprises to sacrifice their ownership 
characteristics if they need financial accommodation. Nor, such an 
administrative arrangement sounds efficient or even logical economy-wise. 
The right approach, in our opinion, is therefore, to evolve a scheme of 
permissible financial accommodation which could also be consistent with the 
universal preference of these enterprises for the form of capital structure. The 
problem is one of meeting the cash needs of a sole proprietorship for 
establishment and growth, but at the same time, without changing the structure 
of the enterprise. Thus conceptual efforts as well as institutional arrangements 
are required to provide such a financing mechanism in conformity with the ban 
on interest. 
In the developing countries, sole proprietorships mostly get finance from 
informal sources. In the traditional Islamic framework, financial accommodation 
in the form of cash can only be provided either as qard (interest-free loan) or 
by participating in the risk profile of the enterprise through mudharabah or 
musharakahl 
8. 
Individual motivation, for example, for the construction of a house, for 
the purchase of a consumer durable, for the education of a child etc., is a 
primary factor in effecting the saving choice. Inflation wipes away a large part 
of the purchasing power of these savings. Individual savers whose choice 
pattern is not effected by the prohibition of interest, to some extent, can 
however, neutralize the eroding effect of inflation by interest-based 
inv . estments. But, individual savers who are conscious about the prohibition of 
interest, are hence, left with a dilemma; to forego present consumption, save, 
but only to be wiped away by inflationi It is obvious that two individuals, 
otherwise facing similar conditions, but one being disappointed with investment 
opportunities or even not being able to protect the purchasing power of his 
181nterest-free loans are the most effective form of finance. Such loans do not disturb the sole 
pr 
' 
oprietorship structure of an enterprise. In context of the birth of sole proprietorships in Japan 
and their rise into multinationals, the importance of interest-free funds is often considered as a 
predominant factor. interest-free loans may equally be effective in the developing Muslim 
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savings will save lesser compared to the one who enjoys at least some 
investment opportunities. 
Islamic banking facilities are not available to an overwhelming number 
of_ the population which is conscious about the prohibition of interest. Informal 
participation in the capital of enterprises can however, provide investment 
opportunities to a significant segment of the Muslim individual savers. There 
may be numerous sole proprietorships needing such funds. The two can 
benefit from each others complimentarities, but, only if, the funds are 
cons istent with the legitimate preferences of the enterprises. Again, a 
mechanism to informally bring these two parties together is in the larger 
interest of the society. 
6.3.3 Capital Structure of Joint-Stock Companies 
The discussion of this sub-section inevitably leads us to the controversy 
between different theories of capital structure of the firm. The competing 
theories try to explain several related phenomenon: Why some firms rely more 
on internal financing compared to others? Why firms combine debt and equity? 
Why, firms issue common and preferred stocks? Why firms sometimes buy 
their own stock? What is the optimal policy related to these is sues? Why this 
optimal policy is different for different firms and even for the same firm in 
different times? These numerous and complex issues are thoroughly analyzed 
in the relevant literature. It is not the objective of this chapter to deal with these 
3s-19 complex issue 
In this context, in a broader sense, it is relevant to mention that, after 
decades of domination by the neo-classical and Keynesian theories (led by the 
Miller-Modigliani propositions), the traditional capital structure theory has re- 
. emerged., in simple terms, the intuitively appealing implication of this several 
decades old theory is that, the first preference of finns is to finance their growth 
countries. Nevertheless, the existence of a return-free mechanism does not necessarily impose 
a restriction on the Islarnically legitimate return bearing informal financing mechanism. 
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from internal sources. If firms have to choose between debt and equity, they 
will prefer debt simply because it is consistent with their first preference. The 
preference for internal financing, is in fact, a preference for internal ownership. 
The stronger is the internal ownership, the more it is secure to borrow, i. e., 
borrowing is consistent with internal financing. On the other hand, the strength 
of internal ownership in fact, weakens external ownership and vice-versa 
20.21. 
The re-emphasis on this theoretical premises has been strengthened by 
at least, two considerations. First, tax, bankruptcy, and agency costs (moral 
hazard, adverse selection etc. ), all relate to external (stocks) rather than 
internal financing. Second, profit retention (which is a positive function of the 
size, of internal ownership and an inverse function of external ownership) 
improves cash flows and capital base of the firm, hence enhances its growth 
prospects. In chapter four we reported the results of some recent studies 
revealing that for the 1970-85 period, in average, corporations in the G-7 
countries met 73% of their financing needs by their retained earnings, 22% 
through 'longer-term bank-industry relationships as direct equity linkages or 
loans and -the remaining 3% through stock markets. The average figures for 
direct bank-industry relationships are in fact inflated by the high dependence of 
West German and the Japanese Corporations on this source of funds. 
This evidence suggests that even in the economies where they are 
expqcted to function most efficiently, the stock markets are not effectively 
promoting savings which is considered to be their important function. As major 
companies are financing their. growth through retained earnings (not issuing 
much new stocks), the volume of daily turnover in the stock markets, is an act 
of speculation, rather than real investment. The day to day hazards of 
19 For an updated review and comparison of the competing theories one may refer to Brigham 
(1992), and Kelly 0989). 
20 ers (1984), Myers and Majluf (1984). 
, See, e. g., 
My 
21, 
_ihe 
robust signaling theory advises that investors should suspect the intention of large 
corporations whenever these issue new stocks. Because, if the prospects of the corporation 
were good, why should corporations share it with stock holders? Conversely, they will only try to 
share the bad prospects of the enterprise. In other words, if the prospects are good they will 
borrow and if bad issue stocks! 
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speculative practices in the stock markets and the resultant damage to the 
wealth of the society is equally criticized by the Islamic scholars as well a large 
22 
number of Western economists 
Referring to similar problems, one of the most prominent contemporary 
analysts of capitalist institutions raises a serious objection on the stocks as 
"investments that are not associated with particular assets". As such, the risk 
of expropriation is quite substantial. The risk is due to the fact that "the assets 
in question are numerous and ill-derined and cannot be protected in a well- 
focused, transaction specific way' (emphasis added)23. As Islam puts 
emphasis on well defined property rights, this observation need to be taken 
seriously by Islamic economists. 
I 
,, - 
Stock markets have also contributed to the elimination of risk-aversion 
by enhancing portfolios of assets whose returns are negatively correlated. As a 
result, under the normal functioning of the market, even with a decline in the 
price, of, a stock, for instance, from $30 to $10 next morning, investors still 
stand gainers because the price of the other assets held in the portfolio must 
increase. Thus the gambling process and the short-termism is permanently 
vitalized'. In the existence of such a trend non would be willing to accept a 
lower (competitive) rate of return. The cost of capital eventually aggravates the 
efficiency of the production system -a popular explanation for the 
competitiveness of Japanese bank dominated economy over the relatively 
stock market oriented US and European economies24. 
22 Keynes is reportedly used to resemble stock markets with "casinos", on his views and an 
interesting discussion on the role of stock markets in economic development, see Sing (1993). 
Also see Allais (1993) on the speculative moves in the stock market, the damage caused by it 
ahd the proposed reforms. For the views of Islamic scholars on the subject one may refer to al 
Oari (1993). 
230liver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Rational 
Contracting, NY, The Free Press, 1985. Qouted in Armen A. Alchian and Susan (1988) p. 71. 
24Sing'(1993) refers to a MIT study on the subject of competitiveness of US and Japanese 
industries. The MIT study concludes that as a result of diversification - seeking higher rate of 
return, the US firms have lost competitiveness to the Japanese. 
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Given the fact that corporations in the developed market economies 
have met only a small part of their total financing needs, the existence of 
trading in billions of dollars every day is the result of mere speculation. A little 
more reliance of these companies on such a method of financing could further 
increase the speculative process and further undermine the competitive basis 
of the market system. So, the minimum existence of common-stock financing 
in companies capital structure must be considered as a prudent policy on their 
part. 
In the chapter four we made an attempt to explain the reasons of the 
over 
, 
whelming use of mark-up (Islamically approved form of debt financing) by 
tlie Islamic banks within the framework of the traditional theory. An implication 
of this approach is that the overwhelming existence of mark-up is also related 
to the preferences of the companies as user of funds. This consideration 
open . s, the possibility of exploring such strategies for capital participation in 
enterprises which like mark-up can be consistent with the preferences of the 
enterprises. 
ý\gain, therefore, in the absence of a comprehensive financing 
mechanism, which can at the same time be consistent with the considerations 
of firms for, ownership, their reliance on the mark-up can be considered as a 
sound second best option. If mark-up is reduced, capital requirements will be 
met by increasing reliance on stocks/PLS. Given the present experience with 
stocks, a greater reliance on the mechanism of financing is not prudential. 
Evolution of a comprehensive PLS financing mechanism can thus meet these 
considerations of the enterprises. It may be suggested that financing through 
the 
'M 
ark-up or debt in general, strengthens internal ownership, because it is 
redeeming in nature. The debt may be a long-term one, but each time 
contracted, it has to be re-paid and it is not going to stay in the capital structure 
of the'enterprises permanently. If debt financing is preferred by the enterprises 
for its redeeming nature, for the same reason, participatory financing will also 
be preferred, provided that it is also redeeming in nature. 
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, 6.4 DECLINING PROFIT AND 
LOSS SHARING: 
A COMPREHENSIVE ISLAMIC FINANCING MECHANISM 
ý In the preceding sections, it was argued that within the framework of 
Islamic interest-free economy, the right of enterprises for a comprehensive 
financing mechanism need to be recognized. A comprehensive financing 
mech, anism was defined to be a device of providing funds through participation 
in the risk of an enterprise but without interfering in the enterprise's longer-term 
ownership structure. Further, it was argued that because of its redeeming 
nature, therefore non-interference in the ownership structure, debt is popular 
among enterprises. Since, Islam prohibits the provision of funds on the basis of 
fixed return, a comprehensive Islamic financing mechanism can only be based 
on the parent principle of participation in the risk profile of an enterprise. In the 
present and following sections, broader outlines of the proposed redeeming 
PLS mechanism are proposed and some related issues are analyzed. 
6.4.1 Issues in the Redeemability of PLS Funds 
Are the funds provided under mudharabah and musharakah 
redeemable? Some researchers consider that in their pure forms, these two 
lsla'mic modes of financing are redeeming in nature. As redeemability is closely 
related to the manner in which the principal funds are re-paid, a closer look at 
the're-payment method of the principal of mudharabah and musharakah funds 
is therefore, required. However, before discussing whether these funds are 
redeemable or not, it is important to describe the specific notion of 
redeemability of funds as adapted in the chapter. 
The re-payment of the principal funds depends on the nature of the 
specific. _activity 
which uses the funds in question. Some activities seeking 
finance are simple and single operation transactions. in such cases, the issue 
of redeemability is irrelevant as all funds will retire together with the conclusion 
of the' transaction. Whereas, an overwhelming number of contemporary 
activities seeking finance are in fact inseparable parts of ongoing enterprises. 
One, part of the funds (the permanent equity) of such enterprises cannot be 
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retired. But often, a greater proportion of funds is retired on the basis of 
contractual agreements about timely planned re-payment schedules. 
In the present chapter, all retiring funds as treated redeemable. These 
funds are usually of two types. A smaller, yet, an important part of the funds is 
re-payable in lump-sum at maturity. In the conventional economy, short term 
debts are examples of such funds. A significant part of all retiring funds is 
however, amortized in installments. Contractually, these installments mature at 
different, time intervals. This maturity structure is of vital importance as it 
enables the enterprises to manage their cash flows conveniently. Long-term 
debts particularly created as a result of fund flows are examples of such funds. 
With regard to re-payment of the principal of mudharabah funds, a 
distinction must be made between the pure (traditional) form of mudharabah, 
and the-mudharabah principle used by the Islamic banks on their deposits' 
side. 
Non Redeemability of the Pure mudharabah Funds 
In the traditional sense, the principal of the mudharabah can be re-paid 
only after the calculation of its growth. In general, both the mudharabah and 
rnusharakah enterprises are started with monetary contributions. Hence, 
calculation of capital growth is possible only when all non-monetary assets of 
the enterprise are transformed into money. The amount of monetary increase 
in the ý principal. funds deployed constitutes profits and a decrease in them 
losses. " This type of calculation of capital growth is a factual rather than 
hypothetical phenomenon. It is important to note that in case of pure 
Mudha'rabah, this factual calculation of capital growth is a result of conclusion 
an d liquidation of the enterprise. It is therefore, a rule not exception. 
Two types of mudharabas are known: transaction specific and time 
specific. Whether the funds are provided for carrying out a specifically 
identified transaction or provided for non-specific transaction but for utilization 
within a specific time frame, with the conclusion of each mudharabah the 
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contracting parties depart . It is only due to this reason, i. e., factual 
liquidation of each enterprise, factual calculation of capital growth becomes 
feasible. As the enterprise liquidates, all funds are retired, together. Thus, the 
funds of pure mudharabah and musharakah, in fact, resemble the permanent 
equity of a modern enterprise; hence, non - redeemable. 
But if the enterprise is non-liquidating i. e., if it is an ongoing concern, 
factual'calculation of capital growth is not feasible. Since, ongoing enterprises 
are the product of the industrial age, the re-payment of the principal amount of 
musharakah and mudharabah in such enterprises is therefore, an entirely 
contemporary phenomenon. This phenomenon has two important aspects. 
First, most ongoing enterprises periodically prepare balance sheets 
reflecting their respective depreciation, assets-liabilities and profit-loss 
positions. Instead of actually liquidating an enterprise for the calculation of 
capital growth, these estimated evaluation (tandhid al hukmi) reports can be 
treated as the basis for the calculation of capital growth and payment of the 
26 
mudharabah profits 
ý-I 
,,, However, re-payment of the principal amount of mudharabah funds 
being utilized in non-specific activities of an ongoing enterprise is one of the 
most important complications confronted in the application of the mudharabah 
principle. Would that the principal was also re-paid, the retiring funds could 
have been characterized as redeeming. Although profits can be paid on the 
25 To illustrate the importance of this point, we can compare hypothetical transaction specific 
rnudharabah contracts. Different mudharabas may deal in the same merchandise and involve 
the same amount of funds. Yet some of these may convert goods into cash, liquidate faster than 
the others. Demand conditions, efficiency of the mudharib etc., will contribute to the difference in 
the time'needed for the cash conversion process. Whereas, in the second case, the two parties 
are forced to stay in their contractual relationship unless the merchandise is sold. The other 
option'for the owner of funds is to enforce premature liquidation. In this case, the unsold goods 
will be treated as scrap, the owner of funds has to accept a lesser evaluation of the enterprise 
and incur a loss. This implies that factual liquidation of an enterprise is needed to enable the 
parties to depart. 
26Tanýdhid al hukmi is used by the Islamic banks for the purposes of fulfilling mudharabah 
conditions of actual liquidation for distribution of profits. In ongoing enterprises since the 
principal amount remains in active utilization, its ultimate growth is only a matter of forecast 
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basis of periodic evaluation reports, a great difficulty is encountered in the re- 
payment of the principal funds of mudharabah until factual liquidation of the 
enterprise is undertaken. 
Second, if funds are made transaction specific, after evaluation reports, 
whatever, capital growth is obtained, the funds will be re-paid in lump-sum. In 
other words, the vital importance of gradual retirement of the funds by gradual 
re-payment needs further conceptual investigation. In our understanding, the 
gradual rather than abrupt re-payment of the mudharabah funds and profits is 
of immense importance. We do not need to go into the detail of this obvious 
point. However, it may be reiterated that gradual re-payment of the funds 
enables, the enterprise to manage its cash flows with ease and efficiency27 
among several other benefits. 
- Redeernability of Bank Deposits as Mudharabah Funds 
The deposits' side of the Islamic banks presents an important 
contemporary example of wide scale utilization of the profit sharing principle 
underlying mudharabah. In many respects, this application has widened the 
horizon of the traditional concept28. The Islamic banks use the mudharabah 
principle as a resource mobilization technique. The bank as a legal entity is 
one person (mudharib-manager of funds), dealing with numerous suppliers of 
funds (depositors-owner of funds). It is note worthy that unlike in the original 
form of mudharabah, in case of the deposits of Islamic banks, in general, PLS 
deposits are not rigidly linked with the operation of any specific transactions 
and'depositors, withdraw the principal amount of their deposits at wish. 29. A 
rather than actual. To offset any ultimate negative growth in these funds a reserve fund is 
recommended by Islamic scholars. See Chapra (1985) 
271t is note worthy that newer explanations of the firm's capital structure rely mostly on the 
relative implication of different forms of funds for the firms'cash flows. 
28For a detailed stbdy of the differences between traditional mudharabah and contemporary 
rnudharabah (deposits'side of Islamic bank), one may refer to al Amin (1991). 
29We also need to keep in record that al Jarhi (1976) calls for a 100% reserve requirement. 
Fahmi (forthcoming) calls for the complete abrogation of the present deposit mobilization 
mechanism of the Islamic banks to conform it with the original principle of mudharabah. In this 
chapter we do not aim to discuss this particular issue. Suffice it to emphasise that the deposit 
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depositor must wait for the forthcoming evaluation for sharing profits, but can 
withdraw by foregoing his profit claims for the unevaluated period. 
We noted earlier that the pure mudharabah is in fact a form of business 
enterprise. In case one party ceases to continue, the enterprise shall also 
come_,, to an end. In case of the PLS deposits of Islamic banks, normal 
with 
'd' 
rawals do not affect the operations of the bank as a mudharabah 
enterprise. In this manner, the deposit side of the Islamic banks is a major 
departure from the original form of the enterprise, while at the same time using 
the basic principle of profit and loss sharing. 
, .' Conceptually, the depositor-bank relationship is the same as the rab a/ 
mal and mudharib relationship. Keeping in view the condition of an evaluation 
period for profit claims, PLS depositors, in general, are free to deposit their 
money at will and to withdraw at will, often, in proportions and amounts of their 
choice30. If we consider the depositors as financiers, their funds can be 
considered as redeemable capital, as the withdrawal of these in nonnal 
circumstances will not create any hazard for the banks as ongoing enterprises. 
This is*so because each PLS deposit is considered as an enterprise in itself. In 
this way, the Islamic bank is involved in as many enterprises as its 
rnudharabah depositors. The cost of a premature liquidation of this typical 
enterprise for the depositor (rab a/ mal) is negligible because, factually an 
individual deposit is not specifically linked to any real economic activity; 
although as a pool, these constitute the bank as an enterprise. The cost of the 
premature liquidation of ad eposit-e nterp rise for the bank (mudharib) is also 
negligible for the same reasons and for the fact that the depositors are 
numerous. 
Thus, we observe that there is a disguised but an important dichotomy 
between the contemporary practice of mudharabah on the deposit side of 
mobilization techniques of Islamic banks are almost uniform and it has the approval of the 
consensus of shariah scholars. 
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Islamic banks on one hand and an expected mudharabah on the assets' side 
of these banks (for the same reasons between individual rab al mal and 
mudharib related in ongoing enterprises) on the other. In the previous case, 
the Islamic banks have benefited from the book keeping and balance 
experience of modern ongoing enterprises including conventional banks. This 
has not been done in the second case as mudharabah on the asset side of the 
banks is still subject to the conditions of the traditional mudharabah. The 
traditional mudharabah, though not restricted to but were predominantly 
practiced to finance single transaction trading activities. Thus, it can be 
concluded that, through tandhid hukmi (annual evaluation) and linking 
mudharabah deposits (funds) with the general performance of the enterprise 
(bank) rather than a specific activity in it, the basic principle of profit sharing 
has been adapted to suite the liability side of Islamic banks. In principle, it 
should also be adapted to meet the requirements of financial as well as non- 
financial ongoing enterprises on their asset as well as liability side. 
Implications of Redeemability of Finance for Ownership Structure 
As emphasized in the opening paragraph of this chapter, the essence of 
PLS financing lies in taking the responsibility of the risk inherent in ownership 
of assets. In pure mudharabah the financier wholly owns the capital of the 
enterprise and wholly bears the risk of loss of this capital. In pure musharakah 
each'party bears the loss of his part of ownership. We concluded that pure 
mudharabah and musharakah contracts impose ownership considerations on 
the firm's financial policy. In other words, the firm cannot acquire funds unless 
it is willing to change its ownership structure. A large number of enterprises, 
obviously. cannot compromise with this condition. As a compromise solution, 
we proposed that in order to be universally acceptable, the PLS arrangement 
should be flexible with respect to the longer-run ownership structure of the 
enterprise. An objection can thus be raised: How can the PLS principle remain 
neutral with respect to the ownership structure of an enterprise? 
301t shall be noted that Islamic banks have different types of PLS deposits, such as specific 
purpose and general purpose etc. But in general, all these deposits can be withdrawn at wish 
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, An infinite life span of an enterprise and infinite number of occasions of 
need for unknown sizes of finance is in our perspective. This phenomenon is 
not the same in the pure form of mudharabah or musharakah. However, 
'perspective is synonymous with the deposit-e nterp rise outlined above. The 
deposit-enterp rise does not interfere with the longer-run ownership structure of 
the mother enterprise - the Islamic bank, yet the depositor is fully responsible 
for the loss of his money. Each PLS deposit is a full-fledged PLS contract. If 
some funds are withdrawn, the remaining funds in the deposit constitute newer 
PLS contract and so on. 
ýI'. 
In the scheme of the PLS proposed in the next sub-section, the concept 
of the deposit-enterprise has been generalized. Thus each PLS contract 
apportions ownership among parties. The parties will be responsible for the 
risk of their respective parts of ownership. But, the ownership of the financier 
systematically and gradually extinguishes, implying that a single financier will 
not have any permanent ownership stake in the project. Certainly, some 
financiers will always be there, but all of them in their perspective, will not hold 
any permanent ownership in the enterprise. 
_An 
anonymous shariah referee on an earlier version of this chapter, 
explains the shariah implication of this arrangement in the following words: , "If 
the enterprise wants to obtain finance from a person without giving him a share 
in the ownership of his assets it will not be in accordance with the shariah. 
However, it may be true that even though the holder of such an instrument will 
get a share in the assets of the enterprise, yet, because, of the redeemable 
nature of this instrument, this sharing in the assets will not change the 
ownership structure of the enterprise in the long run" (emphasis added). 
6.4.2 Outlines of the Proposed Redeemable PLS Scheme 
it is an irony that despite the academic soundness of the PLS literature, 
we fail to identify a conceptual scheme for systematically retiring the PLS funds 
from an enterprise. Specifically, if a bank or an individual investor extends 
(See, e. g., Ahmad 1993). 
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funds to an ongoing enterprise on the basis of mudharabah, how these funds 
will be re-paid after adjusting for losses if any? In the present sub-section, we 
try to initiate discussion on this issue. 
'A number of efforts have been made to evolve interest-free financial 
instruments. Some of these aim to mobilize resources to supplement the 
available public funds as well as the resources of the Islamic banks3l. The 
principle underlying these efforts is similar to the idea of issuing common 
stocks i. e., these proposals generate non-redeemable, permanent and 
tradable ownership titles. Hence, the limitations of common stocks as a source 
of funds (discussed in previous sections) in general apply to these instruments 
as well. For instance, at a given time, the enterprise in question may consider 
to issue permanent ownership claims on its assets, to raise funds it needs. The 
holders of these claims become permanent owners of the enterprise. 
The problem arises from the fact that the need for finance is a 
continuous reality. There is no guarantee that after issuing these shares, the 
enterprise will not need more finance in the near future. As an ongoing activity, 
the enterprise must always need more funds. What it should do? Could it issue 
more permanent claims on its ownership? The simple answer is that such 
claims can be issued but to a certain limit and this limit is much narrower than 
often considered in the literature on PLS financing. We discussed the minimal 
role of stocks in companies capital structure in the industrialized countries. The 
extreme , case - 
is the inability of an overwhelming number of sole 
proprietorships to go public . 
The Proposed Scheme 
, The example of informal financing can be taken as an illustrative case. 
Due to the fact that, in the majority of Muslim countries, individual savers as 
3, 'For example, M. El-Hennawi, (1993) proposed investment certificates as permanent 
ownership titles on specific projects. The idea of leasing certificates being formally developed in 
Kahf (forthcoming) is another example in the same lines. Revenue sharing bonds as interest. 
free project financing techniques were innovated and patronized by the late President Turgut 
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well as small enterprises do not have an access to Islamic banks, informal 
participation in the capital of the enterprises can enhance investment and 
growth in these countries. Moreover, these small enterprises are not expected 
to be leveraged, capital participation in them will be consistent with the OIC 
Fiqh Academy Resolution. Furthermore, a wider scale business interaction 
between the people is expected to enhance the cherished social solidarity 
among the Muslims. 
Suppose a small sole proprietorship enterprise, is in need of funds, (for 
instance, $25,000)32. As the enterprise is sole-proprietorship, these funds 
cannot be extended on the basis of pure mudharabah or musharakah. We 
propose that these funds can be provided on the basis of redeemable PLS. 
Suppose, the annual evaluation reveals that at the time of seeking the new 
funds the total net worth of the enterprise was US $75,000. To this we add US 
$25,000 contributed by an individual financier, so that the new PLS enterprise 
with a present value of $100,000 is established. For simplicity, we also assume 
that on pro rata basis the two parties share profits and losses in proportion to 
their -capital contribution. As long as the capital contribution remains in this 
proportion, the entrepreneur will take 75% of total profits and 25% of total 
profits will accrue to the financier. 
I-I,, We assume that the entrepreneur is not interested in a permanent 
part ner. The financier also is not interested in tying-up his funds permanently 
with the enterprise. For his own considerations the financier requires to 
redeem his funds completely during a specified period, say 5 years. For 
adjusting cash flows, it is also convenient for the entrepreneur to re-pay these 
funds in 5 yearly installments instead of accumulating them for the end of the 
fifth year. 
Ozal of the Republic of Turkey. Zarqa (1990) proposed istisna' certificates for financing the 
social infrastructures according to the Islamic requirements. 
32The existing literature on informal finance in the capital scarce developing countries gives the 
impression that interest-based informal lending exists in all developing countries including 
Muslim 
- 
countries. This author has discussed the matter with relevant researchers from India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt. All maintain the position that some 
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We assume that both parties complete all formalities which are required 
for implementing a musharakah contract33. In addition, we make the following 
important considerations. 
k First, the contract is based on the expected profitability of the entire 
enterprise rather than an specific activity in it. 
Second, to calculate capital growth, the contract recognizes the annual 
ev aluation (audit) reports as a perfect substitute of factual liquidation. 
Third, the contract stipulates that in case of profits a certain part say 
$ý000 of the financier's funds will be retired on yearly basis, in case of loss in 
yearly operations, nothing will be retired and capital will be depreciated 
proportionately. 
In this way, the contract will also specify that PLS contract in the first 
year will be based on capital contribution in 25% ($25,000), 75% ($75,000) 
pr . oportion respectively, by the financier and entrepreneur. In the second year, 
after re-payment of $ 5000, of the principal amount, the capital contribution in 
the enterprise will change to 20%, 80%; in the third year to 15%, 85%; in the 
fourth year to 10%, 90%; and in the fifth year to 5%, 95%; finally, the 
entrepreneur will own 100%. The profits will be shared each year in proportion 
to, the capital contribution relevant for that year. However, with adjustment for 
losses in some years, this schedule may not be strictly observed. 
Fourth ,a third party, viz., a Savings' Association administered by the 
government, may endorse the contract with a guarantee for the yearly 
repayment of the agreed proportion of the funds contributed by the financier. 
Tifth, the contract does not impose any restrictions on the entrepreneur 
regarding mobilization of funds from other shariah consistent sources. 
Muslims, though use interest-based institutional finance, however, do not charge interest on 
inter-personal loans. 
33For these conditions, one may refer to Omar (1992) 
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However, if the enterprise plans to sell its shares on permanent basis, it cannot 
do so without first offering the partnership to the financier. 
Thus it can be expected that using this mechanism the enterprise can 
meet its financing needs to expand without involving in riba and without 
compromising its longer-term ownership preferences. 
The case can further be generalized. Suppose, the above funds were 
acquired and the new enterprise established on 1-1-1995 with the present 
value of $100,000. Since, this enterprise does not restrict the entrepreneur to 
mobilize additional funds, on 1-1-1996, after the first annual audit report, the 
entrepreneur may acquire more funds on conditions mentioned above to 
expand the enterprise further. Thus, a continuos flow of PLS funds can be 
generated. Retiring funds will thus continuously be replaced by new funds 
without any rigid conditions imposed on the ownership structure of the 
enterprise. The door for utilization of entrepreneurial skills, which is now 
stagnated, in the Muslim countries, can be made dynamic by removing the 
financial constraint34. 
Following the proposed scheme, the Islamic banks are expected to 
open line of redeemable PLS with enterprises seeking finance. It is noticeable 
that at the present Islamic banks extend very short-term mark-up based funds. 
An importapt reason for this is the requirement of matching liabilities (deposits) 
which, are mostly short4erm in nature, with assets (mark-up funds). As the 
proposed scheme is biased against issuing stocks and in favor of resorting to 
direct and redeeming relationship between banks and enterprises, the banks 
are required to participate at least in the medium term capital of the 
enterprises. This requires the Islamic banks to mobilize medium and long-term 
funds to supplement their ordinary PLS deposits. 
341tmust be emphasized that we are not offering any panacea. But we notice in Pakistan that 
excess liquidity has been termed by the State Bank as the number one problem of the 
economy. One reason of this phenomenon is the non-availability an appropriate financing 
mechanism. The moral conditions of the people of Pakistan may not be ideal. Even with these 
conditions it is almost impossible to find interest-based informal funding. Thus, our attempt is a 
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The banks need to issue financial instruments to raise the required 
funds. It is a shariah requirement that these instruments must be supported by 
assets which may comprise some debts but should overwhelming constitute 
cash and real assets. Islamic banks' assets overwhelmingly comprise of mark- 
up based debt, therefore these banks cannot mobilize long or medium term 
funds by issuing financial instruments. On the assets' side, the involvement of 
the banks in redeemable PLS is expected to leave them with a much better 
cash flow and liquidity situation compared to the permanent PLS. This situation 
will further improve, as a change in the asset structure of the banks would 
_: I I, 
enable them to issue redeemable PLS instruments. 
Policy makers in the Muslim countries may benefit from the experience 
of finance and industry relationship in Japan and Germany. As it is well known, 
the corporate sector in these countries does not rely much on stocks for 
financing their growth. Rather, the relationship between banks and industry is 
much, stronger in terms of equity and credit linkages. The banks in turn resort 
to the market to mobilize funds by issuing long-term bonds. This experience is 
highly- relevant in the framework of the proposed redeemable PLS scheme. 
Furthermore, the scheme is also expected to enhance managerial 
incentives as compared to permanent PLS, as will strengthen internal 
ownership of the enterprise. In addition, the scheme may also overcome the 
inevitable domination of the economic system by financial institutions under the 
permanent PLS. This matter is of immense importance viewed in context of 
mobilization of external finance for the resource scarce Muslim countries. As 
compared to permanent PLS, redeemable does not endanger the host 
economies to external domination in the longer-run. This aspect is more 
formally discussed in chapter seven. 
merely an effort to open a dialogue in the direction of evolving a comprehensive financing 
mechanism. 
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6.5 INVOKING SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
The proposal to redeem the mudharabah and musharakah funds in 
installments is knew for the literature on PLS banking. Therefore, critics may 
raise,., an objection about the shariah permissibility of the proposal. In the 
present section we argue that although redeemable PLS is not known in the 
academic literature on PLS financing, its underlying principle has been 
adapted in a number of contemporary Islamic legislation in different countries. 
Moreover, some Islamic banks with the approval of their shariah advisors have 
also started issuing redeemable financial instruments. 
6.5.1 A Lesson from Financing Awqaf Properties 
A waqf is a legal person. Its property cannot be owned but by itself. This 
implies that the waqf cannot be financed on the basis of the mudharabah. 
Also,, the waqf property cannot be shared by others. This implies that the 
permanent musharakah also is not a convenient financing technique as the 
waqf will become a permanent partnership (the waqf may however, manage its 
current assets with doing short-term musharakas). This financing problem is a 
typical, example of a situation where the need for a comprehensive Islamic 
financing mechanism outlined in the previous section of the chapter emerges. 
The example is generally valid. Therefore, a solution put forward to overcome 
this typical problem, can also be valid for all such cases where generalization 
of the problem is possible. To overcome the typical problem, the Muqarada 
Bonds'Act 1981 was introduced by the Government of the Kingdom of Jordan 
under, supervision of a shariah board comprised of prominent shariah 
scholars. 
Salient features of this legislation which are relevant for the present 
chapter are as follows: i) Sponsors of a project can avail funds from a financier 
with a third party guarantee of the principal amount, ii) The provider of funds, 
instead of claiming a fixed return on the funds provided, will in fact share in the 
positive outcome (profits) of the project, iii) The funds provided will be 
amortized on the basis of the third party guaranteed principal amount and on 
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the basis of shares in profits and an agreed upon formula of amortization 
which will also be implemented under the guarantee of the third party, iv) 
Consequently, through a redeemable financial instrument, a financier 
participates in the capital of a waqf project without interfering in its ownership 
structure in the longer-run. 
It is noticeable that the law was enacted under the supervision of a 
Fatwa committee. Therefore, a shariah evaluation of the legislation is not in 
the competence of the present chapter35,36. 
6.5.2 A Lesson from Financial Islamization in Pakistan 
During the time when the legislation about Muqarada bonds were being 
incited in Jordan, Pakistan was also making efforts to Islamize its banking and 
financial system. Regarding, the re-payment of the principal amount of a 
financial accommodation, another significant contemporary development is the 
evolution of the concept of Participation Term Certificates. The concept was 
evolved when the experts involved in the Islamization (led by the Council of 
Islamic Ideology, Pakistan) of the financial system in Pakistan felt the need to 
replace, ordinary debentures (which are redeemable) with profit and loss 
sharing alternatives37 
,- -ý For the purpose of 
this discussion, major features of the PTCs may be' 
higlýlighted: i) Primarily PTCs are supposed to be the Islamic version of what is 
known as rededmable capital in the conventional financing practices, ii) PTCs 
also contain the characteristics of what is known as preferred stocks in the 
conventional financing practices, iii) As such PTCs will be issued by an 
enterprise which needs medium and longer-term finance, but for such time 
horizon, for the value of the finance needed, the firm does not plan to 
undertake any changes in the ownership structure of the enterprise, iv) The 
3517or more details of the legislation, see Khairallah (1986). 
36However, one may refer to the OIC Fiqh Academy Resolution regarding Muqarada Bonds for 
sharia'h observations on the legislation. 
37See Council of Islamic Ideology (1981). 
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principal amount of the funds as such generated will be re-paid in a specified 
time period, in specified installments. In addition, the PTC holders will share in 
the profits of the enterprise as agreed a priori, v) As the principal amount will 
start. declining due to payments of installments, the proportion of the PTC 
holders will decline overtime and those of the enterprise will increase, iv) When 
old PTCs are retiring, the enterprise has the choice to directly invest the 
increasing amount of the retained earnings in the growth of the enterprise or 
use'them indirectly for the same purpose by issuing new PTCs, and vii) For the 
purposes of retiring the PTCs, the profits of the enterprise are tax deductible. 
However, as practiced by companies under trusteeship of the Bankers 
Equity Limited, the PTC arrangement of financing has certain objectionable 
features, such as: i) The assets of the issuing firms are kept as a collateral 
against the principal amount of the PTCs, ii) The principal amount also 
includes, the discounted values of the PTC funds for the grace period of the 
enterprise (if it is new) and iii) In case of loss, the bondholders through their 
trustee; ýwill have a recourse to the bank accounts and other assets of the 
isS-Uing enterprises. 
6.5.3 Lesson from Islamic Banks and Mudharabah Companies 
As discussed above, another significant lesson can be drawn from the 
deposits' side of Islamic banks which represents the most successful 
contemporary experience of the application of the PLS principle. Similar is the 
case with mudharabah companies. The calculation and payment of profits to 
the certificate holders like profit for the depositors does not require a practical 
38 
liquidation of these companies 
Among the Islamic banks, the practice of Taqwa Bank is of special 
relevance to support our argument. The scheme of the Taqwa Bank is known 
as -ashum imtiyaz qabilatah fil istirdhadh (redeemable preferred shares). An 
evaluation of this financial instrument is not the purpose of the present chapter. 
38al Amin (1990) discusses several of these issues from the shariah perspective. 
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Neither, our purpose is to advertise the particular financial instrument. We 
however, simply aim to highlight that the shariah board of Taqwa Bank (which 
also included prominent scholars such as al Shaikh Yousuf Al Qardawi), must 
ýave evaluated the prospectus of this typical financial instrument. Which 
implies that redeemability of the PLS funds has been approved in principle. 
The contemporary practical cases of the redeemable PLS have in fact 
opened a new dimension in the field of practicing Islamic principles of 
financing. There are numerous cases, where in fact, such a redeemable nature 
of financing is of paramount importance39. The redeemable techniques of 
financing have also been suggested as probable Islamic mode of financing for 
Awqaf , properties4o as well as for Islarnizing the capital structure of the 
41 
companies 
6.5.4 Role of the Govemment 
In the proposed and practical cases of redeemable PLS outlined above 
the principal amount of the finance is almost guaranteed. An objection may be 
rai sed against such an arrangement. If the principal amount is guaranteed, the 
contract would be a qard (loan) contract. In such a case, there is no 
justification for the financiers' share in profits. Provided that there is no third 
party guarantor such an objection is a valid one. But, a third party (a party 
having no stake in the enterprise) guarantee for the re-payment of the principal 
amount of a PLS fund is visualized and legitimized by the Islamic scholars42. 
Such a guarantee of the principal amount does not transform the character of 
the contract from sharing to qard. If the principal is re-paid as guaranteed, in 
most contracts, it would be re-paid only in installments. 
39For more details see BenDjilali and Khan (1995). 
4 
IOSee 
IDB (1987). 
41IDB (1994). 
ý2See ýahf (1989), Siddiqi (1993) The OIC Fiqh Academy (1989) 
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Due to the third party guarantee, the use of this redeemable financing 
by large enterprises may be more feasible compared to smaller enterprises. 
But the actual problem of the elimination of interest also requires an alternative 
mechanism which can be used by the common people and millions of sole 
p roprietorships. In the absence of any such mechanism, the common people 
do not have any investment opportunity. Lack of investment motivation can 
have adverse effects on their savings. Whatever, small savings are made, in 
the absence of direct investment opportunities, these savings are deposited in 
the banks. It is well known that these small deposits constitute major sources 
of the banks' deposits. But on the other hand it is also well known that the 
banks rarely provide financing to smaller enterprises. Thus, a wide scale use of 
the mechanism may really revolutionize the process of elimination of interest 
from the economy. 
Both, the cases of the Muqarada bonds and PTCs, and for that matter, 
all bonds require a trustee to protect the interests of the bond holders. 
Moreover, with the same objective, the bond prospectus, determines the bond 
indentures. The bond indenture covers various aspects of the bond contract in 
a comprehensive manner so that no party should be harmed. The trustee 
guarantees the enforcement of the bond indenture. In the case of the 
Muqarada bonds the Ministry of Awqaf, representing the Government acts as a 
trustee. In case of the PTCs the Banker's Equity, a public sector, investment 
bank, representing the Government acts as a trustee. In any case, in the final 
analysis, the final arbitrator between parties to a contract is always the legal 
system of a country. In case of the Muqarada bonds, the Ministry of Awqaf, not 
on. ly guarantees the principal amount, but also guarantees to re-fund, the 
outstanding principal amount when ever so desired by the bondholders. For all 
practical purposes, the Banker's Equity almost functions in similar manner. 
I -, 
To conclude this section, it may be re-emphasized that the concept of 
Muqarada bonds, PTCS, practices of mudharabah companies, deposit side of 
Islamic banks, redeemable shares of the Taqwa Bank have consciously been 
developed to replace the interest-based financing with suitable Islamic 
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alternatives. These experiences suggest that provided the calculation of capital 
growth is possible, the practical departure of parties of a PLS, contract, does 
not require factual liquidation of the entire enterprise. Moreover, all these 
arrangements lead to one basic conclusion: that subject to the profitability of 
the 6nterprise, the principal of mudharabah and musharakah funds can be re- 
paid in installments. In other words, a redeemable profit and loss sharing 
financing mechanism is possible. Since a redeemable financing mechanism 
does not interfere in the long-run ownership structure of the enterprise, it can 
serve as a comprehensive financing mechanism as defined in Section Two of 
the chapter. Thus, it has the potential to be a real substitute to interest-based 
rinancing. 
6.6 ELEMENTS OF GROWTH OF AN ENTERPRISE 
In previous sections of the chapter it is argued that it is possible to 
visualize a comprehensive financing mechanism in Islamic economics, which 
can meet the cash requirements of firms without causing any unwanted 
change in their longer-run ownership structure. The present section intends to 
arg I ue that such an arrangement is also inevitable for the growth of enterprises 
under the PLS system. 
6.6.1 Growth: Relationship with Retention and Rate of Retum on Equity 
Major potential of an enterprise is reflected from its success as an 
0 ngoing, concern. The most reliable indicator of the success of an ongoing 
enterprise is its growth over time. The growth of an enterprise is similar to the 
growth of an economy, seen as one enterprise. As the growth of the economy 
depends on savings, and efficient utilization of these savings, the growth of an 
enterprise also depends on two important variables: i) the amount of retained 
and re-invested resources and ii) the efficiency in utilizing these resources. 
Retention is important because the capital base of the enterprise 
depends on it. In particular, retention is vital for the growth of smaller firms. 
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The *reason is simple: There must be some balance between equity and 
borrowing at all stages of operation and size of a firm. As more funds are 
needed overtime, all these cannot be met by borrowing without any equity 
base. But small firms do not always prefer and cannot raise equity easily. For 
such firms, therefore, profit retention is the sole equity base. 
The more an enterprise retains and re-invests, the greater is its capital 
base, the higher is its potential for growth. Given the capital base, the higher is 
the rate of return on this capital, the higher would be the growth rate of the 
enterprise. Growth (g) of an enterprise is thus defined as: percentage of 
earnings retained (R) times return on equity (ROE); i. e., g=RX ROE. If R=O, 
the capital base of the firm will remain constant, whatever the ROE may be, 
the growth of the firm would be constant. In the same manner, the ROE is 
extremely important. If it is zero, R cannot be positive, naturally the growth of 
the enterprise would not be positive. 
Traditionally, there are two methods to look at the ROE: the operational 
side of the enterprise and its financial policy. The first method uses the 
operational side of the firm to define the ROE. It implies that the return on 
equity can be improved, either by producing more - increasing the equity 
turnover (using the equity more efficiently) or by increasing the enterprise's net 
profit margin by arranging to become more profitable. Both the two relate to 
the operation of the enterprise. By using this method, higher ROE will lead to 
an increase in capital base, only if a non zero fraction of it is retained and re- 
invested in the enterprise. This way of looking at the ROE is related to the 
operational side, such as production and marketing policies of the firm. 
The ROE however, increases the capital base of an enterprise in a 
more, direct form through its financial policy. The second method expresses the 
ROE as a result of the financial policy of an enterprise. The ROE can be 
increased by increasing the capital base of the enterprise by asset acquisition 
. through borrowing. In the traditional sense, therefore, increasing the financial 
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leverage of the enterprise i. e., by acquiring more assets through borrowing, 
the ROE can be improved. 
I As this way of expressing the ROE is related to the capital structure of 
the enterprise, it is relates to the financial, rather than the operational policy of 
the firm. In the same manner, the decision of profit retention is a matter of the 
capital structure and financial policy. Thus, being both related to the capital 
structure of the enterprise, profit retention and this interpretation of the ROE, 
are consistent with each other - both directly add to the asset-base of the 
enterprise. 
6.6.2 Relative Variability of Retention and Gearing-based Growth 
Retention and financial policy component of the ROE (financial leverage 
of t6 enterprise) are important factors contributing to the growth of an 
enterprise. Nevertheless, retention-based growth is more stable compared to 
debt-based growth. As retention expands the shareholders equity in the 
enterprise, this leads to the conclusion that equity based growth is more stable 
than debt-based growth. 
Khan (1995) provides mean, median and standard deviation values for 
self financing, ROE and gearing for various sectors of the Pakistani economy 
for the 1980-91 period. Based on this data the growth and variability of growth 
is calculated for the sectors in question. Some observations must be made on 
t'his'data: i) By. definition, industries grew either by high retention, or by high 
leverage or by both - growth industries such as, the chemicals sector relied 
less on debt but retained a substantial part of its earnings, paper industry 
relied more on debt than on retention, sugar depended on high rate of 
retention. Zero growth industries - textiles and transport borrowed 
substantially, but their ROE was very low suggesting operational losses, ii) In 
average, transport, textile, paper and cement industries which relied more on 
debt experienced unstable growth. Energy is the only sector which relied more 
01n debt but experienced a stable growth, an explanation to be seen in the 
stable' demand for the products of this sector, iii) In general, therefore, 
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industries relying more on debt experienced unstable and lower growth, 
whereas, industries relying more on retention (shareholders' equity) 
experienced stable and higher growth. 
6.6.3 Effect of Redeemable PLS on the ROE 
), 
An important advantage of mark-up based debt financing is the 
acquisition of assets, which in turn, strengthens the ROE of an enterprise. On 
the other hand, the important disadvantage of debt financing is its adverse 
consequences for the financial risk of the enterprise. Whenever, debt financing 
is considered, bankruptcy is always possible. So, even if debt financing 
enhances asset acquisition, at the time of forced liquidation, these assets can 
only be auctioned at throw away prices. In addition, bankruptcy entails other 
costs. All these costs are the result of opting for debt. But debt-financing shifts 
these to the owners of the enterprise rather than the owner of debts - exposing 
the enterprise to more and more financial risks. 
So, the fault of debt financing lies in its separation of risks from 
ownership and concentrating them on the capital base of the enterprise. A 
mechanism, which can help enterprises to acquire assets but at the same time 
can minimize their financial risks can be superior to debt. The proposed 
redeemable PLS arrangement ensures asset acquisition by the enterprise in 
the same manner as the mark-up does. But unlike under the debt financing 
mechanism, under the redeemable PLS, financiers will not have any fixed 
claims on the*acquired assets. Thus, the question of bankruptcy and the 
related costs will not arise. Hence, the redeemable PLS arrangement has the 
capability to ensure asset acquisition, i. e., expand ROE, but without increasing 
1ý 
the financial risk of the enterprise. 
6.6.4 Effect of Redeemable PLS on Profit Retention 
''Retention of profits promotes self financing, thus, in general, enables 
enterprises to stand more on their own as ongoing entities. In the traditional 
mush arakah-m udharabah contracts, capital contribution by parties and the 
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resultant profit sharing ratios are defined once for all. The typical example is 
mudharabah in which all funds are provided by one party. If total ownership of 
an enterprise is designated as 0, where entrepreneur shares 01 and financier 
02., In the general case of pure mudharabah, by definition, 01 is always zero, 
so that 02 equals one - the enterprise is wholly owned by the financier. For 
simplicity, let us rely on this general case. This is due to the fact that in its most 
common practice, the mudharabah has been a one transaction business 
enterprise. At the conclusion of the transaction, growth in the initial capital is 
calculated for distribution as agreed on pro rata basis. In other words, it is very 
rare to find historical practical evidence of mudharabah as an ongoing 
enterprise, despite its theoretical possibility. 
''_ 4 One great difficulty with the application of the one transaction notion of 
the mudharabah to an enterprise which -is ongoing in nature is the fact that due 
to its ownership structure, single transaction nature and the underlying concept 
of capital growth, retention of profits is neither relevant nor feasible. 
'The proof of this assertion is quite simple. First, to make the question of 
.I retention relevant, the enterprise itself must be made an ongoing activity. 
Second, through tandhid al hukmi (hypothetical presumed liquidation), the 
exact cash value of the enterprise must be calculated, capital growth identified, 
and literally another mudharabah enterprise established, with negotiations on 
profit sharing ratios-etc. Each time if retention is considered, the procedure 
must be repeated. Each time the size Of 02 will increase as a result of re- 
invested profits but 01 will remain zero as implied by the mudharabah 
contract. 
There may be entrepreneurs who may not be interested in investing 
their share of profits in the enterprises managed by them - they may like to 
- deposit 
it in the Islamic banks. But, the economic and financial rationality of 
this decision of the entrepreneur can be justified only if they had a free choice 
to invest or not to invest their savings in the enterprises managed by them. In 
the absence of this free choice and in the presence of the implied imperfection, 
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entrepreneurial decisions under the prevalent notion of mudharabah can best 
be seen as sub-optimal. 
Suppose, the entrepreneur is allowed a free choice to re-invest his 
savings in the enterprise under his management. Suppose it is a rational 
decision for him to retain profits and share ownership in the enterprise. Once 
profits are declared, the entrepreneur must have non-zero share in the 
enterprise implying a positive 01, consequently 02 would become fractional. 
The mudharabah is thus transformed into another form of enterprise - 
musharakah. If the process continues, at the extreme, the enterprise will 
transform into sole proprietorship owned by the owner-manager. Redeemable 
PLS incorporates this vital consideration and allows for profit retention by the 
entrepreneur. 
It is argued in Section Two that together, the profit sharing and sale 
p' rinciples as substitute of interest are comprehensive principles. Following the 
same point of view, it may be argued that when a single transaction business 
activity is in question, the mudharabah enterprise must be used. But when an 
ongoing enterprise is in question, invoking the mudharabah enterprise is an 
injustice to the enterprise itself. In the ongoing enterprises, which are newer 
than the mudharabah enterprise, where required, the profit sharing principle 
and the sale principles need to be invoked jointly as in the case of redeemable 
PLS. 
ý 
Under musharakah however, the retention of profits becomes a 
m-anagement decision. This is analogous with the case of joint stock 
companies43. Under these circumstances, profit retention by an enterprise can 
be. enhanced by designing financial mechanism which is biased in favor of 
retention rather than high distribution of dividends. By definition the 
r6deemable PLS mechanism enhances retention of profits. 
43For arguments on the efficiency signaling role of dividend payments, the reader may like to 
refer to theyoluminous literature on the subject of dividend policy of the firm. However, in the 
present chapter, we are using the premises which argues for profit retention. 
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6.7 ENHANCING CASH-FLOW OF ISLAMIZING ENTERPRISES 
it is argued in this chapter that capital participation in enterprises is 
possible only through the mudharabah and musharakah modes of Islamic 
financing. To enhance participatory capital in enterprises, a redeemable form 
of PLS financing which is more flexible in relation to ownership structure of 
enterprises is proposed in previous sections of the chapter. The present 
section aims at discussing the prospects of enhancing the cash flow of 
Islamizing enterprises. This exercise is also valid for enterprises which look for 
resource mobilization from the markets in consistency with the shariah. 
Depending on their attitude to risk, some financiers may prefer capital 
participation, and others avoid it and resort to mark-up and other fixed return 
investments. There must also be a wide spectrum of investors whose risk 
profile require investment opportunities between the two extremes. Moreover, 
for the purpose of capital participation, some financiers would like to wait and 
see the outcome of an attempted effort at Islamization of the capital structure 
of an enterprise. If these propositions are true, there is a need for financial 
instruments which can meet the preferences of the wide group of investors. 
Hence, enterprises can also attract more participatory capital from financiers 
by attaching incentives with their requests for the installment purchase mode of 
financing. 
While the argument is valid in general, it can be clarified better by taking 
the case of a joint stock company. Suppose a joint stock company has been in 
the stock exchange or over the counter market for sometime. The current 
market value of its share is dollars 9 which is depressed compared to the 
prices*of similar other companies and its own previous prices. The enterprise 
ne . eds a major re-structuring, including the replacement of interest-based 
debts', for which substantial finance is required. Provided the re-structuring is 
undertaken, the growth prospects of the enterprise are high. The expected 
growth if achieved will lead to an increase in the value of the enterprise i. e., its 
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stock prices will increase in the future. However, given its prevailing 
circumstances, the enterprise cannot raise funds by selling more stocks. As its 
prices are already depressed, it cannot issue more stocks as such an action 
will put more downward pressure on the prices. Moreover, there is an interest- 
based debt in its capital structure which drives away the Islamic investors. 
The enterprise can however raise finance by deferred or more 
specifically installment purchase arrangements. This mechanism relieves the 
enterprise's presently available funds for more urgent uses improving its cash 
flow conditions indirectly. The more flexible the re-payment schedule, the 
better its implications for the cash flow of the enterprise. Hence, in general, 
enterprises bargain on prolonging the re-payment period as it improves their 
cash flow conditions. It is natural that the longer the re-payment period, the 
higher the mark-up is expected to be. Thus it is natural for enterprises to seek 
installment purchase financing for a longer period but at the lowest possible 
mark-up. 
in its prevailing depressed circumstances the typical enterprise cannot 
also raise installment purchase financing at a suitable mark-up. In fact, the 
enterprises need long-term funds. Suppose, the enterprise can be made 
profitable if installment purchase worth dollars 10 million can be made 
available at 6% mark-up with a maturity of 15 years. The financiers are willing 
to p rovide the required financing with the required time of maturity, but only at 
11 % mark-up44. 
How to raise the financing which is required to make the enterprise 
profitable? Or more specifically, how to motivate the financiers to provide the 
required amount at the required mark-up for the required time? In order to 
secure the required funds, two flexible options among many possibilities may 
44AM I ong other things the mark-up rate can depend on the re-payment time. For example, in 
the IDB the mark on finance provided under the Import Trade Financing scheme where the 
repayment time ranges between 9 to 24 months, the mark-up ranges between 6-6.5%. While 
under the installment sale scheme, the where the repayment takes upto 12 years, the mark-up 
ranges between 7.5-8.5%. Whereas, under both schemes a rebate of 15% is given out of the 
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briefly be discussed here: i) An offer to purchase the common stock of the 
enterprise by the financier and ii) An offer to convert the liabilities of the 
installment sale into common stock of the enterprise. 
7.7.1 The Option to Purchase Common Stock 
To get the required finance at the required conditions, the enterprise 
can bargain with the financiers. As a part of this bargain, the enterprise may 
offer an open option to the financiers to purchase the common stock of the 
en, te rprise in future at a price specified at present (the time of the contract). As 
the present market value of one share is dollars 9, it will be specified in the 
contract that if he so desires, the financier can buy a specified amount of 
common stock from the enterprise at suppose, dollars 12 per share during a 
specified future date. It may be noted that The OIC Fiqh Academy Resolution 
concerning Muqarada bonds permits some form of future promise, provided it 
is binding on only one party. In the present case, the option to purchase is not 
bind ing on the financier, but the promise to sell is binding on the enterprise. 
Thus the proposed contract, in spirit, does not seem to violate the resolution. 
There are several justifications for putting the future offer price higher 
than the present market price. First, the owners of the enterprise have the right 
to fix the price of their property. Second, by raising the asset base of the 
enterprise with the responsibility for the dollars 10 million installment purchase 
liabilities, the future price of the enterprise must be higher compared to the 
price prevailing 'prior to the addition of this amount. Lastly, the financier is at its 
free will to purchase or not to purchase in the future. 
Both the parties are expected to benefit from this arrangement. The 
enterprise urgently needs the funds for improving its efficiency. It receives the 
required finance for the required period. Moreover, it has the benefit to sell its 
stocks at a higher price. It is noticeable that without the offer, the sale of stocks 
would have further depressed the value of the enterprise, but with the offer, the 
outstanding mark-up for quick repayment (See IDB Brochures on the two schemes, both dated 
September 1993). 
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stock has the possibility of sale at a higher price. Moreover, till actually 
purchased, the offer does not carry dividend claim. Furthermore, till the stock is 
actually purchased, the offer also does not claim votes for the control of the 
enterprise. In addition, these relieve the enterprise from corporate income 
taxes. Hence, the offer arrangement has several clear benefits for the 
enterprise. 
By considering the offer as an investment avenue, the financier 
considers an opportunity to invest in a real project. The expected growth 
potential of this enterprise is high. The stock which the investor will buy at 
dollars 12 may thus be sold at further higher prices in the future. Moreover, by 
buying these stocks, the financier will actually be pumping more cash into the 
enterprise, improving the prospects of the enterprise to pay the installment 
purc 
' 
hase liabilities more efficiently. The financier would also avoid the dividend 
taxes which he must pay in case of outright purchase of such stocks which 
II- 
announce dividends. The financier can also motivate the firm to replace 
inte 
'r' 
es 
' 
t-based debt from its capital structure, thus enhancing Islamic 
investment opportunities. 
7.7.2 The Option to Convert Liabilities into Common Stock 
, The second point at which the enterprise can bargain with the financier 
for favorable conditions of financing is the option to convert the installment 
Ourchase liabilities into common stock of the enterprise. Again, at the time of 
the initial contract, the enterprise may offer to the financier that at his own will 
the financier may convert a specified Part of its liabilities into the common stock 
of the enterprise at a specified higher price compared to prevailing market 
price. 
it may be noted that this proposal resembles a situation where debt is 
considered as a principal in Mudharabahlmusharakah. The shariah scholars 
have 
. 
discussed this issue in detail. All shariah scholars reportedly do not 
agree with this arrangement. However, if it is said that "collect that debt and do 
mudharabah with it", it is reportedly acceptable to the Hanbalites and Hanfites. 
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Some Hanbalites even went to the extent that the indebted person can collect 
the debt from himself and do mudharabah with it45. The concern of the 
scholars who disapprove this arrangement is understandable in case the 
indebted person is an individual and his net worth is not clearly known. But in 
case of an established enterprise with a known asset base, an enterprise to 
which the financier itself has sold on installment credit, the flexibility of the 
scholars who permit the arrangement seems to be more useful. 
Our point can be further strengthened by developing a different 
i 
scenario. Suppose the financier finances the purchase of an asset on 
installment purchase or istisnabasis. As a result, the user of finance owns the 
asset and the financier owns the resultant debts. Assuming that after making 
40% of the debt payments, the owner approaches the financier to buy the 
I 
re 
I 
maining 60% against the outstanding debts. If the financier buys, the 
resultant new enterprise would be a 60: 40 musharakah. As debt can be used 
as a price in a spot transaction, this arrangement is expected to be fully 
acceptable to all shariah scholars. A brief comparison of this situation with the 
general case discussed by the shariah scholars is provided in Exhibit 6 (c ). It 
is clear that the debt created by deferred sale has at the same time transferred 
ownership which can be verified easily. The other debts may do not 
--riecessarily transfer assets. This 
is an important difference between mark-up 
based debt creation and other means of debt creation. 
45 See Al mausua' al fiqhiyah, Kuwait: Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, Introductory 
Publication, Vol. 10 pages 24-25. 
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The benefits of our proposed arrangement for the enterprise are the 
same as in the case of an option to purchase the common stock of the 
enterprise, except that this arrangement does not improve the cash flow 
situation directly. But since it improves the equity base of the enterprise, the 
enterprise can raise more financing easily. Hence, cash flow of the enterprise 
is indirectly improved. The advantages for the financier are almost the same as 
discu'ised in the previous case. 
Since, both parties are likely to benefit, the society as a whole will be 
benefited from the arrangements. Moreover, the arrangement has also 
introduced a certain degree of risk sharing into the installment sale financing. 
Furthermore, it opens a flexibility for capital participation by the Islamic 
investors. An Islamic bank which provides the installment sale facility, before 
utilizing, the options can wait and ensure the abolition of interest-based debts 
from the capital of the enterprise. Indeed, these considerations offer many 
interesting possibilities which can only be postponed for separate studies. 
The above considerations wait careful evaluation as the area of options 
is not yet properly discussed in the Islamic economic literature. While the two 
options apparently do not appear problematic, both have several unknown 
implications. Some of these unknown implications are raised here, whereas, 
the full discussion of these issues may require separate research chapters. 
First, both the two methods are prone to generate markets. For, 
example, instead of utilizing the option for actually purchasing the stock, the 
financier may be prompted to sell the option. It must be noted that according to 
I an OIC Fiqh Academy resolution, an option is not negotiable. Could there be 
s, uch a market? How to regulate it? 
:, -, 
Second, for several reasons, the enterprise may be prompted to call 
back the two options. At what price and conditions? 
- Third, 
how to determine the actual conversion prices, in particular, if a 
market for such options is restricted. 
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Fourth, in both the two options, the, stock prices may exceed the prices 
which can maximize the value of the enterprise. Therefore, enterprises are 
prompted to split the stocks (e. g., if the price of a share is $80 which is 
considered very expensive by many investors, the enterprise will split one 
share into two $40 each) so that many investors can buy the shares and 
maximize the value of the enterprise. What will be the effect of this on the two 
options? 
Fifth, similarly, many growth oriented enterprises (like the one in 
question) for the same considerations of high stock value, offer additional 
stocks in place of dividends. The effect of such decisions on the two options 
are. not known. 
Sixth, many enterprises (in fact a rapidly growing number of them) often 
decide to re-purchase their own stock to invest the retained earnings. Such 
arrangements in fact support the stock price and may not directly harm the 
-interests of the option holders. Nevertheless, this is a decision, if known to the 
financiers in the beginning, could have effected their financing decision. 
These and other consequences of the two options are unknown. 
Despite that these considerations are of significant importance for easing the 
access of enterprises to various flexible and efficient financing arrangements, 
at the same time, enhancing the participatory financing arrangements. 
Traditionally, to meet the preferences of investors in various risk categories 
portfolio diversification is adopted. Portfolio diversification eliminates risk 
aversion, - pushing the rate of return on the portfolio (the cost of capital) up, 
hence leads to inefficiency from the macro perspective. Compared to portfolio 
diversification strategy, the above considerations for meeting the preferences 
of various investors seem to be more efficient as the fixed return financing is 
subordinated to participatory financing. 
Nevertheless, these and related issues which constitute an important 
aspect of the Islamic corporate finance are yet undiscovered in Islamic 
economics. The prohibition of interest, and in its place, the evolution of a real 
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Islamic substitute requires a thorough investigation into these and related 
areas of corporate finance. 
6.7.3 Managing Accounts Recievables 
Firms are not pure financiers but for expansion of their sales cannot 
also avoid credit sale. The cash conversion process thus effects the cash-flow 
and liquidity position of the firm. It has an implication for the growth 
opportunities of the firm as summarized in Exhibit 6 (d). 
Exhibit 6 (d) Growth Possibilities Without External Financing 
M, (2) (3) (4) (5) Cas (6) (7) 
Firms Payable h Net 
Inventory Receivable deferral conversi profit Growth 
conversion collection period on margin possibilities 
period period (numbers cycles without external 
(numbers (numbers per year) financing (5*6) 
per year) per year) (2+3-4) % 
2 2 1 4 4 
2 2 2 2.25 1.75 4 7 
3 2 1 1 2 4 8 
,, 
4 2 2 4 0 4 0 
I 
Exhibit 6 (d) shows that growth possibilities with no external financing 
depend on cash conversion cycles of the firm and its net profit margin. Given 
the firm's net ptofit margin, growth Possibilities can be enhanced by making the 
firm's cash conversion efficient. This can be done by reducing the average 
annual time of the firm's inventory conversion and receivable collection 
periods on one hand and increasing the time of its payable deferral periods on 
the, other. These three periods can be managed directly as well as can be 
used as a basis for generating additional funds to improve the firm's cash flow. 
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Narrowing the Cash Conversion Cycle by Financing 
The average time for the inventory conversion and accounts receivable 
period can only be narrowed within the limits of certain constraints. In addition, 
firms use inventories and accounts receivable to mobilize additional funds to 
enhance their cash flow. Both inventories and accounts recievables are part of 
the firm's assets in place. As such, often these are either sold or used as 
pledges to borrow additional funds. 
Exhibit 6 (e) shows the growth possibilities with and without the transfer 
of accounts recievables. Suppose the firm has SIR 5 million accounts 
receivable with a cash conversion cycle of 2 per year. The net profit margin is 
4%, hence possible growth in the next year is 8% (2*4). We assume that the 
receivable are transferred to a financier at an amount of SIR 4.75 million 
instead of SIR 5 million. Assuming that-this arrangement enhances the cash 
conversion process to 2.3 per year from 2, but at the same time reduces the 
net profit margin to 3.75% from 4%. The new growth possibility with the 
transfer of accounts receivable would then be 8.63% (2.3*3.75) as compared 
to 8% without the transfer. In this case, growth possibilities of this firm are 
increased by . 63%. The transfer process, although may reduce the net profit 
margin, but would enhance growth possibilities by improving the cash 
conversion process. This would not only offset the reduction in net profit 
margin, but would also accelerate future growth by the investment multiplier 
process. 
Exhibit 6( e): Growth Possibilities With the Involvement of a Financier 
Presence Value of Yearly Net Growth 
of the Bank accounts Cash profit possibilities 
recievables Conversion margin % 
(million Riyals) Cycles % 
WithOUt I 
-Ul 
151 2 14 8 
-IF 
F 
1 4.75 1 2.3 1 3. 
A Proposed Islamic Scheme for Managing Accounts Receivable 
We start with a normal case where a client makes orders to the firm for 
shipment of goods, suppose worth SIR 5 million. We assume that as a normal 
case, the orderer does not pay in advance, rather asks invoices for payment. 
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The payments will be made upon receiving the invoices and consignment. 
After making the shipment, the invoices are entered in the accounts receivable 
of the firm as assets. But, it would take time for receiving the cash against the 
invoices. Considering the fact that most sales of the firm take this pattern, 
given the level of sales, the cash conversion cycle is a crucial consideration for 
the firm. 
7. 
II", The firm benefits from shortening the time lag between the actual 
shipment and invoice date and receiving the cash - reducing its cash 
conversion cycle. One effective method of managing the accounts recievables 
to reduce cash conversion is factoring. As factoring involves dealing in interest, 
a'shari'ah observing firm has to find an alternative for factoring. We suggest 
that as soon as the purchase order for SIR 5 million is received, the selling firm 
approaches its bank and offers the same goods at 4.75 million on the condition 
that the bank will immediately transfer the cash in the firm's account. 
As a result, the firm will receive cash and there would be no accounts 
receivable for this sale. The relationship between the bank and the purchaser 
is irrelevant as for the cash flow of the firm is concerned. However, it is useful 
to make some observations on this relationship too. If the purchaser holds an 
account with the bank, the invoices may be charged against that account and 
there would also be no accounts recievables for the bank for this operation. 
Normally, the operation must require such an account. However, if the 
purchaser has ýo such account with the bank, the SIR 5 million will be recorded 
by the bank as accounts recievables. The purchaser will owe the bank the SIR 
5 million. 
We understand that this arrangement can be institutionalized so that the 
three parties know each other's obligations. For example, the bank can be 
chosen with the consent of the purchaser so that the goods are in fact sold to 
him. 
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Trade-Off Between Profit And Growth Opportunities 
The proposed scheme to manage accounts recievables from an Islamic 
perspective is open to an important criticism - by selling at SR 4.75 million to 
the bank, instead of at SIR 5 million to the orderer, the firm is actually reducing 
its net profit margin proportionately. On its account, this criticism is valid. But 
such a decision of the firm can also be rationalized under normal operational 
conditions as noticed from Exhibit 6(b) that there is a trade-off between growth 
opportunities and net profit margin. 
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CHAPTER 7 
PROFIT-LOSS SHARING IN RETROSPECT: 
OPEN ECONOMY CONSIDERATIONS 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN 
Chapter 7 
PROFIT-LOSS-SHARING IN RETROSPECT: 
SOME OPEN ECONOMY CONSIDERATIONS 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO PAKISTAN 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In previous chapters we discussed the relative significance of PLS vis-A- 
vis mark-up as well as the market performance of PLS. In chapter six we also 
introduced some flexibility in the PLS within the framework of a firm. But, in the 
present day markets firms cannot be isolated from the external sector of the 
economy. Particularly, most Muslim-countries (MCs) are net-importers of 
capital as well as technology intensive services. A large majority of these 
countries has already accumulated huge amounts of foreign debts. Many of 
these have started facing "debt-crisis" -a situation in which all new borrowings 
are utilized to service existing debts. 
one proposed solution to overcome the problem is to resort to non-debt- 
creating PLS types of financing. The liberal socio-political setup in many MCs, 
has to a certain extent, embraced this line of thinking as evidenced by their 
respective privatization and economic liberalization policies. However, a 
significant critical argument in this regard cannot be safely overlooked: That, if 
interest-based financing is replaced by the PLS and similar arrangements, 
foreign control -of national resources in the MCs will increase. This control is 
inconsistent with the growing Islamist and nationalist sentiments in many MCs'. 
Since these sentiments have adverse implications for the foreign investment 
environment in these countries, even liberal governments are expected to face 
difficulties in mobilizing external resources through the interest-free means. 
ý 'ý' I- Thus, a departure from the existing interest-based external resource 
"Apart from the emotional rhetoric from political platforms, one can find sentiments against 
foreign control in academic works too. See, e. g., Kahf (1996). 
259 
mobilization strategies will have an adverse implication for capital accumulation 
and economic development in these countries. 
This proposition cannot be objectively ruled out without proper analysis. 
There may be a number of alternative strategies to address the challenge. 
Some circles call for self-reliance and a number of MCs have adopted self- 
reliance policies. A policy of strict self-reliance could cause an autarkic 
situation. In such a situation, a country cannot specialize in the lines of its 
con4parative advantage and cannot improve its competitiveness and welfare. A 
more realistic approach is therefore, one in which the MCs should be ready to 
participate and derive benefits from the competitive structures of the globalizing 
markets. Moreover, economies cannot be Islarnized meaningfully in isolation of 
the world financial markets. 
The objective of the present chapter is to explore the potential of the 
PLS_ vis-ý-vis the mark-up mechanism as an alternative to interest for 
mobilizing the much needed external resources in the MCs in general, and in 
particular in Pakistan. We take the case of Pakistan due to experience of the 
country with Islamization of the economy. 
7.2 FINANCIAL FLOWS AMONG M. Cs: AN OVERVIEW 
Since MCs have common Islamic institutions like the IDB, it is logical to 
initiate the discussion with an Intra-MC scenario. In the broader framework of 
economic cooperation among MCs, the phenomenon of financial flows is a 
significant one. Historically, most MCs are net capital importers. However, till 
the late eighties, some MCs were also clearly classified as net capital 
exporters. This structure of resource endowment of the MCs was widely 
accepted as an area of complimentarities and basis of meaningful economic 
cooperation. The establishment of the Islamic Development Bank, a number of 
regional and national Arab development funds, bilateral joint ventures, and 
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Islamic multinational banks during the seventies, was a clear manifestation of 
economic cooperation based on this particular complimentarity. 
These institutions were established in a global economic and political 
environment, when foreign private investment was generally discouraged in a 
number of MCs and was shy. Therefore, it is not surprising to note that except 
the multinational Islamic banks, most of these institutions were established in 
the public sector. Compared to the seventies and even late eighties, at the 
present, the global economic atmosphere has drastically changed. As a result 
of ambitious privatization programs, many economies are transforming and 
rapidly converging. New realities are emerging quickly. The same countries 
that' discouraged private foreign capital a few years ago, are now fierce 
competitors for it. In such an emerging competitive and converging economic 
environment, both private and public capital flows ought to be less easily 
accessible. Given the rising need of foreign resources for many IVICs, the 
increase in the significance in capital flows among them is therefore, natural. 
II, Owning to this significance of capital flows among MCs Khan (1992e) 
studied the subject matter. Some relevant conclusions of this study are 
presented here. 
7.2.1 Salient Features Of Financial Flows Among MCs 
Financial flows are measured either in gross or net terms. Gross flows 
are total volume of cross-border financial transactions - inflows and outflows of 
funds in a balance of payments accounting year of a country. Net flows reflect 
the difference between inflows and Outflows usually during the same 
accounting period. For the same country gross financial flows may be high 
durin'd a particular period, yet, net flows may not even exist. 
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Significance of Net Capital Flows 
The volume of gross financial flows between countries depends on the 
level -of financial 
integration' among them. Gross flows are more useful 
measurement of financial flows, if short-term trading in financial assets among 
countries is common. An example of such a case is the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Capital markets 
are developed, integrated and free. in these countries. Financial markets in 
MCs are nascent. Trade in financial assets among MCs and between them and 
the rest of the world is almost nonexistent. In majority of the IVICs, capital flows 
are subject to a chronic deficit in the balance of current accounts rather than 
short-term placement of funds by portfolio managers. In such cases, one way 
capital flow, i. e., an inflow could be expected to be predominant. Therefore, in 
individual cases of the MCs, the difference between net and gross flows may 
not be of any significance. 
Under these circumstances, gross flows are not much useful measure of 
financial flows. Moreover, due to their short-term nature and heavy 
concentration on capital markets, gross flows may not create net resource 
týansfer between countries. Therefore, net flows become more relevant 
measure of financial flows in case of the developing countries. Net flows are 
also useful indicators of resource transfer between countries. 
'Financial integration between markets is considered to be high if the transactions cost in 
trading in assets is low and citizens are indifferent between financial assets in local money or 
foreign currency. See, Golub (1991) and IMF (1991). 
2 Data on financial flows for the developing countries is provided by three organizations, viz., 
organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. In the OECD data, net financial flows include all external 
resources, transferred to developing countries excluding worker's remittances. For the World 
Bank (data used in the paper is drawn from STARS of the World Bank), net financial flows 
include loan disbursements, less amortization payments on long and medium-term debt plus net 
foreign direct investment plus transfer payments. The IMF's consideration of net financial flows 
is expressed in terms of net resource balance (NRB). NRB is the difference between a country's 
domestic saving and domestic investment or the balance of export of goods and non-factor 
services. 
Negative NRB implies that domestic investment exceeds domestic saving - the absorption of 
real resources exceeds output. Conversely, if the NRB is positive i. e. domestic saving exceeds 
domestic investment, a part of domestic output is transferred abroad. The net flow of financial 
resources explains the external contribution to the domestic saving - flow of gross external 
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Encouraging Over-all Trend of Net Capital Flows 
The over-all availability of capital for the MCs as a group, from the MC 
sources could be assessed by the balance of their net capital flows as a group. 
For the 1970-1990 period, their net capital flows almost balanced - capital 
outflows (surplus) of the MCs as a group matched capital inflows (deficit) of the 
MCs as a group. An encouraging conclusion is derived from this fact; that for 
the MCs as a group, availability of capital has not been a problem during the 
past 20 years. Moreover, in terms of percentages of their GNP, some MCs 
have been the highest contributors to global official development assistance. 
Predominance of Public Flows 
Financial flows among the MCs are predominantly caused by clearly 
identifiable public sector activities. These activities were engineered by MCs' 
aspiration for, "development cooperation". As a result of the establishment of a 
number of multilateral and bilateral development financing institutions', 
considerable disbursements of official development assistance was made 
during the past 20 years. These disbursements were substantially high during 
the seventies. However, during the eighties, disbursements have drastically 
declined. As a result, during the late eighties, the net flow of funds among the 
MCs became less significant. Some bilateral joint ventures among MCs 
established during the seventies are also noticeable. 
Significapt Inflow of Direct Investment from Non-MC Sources 
There is no significant evidence of any flow of direct investment among 
the MCs (except in case of the Republic of Turkey). However, the net flow of 
saving. In this manner NRB explains the contribution of external resources to domestic capital 
formation. Although the data provided by the three institutions differ, this difference does not 
reflect any major discrepancy. See IMF: World Economic Outlook 1991, pages 60-1. World 
Economic outlook 1989, also contains more conceptual details on the subject. 
'The sources of these flows are development financial institutions of the MCs such as the IDB, 
OPEC Fund, Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa, Saudi Fund for Development, Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development, Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development etc. 
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I 
foreign direct investment from non-MC sources into the MCs is significant for 
the 1970-90 period. 
Significant Outflow of Indirect Investment 
Conversely, there has been no significant net inflow of indirect 
investment in portfolio equities into the MCs either from the MC or non-MC 
sources. The net outflow of such investment from the MCs to the non-MC 
destinations is substantial. 
Growing Significance of Islamic Flows 
During the seventies and eighties, Islamic financial institutions have 
become active in promoting the flow of funds between MCs. These flows are 
composed of the flow of funds generated by the operations of the Islamic 
Development Bank and contribution to the equity capital of local Islamic banks 
by the al Barakah and Dar al Mal al Islami groups of Islamic financial 
institutions. 
7.2.2 Non Sustainable Intra-MC Public Financial Flows 
ý, Data about financial flows among MCs was available only up to 1989. 
The pattern of resource flows among these countries for the 1970-89 period is 
gi. ven in chart 7(a). 
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Chart 7(a): Intra-MC Net Resource Transfer 1970-1989 
Source: Khan, (1992e) 
Using the concept of net flow of financial resources, an attempt was 
made to see any evidence of financial flows among member countries. Total 
net, flows for the OIC countries as a group were compared for the 1970-89 
period. It is interesting to note that for the period in question, total outflows and 
inflows for the OIC countries as a group have almost exactly matched. This 
implies that for these countries as a group, availability of finance was not a 
problem for the period in question. 
It is logical that, countries having a capital outflow, may have contributed 
directly or indirectly to the domestic capital formation of countries having a 
capital inflow. However, for the OIC countries as a group, market has not been 
effective to allocate financial resources. Nevertheless, substantial, but, 
slackening recently, contribution to inter-MC capital flows has been made by 
t: he r ýultilateral and national development financing institutions as well as 
bilat 
, 
eral sources. In fact, some MCs have made highest contributions to global 
ODA as a percentage of their GNP. These activities are affected by non-market 
considerations such as aspiration for "development cooperation". The 
substantial public financial flows during the latter half of the seventies could not 
be sustained afterwards. Particularly, during the latter half of the eighties, the 
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net flows turned into negative for the capital importing MCs as reflected from 
chart 7(a). Some explanations for the non-sustainability of the intra-MC flows 
need to be provided. 
4- 
Non-economic Motivations 
In general, the motivations underlying public financial flows are social 
rather than financial in nature. Yet, two types of economic considerations 
having financial implications cannot be separated from these flows. These are: 
1) public flows originate from public properties. The protection and proper 
management of these flows is therefore, in the general public interest. It could 
enhance future flow of funds. For this reason, even though, donor governments 
may not exactly behave like the market, they should be expected to ensure the 
safe return of at least the principal amount and ii) although, there may not be a 
direct material benefit for the donor country, nevertheless, indirect benefits are 
always associated with the flow of funds. In bilateral cases, these benefits 
include diplomatic goodwill, promotion of trade links and in the multilateral 
context, promotion of favorable global economic environment. 
Compatibility of donor and recipient interests can be gauged from two 
aspects. It is rational to assume that efficient utilization of funds by the recipient 
countries will improve their debt servicing capabilities. Thus, it contains a 
strong incentive factor for the suppliers. However, experiences show that such 
a utilization is often not possible. To ensure better utilization of their funds 
foreigners may'like to intervene in decision making process of the recipients. 
But, for a number of reasons, it is difficult to secure the consent of the 
recipients. 
Recipients always prefer free-hand in the utilization of funds as this 
enables the governments to allocate resources according to their national 
priorities. Often, these priorities are ill defined. Consequently, borrowed money 
is either spent on consumption and other less productive uses or illegally 
transferred abroad as flight capital. 
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Adverse Incentives 
Public financial flows have predominantly taken the form of interest- 
based debt financing. Debt liabilities as well as their interest arrears remain the 
ownership of the foreign donors. This ownership structure creates a serious 
incentive incompatibility problem. The lending mechanism does not arrange for 
the transfer of ownership. Individuals and institutions have no obvious material 
incentive to productively utilize the borrowed money, pay the principal as well 
as its interest services. In contrary, by less efficiently utilizing or by declaring 
bankruptcy, these institutions can ultimately decline the payment of the 
principal as well as interest services. This situation further worsens by the 
ph I enomenon of sovereign dominance. Governments can always procrastinate 
debt services or even unilaterally declare insolvency'. 
Whether from private banks or public sources, lending is exposed to 
moral hazard. Under alternative debt management strategies, debt forgiving 
and debt service forgiving etc. are used as remedial measures'. Therefore, it is 
valid to ask: under such socio-economic environment, isn't it prudent for the 
donors to provide grants rather than debt finance? For donors debt forgiving 
has the same financial implications as providing grants. But for the recipients, 
grants avoids the incentive problem which is mentioned in context of debt 
finance. The fact is that grants transfer the ownership of the resources in the 
beginning. As soon as local public and private parties get the ownership, they 
are* motivated to utilize their property efficiently. By avoiding the incentive 
'Before the debt crisis, this type of incentive incompatibility was considered to be the problem of 
equity financing. Discussing the dominance of debt financing and FDI and lack of equity 
investments in international financial flows, it is suggested that (see IMF 1991) the former are 
not exposed to incentive problems, while the latter is exposed to moral hazards. The debt crisis 
confirmed the phenomenon that lending can equally be hazardous. As soon as this was realized 
international bank lending drastically reduced. 
2 For the past, there is no significant quantifiable evidence of any debt forgiveness for the OIC 
MCs. But recently, substantial debt of Egypt owning to OIC MCs and Western sources has been 
forgiven. GCC countries have also announced a debt forgiving program for some African 
countries. 
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compatibility problem and by offering material incentives, grants are more 
efficient in context of the developing countries rather than loans and equities'. 
Disincentives of Existing Debts 
Countries unable to initiate internal debt management strategies for a 
longer period, are likely to confront severe liquidity and investment disincentive 
problems'. Many indebted countries, at present face lack of liquidity to meet 
domestic consumption and investment needs and at the same time meet their 
debt obligations. This is reflected in their export earning/debt service ratios and 
position of foreign exchange reserves. As a result of lack of liquidity, 
go vernments' borrowing increases which suppresses private investment. The 
share of consumption in GNP increases and investment declines overtime. 
The trend of the MCs consumption/GNP and investment/GNP ratios are not yet 
very discouraging in general. Yet, for a number of countries a negative 
inv6stment/GNP ratio and for a few other, a declining trend in this ratio could 
be identified. 
This situation, seen along with the changing pattern of official reserves 
of MCs, suggests that in fact a large number of the OIC MCs have already 
. confronted the liquidity problem. These are Algeria, Bangladesh, Sudan, 
Mauritania, Yemen, Jordan and several small African countries. Under 
circumstances of the recipients' domestic economy where consumption is 
,p, ressing and the diversion of a part of the borrowed money away from 
investment is foreseen, creditors loose their incentive for providing additional 
funds. 
. ý. - On the other hand, since the recipients are certain that a particular 
proportion of future output will be used to service future debt obligations, they 
loose incentive in adopting present austerity measures. Investment incentives 
are shattered. Under these conditions the interests of both the lenders due to 
'See e. g., Lachler and Kemp (1987). 
2See Clacsseus and Diwan (1990) for formal models regarding these problems. 
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debt default and the creditors due to drying out of additional flows are bound to 
suffer. 
7.2.3 Non-Existence of Intra-MC Private Capital Flows 
No significant market-based capital flows existed among these 
co untries. This is an important observation particularly, in view of the fact that 
there has been a substantial inflow of foreign direct investment from non- 
Muslim country sources as well as an inflow from the Islamic banking sector 
which is also market oriented. 
I 
II 
Some explanation for this phenomenon is available from the overview of 
motivations underlying international private investment. In this regards 
different theories have been presented as well as empirically tested to 
determine the motivations and incentives which cause foreign direct 
investment. These theoretical and empirical studies are summarized in Exhibit 
7(a). From this brief summary of the incentives and motivations underlying 
foreign direct investment we can derive some important conclusions. 
i) It cannot be expected that a particular theory (which concentrates on 
particular factors) provide complete explanation about the determinants of 
foreign direct investment. Rather, in general terms, all of the identi I fied factors 
and most likely a number of unidentified factors may determine foreign direct 
investment. Perhaps, therefore, it is more appropriate to classify these factors 
into three categories: a) resource seeking, b) efficiency seeking, and c) market 
seeking'. Resource seeking investment is induced by the expected profit from 
the exploitation of comparatively cheaper raw materials abroad. Market 
seeking investment has dual functions namely: it is prompted by the market for 
its R&D intensive services abroad as well as it is simultaneously encouraged 
for capturing foreign product markets. 
'See Lessard and Williamson (1985) for this classification. 
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On the other hand, efficiency seeking investment may combine all these 
considerations to produce at lower marginal cost abroad than at home. This 
type of consideration has induced the manufacturing of components in various 
parts of the world market particularly by sub-contracting and production offsets. 
ii) Although, foreign direct investment is considered as a desirable form 
of foreign capital, yet, the incompatibility of incentives of foreign investors and 
local parties are often prohibitive. An incentive incompatibility arises due to the 
open ended of the foreign direct investment in terms of ownership, penetration 
of. local economy and risks. In many developing countries, a nationalistic 
opposition to foreign control of national resources through conventional foreign 
direct investment has been voiced. This has increased the non-commercial 
risks from the point of view of the foreign investors. 
iii) To overcome this incentive incompatibility problem, the different 
elements of the traditional internalized foreign direct investment are separated 
and Ahen externalized. The new forms of the traditional foreign direct 
investment take the structure of joint ventures, licensing, sub-contracting, 
production sharing, profit sharing, etc. Since ownership related sensitivities are 
solved in these forms, incentives of local and foreign parties become 
consistent'. 
'For a profile of these investment relations see Khan (1991 b). 
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Exhibit 7(a): Explanatory Determining Incentives In 
Foreign Private Resource Flows 
Theories Incentives/Motivations Empirical 
Results 
1. Differential Rate of 
Return 
Maximization of return on investment Inconclusive 
2. Portfolio Diversification Risk Management Weak support 
3. Output/Market Size Maximization of Sales Strong support 
4.1ndustrial Organization Exploitation of R and D intensive comparative 
advantages 
Strong support 
5. Market Internalization Preservation of R and D intensive comparative 
advantages 
Strong support 
6. Eclectic Approach 4+5+ exploitation of ownership of projects in 
better locations 
Strong support 
7.13roduct Cycle Maximization of the product cycle period Strong but 
declining su port 
7. Oligopolistic Reaction Repercussion to the actions of rival firms Inconclusive 
g. Liquidity Reinvestment of retained profits Varies with firm 
size 
10. Currency area Minimization of exchange rate risks Strong support 
11. Diversification with 
barriers to capital flows 
Diversification benefits Strong support 
12. Cooperative 
Intermediation 
Comparative disadvantages in production Mixed results 
13. PolitiCal instability Safe investment and return Strong support 
14. Tax policies Avoid high taxes Strong support 
15. Government 
I reg ýlations 
Neutral Weak support 
Source: Derived from IMF (1991). 
", 
An explanation for the non-existence of any FDI flows among MCs can 
be derived from this discussion. FDI is undertaken by motivated multinational 
companies having comparative advantages in R&D intensive services. MCs do 
not home any such companies. Therefore, there are no intra-MC FDI flows or 
more generally no outflow of FDI from MCs as a group. 
Foreign indirect investment in portfolio equities at present is an 
insignificant source of capital flows for the MCs, except for the Bahrain, Turkey, 
Malaysia, Pakistan and Indonesia. No systematic data is available even for 
these countries. But owning to the level of financial market facilities and 
particularly privatization schemes, the financial markets in Bahrain, and stock 
market in some of other countries have recently attracted some foreign capital. 
However, compared to these expected inflows, the observed outflows can 
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safely be termed as massive. These incentives for portfolio investment are also 
covered from the summary of the considerations presented in the above table. 
The three inter-related incentives in portfolio equity investments for the owners 
of funds are, liquidity, security and minimization of risks by portfolio 
diversification. 
I- Liquidity of an asset depends on the quality of the asset reflected in the 
currency in which the asset is held, the economic conditions underlying the 
currency, exchange rate risks, and marketability of the asset. Security implies 
exposure of the asset to non-commercial risks, transfer problems, sovereign 
dominance and other non-diversifiable i. e. systematic risks. When risks are 
non-systematic or diversifiable, there is an incentive for the diversification of 
portfolios over assets whose return do not vary together. A riskier asset must 
offer higher return. A portfolio composing of many risky assets whose return do 
not vary together, is therefore, more liquid, secure and high yielding. Given 
other conditions, the greatest motivation for portfolio investment is therefore, 
maximization of return on financial asset by diversifying the asset structure of 
the portfolios. 
Although short term trading in financial assets does not directly 
contribute to net flow of resources, yet, it improves the overall liquidity situation 
of 
-the 
host economy. The incentive for the host country in a foreign portfolio 
investment is this liquidity effect of the resultant financial flow. However, 
portfolio investment implies an ownership of domestic financial assets by 
foreigners. Thus, it poses the same incentive incompatibility problem as foreign 
direct investment. 
An explanation for the massive outflow of portfolio investment from the 
MCs as a group and no significant inflow of such investment into the MCs can 
be derived from the above discussion. The flow of portfolio investments 
depends on security, liquidity and stability conditions. MCs in general do not 
fulfill these vital conditions. In search of these conditions there is an outflow of 
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portfolio investment from the MCs as a group or more generally, there is no 
intra-MC portfolio investments. 
7.2.4 Risk Sharing Versus Debt Finance 
At least, a partial explanation for the non-sustainability of public financial 
flows can be found in the non-economic motivation underlying the supply of 
these funds in addition to their debt creating nature. The linkage of the supply 
of funds with productive activities and physical projects is generally expected to 
harmonize the motivations and incentives of their suppliers and users. A 
number of factors are expected to ensure the compatibility of fund suppliers 
and users' incentives under the risk-sharing financial flows. 
Linkages of Liabilities with Abilities to Pay 
Other than grants, all forms of inflow of foreign financial resources is a 
liability for the host country. This liability under the risk-sharing modes of 
financing is not fixed as under the interest-based modes. Under interest-based 
financial flows, the recipient country is bound to pay a certain fixed liability 
irrespective of the fact that even the principal amount of this liability may have 
been lost. But under the risk-sharing flows, liabilities arise only if a net financial 
return is accrued to the financial flows. The macro-economic implication of this 
fact for the resource structure of the recipient country is expected to be 
positive. In real terms the recipient country's economic objectives are served 
better by this type of financial flows. 
This benefit is obviously associated with a higher return to be paid to the 
owners of funds for the higher risk they take. Hence, the above mentioned 
benefit is incompatible with the high cost of finance particularly, if low cost debt 
finance is available as a substitute. This incompatibility is insignificant 
compared to the advantages of linking the financial service obligations with the 
ability to pay. Such an arrangement ensures a proper dispersal of service 
obligations over time, a properly diversified currency composition, risk-sharing 
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between owners and users and finally the funding sources become diverse, 
which ensures the stability of supply of funds'. 
Mutuality of Interests 
A greater degree of compatibility of interests of the two parties is 
achieved if their interests are tied-up with a common indicator. Under risk- 
sharing, this common indicator is the financial outcome of the enterprise which 
uses the funds. This fact highlights more crucial incentive considerations. 
Financing through risk or profit inherently promotes common interests of 
the two parties (financier and entrepreneur) as they share the outcome of the 
project. So, there is no cost of capital for only one party as under the interest- 
based system. 
Under debt finance, due to incompatibility of the interests of owners and 
user of funds, a fictitious concept viz. credit worthiness has replaced a more 
scientific concept i. e., financial and economic feasibility. Consequently, feasible 
projects cannot be undertaken because credit goes to the so-called credit- 
worthy borrowers. Under profit and risk sharing arrangements this situation will 
not arise. It is in the interest of the supplier of funds to study the feasibility of 
the project before providing finance. Only efficient projects will get finance and 
risks will be spread over a number of good projects. This will diversify the 
risks and create financial stability. 
Implications for Economic Environment 
An improvement in the economic environment of the recipient country 
ensures better prospects for future reverse financial flows as payment of : L'_ 
service obligations. Risk-sharing flows promote domestic institutions, while 
debt, financing doesn't. Because, under interest-based debt financing, money is 
borrowed from international markets and paid directly without involvement of 
'Caesseus (1990). Earlier, this idea was discussed in all the classical literature on Islamic 
economics. 
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local financial infrastructure viz., stock markets, capital markets, financial 
intermediaries etc. On the other hand, the success of the risk-sharing flows, the 
promotion of these crucial local institutions is vital. 
Once these institutions are promoted, a better intermediation between 
saving and investment could be achieved. Shares of projects could be traded 
(as a result, liquidity position of the economy improves). Feasible projects 
could be identified and risks spread over these projects (as a result, the 
financial system will stabilize) and the overall economic conditions of the 
economy improve. Moreover, reliance on public borrowing decreases and 
private investment is encouraged. A better integration between money and 
goods and services market is ensured. Consequently, compatibility between 
the interests of the suppliers and users of funds is achieved. 
Putting these considerations together, it can be concluded that in the 
general framework of the risk-sharing flows, the interests of suppliers and 
users of funds are more compatible compared to the interest-based debt 
finance. 
7.3 RISE OF CONTRACTUAL INVESTMENTS AND ITS RELEVANCE 
-A change in the relative resource positions of countries could be partially 
attri buted to their international economic relations and the resultant resource 
I transfer. The rvýarket related mechanisms of inter-country transfer of financial 
resources can be classified into three broad categories: debt finance, indirect 
investments in portfolio equities, and direct investments. From the perspective 
of tI he recipient of finance, the advantage of the debt-based finance is the fact 
t; ha I t, I financiers do not interfere in the use of finance'. During the seventies and 
eighties developing countries have relied heavily on this form of finance. 
'See Zarqa (1985). 
21t is widely accepted that, in case of debt-finance, this apparent advantage has caused gross 
allocative inefficiency. See, e. g., Lessard (1985). 
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'. But unfortunately, due to its inefficiency, the contribution of debt finance 
to resource transfer to capital importing countries has almost been negative. 
This'has decreased the repayment capabilities of the borrowing countries thus 
causing the debt crises. As a way out of the debt crises, a consensus has built 
up to promote the flow of risk capital as an alternative to debt finance. 
In context of direct investment, at least four approaches can be 
identified to put the profit maximizing behavior of international investors into the 
perspective of international private resource transfer. These are i) market 
internalization theory, ii) eclectic theory, iii) triple distinction theory and iv) 
cooperative intermediation theory'. These four approaches can be classified 
into two basic categories viz., market internalization and market externalization. 
: 'I , 
Market Internalization 
The common basis of the first two approaches is the hypothesis that, 
since the international markets for intermediate products are imperfect, profit 
maximization requires the internalization of all the market related activities in 
the framework of a multinational enterprise. According to the market 
internalization theory, the market internalization process of the multinational 
causes its R&D activities which creates information as well as integrated team 
of skills. This entire process is the basis of the multinational's comparative 
advantage over the local firms. 
However, acc ording to the eclectic theory the comparative advantage of 
the multinational enterprise depends primarily on factors such as ownership 
advantages, the relative efficiency of market internalization (direct production 
and marketing) over market externalization (e. g., licensing) and the degree of 
dependence of market internalization on ownership of external resources. 
Market internalization is the underlying feature of FDl- The essence of 
market internalization is the acquisition, protection and exploitation of 
I For details please see, Ozawa and Kojima (1984). 
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ownership of R&D intensive resources, right to resource utilization in the host 
countries and often protected markets. Moreover, during the previous decade, 
the return earned by foreign investors on FDI was estimated to be 2 1/2 % 
more than the average rate of interest in the international market' (i. e., the 
average return earned on FDI projects was at least 18%). This is obviously, too 
expensive from the point of view of the host countries. 
Market Externalization or Cooperative Approach 
An alternative strategy for private international resource transfer may be 
found in the cooperative approach or theory of market externalization 2. This is 
by itself an extension of the triple distinction theory (TDT). The TDT suggests 
to make a distinction between the inter-dependent but different behaviors and 
functions of three different entities: firm, industry and market. Due to their 
single control and coherent plans, firms are subject to direction. But since, the 
industry emerges as a result of two or more independent organizations 
agreeing in advance to match their related plans, the basis of industry is 
cooperation rather than 
- 
direction. The market ensures global coordination 
through spontaneous interaction of demand and supply. 
The cooperative intermediation approach suggests that, if left to the will 
of multinational corporations under planned and directed objectives of profit 
maximization, international private resource transfer cannot be beneficial for 
global development 
' 
The basis of the cooperative intermediation approach is the recognition 
of the fact that developed economy countries, as suppliers of R&D intensive 
services and capital, and developing countries as sources of market for the 
above resources as well as cheaper raw materials are always interdependent. 
Historically, through the channels of foreign direct investments (FDI) (of the 
'See, IMF (1985). 
See, Ozawa and Kojima (1984). 
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developed countries in the developing countries), these complimentarities were 
utilized. 
Despite all its advantages, FDI is over exposed to the phenomenon of 
U reciprocal fear": host countries risk the control of their resources by the 
foreigners consequently, foreign investors fear high non-commercial risks. The 
result of the interdependency of developed and developing countries on one 
hand, and the limitations of FDI as an international real resource transfer 
mechanism on the other, was the growth of non-conventional substitutes to the 
traditional FDI (viz., management contracts, production sharing, revenue 
sharing, prod uction-in-hand contracts, turnkey contracts, subcontracting, 
licensing, franchising, international leasing, joint ventures, offsets, buy-backs 
etc. ). 
- Through these channels, the developed countries are able to sell their 
technical and financial resources (even to those economies which are 
dominated by public sectors) at the same time avoiding the sensitivities 
associated with FDL On the other hand, developing countries are able to take 
benefit from the technical and financial resources of the developed countries 
with a minimum risk of foreign control on their national economies - unlike FDL 
Thus, the "new forms" or contractual forms of international investments are 
demanded by both parties. 
A cooperative approac is therefore, in the common interest of the 
international inVestors and their host countries. The strength of this hypothesis 
is found in the growing trend of "externalization" - the growth of the contractual 
forms of international investments rather than "internalization" of markets. 
The relevance of the above mentioned propositions of international 
private resource transfer for Islamic economics can be viewed from two 
perspe ctives. From the ideological and academic perspective, Islamic scholars 
emphasis justice and equity as fundamental criteria for the acceptance of any 
economic relationship. For the efficient and just operation of the market 
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mechanism the Islamic scholars have emphasized "cooperative competition", 
rather than "perfect competition". The concept of cooperative competition is 
reflective of the emphases by Islam on mutual agreement/ understanding in the 
trading activities. 
From the policy perspective, the importance of a cooperative approach 
to international resource utilization is not only hailed by the World Bodies like 
the UN, but also the growing recognition of this philosophy is reflected in the 
behavior of foreign investors. The preference of the host countries' for this 
approach is reflected in the growing acceptance of these arrangements in the 
developing countries. 
From the perspective of resource transfer to the host countries, the 
implication of these investment relations can be seen from the evidence that 
the average rate of profit earned by the firms on contractual investments is 
re'p'o'rted to be 1-3 % in most caseS2. Whereas, interest based borrowing (at an 
average rate of 16%) and FDI (at an average rate of 18%) are much more 
expensive for the host countries. Therefore, from the perspective of the host 
countries, under contractual arrangements, the price of importables are 
considerably lower compared to both import financing through interest based 
commercial credit or internalized domestic production through FDL 
Moreover, contractual investments are designed to transfer ownership 
rights to the host countries during a specific time period. As a result, the 
transfer of resources to the host country. becomes certain. In a reasonable 
period of time the economy may become an exporter. For the foreign investors, 
the arrangements ensure economies of scale due to expanded markets and 
access to cheaper raw materials. Through investments in deferred sale of R&D 
intensive resources, the foreign firms acquire crucial market information for the 
development of advanced production processes and further expand their sale 
based investments. 
'See, Kahf (1978) and Siddiqi (1973). 
2See, Ozawa and Kojima ibid. 
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I On the other hand the philosophy underlying the market internalization 
approach is simply to explain the motivation for the multinational to do business 
in a foreign country. This approach is not concerned with the relative resource 
position of the host and home countries as a result of the multinational's 
activities. 
In view of the above considerations, it could be concluded that 
compared to interest based borrowing and FDI, contractual investment 
relations ensure the transfer of resources on more equitable basis. Therefore, 
these arrangements are more relevant for Islamic economics. 
,,, Consistency with Islamic Modes of Financing 
To be relevant for Islamic economics any financial and economic 
relationship must'be consistent with the general theoretical and practical 
framework of the Islamic modes of finance. In this regard the following 
considerations need to be reviewed. 
Interest-Free Nature: The interest free nature of a financial or 
investment relationship is a fundamental consideration for its acceptance in 
Islamic economics. Naturally therefore, the relationship should be based on 
any of the alternative arrangements to interest viz., pricing, gross income 
sh , aring, net income sharing or sharing-cum-pricing. 
Exhibit 7(b) classifies the contractual investment arrangements on the 
basis of the underlying principles and compares them with the Islamic modes 
of finance. It is clear from the information that by their nature, the contractual 
investment relations are interest free. Thus, these arrangements are either 
based on net income sharing, gross income sharing or pricing/fees. However, a 
single arrangement may often involve different considerations, e. g., technical 
components of a buy-back arrangement may be sold to the local parties by 
charging a fee, instead of adjusting it in the buy back price. 
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Exhibit 7 (b): Characteristics of Contractual Investments & Islamic Modes of Finance 
Contracts / Underlying Prin- 
ciples 
Price/ 
Fees 
Gross Income 
Sharing 
Net Income 
Sharing 
Sharing-Cum- 
Selling 
Mudharabah yes 
Musharakah yes 
Muzara' yes 
Musaqa' yes 
Ija ra' yes 
Istisna' yes 
Ju'ala yes 
Durable Asset Participation yes yes 
Investment Auctioning yes 
Diminishing Participation yes 
Leasing yes 
Management Contract yes 
Turnkey Contract yes 
Franchising yes 
Sub-contracting yes 
Build-Operate-Transfer yes 
Prod uction-in-H and Contract yes 
Production Sharing yes 
Offsets yes 
Buy-Back yes 
Revenue Sharing yes 
qu oint Ventures yes 
Contractual Joint Ventures yes 
Specific Considerations: The interest-free nature of an economic and 
financial arrangement is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for its 
acceptability in Islamic economic framework. Although, in general interest free, 
each of the Islamic modes of finance also has specific conditions e. g., goods 
cannot be the principal of mudharabah; in all sharing arrangements no party 
can claim a predetermined share; a debt cannot be sold for debt; risks related 
to an asset cannot be separated from its ownership rights and passed on to the 
second party. There are several other such specific considerations underlying 
the Islamic modes of financing. Each contract has its own specific conditions. 
But in general, the fundamental principles could not change. 
Some general considerations for the distribution of risks in each case of 
the contractual investment arrangements are summarized in Exhibit 7 (c). it 
can be seen from this information that the motivations for the foreign parties to 
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participate in the contractual investment relations are, in general, related to the 
utilization of their R&D intensive resources, sale of equipments and acquisition 
of cheaper intermediate inputs. The motivation may also be pure financial, as 
in profit sharing or revenue sharing contracts. 
2 A. 82 
Exhibit 7 (c): Benefits & Risks in Some Contractual Investment Relations 
, ntracts 'o t r C c Description Benefits and Risks Benefits and Underlying for Foreign Risks for Host Principles 
r 
Investors Countries 
c hising ran F Use of brand names, Benefit: MAR Benefits: FIN Pricing 
patents etc., for production Risk : PRS Risks : None 
purposes. 
Turnkey Construction and Benefits: MAR Benefits: FIN Pricing 
Contracts transferring over to a local Risks : TR, DD. TEC 
party by a foreign party an Risks : SS 
investment project for a 
specified price. 
Sub- Production of parts and Benefits: AS Benefits: MAR Pricing 
Contracting components by an agent Risks : SS Risks : CE. 
for a principal on order. 
Parts to be used at the 
exclusive risk of the 
principal 
Built- Projects built by foreigners Benefits: MAR Benefits: FIN Pricing 
Operate and on order of home parties. Risks TR, PF, TEC 
Transfer Output and ultimately the DD Risks : SS 
Contracts project itself is bought by 
the host party. 
Production Foreign firm delivers on Benefits: MAR Benefits: FIN Pricing 
in Hand commercial basis a Risks PF, DD, TEC 
Contracts production unit producing a TR Risks : SS 
known quantity and quality 
of particular output. 
Profit A joint venture in which the Benefits: MAR Benefits: FIN Net Income 
Sharing accrued profits and losses Risks : TR Risks : None. Sharing 
are shared by the parties. 
Production Sharing of output of a Benefits: AS Benefits: FIN Gross In- 
Sharing project by the local and Risks : PF, TR TEC come 
foreign parties in return for Risks : None Sharing 
capital, technology etc., by 
the foreigner. 
Leasing Sale of use rights of assets Benefits: MAR Benefits: FIN Pricing 
for a specified price (rent) Risks: AR, DD Risks : PF 
and time. 
I Offsets Suppliers manufacture Benefits: MAR, Benefits: FIN Gross In- 
components locally or AS TEC come Shar- 
assemble them locally. Risks : None Risks : None ing 
uýý-Backs Foreign party supplies Benefits: AS Benefits: FIN Gross In- 
r 
equipments/plants for Risks : TR TEC come Shar- 
production and buys an Risks : None. ing 
apportioned output at lower 
price. 
Revenue Sharing a proportion of Benefits: MAR Benefits: FIN Gross In- 
Sharing revenues by sharing Risks : PF, TR Risks : None. come Shar- 
mostly an infrastructural Ing 
project 
- I I II Notations: TEC: Technology PRS: Prestige. Also see, Exhibit 3 (a). 
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The risks involved in such contracts for the foreign parties, are mostly 
related to debt default and transfer of their share in output, revenues or profits. 
Though, minimum compared to FDI, political risks too cannot totally be isolated 
from these investment arrangements. However, most of these risks are 
ensured by national, bilateral and multilateral investment guarantee agencies. 
The motivation of the host (developing) countries for such investment 
arrangements is primarily the acquisition of more advanced and efficient 
production processes. Through contractual investments this acquisition 
bec6mes effective. On the other hand the risks for the home parties are mostly 
related to the quality of the imported plants. Moreover, at the early stage, the 
host country is usually not involved in the import and establishment of the 
plants and ultimately, the foreigners will not be there to maintain the projects. 
The quality may be faulty, or the requisite know how may not be revealed by 
the'foreigners. These risks can however, be managed by the developing 
countries as discussed bellow. 
Relevance for Islamic Financial Institutions 
The relevance of the contractual investment relations for Islamic 
.I 
economics should also be viewed in perspective of the Islamic financial 
institutions. In this regard two points are worth mentioning: 
Financing Social Utility Projects: As discussed in section two, Islamic 
financ 
' 
ing arrangements are fundamentally based on two principles: pricing and 
sharing. Due to the non-tangible nature of return in case of certain social utility 
projects, the sharing principle of Islamic financing may not be a preferred basis 
of investment in such projects'. So far, the sale-based principle of Islamic 
finance has only been used in financial intermediation, it has not been applied 
'it Should be noted however, that revenue sharing has been successfully used in some similar 
projects. 
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to the infrastructural projects'. On the other hand the sale based contractual 
investment relations have been used in such projects successfully. 
The involvement of foreign investors in such projects can only be on the 
basis of a deferred sale relationship. The foreign firm will bring plants, install 
them and establish the projects on the basis of an agreed upon fees or price to 
be paid on deferred basis. Typical examples of this relationship is the turnkey 
or prod uction-in-h and contracts. In case, the transaction involves R&D 
intensive services of intangible nature, again the pricing principle (as in 
franchising or management contracts) can be utilized. Similar is the case with 
leasing, where services of durable assets are sold or sub-contracting where 
some work is done on the basis of agreed upon price. 
Financing the Sale of Output of Sharing Projects: It is a reality that trade 
financing is a salient feature of contemporary Islamic financing. By financing 
the purchase of intermediate inputs, this mode of finance effectively contributes 
to economic development. Trade financing also supports producing units by 
financing the sale of their output. Therefore, this mode of Islamic finance 
utilized to promote the sale of output of projects established on the basis of the 
sharing principle. 
To start with, on order of a member country, an Islamic bank or trading 
company could deal with a foreign investor to install an industrial plant (e. g., a 
car'plant) in the member country on the basis of gross income sharing2. 
Assuming that'the plant will annually produce 30,000 cars and the agreed 
gross income sharing ratio between the member country and the car manufac- 
turer is 50: 50, the car company, will thus annually own 15,000 cars from the 
plant. The trade financing mode of the Islamic bank may be utilized to finance 
the sale of these 15,000 cars for the car manufacturer. Thus, an Islamic 
'Zarqa (1990), presents a case where financial certificates can be developed to finance such 
projects on the basis of the sale principle. 
2The question, why should the car manufacturer opt for gross income sharing rather than net 
income sharing has been discussed in section 3.3 bellow. 
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I 
financial institution will effectively contribute to economic development and real 
resource transfer while at the same time being self-supporting. 
7.4 CHALLENGES OF EXTERNAL RESOURCE 
MOBILIZATION OF PAKISTAN: 
THE CASE OF AN ISLAMIC IDEOLOGICAL COUNTRY 
Pakistan being an ideological state, the abolition of riba(interest) has 
from the very beginning formed an integral part of State Policy as enshrined in 
her constitution. In this connection, the Council of Islamic Ideology has 
frequently been caged upon to delineate the true meaning of riba and to 
elucidate the verses of the Holy Quran pertaining thereto. The Council has all 
along expressed the view that the term riba encompasses interest in all its 
manifestations, irrespective of whether it relates to loans for consumption 
purposes or for productive purposes, whether the loan are of personal nature or 
of commercial type, whether the borrower is a government, a private individual 
or a concern and whether the rate of interest is low or high. 
The Council of Islamic Ideology Pakistan; Report on Elimination of Interest from 
the Economy 
Despite the above cited awareness about riba, at the present, Pakistan 
is posed to face a real debt crisis: All new foreign borrowings of the country are 
exhausted in servicing existing riba-based debts. Total internal and external 
outstanding public debt of the country is equivalent to about 90% of its gross 
II domestic product, servicing this debt yearly requires 3.2 billion US dollars, 
mI akin 
.9 
it 
rthe 
first largest expenditure item of the nation's fiscal year 1996 
budget. In March 1996, the Governor State Bank of Pakistan warned that his 
country is likely to enter the "debt-trap"; Pakistan may accumulate liba arrears, 
and continuously request for debt re-scheduling. 
Pakistan -a nation committed to eliminate riba, during 1996, will spend 
more on servicing riba-based debts than even on its national defensel This is 
the predicament of a country where a lucid definition of riba in the form of the 
above quotation has long been known, where the goal of replacing the fiba- 
based financial transactions with some alternatives consistent with the Islamic 
law has always remained in the national agenda and where political will in this 
regard has always remained visible throughout the process of forming a 
national consensus on constitutional issues. 
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Justice Tanzil-ur-Rehman one of the most prominent policy makers 
committed to eliminate riba from the economy of Pakistan contends that the 
present (1973) constitution unequivocally aspires for the clearance of the 
ec - onomy from tiba'. However, in 1976, the constitution was put in abeyance on 
the rationale that the then government (which had the credit of giving the 
nation a constitution consistent with the Islamic law) was in itself antipathetic 
towards implementing Islamic provisions of the constitutioni 
1-: ,t The new government thus, made apparent and pronounced institutional 
efforts to cleanse the banking and financial sector from riba. During 1976-86, 
the period when the constitution remained suspended, cleansing the economy 
from riba, apparently, remained an active part of the agenda of economic 
reform. However, it is also paradoxical that most of the present public debt, 
which is the source of the current burden of riba on the nation, also 
accumulated during the same period. 
In retrospect, the economic urgency of reducing the cost of liba on the 
economy highlights the rationale of the ideological opposition to riba. 
Nevertheless, riba cannot be eliminated in isolation of the realities related to 
the country's reliance on external resources. Particularly, during the past five 
years, the Pakistani economy has been widely liberalized, exposing it to 
external shocks. Thus, the task of elimination of riba, in isolation from the world 
economy, apparently seams to be an uphill task. However, the policy 
objectives of liberalizing the economy, narrowing down government borrowing, 
and a conscious plan to reduce the cost of interest payments on the economy, 
are in fact, consistent with each other. The objective of this paper is to assess 
the prospects for Pakistan to reduce its reliance on interest-based international 
borrowing by increasing the use of interest-free alternatives. 
'See, Preface of the CII Report (1981). 
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7.4.1 Challenges Of Islarnizing The External Sector., An Overview 
The 1973 constitution of Pakistan guarantees the full implementation of 
Islamic laws in the country including abolition of riba. However, practical efforts 
of Islamizing the economy started in October 1977 after suspension of the 
constitution, when the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) was asked by then 
Chief Martial Law Administrator, General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq to prepare a 
blue-print of an interest-free economy. In November 1977, the CII appointed a 
Panel of Economists and Bankers to undertake the preliminary task of 
preparing the blue-print of an interest-free economy. The Panel submitted its 
third report (which deals with the elimination of riba from the economy) in 
February, 1980. The report was evaluated by a group of shariah scholars 
appointed by the CII and finally adopted in June 1980. 
The CII Report on the Elimination of Interest from the economy of 
Pakistan is a valuable work on the subject and can rightly be termed as the 
only one of its kind. In general, the alternatives suggested for Islarnizing the 
economy are also relevant for the purpose of external resource mobilization. 
Moreover, Islamization of the overall structure of the economy must have 
implications for external resource mobilization. However, in some places, the 
report directly deals with issues related to external resource mobilization. An 
review'of the C11 recommendations directly dealing with the issue of mobilizing 
external resources is in order. , 2, 
A. While 'dealing with foreign transactions of banks involving interest, the 
report mentions two cases: i) foreign transactions of Pakistani banks, and ii) 
local transactions of foreign banks. The CII recommended that both these 
"would also have to continue on the basis of interest until alternative 
arrangements conforming with shariah are evolved in regard to these 
transactions"'. However, the C11 also recommended that in order to avoid 
merger of interest and non-interest income, the administration of foreign 
branches of Pakistani commercial banks may be entrusted to a separate 
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corporation. The foreign currency deposits held with commercial banks should 
also be transferred to this corporation. These recommendations were never 
implemented. ' 
B. The CII report also deals with Islamization of the capital structure 
of, specialized financial institutions', namely, Pakistan Industrial Credit and 
Investment Corporation (PICIC), Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan 
(PIDC), National Development Finance Corporation (NDFC) and Agricultural 
Development Bank (ADB). In case of pICIC3, the CII recommended that: 
i) As the capital of PICIC contains foreign ownership, any Islamization of 
the. capital of PICIC should be undertaken in consultation with the foreign 
owners. If the owners do not agree with the proposed Islamization, they may 
be offered to divest their stakes in the PICIC gradually, 
ii) Foreign currency loans obtained by PICIC on the basis of interest 
would be guaranteed by the government4, 
iii) PICIC has to pay interest on certain foreign loans, which is 
recommended to continue till appropriate shariah consistent alternatives are 
made available and 
iv) Since PICIC borrows from the World Bank, Asian Development Bank 
etc. ', ' on the basis of interest, it was recommended by the C11 that, "the 
corporation may continue to obtain it (the credit) on the basis of interest until 
viable alternative conforming to shariah is available". The C11 repeated the 
same recommendations in case of the remaining institutions'. 
'See, Ahmad et. al eds. 1983 p 149. 
2Pages 150-156, ibid., 
3PICIC was established in 1957 to provide long and medium-term debt and equity capital to 
private sector industrial projects, issue and purchase of debentures and act as underwriter, 
trustee and guarantor of public issues of shares, debentures and loans. PICIC is a public limited 
company, 65 percent owned by the local private sector, and 35 percent by foreign investors 
including the IFC. Both its liabilities (foreign loans) and assets involved interest. See, C11 ibid. 
41t is important to note that PICIC is a private sector organization, the government as a third 
party can provide such guarantee but only for the principal amount of the loan. 
5See ±ýId_ p 153 for IDBP, p 154 for NDFC and p 156 for ADB. 
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C. Concerning government external borrowing on the basis of 
interest, the CII again recommended to continue the practice until suitable 
Islamic arrangements are available'. However, the CII, in a brief paragraph of 
its Consolidated Report on the Islamic Economic System, Islamabad: CII 1983, 
urges the government to ask Pakistani banks working abroad not to deal in 
interest-based transactions, and to urge the foreign governments and 
I-I- institutions to deal with Pakistan on the basis of the Islamic alternatives. 
D. During the 1980-84 period, a number of legislation were 
introduced in Pakistan to initiate an Islamic financial system. On April 10,1991, 
the -Parliament passed the shariah Act which reinforces the constitutional 
provisions which make the shariah as a supreme, source of law of the land. 
These laws provide the general framework for undertaking economic activities. 
However, specifically in relation to mobilization of external resources these 
laws are also silent. The only exceptio n is the historical November 14,1991 
judgment of the Federal shari'ah Court on 20 different laws of the land dealing 
with interest (riba) and banning interest from all public and private transactions 
involving the people and government of Pakistan. On the appeal of the 
government, this judgment is however, still under consideration of the Supreme 
Court. It should be noted that the government is constitutionally bound to the 
ban on riba but is seeking time for finding alternatives particularly, for 
mobilizing resources to meet the needs of the public sector - external 
resources constituting a bulk of these. 
The shariah Court judgment has also covered the issue of elimination of 
fiba in view of the domination of international economic, commercial and 
financial transactions by interest. 
First, the learned Court identified murabahah-based trade financing as 
practiced by the Islamic Development Bank and other Islamic banks world- 
wide', as a substitute to interest-based trade financing. 
I ibid. p 180. 
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Second, the Court also found that foreign direct investment should be 
encouraged, as for attracting portfolio investments, Pakistan cannot compete 
with other markets. 
Third, as far government borrowings are concerned, it. was ruled that the 
government of Pakistan must stop borrowing on the basis of interest and 
instead seriously consider to evolve a profit and loss sharing system. 
Fourth, the court noted that after the international debt crisis, the 
international community is also seeking an alternative mechanism and 
Lastly, international practices of the Islamic banks have in fact provided 
the alternative to interest-based debt financing. The court thus observed that 
the delay in the elimination of interest for fear of difficulties with international 
transactions is unjustified. 
F. As a follow-up of the shadah Act, 1991 an Islamization 
Commission was appointed by the government to study the process of 
Islamization of the economy and suggest recommendations. A report was 
submitted by the Commission on Islamization of Banks and Financial 
.I In stitutions. As with other reports, the general recommendations of this report 
are relevant for the external resource mobilization as well, but the report does 
not contain any specific suggestion for mobilizing external resources. 
7.4.2 Reliance On Foreign Resources 
In current prices, the external resource requirements for the 1989-92 
period have been about Rs. 70 billions per year. The figure for 1993 was at a 
peak level of Rs. 75 billions as the government budget deficit increased to 8% 
of GNP, the rupee depreciated significantly against the US dollar and inflation 
remained in the two digit level. The government plans to cut the deficit 
expenditures to 4% of GNP and the rupee exchange rate has not so far 
stabilized. Moreover, keeping in view the GNP growth objectives of 6%-7% for 
the future, drastic improvements required for uplifting the social sector, public 
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utilities and infrastructure, the need for more external resources is inevitable to 
supplement domestic resources i. e., tax revenues. The projected resource gap 
is given in chart 7 (b). By the year 2000, the country will yearly need an 
estimated amount of US dollars 6 billion inflow of foreign resources, about 4 
billion of these will be needed for yearly servicing riba-based debts. 
Chart 7(b) 
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The major source of external funds for Pakistan has remained public 
long, term debt from multilateral institutions and bilateral sources. Chart 7 (c) 
p resents information on yearly outstanding long-term external public debt of 
Pakistan for the 1970-94 period and projects for the year 2000. It can be seen 
that since 1980, the debt has accumulated sharply. The long-term outstanding 
public (non-defense) debt of Pakistan in June 1996 is estimated to be over 25 
billion'US dollars. It is projected with a 0.97 R2 that this amount will reach 35 
billion dollars by the year 2000. 
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Chart 7 (c) 
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Although, historically,, Pakistan has relied on official development 
assistance, since 1988, it is also resorting to private sources of credit in the 
international markets. Although, at the present, the yearly outstanding debt is 
about 120 million US dollars, it is expected that this type of debt will increase 
in the future. In addition, the trend of increased reliance on private capital is 
likely to continue as Pakistan intends to mobilize funds from the international 
bond markets, attract foreign portfolio investment in local stock markets, direct 
investment in projects and foreign currency deposits in the banks. If the ability 
to pay did not improve simultaneously, an in the reliance on conventional 
private capital will drastically increase the foreign liabilities of Pakistan. 
ý, 
Pakistan'. s total debt service and interest payments as a percentage of 
exports is given in chart 7 (d). In 1971, Pakistan was paying about 7% of its 
total export earning as interest on foreign loans. This percentage has increased 
to. 13% in 1994. Whereas, the allocation of export earnings for debt servicing 
increased from 17% in 1971 to 27% in 1994. 
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Pakistan has a considerable potential to attract foreign direct investment 
(FIDI). FDI has remained low in Pakistan. The peak yearly inflow of US dollars 
1000 million may be achieved during 1996 as during the first 9 months an 
inflow of 600 million dollars was reported by the government. 
For a number of reasons, Pakistan's external debt situation apparently 
does not indicate any seriousness compared to other low income developing 
countries. For instance, so far, Pakistan has no interest arrears outstanding, it 
has not asked for any re-scheduling, its debt service as a percentage of 
exports has remained stable. However, the real signal for alarm underlies chart 
7 (e). With anqual GNP growth targets between at 6- 7%, annual inflation at 
8%, budget deficit at 4% of GNP, external account deficit of at 3% GNP, and if 
the present export and import performance is sustained, from 1995, an outward 
real resource transfer has started from Pakistan. The total inflow of debt must 
have fallen short of total debt services by about yearly 500 million US dollars, 
indicating the beginning of a real debt-trap. By the year 2000, this shortage will 
increase to 1.5 billion US dollars stabilizing around 1 billion and 1.5 billion 
dollars after the year 2000. This means that total mobilization of foreign 
294 
conventional funds will fall short, net outflow of resources will take place by an 
estimated 1.5 billion US dollars yearly. 
Chart 7 (e) 
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7.4.3 The Case For Interest-Free Alternatives 
Given the above mentioned scenario, if interest-based borrowing 
cont 
' 
inues, Pakistan will inev. itably develop interest arrears, ask for rescheduling 
its , debts and confront more problems on its credibility on the criteria of financial 
risk. These factors, if accumulated will adversely effect all types of flows to 
Pakistan, making external resources even more costlier and adversely effecting 
its export competitiveness. Although already late, Pakistan also has an 
alternative to develop a long run strategy to increasingly rely on a set of 
interest-free alternatives for external resource utilization. 
There are at least three separate . but inter-related aspects of such an 
alternative strategy. First, how to meet the requirements for short-term funds 
for the balance of payments considerations? As for as the liquidity 
requirements of the economy are concerned, there is no better alternative to 
the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Recently, Pakistan's foreign 
exchange reserves have remained unstable only during periods of political 
instability. Whereas, under normal circumstances, the foreign exchange 
reserves could well be maintained over and above the safe range of 5 month's 
import requirements. Once these safe limits are attained and maintained, the 
, need_ for liquidity for contingency requirements will not remain critical. 
Second, what could be done with the existing debt stock which is 
estimated at US dollars 23 billion in June 1996. If interest-based borrowing is 
avoided, how the existing debt will be serviced at the June 1996 rate of US 
dollars 3.2 billion per year? Lastly, how to tackle the need for additional long- 
term funds? The remaining paper deals with the last two considerations. 
7.4.3.1 Managing the Exiting External Debts 
We estimate in chart 7 (f) that during 1997, Pakistan will need to repay 
1.2, billion dollars in principal amount and 700 million dollars of riba, servicing 
its long-term public debt. So far, Pakistan has little interest arrears if any. The 
US dollars 700 million annual payments of riba is basically a matter of concern 
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for the shari'ah scholars. A sharfah-based policy in this regard is not clear. The 
resultant uncertainty has been instrumental in coining the concept of the so. 
called "sharfah risk"' - Pakistan's country credit risk factor associated with the 
possibility of declining the yearly payment of riba. 
Chart 7(f) Servicing Pakistan's Long-term Public Debt 
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Many developing countries which have confronted the debt crisis have 
adopted debt transformation programs. These programs commonly aim at 
red 
' 
ucing debt servicing difficulties of the indebted countries by linking their 
present to future foreign exchange liabilities and at the same time link these 
with foreign exchange earning capabilities. The most common form which has 
been adopted by several countries is the conversion of debt into equity, mostly 
with an encouragement by the World Bank particularly, the International 
Finance Corporation and Multilateral Invetment Agency. 
At times there were optimisms about the benefits of the programs. 
These programs were presumably seen as a reliable source of reforming the 
iý I domestic sectors of the concerned economies. Moreover, it was expected that 
'See, World Bank Report No. 11590-PAK. Some researchers suggest that in the Hanafi fiqh 
dealing with a non-Muslim on the basis of fiba in not as strictly prohibited as in Other schools of 
fiqh (see, Saleh (1986). We understand that the continuation of riba-based external resource 
mobilization in Pakistan has not been accepted permanently as such; rather, it has been 
temporarily accepted as a necessity. 
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by linking external financial liabilities with the ability to pay, the programs will 
ease the external account restrains of the indebted countries. Furthermore, the 
programs were also expected to give impetus to the development of domestic 
financial markets. 
Nevertheless, there were many apprehensions too. These 
apprehensions directed policy makers to ensure that otherwise potential 
foreign investment is not diverted towards these programs. Naturally, therefore, 
many programs became overcautious in this regard and the resultant 
regulations have made many programs ineffective. Moreover, a certain level of 
increase in the M2 in many countries and the resultant high inflation is 
allegedly due to the liquidity released by the programs. Pakistan, so far has not 
considered the debt conversion option. Soon, Pakistan may be compelled to 
adopt some drastic debt management stretagy including interest re-sheduling, 
and over-all debt service re-sheduling on the basis of further negotiations on 
interest. 
It is a practical experience of the developing countries that debt re- 
sheduling is a vicious circle. Countries which have once fallen into this circle 
have not been able to come out of it. As an alternative to debt re-sheduling, 
debt conversion can be considered as a lesser evil. The debt conversion option 
is also consistent with the ongoing process of privatization. A certain amount of 
external debt is owed to the privatizing companies through the specialized 
development financing institutions, and over 90% of the outstanding debt is in 
the public sector. 
Some Islamic economic aspects of the existing debts can be explained 
with the help of Fig. 7 (a). The Fig. is drawn on the assumption that there is 
given amount of interest-bearing debt and contracting such new debt is 
cea sed. However, new debt will be created through deferred purchase. 
it is important to note that so far Pakistan has nominal interest arrears 
shown as pa in the Fig. Most external debt of the country is in the form of the 
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principal amount shown as op, in the Fig. The principal amount of the debt 
comes in the framework of the Qura'nic verse 11-279 ... Ye shall have your 
principal sums... 
. One familiar possibility with regard to the principal amount of debt is its 
conversion into equities of the privatizing companies. This arrangement 
becomes similar to the use of debt as a principal capital of mudharabah or 
musharakah contracts. The acceptability of this matter is discussed in the Fiqh 
literature in detail. In general, such a use of debt is not accepted by the 
scholars. But the Hanafi's are said to allow such a use of debt if it is said that 
"collect such and such debt and do mudharabah or musharakah with it". It is 
repo'rted that some Hanbalis went further by saying that an indebted person 
can ýcollect a debt from himself and does with it mudharabah. Obviously, the 
flexibility of these scholars is valuable in considering conversion of the principal 
amount of foreign debt into equity. 
Alternative ways of exchanging the principal amount of the for equity 
may also be explored. It is known that debt cannot be sold for debt, but debt 
can be treated as a price in a sale transaction 2. A sizable amount of Pakistan's 
external debt is owed by public sector corporations. These corporations can 
approach the owners of the debt, offering their existing shares (not new issues) 
in a sale for the principal amount of the outstanding debt. This would be 
equiv 
, 
alent to using the debt as a price in the specific trade which is not 
objected by shariah scholars. 
In view of the political rhetoric against "selling the country", we suggest 
that in both cases of possible conversions, the foreign participation must be 
declining and redeeming in nature rather than becoming permanent. 
'See, 'Government of Kuwait, mausu'al fiqh a/ Islamiyah 
'For a consensus opinion in this regard, see ibid Vol. 21, p 126 paragraph 58. 
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Fig. 7(a): Some Aspects of Debt Managing Existing Debt 
op: Principal amount of all current external debt 
pa Interest arrears 
oa Total current external debt 
ad Debt to be created given the os volume of deferred istisna', etc. ' 
osj Volume of deferred trade like istisna' 
Thus it may be a good practical option for Pakistan to offer the equity of 
a number of public enterprises for the principal debt outstanding against these 
I enterprises. It may also be recalled that the Council of Islamic Ideology, while 
I giving its ruling on the outstanding debt on PICIC and other institutions had 
proposed the option of divestiture. Moreover, if any scheme can reduce the 
co. untry's long-term reliance on interest-based financing, it may be proposed for 
I 
consideration under necessity. 
, ý; ý, ý,, , 
7.4.3.2 Interest-Free Long-term External Resource Mobilization 
Long-term inter-free resource mobilization will have to take the form of 
either deferred trade, direct investment or capital participation. In this 
sI ubýsection, we will discuss different possibilities in this regard. 
Financing the Acquisition of Goods 
Export oriented production of commodities can be expected to remain a 
predominant strategy of international producers. Countries like Pakistan will 
continue to be importers of these products. Traditionally, Pakistan's own 
'It need also be noted that the ad amount of debt is subject to deferred trade in real goods and 
. 
services. Debt created as such is not expected to create problems as it will not cause capital 
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exports concentrate on cotton, cotton-based textile products, rice, leather, 
leather products and rugs. Imports concentrate on petroleum and petroleum 
products, manufacturing and food items. Both the demand for importables and 
supply of exportables are chronically constrained by the shortage of finance. 
With the prohibition of interest-based finance, the financial constraint on 
demand and supply need to be removed by creating a liability (dayin), 
respectively, through price deferred sale (PDS) and object deferred sale 
(ODS). 
At the present however, on the demand side, due to lack of sufficient 
reserves, an important part of payments for advance or spot transactions is 
effected by international borrowing. This process involves two distinct 
transactions; the credit transaction and the purchase transaction. Instead of 
this, in the PIDS based import trade financing arrangement, e. g., as practiced 
by the IDB, the credit is created by the market in question through 
postponement of the payment of price for the future. 
Whether a good is acquired or supplied, there could be a situation 
where, the stock of the commodity in question does not exist or yet to be 
produced. If the non-existence of the stock is due to a financial constraint on 
supply (for example the presence of an underutilized export potential), buyers 
could be expected to offer advance payment through ODS to secure the 
, acquisition of commodities 
in the future. Combinations of such ODS and PIDS 
contracts is given in Exhibit 7 (d). 
flight, unproductive use of resources and other leakages as caused by conventional debt 
finance. 
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,, Exhibit 7 (d). 
Elements of Sale-based External Financing 
Contracts Resultant receipts and 
payments 
Inward-Sa/am: sale of commodities; sale of Pakistan receives advance 
use-rights of assets; sale of services; sale 
: 
payments for its goods and 
of combination of skills and assets on the services 
basis of advance receipt of the price 
' Outward-Salam: purchase of commodities, Pakistan pays in advance 
services, use-rights of assets, skill-asset to acquire assets and 
combinations by advance payment services 
Inward-Mua7ia: purchase of commodities, Pakistan receives goods 
services, use-rights of assets, skill-asset and services but defers 
combinations with delayed payments payments 
Outward WOW sale of commodities; use- Pakistan supplies goods 
rights of assets; services; skill-asset and services but receives 
combinations on the basis of deferred payments on deferred 
payments basis. 
ý The General Role of Credit-Purchase 
One of the crucial determinants of financing imports through deferred 
sale is the condition that demand should strictly be related to a specific object 
I '' J1 '*ý of saie, which must already exist. In other words, the notion of financing 
through deferred sale could be realized, only, if a specific object and its 
demand simultaneously exist. As, in general, supply financing requires 
advance payments, and demand financing implies delayed payments, for the 
capital importing countries, import financing takes precedence over export 
financing. Moreover, production of exportable commodities depends on an 
initial minimum amount of imports. Using the sale-based method, imports could 
be financed in different ways. Assets are imported either for end-use or re-sale 
purposes. In case of asset acquisition for end-use purposes, credit purchase 
on the basis of the mark-up principle is the only capable means to avoid 
interest-based credit. 
, -, - -- . 
7.4.3.3 Istisna. * Deferred Trade In Skill-Asset Combinations 
International producers, on account of their investments in research and 
development accumulate comparative advantages in technical skills, product 
design's and techniques etc. Since, investment in these resources have already 
been made, the enterprises have the opportunity to expand their revenues by 
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selling these resources through various means. Countries like Pakistan, in 
certain cases have to prefer the acquisition of these resources, produce 
internally instead of importing. The reasons for preferring such acquisitions is 
diverse. Some of these reasons are mentioned in course of the following 
discussion. 
The Istisna' Contract and its Relevance 
Deferred transactions involving skills can be put in the broader 
framework of istisna' (translated by some as contract of manufacture, ). Istisna, 
is'. defined as, "A contract through which the immediate purchase of something 
subject to manufacturing is effected. The manufacturer takes the responsibility 
to manufacture the object using his own material and subject to specifications 
for a specified price and deliver it during a specified time"2. The potential of this 
contract in financing projects in the contemporary Islamic world are 
encouraging. There are a number of ways of utilizing this contract for mobilizing 
external resources. 
Banks as Contractors: It is common to suggest that the banks will 
directly take istisna' contracts from the promoters, construct the projects and 
hand over according to their mutual agreement. Direct implementation may be 
an effective way of utilizing the contract. But, the Islamic financial institutions 
are specialized in financing rather than building projects, therefore, will hesitate 
to opt for such an arrangement. As such, the prospects of direct utilization of 
the contract by the Islamic banks is limited. 
Islamic banks can however play a crucial role in financing the 
istisna' , projects. In this case, the promoters will undertake all the necessary 
ground, work: undertake technical and financial feasibility studies, collect 
competitive bidding from competent constructors, decide on the total cost of 
'See; Nabil Saleh, Unlawful -gain and legitimate profit in Islamic law. Riba, gharar and Islamic 
banking, Second, edition, London: Graham & Trotman, 1989. 
2Mustafa Zarqa, The Istisna' Contract, paper presented at the IRTI Lecture Series of Eminent 
Sharia'h Scholars, held in IRTI, during Ramadhan 1414H. (Translated from Arabic). 
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the project and then approach the banks for finance. Suppose, the cost of a 
project on the basis of competitive bidding has been determined to be'200 
million dollars. The promoters sign the contract with the constructors and then 
approach the financiers to buy the project for them for, say 250 million dollars, 
the price to be paid in installments. 
This last possibility creates a trilateral relationship (promoters, 
contractors, financiers) and assigns responsibilities on the basis of 
specialization, thus could be convenient to the financiers compared to the first 
option. This option could also be more efficient because of the specialized work 
of , the contractors. However, acceptance of this requires that a more 
fundamental question must be answered: Can an istisna' contract be traded 
before its completion? If the Islamic financial institutions have to finance the 
istisna'-based investments, this question needs to be answered. 
A Comparison Between Salarn and Istisna' 
No discussion on this specific question is available in the literature. 
However, a similar question has been discussed in context of the salam 
contract. Apart from the Hanafi scholars (who, reportedly, do not consider 
istisnp' as binding, thus do not object to delaying the price in the istisna' 
contract) most other scholars, consider istisna' as binding and as a special 
case of the salam contract; the price must be paid in advance (see, Zarqa itýM. 
Thu 
'sa 
close comparison between the two contracts is useful and in order. 
I Hamad (1994) reports that including the Hanafi scholars, most other 
scholars do not consider the sale of an object of salam (practically, the salam 
contract) before taking possession of the good as lawful. Nevertheless, we also 
have important exceptions. Maliki researchers along with Ibn Taimiyyah and 
Ibn al Qayyim, consider the sale of the object of salam as a valid transaction. 
Ibn al Qayyirn is reported to allow such a sale even to the party which has 
undertaken the responsibility of supplying the good. Whereas, the permission 
of the Maliki scholars is restricted to non-food items only (see, Omar 1991). 
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. To benefit from the 
flexibility of the last group of scholars, we suggest to 
extend the analogy of salam to istisna'. For this purpose, it is important to 
highlight major economic differences between the salam and istisna' contracts. 
it is important to note that perceptions towards risk and its implications matter 
differently to different people. The above mentioned difference of opinion is 
merely an example of this difference in human perception about risk. The 
unde I rlying risks of the two contracts can be compared to some extent. 
I-I First, istisna' is used for supplying by production of such commodities 
whose qualitative and physical features are controllable by the supplier's 
efforts; such as production and supply of shoes, clothing, carpets, crafts, 
jewelry, or any of the modern means of production like, industrial plants etc. 
The features of the object must be specifically mentioned by the orderer. For 
example, a shoe factory might already be producing shoes for the market. 
Shoes having the general features of the product produced for the market 
cannot be the object of istisna'. Only specially designed shoes, which are not in 
the market, if ordered by a buyer will be the object of istisna. 
'The specially designed goods may also be sold in the market. But the 
Jact that the manufacturer has not produced the product for the market may be 
due to several reasons. There is a possibility that the manufacturer did not get 
the idea related to the design of the product, which may itself involve research 
, expenditure; 
the manufacturer had an idea about the design but considered 
that it has no 
* 
market; the manufacturer may already be manufactudng the 
object but due to high costs, only on the basis of orders, the manufacturer may 
be considering that the object has good market, but its production requires 
finance, guarantees and other institutional support etc. So, there are several 
factors due to which certain objects can only be produced on order. 
Whereas, salam is used for the supply of commodities whose' qualitative 
, and physical features are not fully in the control of the supplier such as 
agricultural commodities, goods already being produced or manufactured for 
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the market using known processes such as wheat, tomatoes, tomato pastes, 
jewelry, clothes, shoes, cars etc. 
As agricultural commodities cannot be identified with unique features 
which can be controlled by the producer, these cannot be the object of istisnal. 
Thus all such commodities the control of whose features is either not required 
or not, possible, are the object of salam. As all agricultural commodities are 
subject to natural calamities, the salam contract in these commodities is also 
exposed to these risks. On the other hand, the production condition of non- 
agr. icultural commodities is relatively more controllable by human efforts. Thus 
salam in agricultural commodities is more riskier than salam in non-agricultural 
commodities. Moreover, as istisna' is not related to production of agricultural 
commodities, it is a less riskier contract compared to salam contract. Therefore, 
the sale of the object of istisna' prior to taking its control may be seen even 
more favorably by those who agree with Ibn Taimiyyah, Ibn al Qayyirn and the 
Maliki, scholars, regarding their acceptance of selling the object of salam prior 
to taking its control. 
Third, except for the Hanafi scholars, who do not object to delaying the 
payment of price in the istisna' contract; majority of scholars, favor advance 
payment, of the price. The Hanafi position has the advantage of making the 
istisna' contract as a mode of project financing. Countries like Pakistan cannot 
make-advance payments. If the Hanafi position is adopted, projects can be 
established and the payment can be delayed for latter days. As projects 
become operational, the price can be paid from the revenues of these projects. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty is that the permission of delaying the price is 
due to the fact that the respective scholars do not consider istisna'as a binding 
contract. The orderer has the option to take charge of the manufactured 
produ 
, 
ct or. decline it. This is practically not possible in the modern times. For 
example, Pakistan orders a foreign contractor for the establishment of a 
m6n'ufacturing project in the country. The foreign contractor will never accept a 
condition which bestows a veto power to Pakistan to accept or reject the 
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p, roject once it is established. Even, if the specifications are not fully met, such 
a project cannot be dismantled or removed and taken away after its 
establishment. As such projects are irreversible, they require binding orders. 
Fortunately, we do have an intermediate approach too. Reportedly Abu 
Yousuf follows his teacher Abu Hanifa as for delaying the price, but goes along 
the rest as for the binding nature of the contract is concerned (see, Zarqa ! bid). 
This sounds an efficient course of action. 
First, delaying the payment of price till inspection of the object can be 
helpful in enforcing the specifications of the contract. If specifications are found 
to be met fully, the price will be paid as contractually agreed. The producer will 
have the thread-based incentive to keep control on quality as contractually 
agreed. 
Second, delaying the price also creates efficiency in the sense that if 
specified qualities were not met, the parties can re-negotiate on the price and 
the product will not be refused for qualitative reasons. Moreover, the contract, 
particularly, in the contemporary context can serve as a mode of financing by 
delaying the payment of the price. 
Finally, capital importing countries like Pakistan will no doubt prefer 
delayed payments, but the supplier of projects, for several reasons frequently 
ask for at least partial payment of the price in advance. Thus, in general, we 
must, expect that there would be a financial constraint on implementing an 
istisna'- contract. This implies that the istisna' contract will by itself need 
financing. This partially reverts to the more rigid position which calls for making 
advance payments which has beneficial implications. 
7.4.3.4 Modem Variants of Istisna' 
Despite the financial limitations, the istisna' contract has a great 
potential for the mobilization of external resources for a country like Pakistan. 
However, within the framework of contemporary islamic financing, the Practical 
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I 
experience with the contract is very limited. Nevertheless, some possible 
variants of the contract are being used in a number of developing countries, 
including some Muslim countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Algeria etc. 
(see, exhibit 2 for the description of these variants). These experiences are 
discu'ssed in the following with an emphasis on their relevance for interest-free 
external resource mobilization. 
It is possible that certain projects may not be suitable for direct 
investment. This may be either due to the fact that the government does not 
want a permanent ownership of certain projects by the foreigners. Or it may 
also be due to the fact that certain projects though crucial for home countries 
are simply not attractive for foreign investors. These considerations will create 
a number of different scenarios as far the istisna' contract is concerned. 
Istisna': Modern Variant -1 
Jhe host country places an order on a basis of a pure istisna' contract. 
The , contractor will build the project according to specifications and the 
payments will be made as agreed, most likely, in installments to be completed 
till a few years after completion of order. Some payments will even be made 
along with the order. This is popularly known in many countries as a turnkey 
contract. 
A turnkey contract is an arrangement whereby a foreign party involves in 
a contractual investment in the host country for the construction of a project. 
The constructor becomes responsible to build the project, make it operational 
and turn-over the ownership of the project to the host party. The contract may 
also specify the responsibility of the contractor for some preliminary training to 
the local party to operate the project. 
Where this pure istisna'contract can be utilized for the construction of all 
types of projects, the best candidates are however, projects which do not 
generate substantial revenues. Therefore, despite their economic needs, the 
projects are not feasible financially. Or projects, whose ownership needs to be 
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transferred soon. These are usually, buildings, roads, bridges, airports, 
seaports, and similar other projects. 
Istisna': Modern Variant -2 
In this case, host parties may be interested in the establishment of the 
projects, but not interested in getting ownership soon. This may happen due to 
a'number of reasons. The hosts may try to lure foreign investors by offering 
permanent ownership of projects. The host may consider to control quality of 
projects in a longer-run scenario. The host country is not capable to take the 
administrative and managerial control of the project due to technical or financial 
reasbns, etc. 
In this case, the foreign investors may not be willing to undertake the 
project, unless, the market for the output of the project is ascertained. Thus, to 
benefit from the external economies of the project, the host will have to 
consider to purchase the output of the project at a price acceptable to the 
investors. In this case, the istisna' contract is undertaken to support the market 
of 
-the 
specific project. In addition, to the price support, the contract may further 
be made attractive for the investors, by allowing them an exit window. After the 
completion of the project, whenever they desire, the investors shall be able to 
sell their stakes and leave the project. 
,., One special variant of this istisna' contract, known as built-operate- 
transfer (BOT) is also popular in the projects mentioned above. The important 
terms-and conditions of the BOT contract are the public sector guarantees to 
purchase: i) the product of the project and ii) the project itself, whenever so 
desired by the contractor (s). If the host desires the contractors to sell their 
interest, it may have such options specified in the contract. 
Istisna. Modern Variant -3 
'',: 'Another special case of istisna' contract is known as prod uction-in-hand 
contract and is more applied in the manufacturing sector. in certain cases it is 
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required that not only the project be developed on the istisna, basis, but the 
constructors should also develop local technicians and management to take 
over the control of the project at a time when the project reaches a production 
stage as specified by the contract. In this way, the foreign investor takes the 
risk of making the project successful in the hands of the local manpower. The 
contractor "undertakes to deliver on a commercial basis and within a set time, a 
produ ction unit that has produced a specified result -a given quantity and 
quality of output, with a minimum amount of local managerial staff. It, in fact, 
a- ssumes all the investors responsibilities with regard to the smooth running of 
a project up to the planned cruising speed"' 
,,. Istisna': 
Modern Variant -4 
. 
Another important case of the istisna' contract will emerge, if the orderer 
specifies, the choice of input and the location of the project. In certain cases 
suppliers of goods are required to either manufacture components of the goods 
locally, or purchase the components from a local producers, or/and assemble 
the goods locally. Most defense productions are suitable candidates for such 
arrangements known as offset contracts. 
Istisna': Modern Variant -5 
Countries like Pakistan where labor, raw material and utilities are 
cheaper compared 
. 
to the developed countries as well as the newly 
industrializing countries, can also acquire orders on the basis of istisna' 
particularly, for the production of components through international sub- 
contracting. Since the acquirers of the products would be relatively capital 
abundant industrialized or newly industrialized countries, they may even make 
advance payments. Even if the payment is made in the future, the investments 
will generate employment, and enhance future export earnings. According to 
UýIDO, "A sub-contracting relationship exists when a firm (the principal) places 
an order with another firm (the sub-contractor) for the manufacture of parts, 
See Abdullah (1984) p 19. 
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components, sub-assemblies or assemblies to be incorporated into a product 
which the principal will sell. Such orders may include the treatment, processing 
or finishing of materials or parts by the subcontractor at the principal's 
request"'. 
The principle of sub-contracting has several important implications for 
organizing production and services in the domestic as well as the external 
sectors of the developing economies. The process of organization may 
generally take any of the following forms: i) Pure form of international sub- 
contracting takes place between independent units located in different 
countries for the manufacturing of finished products either via the sub. 
contractor or directly by the principal, ii) Within border sub-contracting takes 
place between a subsidiary of a multinational and a local firm, both of the two 
units are located in the same country for the production of either finished goods 
(commercial sub-contracting) of components (industrial sub-contracting) and iii) 
SUb-contracting may take place between the subsidiaries of multinationals 
loc Ia ted in the same country or in different countries for finished products or for 
components. 
The idea of sub-contracting can also be used in another sense. An 
Islamic'bank may undertake to supply projects on istisna' basis. Since, the 
bank is not a constructor, it will appoint sub-contractors. However, the bank will 
remain responsible for meeting the conditions of the contract with the buyers of 
the projects. 
Proxy Istisna Variant -6 
The Council of Islamic Ideology had suggested investment auctioning as 
a new mode of project financing. Under this scheme, the private sector or 
'': ,I 
consortium of commercial banks was suggested to establish industrial projects, 
run and make them successful and then sell these projects to the highest 
bidders. The price could be paid in installments. 
See Germidis (1980). 
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However, the details of this proposal were never worked out, If the 
projects have to be developed on the basis of orders from public sector or 
private parties, the contracts would include conditions which will make this 
arrangement similar to the arrangements discussed above. Without orders and 
pI roper guarantees, in general, it is hard to expect that such projects will be 
developed with the objective of selling their ownership on installments. 
Therefore, for all practical purposes, if implemented, this proposal will take any 
of the above discussed forms. 
" Modern Variants of Istisna': Related Considerations 
,. 
Another matter which deserves consideration is the importance of trade 
marks, patents and copy-rights which emerge out of the investments in 
research and development, innovations and entrepreneurial risk taking. The 
design and specifications which an orderer may place, may be the result of 
research findings on which he has already invested resources. Once the order 
is placed with specifications, the manufacturer virtually controls the innovations 
underlying the design. The orderer bears the entrepreneurial risk for the new 
design, whereas, the manufacturer controls the design. In the international 
context, these are important considerations. This could lead to disputes and 
other situations which are disliked by the sharfah. 
Such problems could be overcome by selling the patents, copy rights 
and brand names as is done in the international franchises. In the international 
business, the franchisee uses brand names, trade marks, patents, etc. and 
engages in the production, exchange and use of the goods or services of the 
franchiser. In return, the user pays either fees or a part of the profit generated 
from the business to the grantor of the franchise as stipulated in the contract. 
These" consid e ration can be incorporated in the contract, while negotiating the 
price of the contract. 
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7.43.5 Pros and Cons Of Modem Variants of Istisna' 
For any recipient country, there are obvious advantages and 
disadvantages of the above mentioned variants of istisna'. The obvious 
advantages are: 
i) Private interests are associated with projects which used to be 
traditional concern of the public sector. This could ensure better 
operation of he enterprises, 
ii) The involvement of the public sector in economic activities is reduced 
to a supervisory role, economizing resources of the public sector 
which is crucial to curtail the public debt, 
iii) These schemes compromise between the considerations of host and 
foreign parties regarding the optimal control of ownership, 
iv) The transfer of technology becomes more systematic and smooth, 
v) The projects contribute to net capital formation without resort to 
foreign aid and other interest-based financing, 
vi) Cash flows of the economy gets improved, as substantial current 
funds can be relieved and future export earnings will be enhanced, 
vii) These arrangements create debt, but the servicing of this debt is 
much easier as the projects are certain to generate income, and 
viii) Certain aspects of risk-sharing between local and foreign parties is 
inherent in these arrangements. 
On the other hand, the recipients of projects need to become careful 
about a number of problems related to these projects: Which often include, 
i) Many countries have experienced that, in general, international 
contractors specify designs with specific import requirements 
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particularly, in terms of capital and skill intensities. The general 
framework of the designs of the projects are kept the same 
irrespective of the climatic, geographical and economic realities of 
different countries and regions. Seldom the project designers take 
into account local realities. Consequently, the projects prove to be 
unsuitable in many cases, 
ii) In general, these arrangements are unique in the sense that during 
the design and construction phases of projects, local parties are not 
involved. When the project reaches the operational stage, the actual 
constructors leave the projects. As a result, achieving proper 
operation of the projects and their maintenance becomes a real 
problem. To overcome this difficulty, a management contract is 
signed by the two parties, incurring additional costs but without 
solving the basic problems, 
iii) Other negative aspects are related to the regulation of the so-called 
priority sectors, and imperfections created as a result of incentives 
policies, 
iv) The obligation of the foreign party often ends with an inconvenience 
for the respective projects in terms of operational and maintenance 
difficulties, 
v) many. problems on the operational side of these arrangements are 
related to performance requirements, guarantees and bargaining 
strengths of the contracting parties. In general, foreign firms are 
reluctant to performance obligations. They do not provide guarantee 
of their performance. Guarantees usually range from 5- 10 percent 
of the value of the contract which does not match any mishaps in the 
project. In some cases it may even mean complete project failure. 
Yet, in most negotiations the foreign firms always keep an upper 
hand. 
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For the foreign contracting parties, the schemes have again several 
clear advantages. These advantages are related to the sale of technology, and 
entrepreneurial services as well as profits from the operation of the projects. 
The foreign firms which undertake to establish the production relationship 
enjoys the independence in decision making. The decision of purchasing the 
products and projects by the local authorities if and when taken with mutual 
understanding, protects the foreign party against many apprehensions. 
However, the contractors could have many apprehensions too. Their 
fears could relate to transfer risks, pricing of the output of projects, contract 
frustration caused by sovereign position of governments and expropriation etc. 
From the contractor's point of view, the prevailing national, regional or 
international guarantee facilities do not give sufficient coverage to these 
important investment activities. So, in situations of calamities or any other wide 
ranging threat to the projects, responsibilities for risk are disproportionately 
borne by the contractor. 
How to Finance an Istisna' Contract? 
As delayed payment of obligations enhances cash flows of -the recipient, 
it is beneficial for an acquirer of assets (importer) to bargain for a longer 
maturity structure for the payment of its obligations. Similarly, an advance 
payment for the country's exports will also enhance its present cash flows. A 
typical example of such flows is the advance payment of a consortium of some 
Islamic banks for the Pakistani rice and cotton. Thus, Islamically acceptable 
finance only takes the form of deferred sale, more exactly, deferred payment 
and deferred delivery, respectively in the two cases. Consequently, for the 
acquisition of assets for end-use purposes, irrespective of whether investment 
or consumption, as importer of goods and services, in the final analysis, 
Pakistan's options for external resource mobilization are restricted to purchase 
with delayed payments. However, as briefly discussed above, these 
arrangements can provide a comprehensive framework for interest-free 
investment financing. 
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How the istisna' contracts could be financed remains to be an important 
consideration. When the mark-up based Islamic financing was initiated, a client 
and a financier dealt with each other on a one to one correspondence. Then 
t he concept was developed into syndicated installment sale, leasing and 
murabahah, in which several financiers jointly finance one client on the basis of 
the mark-up by sharing the cost plus according to the proportion of the finance 
provided by them. With the same logic, numerous financiers can come together 
to provide the murabahah finance and share the mark-up in accordance with 
their contribution of finance. Each financier will hold a certificate of debt say, 
$106 ($100 principal finance and $6 as the mark-up) to be redeemed, say, in 
five years. 
These certificates can only be redeemed not traded. However, it may be 
declared by the promoters of the project that during a certain period, the 
certificates can be converted into common stock of the project if so desired by 
their holders. With the conversion possibility, these debt certificates would 
represent some form of convertible warrants as used in many developed 
countries. 
7.4.3.6 Acquisition of Skill-Asset Combinations by Participation 
Incorporation of an ownership stake for the foreign suppliers in the 
above mentioned arrangements will enhance efficiency of the projects. Foreign 
suppliers may be offered to share in the output or profits of the respective 
projects with a' declining nature of participation instead of the deferred sale 
mechanism. Accordingly, on the orders of the host party a foreign investor 
establishes an industrial facility in the host country as a joint venture. Profits or 
oI utput could be shared on pro rata basis. Moreover, the host undertakes to 
gradually buy the ownership share of the foreign party in the project. 
. In addition to traditional forms of durable assets (land in muzara' and 
trees in musaqa) new forms of durable (rentable) assets can also be given 
over on the basis of output or revenue sharing. Ibn Taimyyah, is reported to 
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have preferred such an arrangement over renting on the basis of equity. In a 
broader sense, the gross income (output /revenue) sharing arrangement could 
thus be used for the utilization of all possible real assets, in addition to land and 
plantations'. 
Output Sharing: Modem Variant -I 
In the development of natural resources, particularly, oil, and other 
precious commodities, the production sharing arrangement has been widely 
used. In this arrangement, the foreign party shares in the production of the 
project rather than the profits. In context of Pakistan, exploration of oil, coal, 
niineral resources and agro-business are good candidates for outright 
production sharing. 
A major operational problem in production sharing arises due to risks 
associated with the sale of output which effects supply, prices and ultimately 
revenues. Thus, the amount of production under this contract becomes a 
sensitive issue in the relationship of the two parties. These sensitivities are only 
a matter of negotiation and identifications of contractual responsibilities. 
Output Sharing: Modem Variant -2 
As production sharing is related to commodity producing sectors, 
revenue sharing is relevant to public utility generating projects, such as roads, 
bridges, energy, telecommunications, airports, sea ports etc. These sectors 
generate revenues, which can be shared by local and foreign parties. 
I- In this regard, the Turkish experience is worth exploration. Since 1986, 
Turkey is using the concept of revenue sharing bonds to mobilize resources for 
the Public Participation Fund (PPF). Through the mechanism of Revenue 
Sharing Bonds (RSB), the private sector participates in infrastructural services 
such as bridges, dams, power plants, highways, telecommunication etc. The 
proceeds of the RSBs are not guaranteed but are calculated annually on the 
I Siddiqi (1991) and al Masri (1986). 
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basis of the revenues accrued to these infrastructural projects. The concept of 
the- RSB could have long lasting contribution to the socio-economic 
development in countries like Pakistan, and Turkey which have marketable and 
large publicly owned infrastructural projects. 
In Pakistan, the financial resources to be allocated to the infrastructural 
sector can be enhanced by privatizing at least partially some of the 
infrastructural projects including perhaps seaports, civil airports, major 
highways, bridges, irrigation channels and other revenue generating projects. 
The outstanding debt on Pakistan has partially been created by these 
infrastructural projects. The revenue generated by such privatization schemes 
can be partly used to retire the outstanding debt and partly for avoiding 
additional borrowing for the development of infrastructural projects. This will 
also have a sustained positive effect on the overall economy. 
The incorporation of private interests in the projects will also introduce a 
discipline on the utilization of funds in more rigorous cost effective manner. 
This will ensure avoidance of problems associated with cost over-runs 
particularly, of the huge infrastructural projects and quick improvement in the 
highly needed infrastructural services. The overall competitiveness of the 
national economy will improve. 
In addition to these inherent advantages of the scheme, it is flexible for 
policy changes. to suit different objectives of national economic policies. For 
example, in Turkey, part of the revenues from the RSBs are invested in the 
remote parts of the country in labor intensive schemes. The funds can also be 
spread out with public funds, thus can have efficiency effects on such public 
funds. Therefore, the general validity of the RSB scheme for economies where 
infrastructural facilities are underdeveloped is obvious. However, it may take 
perhaps many years of familiarization before the lesser developed economies 
are convinced to implement similar initiatives. It also seems to be linked to a 
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reasonably developed capital market as well as a responsive private sector to 
make the scheme more successful. 
Output Sharing: Modem Variant -3 
Supplier of equipments can also provide them with the contractual 
agreement that a part of the production generated with the use of the particular 
equipment will be apportioned for the supplier. The receiving party uses the 
equipment for specific production purposes determined by the contract. 
Pakistan can consider contracting with manufactures to install plants in 
Pakistan on the basis of this arrangement. As an example, we may mention the 
huge market inside Pakistan and its surrounding countries for automobiles and 
personal computers. The foreign manufacturers can produce in Pakistan, share 
output and market it into the Central Asian countries. 
This arrangement has several advantages for both parties. For the 
foreign party, it is a form of investment in the sale of equipment. The supplier of 
the equipment expects that on one hand he can market his technology and 
machinery and on the other hand, he can receive the production of his choice. 
The portion of the production brings him several advantages over other forms 
of investments. For example, he shares the advantages of low cost production 
in producing in a country abundant with raw material without being involved in 
any economic and political sensitivities. Economic as well as non economic 
risks associated with direct investment are thus minimized. 
For Pakistan, the contract serves the function of risk finance. The 
supplier shares the risks involved in the process of production, technology is 
effectively transferred, and the problem of foreign marketing is overcome to 
certain extent. It is obvious that the buyback arrangement does not entail any 
significant amount of secondary finance as is the case with many other types of 
contractual investment relations. 
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Output Sharing: Related Considerations 
In production sharing contracts three major risks are involved and 
shared commonly by the two parties: i) Uncertainties regarding recoverable 
reserves, ii) The price of the commodity (mostly oil and other minerals) in 
international markets; and iii) The operating costs of the field. Risk sharing 
would, therefore, relate to any of these or other risks specifically or all of them 
in common. There may be a formal contractual arrangement, "in which the 
contractor is paid some multiple of the costs it has incurred, if a commercial 
field is discovered. However, the concept can also be extended to a payment 
of a fixed fee per barrel (unit) or even a share of the value of the oil (product) 
produced"I. 
A risk sharing contract is mostly used in the mining sector. One form of 
the risk sharing contract for example, would be payment of foreign firms' 
shares not in kind but in cash, where another form of the contract may be the 
guarantee provided by the foreign partner of the contract to sell a part of the 
product at an agreed price. In the previous case, the local party of the contract 
takes the risk of selling the output where in the latter case the foreign partner 
takes up this responsibility. In some contracts the case of risk sharing may be 
even more different. The foreign firm sinks its resources into the exploration 
process risking the failure of the project. All the costs of production would then 
be received back through the revenues of the project. 
74.3.7 Musharakah Joint Ventures 
Pakistan has to exploit the accumulated experience of its well developed 
specialized institutions, namely the national development financing and 
investment promotion institutions, skills in contracting and building, experience 
of trading corporations etc., for venturing into inward and outward oriented joint 
ventures and various types of istisnacontracts as highlighted above. 
Lessard (1986). 
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As external resource mobilization involves the process of facilitating 
local requirements and external financial, entrepreneurial and technological 
resources, both equity as well as contractual joint ventures are an effective 
source of encouraging the inflow of foreign investment. Pakistan has a 
reasonable experience of some public sector equity joint venture with Saudi 
Arabia and some other Muslim countries. As these joint ventures are being 
privatized, establishment of similar joint ventures in the financial and non- 
financial private sector is being encouraged by Pakistan. 
It may be noted that the degree of industrial specialization in Pakistan is 
considerably high. The organization of investment projects by local managers 
and entrepreneurs is possible compared to other developing countries. 
However, proper institutional support also needs to be provided by the 
government in order to bring together local resources, foreign capital and 
technology. 
It can be noted that foreign capital can be provided by multilateral 
organizations, Islamic banks, other institutional and private investors. 
Technology can only be provided by multinational corporations. Whereas, 
local organizations such as national development financing institutions (NDFIs) 
can play a crucial role to intermediate between local investment opportunities 
and external resources. Thus in most cases, a trilateral joint venture between, 
a) NDFI representing local parties, b) foreign financiers and c) Multinational 
corporations aý suppliers of technology would be an effective organizational 
form. 
7.4.3.8 Foreign Direct Investment 
For attracting foreign direct investment, Pakistan is directly competing 
with China and India. Pakistan, has however, recently offered maximum 
incentives to foreign investment in the energy sector, including power 
generation, exploration of coal and natural gas and related production. The 
present government has signed memorandum of understanding with foreign 
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investors for about US dollars 20 billion. Most of these projects are expected to 
be completed by the year 2000. Even if half of these targets are achieved, 
there would be an additional average annual inflow of foreign direct investment 
in the power sector of US dollars 2 billion for the period. If the expected 1 billion 
dollar net inflow for the year 1995 is maintained, the year 2000, Pakistan's 
average net inflows would reach US dollars 3 billion on yearly basis which 
would be an increase of 400% over the 1990 period. 
Apart from the energy sector flows, Pakistan's prospects to attract FDI 
are bright in general. However, in an FDI vis-2t-vis istisna' scenario, one needs 
to look at the implication of the political rhetoric of "the country being sold" and 
the associated sentimental opposition to FDI and its impact on investors' 
confidence in a longer term perspective. With this consideration in view, istisna' 
is superior to FDI as it does not lead to foreign control of national resources. 
Similarly, a joint venture with declining foreign participation would also alleviate 
the fears of foreign control and improve the investment climate. 
We therefore, understand that by incorporating these consideration in 
the investment policy, the climate for foreign investment can be improved. This 
will imply that the foreign investment should be based on istisna' whenever 
possible and in most cases the possibility of a systematic exit for foreign 
investors from projects must be provided. This will alleviate the pressure of the 
opposition to foreign investment and enhance mutual confidence between 
home and host parties. 
7.4.3.9 Financial Instruments 
Mudharabah (PLS) bank deposits and certificates the two prime Islamic 
financial instruments. A number of factors are expected to strengthen the 
demand for PLS deposits. In a recent supplement on Islamic banking the Wall 
Street Joumal estimated that during the next ten years 50% of savings of the 
Muslim people (which at the present is estimated about 100 billion US dollars) 
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will be handled by Islamic banks'. A number of factors are expected to support 
the market for mudharabah-based financial instruments. Foremost important 
among these is the fact that the general awareness about the Islamic 
requirements for investment has been growing for more than three decades. 
Moreover, due to the revolutionary break through in the field of technology, 
information about investment opportunities is becoming more easily accessible. 
These developments are conducive for an investment environment 
where investors do not like to involve in the management of the enterprises. To 
attract the potential demand, the general principle of mudharabah financing 
(i. e., separation of management and control of ownership) could therefore be 
effectively utilized. 
PLS Foreign Currency Accounts 
PLS foreign currency accounts offer a potential source Ao attract the 
savings of a large segment of expatriate investors. The only foreign currency 
account (FCA) offered now is interest bearing. The return on this account 
reflects LIBOR plus a little margin guaranteed by the banks which are mostly 
public sector enterprises. Ironically, Pakistan does not offer foreign currency 
PLS accounts to attract the savings of the Islamically conscious investors. 
The PLS accounts are not new for Pakistan. Pakistani banks have 
acquired experience in the operation of these accounts. If PLS FCAs are 
introduced,. it is expected that a large number of non-resident Pakistani 
investors and non-Pakistani investors who avoid interest will also be attracted 
from the Gulf region and other countries. 
Modaraba Certificates 
Modaraba Certificate is another Islamic financial instrument issued by 
Modaraba companies since 1984. At the present, there are over 52 companies 
with a total subscribed capital of about 9 billion rupees listed in the local stock 
I See Wall Street Journal April 9,1996). 
323 
markets. However, the Modaraba as a sector is under tremendous market 
pressure and has lost substantial value during the past three years'. 
One of the serious problems of the Modaraba companies has remained 
their relative disadvantageous position as compared to their competitors in 
terms of availability of liquidity. Leasing companies and banks compete with 
the Modaraba companies in the business line. But leasing companies have 
been mobilizing funds thorough certificates of investment as well as from the 
sources of conventional credit. Banks have also been using their resources in 
competing with Modaraba companies in the leasing business. However, till 
recently, the Modaraba companies have been relying on only one instrument: 
the Modaraba certificates. 
There Modaraba certificates have two primary limitations. First, these 
are non-voting but non-preference shares. Obviously, as compared to both the 
common and preference stock of other companies these certificates are inferior 
assets. Second, these are part of the permanent capital of the companies and 
cannot take care for the function of temporary capital of the companies. 
Perhaps, due to these limitations some financial innovation has been 
introduced in the Modaraba companies, namely, a) International Finance 
Corporation's Income Notes (IFC-INs), b) Mushar-akah Certificates and c) 
Redeemable Musharakah Certificates (RMCs). The musharakah certificates 
are an equivalent of the common stock of other companies. The IFC-INs are 
equivalent to redeemable preference shares with conversion options. Whereas, 
RMCs could be compared with the defunct participation term certificates. 
The fundamental problems of the companies is however related to their 
dominant asset i. e., Modaraba certificates. The new arrangements are steps in 
the right direction, but cannot solve the problem of the Modaraba certificates as 
dominant assets of the companies. To overcome the problem of these assets 
I For a comprehensive study of the sector see Khan (1996). 
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these should be brought at par either with common or preference stocks of 
other companies. 
More, most companies manage their assets in the trading and leasing 
activities. This has put these companies at a relatively disadvantageous 
position compared to the more specialized leasing and trade financing 
institutions. The exercise is however, one of a success. These institutions can 
be vitalized by appropriate policies including easing the burden of double 
regulation by the Corporate Law Authority and the State Bank of Pakistan and 
by providing appropriate tax structure. 
In addition, the activities of the companies need to be diversified. There 
is a potential to establish capital market Islamic funds to lure Islamic investors 
from outside Pakistan to invest in the country's stock markets. At the present, 
no such facilities are available. The activities of the Investment Corporation of 
Pakistan (ICP) are seen by many investors suspiciously. The portfolio of all the 
ICP issues are two liberal as the ICP remains indifferent with respect to the 
capital structure and business activities of companies while selecting their 
stocks. Islamic unit investment funds can cater to this genuine demand of the 
investors. 
I Another potential area for the expansion of the activities of these 
companies is the area of syndicated financing. Syndicated Islamic trade 
financing, installment sale, and leasing are being practiced by the Islamic 
banks for a number of years. In fact, Pakistan has benefited from this type of 
Islamic financing to market rice and cotton as well as procuring assets for some 
energy sector projects. However, the mudharabah companies have not been 
involved to any significant extend in such financing activities. A working 
relationship between these companies and Islamic banks can contribute to the 
enhancement of inflow of foreign capital. 
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New Sources of Resources 
The mudharabah companies are mostly relying on shareholder's equity. 
These companies have the potential to expand their activities and return on 
equity by opting for installment purchase to finance their trading and leasing 
operations. Such financing may be readily available with the Islamic banks 
which are looking for investment opportunities. 
The mark-up mechanism has so far been utilized by the Islamic financial 
institutions for asset management. The use of the mark-up principle in resource 
mobilization is not common. Initially, the Islamic financial institutions had an 
excess liquidity problem. Therefore, the need for mobilizing additional 
resources was not an urging matter. But, financial as well as non-financial 
enterprises always require additional funds for expanding their operations and 
enhance their rate of return on equity. - 
The mark-up is irrelevant for deposit mobilization, because, the Islamic 
law does not recognize money as an object of sale. Individuals, households 
and firms need money not for its own sake, but for the fact that money enables 
its holder to have a command on goods and services. In this way money plays 
a crucial role in the market economy. To play this role efficiently, money has to 
be neutral between goods and services and not compete with them as an 
object of sale. If money changes its neutral role and starts to play the role of an 
object of sale like goods and services, markets will loose their efficiency and 
consequently the society will suffer. 
Trading in money for money, is thus prohibited in Islam. Interest-based 
deposit mobilization, in fact implies that the depositor sells his current amount 
of money on deferred basis to receive a higher amount in the future - with 10% 
annual rate of interest, a dollar deposit is sold now, for 1.10 dollars a year from 
now! This constitutes riba. For this reason (for the prohibition of sale of money 
for money), the mark-up is entirely irrelevant for deposit mobilization. 
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However, deposit mobilization is not the only source of resource 
mobilization. As mark-up based financiers, Modaraba Companies and other 
Islamic financial and non-financial institutions acquire ownership of assets and 
then lease or sell these on installment basis to their clients. In all cases, the 
these institutions pay to the sellers of these assets in lump sum, but they 
receive from their clients on installments. This must cause a mismatch in the 
two sides of the balance sheet as well as impose a cash flow constraint on the 
operations of these institutions. 
The liabilities of Modaraba Companies at the present comprise only of 
permanent equity (share-holders' capital and Modaraba certificates). In this 
way, these are 100% equity-based. Similar is the case with Islamic banks. As a 
matter of fact, the conceptual foundations for resource mobilization through 
deferred purchase are yet to be developed. 
Even if these institutions can adopt a policy of 20% mark-up based 
leverage, by avoiding up-front and lump-sum payments and resorting to 
installment purchase, they can mobilize substantial resources. The case of 
Islamic institutions is different compared to conventional banks. Islamic 
institutions are involved in deferred trading. The assets financed by them make 
their clients more solvent compared the clients of conventional banks where 
the use of funds is often not possible to monitor. Hence, the assets' side of the 
Islamic institutions is comparatively more stable. Moreover, Islamic institutions 
do not have any fixed obligations on the liability side of their balance sheet at 
the present. Thus, they have a better potential to take the burden of a suitable 
amount of leverage. 
Enhancing Capital Participation 
To attract Islamic investors, Pakistan needs to provide investment 
opportunities in existing enterprises. In this regard the position of the OIC Fiqh 
Academy resolution discouraging investments in enterprises having interest- 
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based assets and liabilities needs to be noted. A three-tier policy is needed to 
promote investment opportunities in the framework of this resolution. 
First, and foremost important matter is the cleansing of interest from the 
capital structure of existing companies. This should be the concern of a 
conscious policy. Since a lot of financial re-structuring is going on in the 
economy, the atmosphere for such a policy is ripe in Pakistan. 
Second, many enterprises may not be having any interest in their capital 
structure such as owner-operated non-listed enterprises. National Development 
Financing Institutions (NDFIs) have the mandate to intermediate between small 
domestic enterprises and international financiers. Larger reliance on 
arrangements like line of equities, line of leasing and installment sale as used 
by the Islamic Development Bank with the NDFI's can enhance investment 
opportunities in this area. 
Finally, a lot of management re-structuring is taking place in the 
framework of the privatization program. This is an opportunity for the Islamic 
investors to come forward and take the management of the enterprises and re- 
structure their capital in terms of Islamic investment requirements. The 
potential of this opportunity needs to be explored. 
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7.4.4 Coping With Risks 
Many risks, thus opportunities are ahead to confront and exploit in the 
process of reducing the reliance on interest-based foreign resources. Some of 
these considerations are mentioned here. 
Debt Management 
The trade-based modes of financing also create debt. Therefore, it may 
be__asked that what difference these will make compared to interest-based 
credits, for the debt profile of the recipient country. The difference between the 
two are several. 
First, the sale-based arrangements transfer physical assets, R&D 
intensive services and technology to the host countries at the initial stages of 
the contract. Logically, therefore, so-called "urgencies" which divert funds 
under debt finance to consumption could not adversely influence resource 
allocation under sale-based finance. 
Second, completion of the payment of deferred price of the equipments, 
consumption goods, research and development intensive services, 
-finalizes 
the 
transfer process of ownership. This could be expected to work as an added 
incentive for the efficient operation of projects'. 
Third, the bias of sale-based finance towards investment is also 
expected to positively contribute to the overall performance of the economy. 
As a result, the issue of debt-default could not matter much in this case. 
Finally, under sale-based arrangements, a greater part of foreign 
liabilities constitute projects equipments or other physical assets. If need may 
arise, ownership of these projects can be sold to amortize the debt. Such is 
ý--"A' essentially not the case under pure debt. Thus, management of debts created 
'Payment of installments, is not necessarily a function of the operation of the projects. Yet, for 
an incentive advantage such an arrangement could be superior. 
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through sale-based finance could be much easier compared to the 
conventional debt financing. 
Contract Enforceability 
The success of any strategy based on the above outlines of the interest- 
free options will depend on how effectively the numerous contracts are going to 
be enforced from the perspective of both Pakistan and external partners. A 
failure of enforcing contracts forcefully has the potential risk to lead to riba and 
gharar. Islamic assigns great importance to fulfilling contractual obligations. 
The maturity of all deferred sale transactions involves time. Therefore, contract 
enforceability becomes a serious risk for both parties, such as sub-standard 
supplies and debt default, respectively, for importers and exports. The rights of 
all parties need to be protected by proper institutional arrangements. 
Debt default is a threat to the interests of the owner of the debts. If it is 
serious, no credit could forth come. As interest-based debt re-shedding is not 
possible, default could be a much serious problem in an interest-free economy 
compared to an interest based economy. However, in accordance with Islamic 
injunctions, the following concepts may be developed to provide institutional 
arrangements to overcome the problem of default. First, if the seller feels that 
by selling on credit he may be exposed to the risk of default (particularly in a 
foreign country), he can ask for a material security as mentioned in the Holy 
Quran. 
In case of default the owner of the debts will recover his money by 
selling the material security (if the market price of the security is higher than the 
debt, the excess amount will be returned to the owner of the security). Second, 
there is a specified share of the indebted persons (alghatimin) in the zakah 
proceeds. If there is a debt default, some part of the zakah proceeds the share 
can be used to compensate the owner of the debts by the government. Third, 
the collection of penalties from the defaulters by the government is possible. 
Although, the proceeds of such penalties cannot be paid to the owners of the 
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debt, yet they can be channeled into a general organization such a the 
government's guarantee organization. Fourth, the transfer of debt from one's 
obligation (dhima) to another person's obligation (i. e., hawalah al dayin) is 
another important consideration with regard to overcoming the default problem. 
Two forms of hawalah al dayin are mentioned in the literature': In the first case 
the debt is in fact transferred from the original debtor to a new debtor (see, also 
the concluding section) and in the second case the debt is not transferred as 
such but a third party guarantees the payment of debt. 
In the same manner, the domestic parties need to be protected against 
possible violation of specifications while supplying equipments, projects etc. 
Specifically due to the deferred nature of deferred sale, a particular level of 
general uncertainty may prevail regarding the quantitative and qualitative 
availability of information to both the parties in relation to the following matters: 
i) the existence of the object of sale and its price, ii) characteristics of the object 
of sale and its price (identification of species, quantities, future performance 
etc., ) and iii) control of the respective parties over the object of sale and its 
price. If excessive, this uncertainty may cause a loss to the buyer and is called 
gharar'. In order to protect the rights of both the two parties of a transaction 
Islam calls for the elimination of such uncertainty by arranging just contractual 
arrangements and their enforcement. 
To overcome these difficulties, the importing countries need to provide 
proper - institutionat arrangements, including guarantees. While, such 
arrangements can be ensured by bilateral agreements. Parties' rights to 
international contracts are also protected by relevant international conventions. 
In addition, the international guarantee facilities such as MIGA and the Islamic 
insurance facility can be utilized to minimize the apprehensions of parties to 
such contracts. 
'See, Saleh ibid. 
2ibld 
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Hedging Against Price Fluctuations 
Changes in international commodity prices, interest-rates and exchange 
rates pose Pakistan a risk on both the current and capital account. LIBOR is 
likely to increase to 6% in 1995 from 4% in 1994. This is linked to the Pakistani 
economy by the rates on the FCDs. To keep the FCDs at par, at least with the 
LIBOR, rates on the FCDs have to be raised to over 6% starting from 1995 
from 4% in 1994. When and if international interest-rates are increased, 
Pakistan's interest services are bound to increase. The most effective way of 
dealing with this situation is to by-pass the market for interest-based markets 
by resorting to interest-free alternatives. 
Even if Pakistan resorts to interest-free alternatives completely, a 
number of risks cannot be ignored. The existing outstanding debt is bound to 
pose challenges, which however, at present does not seem to be a serious 
problem. Most of this debt originates from official development assistance, 
contracted at a fixed interest-rate. An increase in the market interest-rate will 
however, effect Pakistan's private debt liabilities which are around US dollars 2 
billion at present and are likely to increase in the future. These loans Pakistan 
has to avoid by stopping new contracts. Moreover, unless alternatives are 
developed, the new deferred sale contracts will also be based on the 
benchmark of LIBOR. But again, since rescheduling of debts under these 
contracts are not possible, no serious interest-rate risks are foreseen. The 
financiers may confront some risk, but as active players in the market they may 
even benefit from this risk by appropriate hedging. 
As regards exchange-rate risks, Pakistan is not expected to confront 
any serious problems. Pakistan's existing debt is reasonably better kept as far 
currency composition is concerned. Moreover, Pakistan's export earnings are 
also well spread over countries of important currencies. Nevertheless, if the 
new direction of resource mobilization is adopted, Pakistan's hedging position 
could be improved overtime by making it a policy target. The central point of 
332 
this policy target would be to match the inward salam-muajal contracts with 
the outward salam-muaWal contracts. 
In simple terms this implies that for each one dollar worth of inward 
contracts Pakistan must try to build-up a corresponding outward contract, as 
for each one dollar of imports there must a corresponding one dollar of exports. 
Particularly, when liabilities in foreign exchange are deferred, an equivalent 
amount of assets in foreign exchange must be deferred to have a hedge 
against future uncertainties. In the traditional sense, imports are usually 
controlled, but in case of various inward contracts, the government should 
rather attempt to maximize the number of such contracts. The potential for 
Pakistan to export such contracts is also high. Pakistan's national development 
financing institutions, contracting institutions and investment appraisal 
capabilities, are matured compared to many countries, particularly, in the 
Central Asia. These institutions, private investors from Pakistan, trading 
companies and Islamic banks have the potential to work together for the export 
of contractual investments from Pakistan to many developing countries. 
Most hedging activities are facilitated in the stock exchange and future 
markets by options and derivative trading. Pakistan has yet to develop these 
markets but from the technical, professional, institutional and shariah point of 
view, we researchers have to face the blame of ineptness towards the lack of 
und 
' 
erstanding of these contemporary institutions and take the challenge to 
develop the Islamic conceptual framework in this regard. 
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Chapter 8 
TOWARDS A CONTRACTUAL MODEL 
OF PROFIT-LOS S-S HARI NG 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
We noticed in chapter two that the theory of the PLS assumes 
availability of full and equal information about actual profits to depositors, 
banks and entrepreneurs. Given this information each group asks for a 
minimum p/s ratio acceptable to it. As the central mechanism underlying the 
PLS system is the p/s ratio rather than the rate of profit, the model does ignore 
the possibility of losses. The existence or non-existence of an expected 
positive rate of profits (a positive NPV investment opportunity) determines the 
existence or non-existence of a PLS contract. On an ax ante basis, the PLS 
contract exists, because the expected profits of the underlying projects are not 
only positive but are also superior compared to competing opportunities. Thus 
there is only one possibility to start with a PLS project, i. e., a positive NPV 
investment opportunity. This consideration is so central to the model that 
Siddiqi explicitly emphasizes the point that banks as prudential institutions will 
almost ensure positive profits. 
For defining the p/s ratio the assumption of a positive rate of profit is 
needed. However, as for the case of the PLS as an alternative to the interest 
mechanism is concerned, there are practical difficulties inherent in the PLS 
itself, which we discussed in previous chapters of this work. The objective of 
the present chapter is to recapitulate these inherent limitations of the PLS. The 
chapter also aims at summarizing and formalizing the proposed reform in the 
PLS mechanism. 
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8.2 A BASIC LIMITATION OF THE P. L. S. MODEL 
The PLS is based on the concept of Islamic financial contracts, 
particularly, the MM. The MM are firm level arrangements. However, the PLS 
model derived from the MM contracts does not emphasize the firm level 
behavioral considerations. The model instead is more suitable to deal with the 
closed economy macro-monetary system. A monetary model does not require 
to be based on behavioral considerations. Therefore, most criticisms of the 
PLS are launched from the contractual and behavioral premises. 
In the previous chapters we argued for changes in the PLS from a 
number of aspects. Fundamentally, the PLS should mold to meet the 
requirements of firms rather than asking them to confirm to its given structure. 
The most crucial implication of this consideration is in the area of ownership 
structure of firms. Considerations related to ownership structures are equally 
relevant within a firm in a closed or open economy and between foreign and 
local parties in an open economy context. 
We reported that at least two studies, namely, Ahmad (1990) for Sudan 
(which is a capital scarce economy) and al Haýar and Presley (1996) for Saudi 
Arabia (which is a capital rich economy) found that firms do not like to use the 
MM arrangements. The brief explanations in both the two cases is related to 
considerations for ownership structures. The two researchers asked their 
respondents: "Do you prefer the MM modes of finance? " We argued that the 
MM are more than modes of finance; these are in fact forms of enterprises. So 
strictly speaking, the implication of the question asked is, "If you need finance, 
will you prefer to change the ownership structure of your sole proprietorship 
enterprise and become a partnership in case of musharakah, or close your 
business and work as an agent in case of mudharabah? n 
The central issue is therefore that, in the PLS, the availability of finance 
is conditional to the change in the firm's longer-run ownership structure. From 
the firm's perspective, this is a crucial behavioral consideration Mich the PLS 
model totally disregards. 
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8.2.1 A Proposed Reform in the PLS 
The PLS can be re-structured and vitalized by incorporating the ignored 
behavioral consideration. By disregarding this consideration, the PLS has 
confronted the typical principal-agent problem, In a principal-agent 
relationship, the allegiance of the agent to the contract depends on whether 
cooperation or non-cooperation is more financially rewarding. If non- 
cooperation is rewarding, the agent will behave dishonestly. Consequently, the 
efficiency of an enterprise characterized by a principal-agent relationship 
largely depends on the implicit or explicit incentive mechanisms underlying the 
contracts. 
We take up mudharabah as a pure financial contiract based on sharing - 
a contract in which the financier owns the project but the entrepreneur 
manages it and the outcome is shared by the two and the entrepreneur 
controls all the information related to the operational results of the enterprise. 
The entrepreneur could have an incentive to report the enterprise as inefficient 
and keep for himself a larger proportion of the project's outcomel. In a cross- 
country scenario the problem will be aggravated by many other considerations. 
Thus, from the perspective of the principal, efficiency of the enterprise is also 
restricted to the reporting by the agent in addition to its actual operational 
performance. 
Some researchers argue that, for two reasons the above situation vAll 
not adse in an Islamic economy. Firstly, Muslims believe in the eternal concept 
of life, in which honesty is rewardable and dishonesty punishable. This is a 
non-material incentive for people to be honest. Secondly, if all financial 
operations are based on sharing (and a continuing rather than one time 
relationship is developed, between financiers and entrepreneurs), honest 
entrepreneurs will force dishonest entrepreneurs out of the market. So there is 
also a financial incentive for being honest2. 
IKhan(1983b). 
2Ba_, hir (1990). 
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Strengthening Incentive Systems 
The behavior of the entrepreneur could be checked by the principal by 
monitoring which could become too costly to be feasible. The other way to 
counter dishonest agent behavior is to design contracts in which honesty rather 
than dishonesty is rewarding. 
Both the financial and non-financial incentives for cooperative and 
honest behavior mentioned above are implicit in the general framework of the 
Islamic economy. These are not contract specific. Therefore, by introducing 
I- certain contract specific incentive mechanisms, cooperative and honest rather 
than non cooperative and dishonest behavior can be made more rewarding. 
But the incorporation of incentive systems in contracts is often difficult. 
However, one strong incentive for cooperative behavior, which could also be 
feasible to incorporate in the sharing contract, is the transfer of ownership of 
the project to the agent within a known time period. By linking the transfer of 
ownership with the declaration of profits, the agent can be prompted to declare 
higher profits. 
To put the affect of this incentive mechanism on efficiency into sharp 
focus, two PLS contracts can be compared. In the first case, the principal 
perpetually holds the ownership of the projects as under the MM. In the second 
case, the contract ensures that the ownership of the project will be transferred 
to the agent after co mpletion of certain payment. It is obvious that in the latter 
case, to complete the payment and get ownership, a rational entrepreneur will 
not only report honestly but would also work harder. This is not the situation in 
the previous case. Thus, it could be suggested that incorporation of the 
provision of sale of investment in the PLS contract may offer a very strong 
incentive for cooperative and honest behavior and incorporate efficiency 
elements in the PLS. 
338 
Incentives in Mark-up vis-A-vis Sharing 
In international investments as soon as a sale element is incorporated in 
the sharing contract, the principal-agent positions are reversed. As the supply 
of finance, technology, and R&D intensive services is made on the order of the 
domestic public or private parties, these parties assume the role of the 
principal. Whereas the supplier, being working on their behalf acts as an agent. 
In such a situation, the incentive structure underlying a particular 
contract will depend on the relative importance of the pricing and sharing 
elements. If the pricing element is overwhelming (i. e., if a pure deferred sale is 
adopted), the supplier may be prompted to maximize his profit by saving on 
qual ity; sub - standard equipment and methods may be supplied. But the 
observation of the behavior of some multinational companies suggests that in 
order to expand sales and control markets, these companies sell high quality 
resources at a low profit margin. Nevertheless, generally speaking, the risk of 
receiving low quality of resources will be high if the importing country is less 
developed and the objective of the transaction is the import of technology as in 
offsets, turnkey projects etc. 
To the extent that the pricing mechanism is replaceable by the sharing 
mechanism, an incentive system can be developed to promote the importation 
of highly quality resources. This is because, under the sharing arrangement, 
the agent will have an incentive to supply good quality of resources with which 
higher output can be generated and shared. 
The choice between a sharing and a pricing arrangement will depend on 
the objectives of the import policy. If transfer of technology is the main 
objective of the import of resources, then pricing arrangements will become 
inevitable. On the other hand if maximization of national output is the prime 
objective of the import policy, the sharing arrangement would become more 
relevant. 
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Transfer of technology and maximization of national output may not be 
conflicting objectives. However, the quantity of output to be produced by the 
imported resources* can be verified in a relatively short period of time. 
Whereas, the quality of the imported technology can only be verified in the 
longer run. 
Therefore, it may be appropriate for many developing countries to 
postpone their emotional considerations for technology transfer to the future 
and design contracts with foreigners for the maximization of present revenues. 
Once the resource-base of these countries is developed by increased 
productivity and as a result reasonable R&D expenditures are forthcoming, 
they can also be in a position to evaluate the technological component of the 
import of foreign resources. This implies that, for some time, some developing 
countries should give priority to pursue acquisition of projects on the basis of 
profit or output sharing instead of pure installment purchase. 
Accordingly, an agreement will be reached by a host and foreign party 
for establishment of a joint venture project in the host country according to the 
specifications of the host. The host party will gradually and systematically 
purchase the ownership share of the foreign party out of his shares in the 
profits or output of the project. As national resources will not be permanently 
owned by foreign investors, this will alleviate the sentimental rhetoric against 
foreign control and its adverse effects on the investment climate. 
Incentivd Structures in Gross and Net Income Sharing 
Output and profit sharing arrangements could be interchangeable and 
can be alternatively utilized in different circumstances. In this regard, some 
points about the suitability of output sharing are worth mentioning. 
First, in the process of international resource transfer, due to the 
dominance of sovereign influence on the part of the principal, especial risks are 
confronted by the foreign investors. The most important of these are the 
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transfer risks e. g., changes in economic conditions and policies adverse to 
foreign exchange earning and payment of profit services. 
In many cases, these risks can be managed better by adopting an 
output rather than profit sharing strategy. For example, in profit sharing, profits 
are calculated in the local currency and then the foreigner's share is remitted in 
foreign exchange. During the period of production, sale and profit remittances, 
exchange rate and exchange control policies may become adverse to the 
foreign investors. Output sharing is resistant to such risks as currency 
conversion process can be avoided. 
Second, the general perception is that the incentive mechanism of profit 
sharing makes it more efficient therefore, preferable compared to output 
sharing3. However, this may not always be the case. 
In Table 8(a) different cost scenarios have been presented facing four 
foreign projects A, B, C, & D. These projects are established on order of the 
host country which is their ultimate owner. Therefore, the host country 
assumes the role of the principal. However, since the foreign suppliers of these 
projects work on order, they play an entrepreneurial role. 
Table 8 (a): Efficiency Considerations in Net and Gross Income Sharing 
Entrepreneurs Gross 
Income 
Variable 
Cost 
Net 
Income 
Share of Principal 
in Gross Income % 
Share of Principal 
in Net Income % 
A 100 0 100 50 50 
B 100 5 95 50 52 
C 100 10 90 50 55 =D 100 15 
- 
85 L 8 
Assuming that the gross income (output) sharing ratio between the 
foreign investors in the four projects and the principal (i. e., the host country) is 
50: 50. The hypothetical data of Table 8(a) shows that investors in all the four 
projects, irrespective of cost structures of their respective firms, pay equal 
proportion of gross income as shares to the principal. But as a percentage of 
net income (profit), the inefficient agents pay more shares compared to the 
efficient agents. Since, for the determination of the enterprise's profitability, net 
31-essard and Williamson (1985) p 64. 
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income is more relevant, the incentive structure underlying gross income 
sharing crystallizes the cost of inefficiency. Therefore, profit maximizing agents 
will see the indication that gross income sharing actually works as a tax on 
inefficiency. 
Third, in output sharing compared to profit sharing limited variables need 
to be monitored, therefore, monitoring the cost would be much easier and 
Finally, since the shares of the project in question in a particular time will 
be sold at the prices prevailing then, efficient projects will fetch more sale 
revenues compared to inefficient projects. This fact would also work another 
important incentive factor for the foreign entrepreneur /investor to provide good 
quality of resources. 
8.2.2 A Model Of Redeemable Profit and Loss Sharing4 
We assume that the firm is interested in the acquisition of independent 
ownership. This assumption is reminiscent of the Islamic and nationalist 
sentiments in Muslim countries against foreign control as well as owner- 
managers' preferences as indicated in Ahmad (1990) and al Hajjar and Presley 
(1996). Moreover, it is conforming with the ethos of owner operated enterprises 
which seek funds for growth financing. It is also consistent with the reviving 
traditional theory of finance according to which firms prefer debt finance due to 
its redeeming nature and harmony with internal ownership. It is also compatible 
with the problem at hand: Firms desiring and being able of issuing equities will 
go ahead with the PLS. The problem is with the provision of that part of the 
needed funds for which Finns are not able or willing to issue equities or offer PLS 
contracts. 
We also assume that an entrepreneur unlike a typical manager prefers to 
invest his savings in the growth of his own enterprise rather than keeping these 
savings outside. If he keeps his savings outside, it means that those outside 
investment opportunities are superior to his enterprise and it will adversely 
4This subsection is adopted from Boulem and Khan (1995). 
342 
reflect on his om efficiency. However, in the initial stages of the enterprise, the 
entrepreneur prefers some risk-sha, ing arrangement as it spreads the risk. 
Therefore, the promotive role of an Islamic financial institution is essential due to 
an infant entrepreneur's attitude towards risk. Gradual acquisition of ownership is 
expected to improve entrepreneurial risk profile. Redeemable PLS encourages 
entrepreneurial initiatives and ensures a systematic process for their promotion. 
We assume that a redeemable PLS enterprise starts operation Wth a 
capital contribution by the entrepreneur equal to an amount B, and a capital 
contribution by the financier equal to an amount K. Compared to KB is a small 
amount. Hence, K can be re-written as K NB; N being a real number. 
Consequently, the project needs B+ K= B+ NB (1 + N)B amount of capital in each 
period. 
With respect to profits and re-invested profits, we consider two cases. The 
first case represents a hypothetical case of a project Mich yields a constant 
stream of periodically (yearly) calculated profits. In the second case the profit 
yields are assumed to be different in different reporting periods. 
Constant Stream Of Profits 
We assume that the project yields profits equal to P, for all periods. In 
period ti, the entrepreneur's share in profits vvould be 
Sh, P' I'and 
N+ I 
Similarly, if the joint nature of the enterprise is contractually agreed for 6 
years, the share of the entrepreneur in profits in period tr, can be written as 
Sh6= P' fl+5-- p' +lo +]0 N+] (N+1)B (N+Ify 2(N+lf (NI-]fB1 (N+Iyy 
P) 
+ 
PI 
15 
N+J B(N + 1) 
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Given this pattern, we can deduce that at period j, the share of the 
entrepreneur will be 
shj 
PI [I + pi ij-1 
N+l (7V + I)B (1) 
We assume that the share of the entrepreneur in total profits is entirely 
re-invested in the project for buying-out the ownership shares of the financier. If 
we donate by C,. 1 the entrepreneurs capital contribution in period j., and sh,.,, the 
entrepreneur's re-invested profit-share in that same period, the entrepreneurs 
total capital contribution in period C, can be written as follows: 
Cj = Cj., + sh,., 
Similarly, Cj., " -2 +sh, 'ý 
Ci 
-2 
(2) 
and so on. Hence, equation(2) can be rewritten to take the following 
form. 
n-I 
Cl + 1, sh. j 
j-1 
(3) 
where C, = B. Equation (3) shows that the entrepreneur's capital contribution to 
the project in period n can be expressed in terms of his previous shares. 
As the share of the entrepreneur in total profits increases and that of the 
financier decreases every year, due to the change in fractional share in 
ownership, the relationship between the profit P, and the period j is important. 
For the project to belong to the entrepreneur in period j, the necessary condition 
is that his profit-share should be equal to the total profits of the project. In other 
word, we must have the following equality in period j. 
P, 
+ 
P, 
N+l B(N+I) 
P, 
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Mich leads to 
NI 
(J-J) Log (14 pI )= Log (N + 1) 
B(N+I) 
j_J 
Log (N+I) 
Log /I+ Pi 
B (N4- 1 
Equation (4) shows that time needed for the entrepreneur to take over the 
project under redeemable PLS and under the profit conditions cited above is 
inversely related to the amount of profit yield. In other words, as P, increases the 
time needed for the project to pass under the ownership of the entrepreneur 
decreases. In addition, computing the derivative of equation (4) Wth respect to P1, 
we get 
d(J-1) - Log (N+I) 
dp, Log[] +A12 B(N-1) 
I 
p, + B(N+I) 
(5) 
Equation (5) is negative which shows the inverse relationship between the 
time period j and the profit Pi. As P, increases, the time period needed for the 
entrepreneur to take over the project decreases less than proportionately. 
Over time, the contribution of the entrepreneur increases, Mich of course, 
induces him to increase his effort level and increasing his productivity and 
consequently increasing the profits. This is so because the entrepreneur is taking 
more risk by investing by retention more and more from one period to another. 
This increase in profit as a result of the increase in productivity through the 
increase in entrepreneur-ship will have a positive effect in reducing the length of 
time j as shown by equations (4) and (5). As P, increases as a result of an 
increase in productivity, the denominate of the right hand side of equation 
(4) 
345 
(4) increases and hence the right hand side of equation (4) decreases, that is 
decreases. 
Depending on the motivation for acquisition of ownership, the 
entrepreneur is expected to improve his effort level, minimize the non-pecuniary 
expenditures (e. g., on expensive office furniture, attractive secretarial staff, 
Concord travels etc. ), even report the project over efficient, improve his savings 
and may even seek to mobilize finance from other sources for quickly 
completing payments and getting ownership. Thus, it can be expected that the 
incentive for ownership will work as a deterrent against moral problems. 
With the passage of time, the financier's capital contribution to the project 
diminishes so that the entrepreneur becomes the sole proprietor of the project 
with respect to the specific financier. As discussed in chapter six, the 
entrepreneur may have similar redeemable PLS relationship with other 
financiers too. 
As the financier's ownership of the project decreases, its cash flow 
improves because, the bank does not only share in profits but also recovers its 
principal capital in somewhat an amortizing form. With recovery of its initial 
capital contribution and its own share of profits, the bank can start a new project 
with another entrepreneur. The financier therefore, becomes a source of 
generating new projects and a promoter of new entrepreneurs. Subject to 
conditions of equation (6), the financier's share in projects can be maintained 
until the entrepreneurs become self-supporting and be able to enter into 
competition. 
P, = B(N+])[(N+I) 
1 
j-1 
(6) 
Equation (6) shows the relationship between the profit P, and the period 
needed for the entrepreneur to take over the project entirely according to the 
principle of redeemable PLS and under the conditions cited above. 
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Different Streams Of Profits 
In this case, we assume that the profit yield in each period is different, 
i. e., P, P, ... Pj are different. The entrepreneurs capital contribution in period 
depends on his initial contribution (B) to which he adds a part of his profits-share 
of the previous period. In other words, we assume the following relationship 
between his total capital contribution in period j and his profit-share in period j.,. 
Cj =B+ shj-l (7) 
Following this pattern, we can compute the capital contribution and the 
profit- share of the entrepreneur in each period. 
In period 1: C, =B sh, 
In period 2: c2 =B+ 
P1 
N+l 
pi 
N+l 
sh2 
P2 
+ 
PI P2 
_ N+j B(N +1 )2 
In period 3: 
ppP, p P2 Ap p2p 
C3 =B+ 
2+ 
Sit, =I++3 etc. N+ I B(Al+ If N+ I B(AT+ If9 (N+ If 
Following this pattern, we can deduce the following formula for the 
entrepreneur's profit-share in period 
IlPk 
shj 
pj + pj - pj. l ++ k-I N+l B(7V + 1)2 (N+I)j Bj 
(8) 
Equation (8) can also be rewritten as: 
j. 1 
j. ] ri Pj, ]-., 
shi I 
n-k (9) 
k-I (N + 1)* B 
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where S and P denote, respectively, the sum and product signs. 
It is worth noticing that the entrepreneur does not reinvest all his previous 
capital contribution in the current period. For instance, in period 2, his 
contribution was B+-P' ; and his profit-share was equal to 
P2 + P, P2 N+1 N+I B(N+1)2 
the new capital contribution in period 3 is equal to his profit-share in period 2 
plus the amount B. Hence, the difference from his second period contribution 
P' will be left to him to use it either for his own consumption, saving or to N+I 
start another project etc. 
As we can notice, it is difficult to get from equation (9) an exact formula 
that could help us know the length of time needed for the entrepreneur to take 
over the project. Given this difficulty, we assume that the profits yield in all 
periods are equal to P, ". From equation (9) the profit share of the entrepreneur 
in period j becomes equal to: 
shi =A (i +A+ 
All 
-+ 
P11.1 
17: 7) N+l B(N+ 1) (N+lf B7 (N+1)'"' 
I-[-P, 
shj 
PI B (N + 1) 
N+I PI 
B (N + 1) 
Given the initial capital contributions of the financier and of the 
entrepreneur and the expected profit P, which is assumed to be the same from 
period one to period j-1; equation (10) gives us the ability to compute the profit 
share of the entrepreneur in period j. A necessary condition for the entrepreneur 
to own the project at 100% at the end of period j, is that his percentage profit 
share 
shj must equal to one. Hence, from equation (10), we get 
PI 
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I-[- A 
shy B (N -f 1) 
B (N + 1) 
Mich implies 
P) 
-Ii B(N- 1) 
- AT+ I pi 
B(N -, 1) 
Simple algebraic manipulations lead to 
Log ( pf - N) 
PI Log - B (N + 1) 
(11) 
, Equation (11) gives the length of time needed for the entrepreneur to get 
over the project. The length of time j depends on three factors, a) the capital 
contribution of the financier, b) the capital contribution of the entrepreneur and c) 
the expected profit in each period assumed to be the same across periods. 
8.3 SOME IMPLICATIONS: RECAPITULATED 
The present Model of redeemable PLS uses the p/s ratio but introduces a 
number of important changes to the original model. 
First, the present model is a firm level contractual model thus much closer 
to the premises of the MM contracts compared to the original PLS model where 
monetary implications have eclipsed contractual considerations. Since the 
present model is also based on a p1s ratio, the monetary implications of the model 
can be interpreted as in the original model. But two limitations of the p/s ratio must 
be mentioned as for using it as a monetary mechanism is concerned: a) Given the 
level of reliance on the mark-up by the Islamic banks, the p/s ratio 
349 
does not remain as viable a monetary mechanism as it was envisioned in the 
original model which perceived the Islamic economy as 100% PLS-based and 
b) in our model of the PLS, the p1s ratio is more a micro-economic phenomenon 
as it is individuated compared to the original model. However, we consider that 
the mark-up mechanism is more suitable instrumental variable as it can be more 
effectively controlled by the monetary authorities compared to the p/s ratio. 
Second, our model introduces an important change in the PLS. As we 
interpreted the MM as forms of enterprises rather than as modes of financing, 
the redeemable PLS can serve as a financing mechanism within the framework 
of an MM enterprise. This conclusion is consistent with the introduction of two 
types of redeemable instruments by the modaraba companies in Pakistan. 
Funds are redeemed by a systematic and gradual withdrawal of the principal 
amount by the financier. This characteristic of the proposed PLS model takes it 
closer to the redeeming characteristic of mark-up based funds or even 
conventional debt finance. Due to its redeemable characteristics, finance will 
remain neutral to the longer-run ownership structure of the firm. This is most 
significant change in view of the ownership sensitivities between the financier 
and owner or between host and foreign parties of a firm. 
Third, the present model allows the entrepreneur to retain and re-invest 
his share in profits to the extent of 100% internal ownership. We are aware 
that 100% internal ownership is an extreme case. However, this is only 
representative of a situation of such funds for which the firm is not ready to 
offer permanent ownership. Indeed, we intend to supplement rather than 
replace the permanent PLS funds. Our allowance for retention and re- 
investment of profits by the entrepreneur is expected to introduce efficiency in 
the firm. As the entrepreneur has the opportunity to re-invest in the firm, his 
decision to invest outside will signal the superiority of the outside investment 
opportunities. Thus, the entrepreneur is forced to invest in the firm managed 
by him. As his stake in the firm increases, he will have the incentive to work 
harder. 
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Fourth, the financiers' promotive role is enhanced in our model. In the 
original PLS model, once a contract is signed, the financier takes permanent 
stake in the firm unless it finds another buyer. In the present case, the 
financier systematically gets out from maturing projects and takes up stakes in 
infant projects. Thus the financier shares the risks of infant and gives up 
ownership stakes of projects which mature and become familiar with risk and 
acquire assets by re-investing their profits. Such a promotive role by the 
financial institutions is highly needed in the developing countries. 
Finally, the proposed arrangement combines the prime merits of mark- 
up and PLS. The merit of the mark-up is that it facilitates the acquisition of 
assets. The prime merit of the PLS is that it links financiers' interests with the 
outcome of projects, thus introduces efficiency. The proposed redeemable 
PLS facilitates acquisition of assets i. e., renders the functions of mark-up, but 
through the PLS mechanism. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Chapter 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
The emergence and rise of Islamic banking and finance is an important 
academic as well as practical development of our time. The driving force 
behind the Islamic banking and finance movement is the prohibition of riba and 
permission of bai' (trade) by God in the Holly Qur'an. The Holly Qur'an is the 
fundamental source of Islamic legislation. 
' The theory of Islamic finance evolved on the basis of the PLS which is 
the underlying principle of two participatory Islamic financial contracts, viz., the 
MM. However, the practice of Islamic financial institutions does not conform to 
the theory and overwhelmingly relies on the mark-up. The PLS is in striking 
contrast to the interest mechanism, but the mark-up is not. Yet, it is noticeable 
that the operations of Islamic financial institutions concentrate on installment 
sale which is based on the mark-up mechanism. 
The Islamic banks seem to be satisfied with this situation, but Islamic 
economists and shariah scholars have shown interest in understanding the 
causes of this phenomenonl. This is a useful academic exercise as it relates to 
the understanding of Islamic bank's operations, the development of the 
discipline of Islamic finance and the evolution of an Islamic financial system. An 
attempt is made in the present research to offer some explanations about the 
dichotomy in the theory and practice of Islamic banking and its implications for 
the future of Islamic banking and finance. 
lin a recent seminar on Problems of Islamicl Banks, organized by IRTI-IDB and the Fiqh 
Academy of the OIC, held in Jeddah during April 1993, Islamic economists and Islamic bankers 
presented papers on the theme of the seminar. It is interesting to note that Islamic economists, 
namely Siddiqi (1993) and al Qari (1993a) concentrated on the problems confronted in the 
application of the PILS modes. Whereas, on the contrary, the papers representing the position 
of Islamic banks ignored this issue and concentrated on the problems related to mark-up based 
operations. 
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9.1 CONCLUSIONS 
In chapters two and three we discussed respectively, the evolution and 
economics of the PLS and mark-up. As for evolution of the theory of Islamic 
banking is concerned, our analysis suggests that it is based on an economic 
interpretation of the difference between riba (interest) and bai' (trade). As 
conventional banking is based on interest which is characterized to be a fixed 
return on finance, its economic alternative must be strikingly different. The 
PLS-mechanism was thus offered as a distinct theoretical alternative to the 
interest-mechanism. The initial models of the PLS largely concentrated on the 
replacement of the interest-based macro (financial) system with an Islamic 
alternative. Thus the resultant models emerged to be macro-monetary models. 
Critics quickly attacked at the gaps in the basic model with respect to the micro 
behavioral considerations. 
On the other hand, we conclude that the practice of Islamic banking is 
based on the legal interpretation of the difference between riba and bai. The 
Islamic law allows a higher rate of return in consideration for time in deferred 
trading. The mark-up is thus found to be a convenient alternative to the 
interest-mechanism in the operations of the Islamic banks. As the banking 
industry is based on risk aversion, to minimize risk, the mark-up has undergone 
substantial refinements. In many deferred trading operations the risk of 
ownership for the bank is completely eliminated. This also eliminates the 
financial and economic distinction between mark-up and interest. However, as 
the laws supersede economic theory, in the operations of the Islamic financial 
institutions the mark-up will continue to dominate the PLS. The mark-up is 
more than a mode of finance - it is a mechanism. As the interest mechanism is 
implicit in all conventional financial transactions, the mark-up has the same 
enchoring potential. It underlies all the deferred sale transactions and even the 
p/s ratio to a certain extent has to make reference to the mark-up. 
In chapter four we tried to provide some alternative explanations for the 
subdued nature of the PLS and robust presence of the mark-up in the 
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operations of the Islamic banks. The existing research works concentrate on 
the role of Islamic banks in promoting the mark-up (or not promoting the PLS). 
In this chapter we looked at both demand (user of funds) and supply (bank) 
side considerations in understanding the subdued nature of the PLS in Islamic 
financing. 
On the demand side, as the PLS spreads the risks of investment 
projects, it should have been very popular in the developing countries as the 
nascent entrepreneurial class can benefit from the risk spreading 
characteristics of the PLS. We argued that for taping this potential benefit of 
the PLS, Islamic financial institutions need to follow entrepreneurial promotion 
activities such as undertaking new projects through the PLS modes. At the 
present, such policies are not common among the Islamic banks. Thus the 
potential demand for the PLS does not become effective. On the other hand, 
the Islamic banks prefer to deal with more mature companies. These 
companies are expected to have enough experience with the phenomenon of 
risk. Thus the risk spreading characteristics of the PLS are not as attractive for 
them as for the infant firms. Moreover, these companies are able to save and 
prefer to invest these savings in their own expansion. In such a situation, they 
depend less on external sources for long-term funds. Thus their demand for the 
PLS is expected to be weaker compared to the mark-up. 
In addition, the demand for a particular form of financial contract must 
also depend on the nature of that contract. Three characteristics of the PLS 
make it lesser attractive: i) the provision for the entrepreneur to re-invest his 
savings in the project is not clearly defined in the PLS contract, ii) the 
entrepreneur cannot become the sole owner of the project under the PLS and 
iii) there is no provision in the PLS contract to conveniently raise additional 
funds. It is certain that by overcoming these limitations the PLS contract could 
be made more attractive for firms. 
Moreover, as the Islamic banks are overwhelmingly using the mark-up 
mode, it naturally implies that the demand for financing is for the acquisition of 
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assets. Due to the size of the public sector, as well as credit facilities provided 
by the multinational corporations for financing re-sale trade, most of the asset 
acquisition through the mark-up is expected to be for end-use purposes. In 
such case, the PLS is not relevant. 
On the supply side, if the PLS is beneficial for entrepreneurial 
development, why the Islamic banks do not undertake promotion policies? 
Promotion policies will require the banks to undertake new projects. The banks 
hesitate to involve in new projects due to the risk of adverse selection and 
longer-term involvement in projects. Moreover, despite the beneficial 
characteristics of the PLS for the economy, it seams that not much work has 
been done to promote the basic principles of the PLS. The advocates of the 
PLS contracts are pre-occupied with the application of the historically defined 
mudharabah and musharakah contracts. Little efforts have been so far made to 
design such PLS contracts which can suit the incentive and efficiency 
requirements of the contemporary diverse production processes. These 
production processes partly involve smaller enterprises and partly large, and 
even multinational enterprises. The financing needs of these enterprises are 
expected to be different. Similarly, the Islamic banks seam to have been 
trapped in the "conventional banking culture", which has its own traditions, 
conventions, terminologies, notion of risk-return trade-off etc. 
Although the deposits of Islamic banks are raised on the basis of the 
PLS, yet these deposits are not traded in the market. Therefore, the evaluation 
of the market performance of the PLS through the experience of Islamic banks 
is not possible. But evaluation of market performance of the PLS is important, 
for, if the PLS has to survive, it must reward risk. Moreover, the PLS must 
compete in a market where sophisticated interest-based financial instruments 
exist side by side. 
, 
To evaluate the market performance of the PLS, in chapter five we 
analyzed the achievements of the Pakistani Modaraba Companies. The 
emergence and market significance of the modaraba companies can be cited 
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as an important outcome of the efforts made at the Islamization of the 
Pakistani economy. This experience is of general relevance for expanding the 
contemporary practice of Islamic financing particularly, in the non-banking 
financial sector. The IVICos., with initial success have however, confronted 
some problems in growing, gaining value and improving the wealth of 
investors. In terms of a number of indicators, e. g., market valuation ratio and 
risk adjusted return, at the present, their performance in general, is found to be 
bellow the KSE average. An analysis of this phenomenon is useful in 
understanding and alleviating the problems confronted by the IVICos. Chapter 
five dealt with these considerations and identified several reasons for the low 
performance of the PLS. Some of the reasons discussed in the chapter are 
critically recapitulated in the following: 
It can be suggested that an over reliance on the stock markets is the 
origin of most problems confronted by t he MCos. There has been no example 
of an unlisted Modaraba. Compared to this, most conventional companies, as 
well as I-Cos., start business as unlisted companies and get listed after 
attaining certain level of operational maturity. An infant MCo., exposed to stiff 
market competition with matured companies cannot be expected to be in a 
competitive position. 
The ease in listing conditions has caused a premature over-spread of 
the-Modaraba sector. The capital requirements for establishing a MCo., is very 
low; Rs. 5 to 7 million paid-up capital compared to Rs. 100 million for the LCos. 
So, instead of establishing one LCo, with the same capital, 20 MCos., can be 
establishedl However, it must be noted that an average size of a MCo., is 
larger than a LCo., but, some MCos., are really small. 
From investors' perspective, the numerical over-growth of MCos., 
resemble them with the collapsed cooperative and finance companies. As a 
matter of fact, the performance of MCos., has sharply declined after the 
collapse of the cooperative and the investment activities of some other 
companies (notably, the Taj Company) which were somehow linked to Islamic 
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sentiments. This unwarranted fear on the part of the public has however, 
motivated the CLA, Registrar MCos., and the SBP to increase their regulatory 
activities. 
Initially, th6 Modaraba business was encouraged by the government 
through fiscal incentives. Companies paying 90% of profits in dividends were 
exempted from the payment of corporate income tax (it shall be re-called that 
the remaining 10% of the profits is the fee of the manager of the Modaraba). 
This implies that the tax encouraged dividend distribution at the expense of 
retention and re-investment. There are strong theoretical arguments backed by 
empirical research that retention and re-investment of profits has a positive 
implication for the future growth and acquisition of value (capital gains) by the 
firm. This argument may not be complete. But, in view of the lack of acquisition 
of value by the IVICos., further exploration of the argument and designing 
conscious dividend policies seams to be in the interest of the IVICos. 
This crucial point may be clarified further with the help of an example. 
True, profit retention is not a feature of the traditional mudharabah. Probably, 
for this reason, the law doeq not encourage Mos., to retain and re-invest 
profits. Since retention and re-investment of profits enhances the growth of a 
firm and its value over time, Mos., not retaining any fraction of the profits, 
practically do not pursue any forceful growth strategy. This is certainly 
reflected in the depressed prices of the MCs. 
Compared to this, we can consider a firm whose dividends are taxed 
and capital gains are not. Such a firm would have an incentive to maximize its 
retention for growth financing which would enhance its value and capital gains. 
In the longer-run perspective, the race would likely be won by the firm which 
retains and re-invests. If the firm faces cash flow problems, like most MCos., 
retention becomes even more urging. Certainly, there are economic arguments 
for and against dividend payments. These arguments, all relate to the decision 
on the degree of dividends vis-A-vis retention. There is no case to my notice, 
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where an economic argument may have been made for zero retention, 
particularly, by a firm facing cash flow problems. 
The initial tax incentive was withdrawn by the government brining the 
IVICos., at par with other non-banking financial institutions. The government 
instead, introduced a tax incentive to encourage the leasing sector. 
Accordingly, 30% of rental expenses are made eligible for corporate income 
tax deductions. This naturally left the expectations of those MCos., which were 
established under the old tax structure unfulfilled. It is observed that some 
companies, which were not having any genuine interest in the modaraba 
business, but were only benefiting from the tax shield for raising cheaper 
Funds for their ongoing businesses had to adjust themselves. This sent an 
adverse signal to the investors and contributed to the weakening of demand for 
IVICS. 
MCos., are short of liquidity. They have to build a reserve with the SBP. 
They do not have recourse to any long-term credit lines and do not have any 
source to raise short-term funds. MCs., are the only source of their funds. 
Thus, the Mos., rely only on rights issues for resource mobilization and pay 
stock bonuses to save cash. Rights issues and stock bonuses, both put a 
downward pressure on the price of MCs., by simply increasing the number of 
MCs., in circulation. In addition, if the investor is in need of cash, neither rights 
issues nor stock bonuses can meet his requirements. The long-term 
consequences of this is the fall in trading reflected in the MVR and prices of the 
Mcs. 
Compared to the MCos., I-Cos., and investment banks are in a 
comparative advantage as far resource mobilization is concerned as these can 
utilize all forms of conventional instruments. Thus MCos., are under 
tremendous pressure as for the availability of Funds are concerned. The most 
serious problem confronted by the MCos., is the mobilization of diversified 
forms of Funds suitable for different uses, particularly, growth financing. No 
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single financial instrument can bring the facility for MCos., at par with the 
financing facilities available to conventional companies and the leasing sector. 
Nevertheless, a common characteristic of all possible instruments would 
be redeemability as compared to the non-redeemability of the IVICos. In this 
regard, recently the religious board has approved two different arrangements, 
namely, redeemable musharakah certificates for using in the local market and 
redeemable income certificates for dealing with the international investors 
particularly, the International Finance Corporation. These facilities will no doubt 
improve the cash flow of the companies, but these are in no sense comparable 
to the sophisticated facilities available to other competing sectors. 
Our analysis has pointed out the relative vulnerability of MCos., vis-A-vis 
competing sectors such as LCos., and investment banks in the KSE. The 
reality that Islamic financial institutions will have to show their viability in a 
mixed environment competing with interest-based financial institutions need to 
be accepted. No single country, a single market or a single sector can survive 
in isolation from the rest of the world and the global market and other sectors of 
the economy. It therefore implies that the MCos., and similar other Islamic 
financial institutions must be equipped with appropriate financial instruments to 
confront, rather than escape the phenomenon of "globalization of financial 
markets". Ideological compromises on the acceptability of interest is not 
possible. Given this premises, it need to be kept in sight that there are over 30 
interest-based financial instruments available, e. g., to the LCos. None of these 
are available to the MCos., - the MCos., have so far relied on one instrument 
only, the MCs!. 
Even the MCs., cannot be considered superior assets compared to 
common and preference stocks of the more matured companies of the KSE. 
The MCs., simultaneously resemble common and preference shares. These 
are similar to common stocks as far entitlement to return is concerned, but 
similar to preference shares as the owners cannot interfere in the management 
of the company - MC-holders do not have voting rights. In this form, MCs., are 
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inferior assets compared to common stocks, as MC., owners unlike owners of 
, common stock do not have any control on the company's management. MCs., 
, are inferior assets compared to preference shares due to the fact that 
preference share holders have preference over common share holders in 
entitlement to return. So, if investors have to decide between MCs., and 
common stocks or preference shares of conventional companies, both of the 
latter two will be preferred. 
It can be argued that preference shares would be eliminated from the list 
of investment opportunities for Islamic reasons. Similarly, common stock of 
companies which do not observe the shariah fully, e. g., which have interest in 
their capital structure are also eliminated from the list of Islamic investment 
opportunities. These are important considerations to strengthen the demand 
for MCs. But it should also be noted that despite these considerations, 
common stock of many conventional companies are close substitute to the 
MCs. Moreover, in order to gain value, the MCs., have to attract a wide 
spectrum of investors which may not necessarily be conscious of the Islamic 
requirements. Such investors will simply look at the fact that by investing in the 
MCs., they will forego their voting rights without any benefits of the preference 
sharesl 
The Most important implication of our analysis is therefore, to evolve 
interest-free substitutes to the several instruments available in the market 
including common and preference stocks. The introduction of Musharakah 
Certificates by some MCos, is a step in the right direction. Musharakah 
certificates will be at par with common stock in the sense that these will also 
entitle the owners to direct the management by using their voting rights. The 
result of this instrument is yet to be seen. The willingness of the lFC to deal 
with the MCos., with Musharakah Certificates instead of MCs., is a clear 
indi'Cation of the superiority of the new instrument. 
If the function of the conventional common stock is taken over by the 
Musharakah certificates, the function of preference shares will naturally be left 
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over for the MCs. But to be at par with the preference shares, the MCs., must 
be competitive in terms of return. The immediate concern is therefore, how to 
compensate the MC., owners for foregoing the voting rights which they can 
enjoy by investing in Musharakah certificates or common stocks of other 
companies? In other words, why should investors invest in MCs., if they can 
enjoy voting and control rights by investing in Musharakah certificates and 
common stock? Unless, there is financial rationale from the investor's 
perspective, in the final analysis, MCs., will be considered inferior assets 
compared to Musharakah certificates; ultimately, MCs., will vanish and only 
Musharakah certificates will prevail. Given this trend the MCos., must be 
relieved from the crippling limitations of a solitary instrument, be it a 
Mudharabah or Musharakah Certificate. 
It may be argued that not all investors are in a position and interested to 
participate in management by voting, e. g., the owner of Funds of the traditional 
mudharabah. We should however, keep three considerations in view: a) 
technology has made voting feasible for every investor; by using electronic 
mail, by the so-called process of "cybercasting", voting rights can always be 
utilized, b) it is not necessary that each voter should vote; the possibility that 
each voter may vote works as a control mechanism on the management and c) 
most institutional investors, e. g., the IFC mentioned above prefer to have a say 
in the management of the MCos. Therefore, the issue at hand is not of 
introducing one more instrument. The challenge in fact is related to the 
evolution of a comprehensive system of shariah-based financial instruments. 
Regarding the evolution of a comprehensive system of Islamic financial 
instruments, it is essential to understand the functions of the conventional 
instruments available, e. g., in the KSE, and how these functions can be taken 
over by different Islamic instruments. Most of these instruments have evolved 
over a period of time. Therefore, we can expect the evolution of alternative 
Islamic instruments over a period of time too. 
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Many efforts are underway to overcome the difficulties of shari'ah 
observing institutions related to the availability of financial instruments for 
resource mobilization. Some good ideas relate to securitization of leasing2, 
and installment sale which if approved by the shari'ah scholars may offer 
permissible', yet secured return to investors; some form of equity-debt hybrids 
("dequities"), which if accepted by shari'ah scholars may offer alternative to 
preferred stocks3. Moreover, redeemable Islamic instruments are needed to 
take over the redeemability function of debt instruments. Financial instruments 
which can be redeemed without violating the shariah requirements are 
urgently needed by the MCos., to improve their cash flow and enable them to 
compete in the market. 
The availability of various types of instruments will enable the MCos., to 
design appropriate financing as well as dividend strategies. Within the 
framework of prohibition of riba, the Mos., should be independent to design 
these strategies, particularly, when they have to compete with firms which have 
the relative if not absolute freedom to do so. 
Our analysis suggests that there is a need for the enlargement of the 
base of PLS financial instruments to provide temporary equity to the Islamic 
companies as all needs for funds cannot be met by the permanent equity. The 
abolition of interest has increased the importance of such funds for the MCos., 
to bring the financial facilities available to these companies closer to those of 
their conventional competitors. One such proposed instrument is the Islamic 
warrants related to the mark-up based debts. 
The preceding analysis indicates that the more cherished PLS principle 
of Islamic financing is neither much popular nor much efficient in practice. 
Given the environment, we suggested that the causes of this phenomenon 
must be searched for within the PLS arrangement. With this objective, in 
chapter six we looked more closely at the PLS focusing on some firm level 
2 See, for example, Kahf, (1995). 
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considerations. This analysis also incorporates the constraint added by the OIC 
Fiqh Academy Resolution which bans participation in the capital of such 
companies which carry interest-based funds in their capital structure. The 
implication of this resolution, which is specifically related to the activities of the 
Islamic banks is generalized in this chapter. It is argued that in reality the 
resolution is not restrictive. Because, there must be hundreds of thousands of 
enterprises in the Muslim world which may not have interest-based funds in 
their capital structure. Many of these enterprises must be looking for funds in 
conformity with the shariah requirements. But due to their preference for 
strong internal ownership, these enterprises may be in difficulty to compromise 
with the ownership structure underlying mudharabah and musharakah 
arrangements. In addition, the emergence of mudharabah companies, for 
instance in Pakistan, can be cited as an example where capital participation in 
the framework of the resolution must be possible. By imposing the restriction, 
the Academy has in fact patronized the evolution and development of interest 
free enterprises. 
Given this framework, the chapter suggested that the problem of capital 
participation in enterprises is in fact a problem of devising a comprehensive 
Islamic financing mechanism -a mechanism which can provide financial 
accommodation in the form of money, but simultaneously remain neutral to the 
longer-run ownership structure of the enterprise. Redeemability of profit and 
loss sharing Islamic financial instruments meet these requirements. Subject to 
the profitability -of the enterprise, a redeemable instrument will facilitate the 
repayment of the principal amount of finance in installments and profits as 
agreed on pro rata basis. Thus, finance will remain neutral to the ownership 
structure of the enterprise in the longer-run. 
In this manner, Islamic banks as well as individual savers will be able to 
participate even in the capital of the hundreds and thousands of sole 
proprietorship enterprises. Once a comprehensive Islamic financing 
3 See, for example, Khan (1995). 
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mechanism is provided, the infant enterprises are expected to have a proper 
environment to avoid interest while financing their growth. On the other hand, 
in the absence of such a mechanism, generally only such enterprises would 
grow comparatively more which are indifferent to the form of finance. Once 
grown in such a manner it would always be relatively difficult for them to 
change their capital structure to conform to the elimination of interest. 
Enterprises opting to operate in an Islamic financial environment can 
mobilize resources by offering participation in their over-all portfolio. Often such 
financing arrangements lead to non-financial considerations such as control of 
ownership. Resource mobilization requirements of the closely hold enterprises 
and some non-depository Islamic financial institutions are unique as these 
cannot compromise on the control of ownership. The present chapter argued 
that such conflicts between resource mobilization requirements and control of 
ownership can however, be overcome by issuing redeemable profit and loss 
sharing financial instruments. Various aspects of this proposal are discussed in 
the chapter. 
Financial Islamization by a country in isolation of the rest of the world 
economies may not be feasible as most Muslim countries rely heavily on 
external financial resources. A good example of such countries is Pakistan. As 
a nation, Pakistan aspires for replacing interest-based financing with non- 
interest alternatives. This aspiration was incorporated in 1973 in the existing 
constitution. The lack of success of the experience of financial Islamization in 
Pakistan can partly be explained by the continuation of external resource 
mobilization on the basis of interest even during the peak days of Islamization. 
Indebted developing countries including Pakistan have largely realized 
that they need to reduce their reliance on interest-based borrowing. In case of 
Pakistan this is reflected in an attempt to drastically cut the budget deficit. In 
addition, privatization is also consistent with a debt reduction strategy. Thus the 
prospects of replacing interest-based external resource mobilization with some 
interest free alternatives are significant. 
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In chapter seven we analyzed the potential of mark-up and PLS In 
providing Pakistan a viable alternative to interest for external resource 
mobilization. We particularly highlighted the potential of istisna' types of 
arrangements. In this regard, two points need to be recapitulated. First, there Is 
a 'criticism that the interest-free alternatives of resource mobilization will 
increase foreign control of national resources. This is inconsistent with public 
sentiments and to some extent with the popular political rhetoric. As such the 
investment climate for the interest-free alternatives will remain unfavorable 
making such alternatives inefficient. 
We argued that such a criticism is not always correct as most modern 
variants of istisna', transfer ownership of projects to local parties. In addition, 
participation with redemption is possible which will not tie-up foreign investors 
with local projects indefinitely. In fact, the existence of an exit window for 
foreign investors offered by a declining participation will enhance the 
investment climate. 
Second, for the immediate success of the interest-free alternatives it is 
essential to use standard known names instead of introducing names which 
are unfamiliar to international investors. Meanwhile, the Islamic concepts need 
to be properly popularized. This point is of particular relevance in the modern 
application of istisna'and output sharing for external resources mobilization as 
there are many known variants of these arrangements currently being used in 
the process of international resource transfer. 
The central concerns of any new strategy are its rationality, internal 
consistency and self-contentment. The rationality of the new strategy to rely 
more on interest-free alternatives are derived from the economic need and 
ideological commitment to reduce the cost of riba on the economy. The 
strategy is internally consistent, because, resorting to riba-based contracting Is 
not inevitable for the mobilization of external resources. The proposed strategy 
must also be self-contented. 
366 
The two fundamental features of the strategy are: a) it will be based on 
deferred sale and sharing and b) even the arrangements based on sharing will 
be fundamentally non-permanent and redeeming in nature to alleviate the fears 
of foreign control of national resources and consequently to improve the 
investment climate. 
The various modern variants of istisna' will be dominant in an Islamic 
strategy for external resource mobilization. It was also explored that some of 
the modern variants of istisna' may be based on profit or output sharing. For 
instance, Pakistan will order a foreign party for the construction of an energy 
project with specifications and may offer the foreign party to select a revenue 
sharing arrangement or a deferred price. This is not well fitted in the traditional 
definition of the istisna, but considerable flexibility is needed in designing 
comprehensive alternatives to the interest mechanism. For the same reason, 
Pakistan should also offer the foreign party a mechanism through which the 
party can systematically find an exit in case it chooses the revenue sharing 
arrangement. As revenue sharing will enhance efficiency by tying-up the 
foreign party's interests in the project, such an arrangement must be in the 
interest of Pakistan as well. 
Whichever, course of action (pricing or sharing) is accepted, there would 
always remain the need for secondary finance. The alternative strategy must 
not scum to interest-mechanism by ignoring the inevitable need for such a 
finance. In this. regard it need to be recapitulated that Islamic warrants must 
supplement istisnaand sharing. 
Chapter eight analytically recapitulates the central points of the 
research - in order to increase the prospects of profit sharing in Islamic finance 
the PLS need to carry the redeemable characteristics of mark-up or debt 
finance. This arrangement also has positive incentive implications and is 
expected to enhance efficiency. 
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It need to be emphasized that the mark-up and PLS have their own 
merits and demerits. The merit of the mark-up is that it transfers ownership to 
those who need it. The PLS cannot play this role. On the other hand, the merit 
of the PLS is that it ties-up financiers' interests with projects which is not 
possible with the mark-up. Thus in both arrangements some conflicts between 
the interest of users and suppliers of funds is natural and at the same time 
each one has inherent potential to minimize the sources of these conflicts, It 
therefore, implies that, by combining certain qualities of the PLS and mark-up 
new PLS contracts can be designed which can harmonize the interests of 
users and suppliers of funds. 
Moreover, a provision for profit retention by the entrepreneur in the PLS 
contract will enhance the entrepreneurial incentives as we discussed in the 
context of the moral hazard proposition. Entrepreneurs must have the option to 
invest their savings in the projects they manage. In the presence of this option, 
if they are investing their savings in other avenues, this will send strong signals 
that those other avenues are superior investment opportunities compared to 
the project managed by the entrepreneurs. Thus an automatic discipline will be 
established in the market for funds, enhancing efficiency. If banks have an 
interest in better cash flows a PLS contract which allows for profit retention will 
replace banks' funds by internal financing overtime, improving cash flows, 
project financing and promotion capabilities of banks. Simultaneously, the 
considerations of enterprises for balancing internal and external ownership are 
tend to be fulfilled. 
9.2 IMPLICATIONS 
Our analysis in this research raises a number of interesting policy 
implications. It may be useful to discuss some of these in brief. 
First, the present use of PLS and mark-up are disproportionate. There is 
a need to increase the use of the PLS principle. However, a word of warning is 
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in order, The demand for the mark-up is a segmented demand and is effected 
for the acquisition of assets either for end-use or for re-sale purposes. If the 
funds of the Islamic banks are diverted to PLS operations away from the asset 
market, the demand for the acquisition of assets will have no other option, but 
to resort to interest-based sources! Thus, given the nature of demand and the 
available funds, the mark-up mode of financing has a highly useful function to 
render. As the top economic priority of a Muslim society is the avoidance of 
interest, the first policy implication of our analysis is that without changing the 
nature of demand for funds, the existing funds of Islamic banks should not be 
diverted away from the mark-up. To re-emphasize this point an example can 
be given. Suppose the institutional requirements and parameters are such that 
the PLS is overwhelmingly used. Eve. n in such an environment, if a company 
needs credit to replace an equipment, or a household requires credit to buy a 
car, the mark-up remains to be a convenient Islamic substitute to interest. 
Second, the most crucial question of our analysis is: Should changing 
the nature of demand for Islamic bank's funds be targeted as a policy objective 
to promote the PLS? The apparent answer is yes. A large source of the 
demand for funds which has a bias for the mark-up namely, public debt is a 
target of macro-economic structural policies in many countries. For instance, 
the FY1996 budget of Pakistan aims at reducing public deficit to 4% of GNP 
from 7.9% in FY1993. Such policies, if implemented faithfully coupled with a 
transparent privatization program will improve the horizon for the PLS 
financing. Such- austerity measures at individual levels can also be called for by 
invoking the religious injunction against israf (wasteful expenditures) -a big 
source of leakage of funds to weaken the demand for the PLS. 
Apart from these considerations, our analysis implies that an attempt to 
change the nature of demand for funds from mark-up (which strengthens 
internal ownership) to PLS (which strengthens external ownership) cannot be 
rationalized in general. The aspiration of entrepreneurs to strengthen their 
internal ownership by profit retention is not only a legitimate one but is also 
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efficient. Moreover, consider the preferences of sole proprietors for funds. 
These enterprises have their licit right for sole ownership, but simultaneously 
the financial system should meet their need for funds. Unless, the external 
funds are redeeming, the demand for PLS implies a sacrifice of ownership for 
getting funds. Even if justifications are made, it is hard to rationalize an 
economy wide imposition of a financial contract against the rightful preferences 
of the entrepreneurs for sole ownership. Thus another important implication of 
our analysis: If the PLS has to improve its liking among enterprises, it should 
also be redeeming in nature in addition to being permanent and perpetual. 
Third, since a resolution of the OIC Fiqh Academy prohibits participation 
in the capital of leveraged enterprises, it may be taken as an encouragement to 
perpetuate the very limited use of the PLS by the Islamic banks. Our analysis 
suggests that such an implication would be unjustified, as there may be 
hundreds of thousands of sole proprietorship enterprises which are not 
leveraged and which need Islamic forms of funds for growth. Capital 
participation in such small enterprises also is consistent with the philosophy of 
the Islamic finance movement. 
Fourth, some issues are raised related to the need of profit retention and 
rate of return on equity for the growth of the firm. Implications of retention, self 
financing and ROE for growth are ignored matters in the literature on Islamic 
finance. Since Islamic finance basically concerns the avoidance of Interest, the 
arguments raised in the research seek conscious policies to enhance retention 
and self financing by enterprises. For Islamic enterprises this strategy could 
work as a shield against interest. A mode of finance which allows retention will 
also enhance entrepreneurial incentives and efficiency. 
Fifth, Islamic enterprises which purchase and lease or sell equipments 
can substantially enhance their cash flows by resorting to installment purchase 
instead of their present practices of lump sum payments. In this way, they can 
enhance their ROE - thus, use their equity more efficiently. In the same 
context, to subordinate any installment purchase to the PLS, Islamic warrants 
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could be issued with convertibility options. These options coupled with the 
desire for installment purchase, can be Instrumental in mobilizing additional 
funds on the basis of capital participation. 
I. . 
Sixth, the redeeming PLS can be effectively used for the promotion of 
entrepreneurs and projects. Islamic banks can undertake projects with Infant 
entrepreneurs and gradually transfer their sole ownership to the entrepreneurs. 
Seventh, the study has several research implications, particularly In 
the field of Islamic corporate finance. Most proponents of the PLS have been 
caught between two opposing approaches; to argue for the superiority of the 
PLS within the framework of the Miller-Modigliani propositions (see, e. g., 
Uthman 1994). According to the MM framework, the nature of finance is 
irrelevant for the efficiency of the firm. This broadly implies that there is a 
dichotomy between the real and financial sectors of the economy. Whereas, 
most works dealing with the PLS (see, e. g., Siddiqi 1983,1983b and Chapra 
1985) strongly argue that the PLS has favorable implications for the real sector 
of the economy. Thus, there is a need to review the Miller-Modigliani 
framework for analyzing the problems of Islamic financing. This will have 
implications for the debate on capital structure of the firm within the framework 
of Islamic financing. As suggested above, many Islamic enterprises can 
improve their present cash flows (thus efficiency) by resorting to for instance, 
installment purchase and at the same time offer capital participation. These 
and related policy considerations particularly, various options to subordinate 
the sale-based finance to the PLS constitute potential research areas. 
Moreover, the subject of growth, self financing, retention of profits, 
consequences of the ROE, the empirical dimension of the subject, all need In- 
depth studies using probably the data from stock markets of the Muslim 
countries. 
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